Negative Incentives Research Articles

The Modular Approach to Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Insolvency

The Modular Approach to Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Insolvency

A Study on the Reporting Intention of Medical Incidents: A Nursing Perspective.

Medical incidents threaten patients' lives and health, increase medical costs, and can lead to medical disputes. A high proportion of medical incidents are not reported. The aim of this study was to explore the factors influencing nurses' reporting of medical incidents. The cross-sectional survey design used a self-administered 47-item questionnaire to survey 835 nurses in three hospitals in Taiwan between January and December 2014. The intention among nurses to report medical incidents was high (3.86/5); nurses' intention to report medical incidents was positively correlated ( r = .34, p < .0001) with their attitude about reporting, awareness of reporting ( r = .37, p < .0001), and support from interested parties ( r = .12, p = .001), and was negatively correlated with positive incentives ( r = -.14, p < .0001) and negative incentives ( r = .29, p < .0001). Nurses' awareness and a supportive work environment affect nurses' willingness to voluntarily report medical incidents; hence, they are critical considerations as Taiwan moves toward systems of mandatory reporting.

Do Public Employees “Game” Performance Budgeting Systems? Evidence From the Program Assessment Rating Tool in Korea

We examine whether performance budgeting systems such as the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) induce public employees to engage in “gaming” behavior. We propose an algorithm for detecting gaming behavior that makes use of the discrete nature of the PART system in Korea (KPART) and the revealed patterns of the distribution of the KPART scores. By employing the test developed by McCrary, we find suspicious patterns in the density of the KPART scores and evidence points to the fact that manipulation is prevalent in the KPART system. Our analysis suggests that public employees are sensitive to negative incentives and that great care must be taken when designing performance budgeting systems.

Willing and able? A two-level theory on compliance with civil liberties in the EU

ABSTRACT Although human rights treaties offer neither positive nor negative incentives, a majority of EU member states fully comply with civil liberties. This article seeks to identify the conditions able to clarify this paradox. Current EU compliance research struggles to provide a comprehensive explanation since (a) there is a lack of studies on practical implementation and (b) it rarely takes into account policy-specificity. The author suggests that a two-level theory based on capability and willingness is a useful approach for analyzing practical implementation when complemented with policy-specific conditions. Using fuzzy-set analysis, the author confirms that capability, namely judicial capability, executive capability or democratic experience, and willingness, namely a solid system of checks and balances, a strong civil society and an active participation in international organizations, are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for compliance with civil liberties and thereby substantiates the usefulness of the explanatory framework for further research.

Effects of shifts in food reinforcement context on rats' consumption of concurrently available water or sucrose solution.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of signaled transitions from relatively rich to lean conditions of food reinforcement on drinking concurrently available water or sucrose-sweetened water in rats. Past research demonstrated that these negative incentive shifts produce behavioral disruption in the form of extended pausing on fixed-ratio schedules. Four male Long-Evans rats operated on a two-component multiple fixed-ratio fixed-ratio schedule. In one manipulation, the ratio was held constant and the components arranged either a large six-pellet reinforcer (rich) or small one-pellet reinforcer (lean). In a second manipulation, the components both produced a one-pellet reinforcer but differed in terms of the ratio requirement, with the rich and lean conditions corresponding to relatively small and large ratios. In both manipulations, components were pseudorandomly presented to arrange four transitions signaled by retractable levers: lean-to-lean, lean-to-rich, rich-to-rich, and rich-to-lean (the negative incentive shift). During experimental conditions, a bottle with lickometer was inserted in the chamber, providing concurrent access either to tap water or a 10% sucrose solution. The negative incentive shift produced considerably more drinking than the other transitions in all rats during both manipulations. The level of drinking was not polydipsic; rather, it appears that the negative incentive shift enhanced the value of concurrently available reinforcers relative to food reinforcement.

Distinct Roles of Opioid and Dopamine Systems in Lateral Hypothalamic Intracranial Self-Stimulation.

Background:Opioid and dopamine systems play crucial roles in reward. Similarities and differences in the neural mechanisms of reward that are mediated by these 2 systems have remained largely unknown. Thus, in the present study, we investigated the differences in reward function in both µ-opioid receptor knockout mice and dopamine transporter knockout mice, important molecules in the opioid and dopamine systems.Methods:Mice were implanted with electrodes into the right lateral hypothalamus (l hour). Mice were then trained to put their muzzle into the hole in the head-dipping chamber for intracranial electrical stimulation, and the influences of gene knockout were assessed.Results:Significant differences are observed between opioid and dopamine systems in reward function. µ-Opioid receptor knockout mice exhibited enhanced intracranial electrical stimulation, which induced dopamine release. They also exhibited greater motility under conditions of “despair” in both the tail suspension test and water wheel test. In contrast, dopamine transporter knockout mice maintained intracranial electrical stimulation responding even when more active efforts were required to obtain the reward.Conclusions:The absence of µ-opioid receptor or dopamine transporter did not lead to the absence of intracranial electrical stimulation responsiveness but rather differentially altered it. The present results in µ-opioid receptor knockout mice are consistent with the suppressive involvement of µ-opioid receptors in both positive incentive motivation associated with intracranial electrical stimulation and negative incentive motivation associated with depressive states. In contrast, the results in dopamine transporter knockout mice are consistent with the involvement of dopamine transporters in positive incentive motivation, especially its persistence. Differences in intracranial electrical stimulation in µ-opioid receptor and dopamine transporter knockout mice underscore the multidimensional nature of reward.

Social insurance with competitive insurance markets and risk misperception

We examine the role of uniform and non-uniform social insurance to supplement a general income tax when neither public nor private insurers can observe individual risk, which is positively correlated with wages (e.g., for old age dependency). In the (private market) Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) equilibrium low-wage/low-risk individuals are not fully insured. While social insurance provided to the poor has a negative incentive effect, it also increases their otherwise insufficient insurance coverage. Social insurance to the rich produces exactly the opposite effects. Whichever of these effects dominates, some social insurance is always desirable irrespective of the pattern of correlation. Finally, we introduce risk misperception which exacerbates the failure of private markets. Rather surprisingly, this does not necessarily strengthen the case for public insurance.

Journalists and Political Sources in Nigeria

The relationship between journalists and political sources has been characterized by a tug of war between reporters and officials where top politicians have the upper hand in the coproduction of news through their ability to provide critical information subsidies that most news media rely on. The dynamic of the journalist–source relationship has, however, mostly been analyzed in stable high-income democracies. This article goes beyond existing research by analyzing the relationship between reporters and officials in Nigeria, in principle, a democracy but in practice, a hybrid regime where journalists face substantial political pressures. Through a combination of content analysis and in-depth interviews, it shows how journalists in Nigeria are not only dependent on the information subsidies found in the West but also affected by politicians using positive (monetary awards) and negative (intimidation and violence) tangible incentives that go well beyond information subsidies. The article argues that this shapes the nature of coproduction of news in Nigeria and that more broadly, the resources available to politicians to influence journalists through such positive tangible incentives and the degree to which they, with impunity, can use negative tangible incentives, should be key dimensions for future comparative work on relations between reporters and officials as political communication research goes beyond stable democracies where money handouts and violence is unlikely to be the key factors influencing news production.

Behavioural interventions to promote workers' use of respiratory protective equipment.

Behavioural interventions to promote workers' use of respiratory protective equipment.

Aversive properties of negative incentive shifts in Fischer 344 and Lewis rats

Research on incentive contrast highlights that reward value is not absolute but rather is based upon comparisons we make to rewards we have received and expect to receive. Both human and nonhuman studies on incentive contrast show that shifting from a larger more-valued reward to a smaller less-valued reward is associated with long periods of nonresponding – a negative contrast effect. In this investigation, we used two different genetic rat strains, Fischer 344 and Lewis rats that putatively differ in their sensitivity to aversive stimulation, to assess the aversive properties of large-to-small reward shifts (negative incentive shifts). Additionally, we examined the extent to which increasing cost (fixed-ratio requirements) modulates negative contrast effects. In the presence of a cue that signaled the upcoming reward magnitude, lever pressing was reinforced with one of two different magnitudes of food (large or small). This design created two contrast shifts (small-to-large, large-to-small) and two shifts used as control conditions (small-to-small, large-to-large). Results showed a significant interaction between rat strain and cost requirements only during the negative incentive shift with the emotionally reactive Fischer 344 rats exhibiting significantly longer response latencies with increasing cost, highlighting greater negative contrast. These findings are more consistent with emotionality accounts of negative contrast and results of neurophysiological research that suggests shifting from a large to a small reward is aversive. Findings also highlight how subjective reward value and motivation is a product of gene-environment interactions.

The Monetary Value of Family Policy Measures in Germany over the Life Cycle: Evidence from a Dynamic Microsimulation Model

This article quantifies the monetary value of key family policy measures in Germany over the life cycle. The analysis is based on a dynamic microsimulation model that combines simulated life cycles for a base population from the 2009 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel with a comprehensive tax-benefit model. The results indicate that households in Germany receive family- and marriage-related transfers of considerable monetary value, yet there is also substantial variation behind the population average. Moreover, it is shown that some measures, such as income tax splitting, may make individuals in fact worse off, in financial terms, over the long course, as a result of negative labour supply incentives which are reinforced through detrimental effects on human capital accumulation.

Incentives, equity and the Able Chooser Problem

Health incentive schemes aim to produce healthier behaviours in target populations. They may do so both by making incentivised options more salient and by making them less costly. Changes in...

Energy-aware load monitoring for improving battery life of mobile peer-to-peer nodes

In this article, we propose an energy-aware load monitoring model, called e-Mon, for enabling energy-aware load balancing in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. P2P is a scalable and self-organizing technology for utilizing computational resources of the end-user devices for the benefit of a computing system. In P2P systems, the need for fair balance of load is crucial since the end-users need to be incentivized to participate in the system. The short battery life, caused by additional strain on the computational resources of the end-user devices, is a significant negative incentive factor for mobile end-users of current P2P systems. The e-Mon model, proposed in this article, enables moving load from energy-critical to less energy-critical nodes in P2P systems. This is done by including the energy status of a peer node as one of the factors defining a node’s load. The model helps saving the energy of mobile P2P nodes, particularly in cases when the remaining battery capacity is low. The article provides a thorough energy-efficiency evaluation demonstrating that e-Mon can significantly improve the battery life of mobile nodes by improving the quality and fairness of load balance between heterogeneous nodes. With a proper selection of a load balancing model for the application scenario, e-Mon is shown to achieve up to 470% battery life extension compared to the case with traditional load balancing with no battery monitoring.

Ban on the Import of Elephant Trophies into the USA from Tanzania and Zimbabwe Comment on the Framework for the Decision

Regulation of use is an essential component for sustainability in use. Prevailing regulatory structures consist largely of a proscriptive and legislative nature imposed by the centre on the periphery, and they have failed to stop negative trends. The profile of the incentive package for regulatory compliance is too often wrong. Incentive is the fulcrum of regulation. Regulation usually requires an element of negative incentive proscriptions backed by powers to enforce them. But any regulatory system which relies primarily on negative incentives is, in the long term, in trouble. Enforcement costs are high and the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the enforced is called into question. History shows that such systems are unstable and that sustainable systems of regulation are those that rely primarily on positive incentives – economic, cultural and institutional – and which are affordable. Hardin's (1985) comment is relevant here: ‘We must recognize that all control operations incur costs; excessive controls generate their own kind of poverty.

Laurent Lardeux , Retours d’exil. Ethnographie des rapatriements de réfugiés en Afrique centrale , Paris, Éditions EHESS, Cas de figure, 2015, 255 p.

Laurent Lardeux, Retours d'exil. Ethnographie des rapatriements de refugies en Afrique central [Returns from exile: an study of refugee repatriation in Central Africa] Paris, EHESS, Cas de figure, 2015, 256 p.A stimulating book, this ethnographic study of refugee repatriation in Central Africa - or rather of refugee mobility and settlement in places of refuge, followed by resettlement in similar places in country of departure. Lardeux not only traces itineraries of refugees from Democratic Republic of Congo to Congo-Brazaville and Central Africa, then back to DRC; he attaches importance to relations that develop between trajectories, refugee careers and institutional policies, primarily those of UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).Laurent Lardeux followed refugees and repatriated refugees from Congo basin from 2005 to 2010, literally moving alongside them through urban and rural spaces they lived in. As shown by a map at beginning of book, he covered distances between Kinshasa and Libreville, Yaounde, Bangui and Brazzaville three times, each journey lasting six to seven months; points that were either close or far for persons leaving RDC in early 2000s. The violence of war raging in that country at time forced as many as 2 million persons to flee; peak of exodus was in 2002. Lardeux judiciously chooses to start his fieldwork in 2005, year UNHCR's repatriation operation got underway.He first describes UNHCR policy in this connection, particularly how it changed over period studied. Under pressure from state governments, institution shifted its emphasis from receiving refugees in asylum zones or facilities and guiding and assisting them to promoting voluntary and assisting in that. Lardeux describes UNHCR practices, which began with encouragement and incentives, then switched to constraint as refugee aid in receiving country diminished, becoming aid for to and reception in departure country. While voluntary nature of repatriation is repeatedly asserted in UNHCR texts, that notion proved extremely malleable; border between free consent and forced was an indistinct one. The policies implemented did contain incentives, attractive conditions for voluntary return, but they also counted on negative incentives of outstaying one's welcome in country of exile, reductions in humanitarian aid and being poorly protected in reception zones. To underscore these ambiguities, author speaks of (in)voluntary repatriation.But what of trajectory and migrant career diversity? Forced displacement generates singular trajectories whose determinants are many. The author distinguishes between the time of exile and the time of return and provides a particularly rich description of practical determinants and types of social relationships that develop as well as their impact on migrants' trajectories.He first describes processes by which social and economic relations are established in exile. …

Effects of the Post-Olympics Driving Restrictions on Air Quality in Beijing

To reduce congestion and air pollution, 20% driving restriction, a license plate-based traffic control measure, has been implemented in Beijing since October 2008. While the long-term impacts of this policy remain controversial, it is important to understand how and why the policy effects of driving restrictions change over time. In this paper, the short- and long-run effects of the 20% driving restrictions in Beijing and the key factors shaping the effects are analyzed using daily PM10 pollution data. The results showed that in the short run, 20% driving restriction could effectively reduce ambient PM10 levels. However, this positive effect rapidly faded away within a year due to long-term behavioral responses of residents. A modified 20% restriction, designed to replace the original 20% restriction system since April 2009, which is less stringent and provides more possibility for intertemporal driving substitution, has shown some positive influence on air quality over the long run comparing with that under the original policy design. Temporarily, the more stringent the driving restriction was, the better effects it would have on air quality. In the long-run, however, the policy was likely to cause a vicious circle, and more stringent policy might induce stronger negative incentives which would result in even worse policy effects. Lessons learned from study of the effects of driving restrictions in Beijing will help other major cities in China and abroad to use driving restrictions more prudently and effectively in the future. Decision-makers should carefully consider the pros and cons of a transport policy and conduct the ex-ante and ex-post evaluations on it.

Incentive mechanisms, loan decisions and policy rationing

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether negative incentives in the pay-for-performance mechanism would trigger loan officers to strategically reject potentially good loans. If so, what is the feasible solution to alleviate the problem. Design/methodology/approach A framed field experiment was conducted to test loan decision behaviors using loan officers from Rural Credit Cooperatives in Shandong, China. A 2 by 2 between-subject design was adopted to generate variation in incentives and prior information about credit risks. Findings Results showed that loan officers did ration credit by rejecting more loans when facing risks of personal income loss. However, providing risk information about the application pool boosted the approval rate and offset the behavioral responses by a roughly same magnitude. Research limitations/implications Findings in this study suggest that certain institutional settings can result in credit rationing via strategic loan misclassification. Further, information sometimes generates similar effects as those costly incentives or mechanisms that are not implementable in practice. Originality/value This study adopted an innovative monetized experimental design that allows researchers to examine the (otherwise unobservable) trade-offs between Type I and Type II error in loan misclassification as incentives change. In addition, an anchoring prior information treatment is used to solicit the relative power of almost costless information and costly monetary incentives, and to point out a potentially feasible solution.

Effects of positive incentive and negative incentive in knowledge transfer: carrot and stick

PurposeEmployees play a central role in firms’ knowledge transferal, but knowledge-sharing brings significant costs for employees. Thus, this study aims to explore the components of firms’ incentive systems and how these influence employees’ knowledge-sharing, and also to test whether employees’ knowledge-sharing intentions transform into better knowledge transfer performance at the firm level.Design/methodology/approachThis study collected data in China, and 219 usable questionnaires were collected. Then, this study used a structure equation model by LISREL for hypotheses testing.FindingsThis study finds that positive economic incentives, positive relational incentives and negative relational incentives all increase employees’ knowledge-sharing intentions, contributing to firms’ improved knowledge-transfer performance. Thus, both positive and negative incentives and both economic and relational incentives exert influences on employees’ knowledge-sharing activities.Practical implicationsBecause employees have both material and emotional needs and always want to approach good things and avoid bad things, firms should take measures to make their incentive systems more comprehensive. Then, employees can be motivated to share their knowledge effectively.Originality/valueExisting studies have mainly explored the effects of positive economic incentives on knowledge transferal. Because individuals have both a promotion self-regulatory focus associated with an approach motivation and a prevention self-regulatory focus associated with an avoidance motivation, and because they have both material and emotional needs, this study classifies incentives into three types and confirms their effectiveness for motivating employees to share knowledge.

Learning curves for harnessing biomass power: What could explain the reduction of its cost during the expansion of China?

To explain the factors influencing the cost of biomass power in China, we applied an improved model of learning curves in this paper. The impact of cumulative installed capacity of biomass power and other factors on the cost of biomass technology were investigated. The results showed that installed capacity expansion has led to significant cost reduction. Meanwhile, the effect of economies of scale was observed in the analysis of generation cost. The ownership structure of the firm and the size of the developer had no influence on the learning effects and stronger policy support may, ironically, produce negative incentive effects on technology improvement.

What is the optimal task difficulty for reinforcement learning of brain self-regulation?

The balance between action and reward during neurofeedback may influence reinforcement learning of brain self-regulation. Eleven healthy volunteers participated in three runs of motor imagery-based brain-machine interface feedback where a robot passively opened the hand contingent to β-band modulation. For each run, the β-desynchronization threshold to initiate the hand robot movement increased in difficulty (low, moderate, and demanding). In this context, the incentive to learn was estimated by the change of reward per action, operationalized as the change in reward duration per movement onset. Variance analysis revealed a significant interaction between threshold difficulty and the relationship between reward duration and number of movement onsets (p<0.001), indicating a negative learning incentive for low difficulty, but a positive learning incentive for moderate and demanding runs. Exploration of different thresholds in the same data set indicated that the learning incentive peaked at higher thresholds than the threshold which resulted in maximum classification accuracy. Specificity is more important than sensitivity of neurofeedback for reinforcement learning of brain self-regulation. Learning efficiency requires adequate challenge by neurofeedback interventions.