Negative Liberty Research Articles

The University As Infrastructure of Becoming: Re-Activating Academic Freedom Through Humility in Times of Radical Uncertainty

ABSTRACT Traditionally, the field of science and technology studies (STS) considered the scientific laboratory as the central site of knowledge production and technological development. While providing rich analyses of the social construction of scientific knowledge and the role of non-human actors, STS scholars have often neglected the university – the very context in which laboratories themselves are embedded – as a relevant object of research. In this paper, we argue for re-introducing the university as a relevant category and object of analysis by using the notion of epistemic virtues to link epistemic culture – traditionally the focus of STS – and epistemic structure – traditionally the focus of higher education studies. Advancing this line of argumentation, we make three analytical moves. First, we explore academic freedom as a specific version of negative liberty that extends beyond disciplinary boundaries. We suggest that academics continuously negotiate academic freedom considering culturally and socially situated epistemic virtues such as objectivity and neutrality. Second, we introduce the notion of humility to revisit scientific knowledge production more generally and academic freedom in particular. Finally, we argue that practicing humility leads to enacting the university as an infrastructure of becoming otherwise, thereby enriching our understanding of universities as distinct and highly complex social spaces with a logic of their own.

Isaiah Berlin and Feminism: Liberty and Value Pluralism

Isaiah Berlin’s account of freedom is more useful for feminists than is generally recognized, especially when seen in the context of his value pluralism. Focusing on the work of Nancy Hirschmann and Sharon Krause, I argue, first, that Berlin’s concept of negative liberty can be used to resist patriarchy when his notion of the ‘conditions’ of negative liberty is taken into account. Second, positive liberty is also useful to feminists, but Berlin does not, as some feminist (and other) writers suppose, simply reject positive liberty; on the contrary, he sees it as a fundamental human value of great importance. Third, Berlin’s value pluralism makes a crucial contribution. It explains why he distinguishes negative liberty from its conditions and why he does not reject positive liberty as a value. It also explains how feminists can see the value in both negative and positive liberty without trying, paradoxically, to fit them both into a single concept. Further, my liberal-pluralist extension of Berlin’s pluralism locates all these insights within a complex but coherent political outlook which provides a sympathetic resource for feminism.

The Balance between "Negative Liberty" and "Positive Liberty"

John Stuart Mill, a prominent figure in classical liberalism, inherits the emphasis on individual spirit from earlier liberals such as Locke. He expanded this notion to include social liberty on the basis of political liberty, deepening the public understanding of individual freedom. To some extent, Mill's recognition of negative liberty and human diversity also corrects the classical political philosophy's singular and universal natural purpose. Moreover, his proposal of positive standards and purposes, based on negative liberty, not only complements and corrects classical liberalism but also offers solutions to the problems arising from neoliberalism in the contemporary world.

Discrimination, freedom of expression and two concepts of liberty: Assessing European legislation criminalizing hate speech

AbstractHate speech has been linked to categorization, stereotyping and discrimination challenges. Moreover, it presents an intersection of criminal law, criminology, philosophy of law and psychology. The authors analyse discrimination and freedom of expression in the legal framework of the European Union and in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. They apply Berlin's two concepts of liberty, namely positive and negative liberty, to research the nature of European jurisprudence and the selected legislative frameworks. The choice between conceptions of essential moral and political values, such as positive and negative liberty, has an enduring meaning. It is a part of the human being and our thoughts and feelings about our identity. Such a choice may be why questions about the most appropriate regulation of the crime under consideration have a special place in the public discourse.

Educational Autonomy and the Holocaust: A Comparative Study of Teachers’ Freedom in European Narratives

ABSTRACT While Holocaust memory underscores the significance of freedom, the actual enactment of freedom varies across different countries, posing a vital question for educating about the Holocaust. How do educators navigate this dissonance? Do they serve as conduits for government perspectives, or do they exercise their teacher autonomy? As part of a comparative study examining shifts in Holocaust memory in Europe from 2020 to 2022, my colleagues and I conducted in-depth interviews with 75 Holocaust educators from Poland, Hungary, Germany, and England, inviting them to share their life stories and professional experiences. This article delves into a recurring theme found within these educators’ narratives: the appreciation of freedom and choice. To interpret the significance of this theme, I integrate educational theories on ‘difficult history’ and teacher autonomy with theories of psychological reactance and the freedom quotient (FQ). I draw on Isaiah Berlin's concepts of negative and positive liberty to bridge the personal and societal dimensions. The resulting model provides a framework for the study's findings. As expected, teachers from Poland and Hungary felt their negative liberty was constrained, while those from Germany and England reported a greater degree of autonomy. More surprisingly, limited negative liberty led many interviewees from Poland and Hungary to find powerful ways to express their inner freedom. These included resistance to authority, activism within and beyond the classroom, and the application of diverse and creative pedagogical approaches in EaH. The interviews also pointed to a connection between higher levels of negative liberty in Germany and England, and a plurality of content and goals in EaH within these countries. In light of these findings, I offer policy and educational recommendations.

No Such Thing as Free Speech? Performativity, Free Speech, and Academic Freedom in the UK

AbstractThe relationship between academic freedom and freedom of speech features prominently in public and political discussions concerning the role of universities in Western liberal democracies. Recently, these debates have attracted increased attention, owing in part to media framing of a ‘free speech crisis’, especially in UK and US universities. One type of response is to regulate academic expression through legislation, such as the UK’s 2023 Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act. This article offers a critical analysis of the assumptions concerning the performativity of speech in this kind of legal intervention. It extends Judith Butler’s discussion of the concept of ‘harmful speech’ as reported by Butler (Excitable speech: a politics of the performative, Routledge Classics, London, 1997) to conceptualize speech-acts as performative not only when it comes to populations, but also when it comes to institutions. Reconceptualizing universities as producing as well as being constituted by speech-acts, the article argues that the effects of free speech legislation need to be considered in the context of the transformation of universities and other political actors (including governments and student unions) in the second half of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. It argues that legal enforcement of free speech at universities further obscures the distinction between negative and positive liberties identified by Isaiah Berlin (Two Concepts of Liberty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958), and considers this shift as part of the reconfiguration of political ontology in late modernity.

Positive Liberty, Negative Liberty, and Marketing Regulations: A Holistic Analysis

Marketing regulations are warranted when unfettered marketing practices compromise many people's positive and negative liberties. We elucidate these liberties’ multifaceted but interdependent connotations for societally justified marketing regulations from a novel framework integrating the social sciences, philosophy, history, and marketing. The limitations of unbalanced or less represented market or government regulation notwithstanding, overcoming marketing imbalances and enhancing personal and societal liberties via pluralistic, well-designed, enforceable, and multilateral regulations can advance a pluralistic democracy's diverse market-related interests. By informing companies and consumers about societally responsible liberties, well-regulated marketing can spur common goods creation.

The Void Ab Initio Theory in Comparative Perspective: J Marshall, H Kelsen, and Beyond

Abstract The void ab initio theory is traditionally associated with the retroactive effect of the unconstitutionality of a statute, in diffused systems of judicial review; as opposed to the prospective effect of unconstitutionality, in Austria, the archetype of centralized judicial review. The paper argues that the void ab initio theory goes far beyond the time-factor of judicial review, having two complementary aspects: 1) The void ab initio theory is tied to a robust theory of negative liberty; and substantive criminal law is its privileged field of application. The void ab initio theory goes back to Marbury v Madison (1803). 2) The void ab initio theory was strongly criticized by Kelsen, whose criticism is accurate, when the theory is unduly extended to the unconstitutionality of laws curtailing positive rights of the welfare state, eg, salaries and pensions, as happened recently in Greece. The act which abolishes the unconstitutional statute retroactively, has ‘the character of a legislative act.’ Indeed, the void ab initio theory in the field of positive social rights encroaches on legislative competence. The paper cocludes that the void ab initio theory is a strong expression of the ethos of legality; The void ab initio is most adequate for (cases involving) legal sanctions, on legal grounds, over adjudicative facts.

Rethinking Liberalism, Spirito-Constitutional Morality: A Case Of Multitudinal Vulnerability Of Women In Pakistan

The domain of liberal political theory has aptly dealt the question of liberty in its negative and positive formulations. However, the vulnerability to violence cannot merely be reduced to the concept of negative liberty as ‘absence of restrain or opportunity’. Moreover, the multitudinal vulnerability of women in Pakistan to violence cannot be merely understood within the framework of Liberalism specially Berlin’s two concepts of freedom. The status of women in Pakistan is very complex due to historical, religious, cultural, social, economic, and political influences. 
 (Bhattacharya 2020) “The practices such as ‘dowry deaths, honour killings, acid attacks, exchanging women in marriage with no consideration for their consent, forced marriages, forced religious conversions’ etc. are rampant.” (1)
 On the other hand, educational disparities due to cultural norms and economic constraints in rural areas, wage disparities, unequal job opportunities, under-representation in decision making bodies stand additional forms of violence against women of Pakistan. In short, women in Pakistan are not only deprived of both negative and positive liberties but vulnerable to all sorts of violence that requires rethinking of the theoretical frame of freedom and liberty in the discipline of political theory. This paper endeavours to explore conceptual and theoretical analysis of freedom through multiple sites of vulnerability of women in Pakistan. The historical and comparative political theory is the methodological framework of this paper.

Neoliberal pathways to the bioeconomy: Forest land use institutions in Chile, Finland, and Laos

Global capitalism has changed the Earth system to the extent that the current epoch is called the Anthropocene. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), land use change has played a crucial role in this profound functional shift in the Earth system. The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and its follow-up processes have insisted the same regarding the persisting decline in biodiversity. To shed light on the institutional aspects of land use change and the transformation towards the bioeconomy, we focus on three countries – Chile, Finland, and Laos, showing (i) how these historically very different societies have designed their land use institutions in recent decades, and (ii) what kind of bioeconomy and biosociety these institutional changes seem to presuppose. Our study's timespan is about fifty years, and the analysis is based on our ongoing research in the countries and the content analysis of legal and policy documents in them. These countries obviously differ regarding their basic constitutional and institutional structure and purposes in land use policy processes. We illuminate similarities and differences in authoritative and authorised transactions and discuss, from the perspective of classical institutional theory, how the state and property are entangled in power, how nature is not understood as a common good and public property, and how the negative liberty and economic conception of democracy is prevalent.

Populism: A Berlinian Critique

How would Isaiah Berlin assess the current wave of authoritarian populism? The question is worth asking both for the light it casts on populism and for what it tells us about Berlin. In several respects, his view of populism is ambivalent: he is surprisingly sympathetic to the Russian populists of the nineteenth century, sharing their concern for genuine democracy and their reservations about elite leadership; he is especially troubled by the possibility of rule by scientific experts, although he does not reject elite judgement entirely; and his assessment of successful political judgement is not as clearly opposed to the kind of charismatic leadership favoured by many populists (for example, the leadership of Donald Trump) as one might expect. It is only in his treatment of individual liberty and value pluralism that Berlin provides anti-populists with more emphatic arguments, especially when his value pluralism is developed as “liberal pluralism.” Overall, the application of Berlin’s ideas to populism highlights some of his familiar themes but also shows how his work can be extended in interesting ways. In particular, his sympathy with the Russian populists suggests that he is more of a democrat than is often assumed, and the application to populism of his famous thesis about the dangers of positive liberty can be extended to negative liberty too.

Ljudska sloboda i moralna predrasuda

This paper discusses the problem of “moral prejudice” in a democratic society. Moral prejudice is presented as an integral part of the moral norm that is contained in the “social contract” of every nation, which equally implies both written laws and customs of the people. The new, “liberal” moral system, which advocates freedom as the fulfillment of the maximum of human possibilities, and includes as praiseworthy things that the traditional system rejected, is not devoid of prejudice. On the contrary, it comes with a new “prejudice” according to which all traditional morality should be discarded, with extreme condemnation, as oppressive. New moral norms, which did not exist as such in laws and customs, are often imposed by judicial interpretations of key rights and freedoms of citizens. Very often these judicial interpretations rest on the very antipodes of traditional morality and prevailing popular sentiment, so that they come as a fundamental opposition to the “social contract” based on the consent of the people through past, present and future generations. These efforts to impose a new moral system on everyone, regardless of their will, are essentially paternalistic and violent. The true task of a free society is to create pluralism in which different groups will have their right to their own moral system, and in which a new prejudice will not arise under the guise of a universal measure of good human life, which ignores diversity in human experience and worldviews. Keywords: positive liberty, negative liberty, social contract, moral prejudice, sexual morality.

Immigration and the Economic Freedom of Natives

Abstract Much of the debate over the justice of immigration restrictions focuses on their impact on would-be migrants. Restrictionists often focus on potentially harmful effects of immigration on residents of receiving countries. This article cuts across this long-standing debate by outlining ways in which immigration restrictions inflict harm on natives, specifically by undermining their economic liberty. It covers both the libertarian “negative” view of economic freedom and the “positive” version advanced by left-liberals. Section 1 focuses on “negative” economic freedom. It shows that migration restrictions massively restrict the negative economic liberty of natives. Section 2 takes up “positive” theories of economic freedom; here, too, there are massive effects. Finally, section 3 describes how to address potentially harmful side effects of migration that might undermine economic liberty.

Liberalism and the problem of domination

We can distinguish two liberal paradigms that stand in opposition to each other. Liberalism as non-domination seeks to eliminate identities resulting from domination and oppression and hindering the emancipation of individuals. Liberalism as recognition holds that ‘the idea of a human world without identities makes no sense’ (Appiah) and considers identities to have their source in individual liberty and to provide the grounds for pluralism. The two liberal paradigms come to largely different results regarding the role of the state and civil society. The paradigm of non-domination tends to enforce individual rights, if necessary against a hostile cultural and religious context. The paradigm of recognition defends mostly individual liberties, if necessary at the expense of certain individual rights. Liberalism stands here in front of a major dilemma: Either it protects individual rights in the sense of freedom as non-domination, or it defends individual liberties in Isaiah Berlin's tradition of negative liberty– in too many cases and in too many parts of the world, liberalism, understood in the terms presented here, cannot have it both ways. This review article argues that the liberal paradigms of non-domination and recognition are complementary; liberalism is about both recognition and non-domination. Following policy recommendation can be drawn: (1) Democratic institutions (parliament, political parties and constitutional courts) and democratic rights (right to vote, right of assembly and freedom of speech) are most efficient in fighting domination. (2) Although social identities are not fixed and open to change, they cannot be engineered by the state or civil society organizations and grow out of some form of social consensus. (3) The consensus around identities takes place within the pluralist public and civil sphere of a community. (4) While the support in the development of individual capabilities by the state is effective against domination, also history and collective memory help to overcome the traumatic experience of domination. (5) Systemic transformation requires the support from below, notably from the civil society, and is based on individual liberties.

Embedded agency: A critique of negative liberty and free markets

The concept of negative liberty as non-interference is operative in the concept of a free market and stipulates that market relations remain outside the purview of social control. As a purported self-regulating system, however, the market functions as a system of necessity that facilitates and rules social life. I argue that Isaiah Berlin’s defense of negative liberty leads to a paradox as it entails subjection to the external necessity of a self-regulating market. The argument for the self-defeating nature of negative liberty relies on two philosophical insights that have their roots in G. W. F. Hegel’s theory of self-determination. First, negative liberty fails to account for the inner and outer conditions of freedom and thus reduces to mere whim or arbitrariness, subject to heteronomous forces but masquerading as license. Second, individual freedom is intersubjectively mediated in its deliberative process and framed by social and political institutions in its exercise; thus, free agency must be theorized as embedded agency. I challenge the association of freedom and the market and the automatic and unchallenged implication of deregulation and freedom. Deregulation, rather, leaves the community’s future development to the whims of economic players using a rhetoric of freedom as both lure and principle.

Vast Personal Forces: Thucydides, Populism, and the Liberty of the Ancients

AbstractModern discussions of freedom focus on negative liberty or nondomination. In his portrait of the Athenian democracy, Thucydides thematizes the psychology of ancient freedom. By focusing on the psychology of the demos, Thucydides shows how democratic imperialism unfolds from the experience of freedom as a kind of felt power. His analysis offers us a way to think about contemporary populism. In representative democracy, the connection between power and freedom has been severed by representation and the modern state, but an experience of power nonetheless remains part of what we mean by freedom today. Modern citizens frequently feel powerless and so unfree, ensnared by impersonal forces. One lure of populism is that it satisfies the longing for freedom as a form of felt power, for a measure of control over one's life.

Pozitivno vs. negativno shvatanje slobode - političke implikacije

The subject of this paper is the analysis of the political implications of the distinction between positive and negative understanding of liberty. The author first explains the relevance of this topic within the framework of contemporary theoretical and political discussions. The starting point of this paper is Berlin's distinction between the concepts of positive and negative liberty. In the first part of the paper, the author will deal with the implications of this difference regarding the type of socio-political system and political culture. In this sense, the author will try showing the democratic concept of liberty is positive liberty, while the classical liberal understanding of liberty is negative. In other words, the relationship between positive and negative liberty reflects on the relationship between democracy and liberalism; this relationship implies possible compatibility, but also potential opposition. In the second part of the paper, the author deals with the implications of the difference between the two concepts of liberty concerning distinctive models of democracy. Referring to Riker's thesis, the author's goal is to show how a positive understanding of liberty leads to a populist model of democracy. On the other hand, a negative understanding leads to a liberal model. The difference between these models of democracy is also reflected in the attitude about whether democracy has instrumental or intrinsic value.

Romanticism, Skepticism, Liberalism: Reading Isaiah Berlin

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is neither to challenge nor to defend Isaiah Berlin’s thought but rather to identify the main influences on his concept of liberalism. Berlin’s justification for liberalism is distinctive in that it reflects influences of Romanticism and Augustinianism. Unlike some liberals, his liberalism does not reflect unambiguous confidence in the products of the Enlightenment. Berlin valued the freedom of expression and identity, yet he feared that these freedoms faced potential threats from both left and right. These considerations led Berlin to found his liberalism on the notion of limited government, as is reflected in his bias towards negative, rather than positive, liberty. Negative liberty implies restraint on the part of the state in order to limit anything that might act as an impediment to individual freedom. In contrast, positive liberty implies that the state may have to be active even to the point of imposing restrictions on individual freedom in order to ameliorate effective limits on liberty imposed as a consequence of societal inequities. Berlin is justly deemed to have been one of the great political theorists of the twentieth century. Few, even among his critics, would deny this, and even those who disagree with Berlin’s conclusions would acknowledge that his framing of the questions and his references to history have elevated and enriched the debate on liberalism.

HOW MUCH DOES NEGATIVE LIBERTY NEED POSITIVE LIBERTY IN ECONOMIC ISSUES?

In attempting to rectify the inequalities ensuing from the flaws of negative liberty, proponents of social justice turn to economic policies based on positive liberty. Unaware of the value provided by each of these notions of liberty, they neglect the tyrannical potential of positive liberty which results from its instrumental value. Promoting government intervention in the market and redistribution of resources as a means by which inequalities are to be redressed, allows for the concentration of power in one place, which renders individual freedom ineffective. This paper suggests that the promotion of social justice through positive liberation is damaging to individual freedom due to the government’s monopoly on regulating the social structure. Keywords: social justice; negative liberty; positive liberty; equality; paternalism; economic freedom

The Crisis of Democracy in Interwar Britain

AbstractThis article reconstructs and examines the idea that democracy (in various senses) was fragile or, as some had it, in ‘crisis’ in interwar Britain. Recent scholarship on interwar political culture has generally emphasized its democratic or ‘democratizing’ character, in line with a conventional historical view of Britain as an exception to the instability and contestation of democracy in Europe. It is argued here that Britain's embroilment in a European ‘crisis’ of democracy was a commonplace of contemporary political thought, commentary, and argument; and that anxieties surrounding this prompted some of the initiatives that are conventionally seen as evidence of ‘democratization’. A properly historical understanding of those initiatives, and of interwar political culture in general, therefore appears to require that contemporary ideas of the weakness or ‘crisis’ of democracy in Britain are taken seriously (but not necessarily endorsed). In conclusion, the article suggests that interwar discussions of democracy gave rise to a tendency to equate democracy with a form of negative liberty, which registered and facilitated influential developments in politics and political thought beyond the interwar period; and that historical understanding of democracy in modern Britain might be enriched through an engagement with the political theorist Sheldon Wolin's concept of ‘fugitive democracy’.