Negotiation Partners Research Articles

THE ALTERNATIVE NEGOTIATOR AS THE INVISIBLE THIRD AT THE TABLE: THE IMPACT OF POTENCY INFORMATION

This study explores the impact of person information about an alternative negotiator in dyadic negotiation in which one of two individuals is able to exit the negotiation to further negotiate with the alternative party. Individualistic negotiators were expected to be influenced more by information about the alternative party's strength than prosocial negotiators. Forty‐nine dyads were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (Potency of the Alternative Negotiator: Low vs. High) by 2 (One's Own Motivational Orientation: Individualistic vs. Prosocial) factorial design. Face‐to‐face interactions were audiotaped and transcribed In line with our expectation, individualistically orientated negotiators engaged in problem solving to a lesser extent and communicated more threats and putdowns when the alternative party was perceived as weak and submissive rather than strong and dominant. Within negotiation dyads power asymmetry evoked power struggle. Eventually, however, negotiators with an alternative party outperformed parties lacking an alternative. As expected, prosocially orientated negotiators were less influenced by both the mere presence of an alternative negotiation partner and potency information about the alternative party. Implications and directions for further research are discussed.

Information management in negotiations: The conditions under which it could be expected that the negotiation partners substitute a competitive definition of the situation for a cooperative one

The purpose of the paper is to investigate under which conditions it can be expected that the negotiation partners substitute a competitive definition of the situation for a cooperative one. A general model for information management in negotiation situations has been developed. Several research propositions focusing on the transformation form a win-lose context to a win-win context are presented. The conditions which the purpose of the paper focus on are summarized in a revised model for information management in negotiation situations.

Threats, Bluffs, and Disclaimers in Negotiations

In a buyer-seller simulation within two negotiation periods, we examined the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of variations in the communication of threats. Specifically, we examined the consequences of receiving no threat or a threat stated with, versus without, a disclaimer. In addition, we examined changes in subjects′ evaluations of their partner and negotiation outcomes after some were led to believe their partner had stated a false threat (a "bluff"). As expected, we found that while negotiators who used threats were perceived as more powerful, they were also perceived as less cooperative and achieved less integrative agreements than those who did not use threats. In addition, when information (allegedly from a constituent) identified the threat as a bluff, we found that the disclaimer lessened the negativity of re-evaluations of the negotiation partner. Taken together, our findings suggest that current theory regarding the effect of threats and bluffs in negotiation needs to be qualified by how these tactics are stated. Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.

War and peace in Israeli politics: Labor Party positions on national security

Disagreements over national security issues, primarily between Likud and Labour (the two major political forces in Israel), have gradually become the central topic of dispute in Israeli politics. Likewise, the distinction between the political left and right increasingly concerns questions of national security, rather than other clevages in Israeli society. The author investigates the Labour Party's positions on national security in the 1980s and into the summer of 1990, thus shedding light on the broader issues of Israel's politics. Beginning with a discussion of the hawk vs. dove schism within the party, he goes on to discuss party leaders' perceptions of threat with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict - perceptions that have constituted, to a large extent, the basis for positions on national security matters. Succeeding chapters focus on the party debate over the appropriate partner in peace negotiations and the increased willingness to accept the Palestinians in this role, the likely shape of the party's proposals for interim and permanent peace agreements, and the attitudes of Laborites toward the use of force. In a final chapter, the author attempts to explain the leftward move of the Labour Party, especially intriguing in the context of the apparent shift of the electorate toward greater hawkishness.

Labor and the Government: A Comparative Historical Perspective

This article compares the development of the workers' right to organize and bargain collectively in England, France, and the U.S. Starting with a common repressive policy, each country followed a different path toward establishing the workers' rights. The main ultimate difference lies in the extent to which the state became involved in industrial relations. In England the state remained aloof after securing very broad legal rights of collective action. The workers were left to do their own battling. In France the state came to look upon collective agreements as an aspect of public policy and became the dominant partner in labor negotiations. The American pattern lies in between: state protection extends to procedural but not to substantive issues.