Naval Warfare Research Articles

THE CURRENT STATE OF MILITARY HISTORY

Military history is often misconstrued as a field requiring little intellectual skill, in which the historian provides little more than a chronology of generals and battles. Analysis of one hundred of the twenty-first century's best military histories reveals that military history today goes well beyond such subject matter, incorporating social, cultural, and political history. Common areas of inquiry for contemporary historians include the impact of society, culture, and politics on a country's ability to wage war; the social, cultural, and political after-effects of war; the society and culture of military organizations; and the relationship between military organizations and the communities from which they spring. While historians continue to devote considerable attention to the conventional militaries of Europe and the United States, many also are studying small armies, irregular forces, non-state actors, civil wars, and non-Western armed forces. Within the military realm, historians frequently tackle subjects of much greater complexity than the generals-and-battles stereotype would suggest, to include the relationship between technological and human factors, the interdependency of land and naval warfare, and the influence of political direction on the military.

Efficiencies from knowledge management technologies in a military enterprise

PurposeThe debate about the differences between government, commercial and military knowledge management initiatives continues. Many consultants and vendors posit that the different objectives of government, military and commercial organizations require different philosophies, methodologies and technologies to achieve success. Many agree that technology is not the most important element of knowledge integration. However, they also agree that knowledge management technologies can enable knowledge integration and contribute to efficiencies in organizations. This study provides empirical research to contribute to this theoretical and practical discussion.Design/methodology/approachThis study explores the perceived differences of the impact of knowledge management technologies between commercial, military and government users. Analysis of variance is used to compare means of responses among the three groups. This study applies hypothesis testing through a case study of an enterprise in the military sector, the United States Department of the Navy's (DON) Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).FindingsThe primary conclusion of this study is that there is a significant difference in expectations among contractors, government civilian and uniform military knowledge workers on expected efficiencies from KMTs. Contractors and uniform military have similar expectations. Government civilians have significantly lower expectations. Contractors have the highest expectations from KMTs.Research limitations/implicationsThere are a few studies that compare government and commercial sector knowledge management expectations and practices. In addition, case studies and anecdotal data provided by vendors and consultants communicate the value of knowledge management technologies. Still there is a need to grow the body of knowledge on the impact of KMTs on efficiency. To that end there is a growing commitment to empirical and conceptual research by scholars in knowledge management.Practical implicationsImplications for scholars and practitioners are posited.Originality/valueThere is still a lack of empirical research on the impact of knowledge management technologies on competitive advantage in government organizations. This study adds to understanding of this area of research.

Medieval Warfare

This introductory text complements (and offers competition to) the excellent Medieval Warfare: A History, edited by Maurice Keen (1999). Unlike its predecessor, Nicholson's book employs the full scholarly apparatus: her wide-ranging and detailed footnote references make her book particularly useful for students; the author's extensive reading is clear and impressive. Six succinct and highly informative chapters cover theory, practice, personnel, equipment, buildings and, notably, naval warfare (a subject which is finally receiving the attention it warrants). Nicholson readily concedes that in a relatively short book such as this, it is inevitable that some areas do not receive enough coverage: her perceptive comments on the ‘Military Revolution’ left this reader eager for a fuller analysis. Conversely, there is perhaps too much on theory in general and on Vegetius's De re militari in particular (ch. 1). As Nicholson writes towards the end of the book, ‘examination of actual medieval battles suggests that Vegetius’s battle plans generally remained theoretical models rather than being used in practice (p. 138). In her account of the battle of Carcano in 1160 (based closely on John France's analysis), Nicholson notes how Frederick Barbarossa ignored Vegetius's theoretical guidelines. Historians afford Vegetius much attention primarily because he produced a rare and, to some extent, influential book on how to wage war; yet it is unlikely that the book's practical common sense would contain revolutionary ideas alien to experienced medieval commanders in the field. Overall, however, the book is well balanced. Within its imposed confines it is very pleasing to see due attention given to sometimes overlooked matters such as non-combatants (focusing predominantly on women) and, as already observed, the maritime sphere. Despite its relative brevity, the volume conveys a convincing sense of comprehension, while adeptly avoiding cluttering the text with dense facts and figures. Nicholson selects her illustrative examples with care, allowing them to breathe without the constriction of lengthy lists; this allows some of the real drama of medieval warfare to come through, so encouraging undergraduates to read further. Students will also be grateful for Nicholson's lucid and straightforward style. This reviewer was not relishing over twenty pages of technical details on weaponry and equipment, but came away enlightened and without the onset of any technophobic twinges: those bored by bores can still enjoy the paragraphs on gunpowder artillery. In her chapter on the practice of land warfare, Nicholson again employs shrewd judgment in her choice of examples, this time for case-studies of three battles. Eschewing the obvious choices (for example, Hastings or Agincourt), she instead plumps for the relatively lesser known examples of Poitiers (732), Neuss (1475) and, as already mentioned, Carcano (1160), As the chronological range of these battles indicates, Nicholson's Middle Ages encompasses its broadest scope: from 300 to 1500. This is a particular strength of the book: not only does it afford the opportunity to include many revealing, colourful and oft-overlooked examples from the early medieval period (such as Clovis splitting the head of a soldier on, tellingly, a military parade ground); importantly, it also serves to show just how little warfare changed over the whole medieval period, thereby questioning further the increasingly challenged concept of a military revolution in the late medieval period. Nicholson is firmly in the evolutionary camp: ‘Arguably, the development of cannon was the first major step forward in warfare in Catholic Europe since the old Roman Empire’ (p. 90). (Note the qualifying ‘arguably ’). This excellent introductory text deserves to run into many future editions. These may wish to reconsider some relatively minor points of issue. Nicholson subscribes to the almost-universally held view that if a fortress were taken by storm, ‘all inside it could expect no mercy’ (p. 130); the biblical justification cited for this extreme action is Deuteronomy, but this actually specifies the slaughter only of adult males. Also, it was not just the wealthy who were ransomed, but all and sundry, as Roger of Wendover makes clear (even corpses were ransomed, usually for half the going rate of living hostages). A rare dating typo crops up for Edward II's downfall (1227, p. 3). Most importantly of all, to facilitate even greater use of such a valuable book, sub-headings should be used throughout: each of the lengthy chapters comprises a long, unbroken text which hinders ready access to relevant material. Nicholson has produced a masterful synthesis which offers a perfect summation of revisionist and post-revisionist scholarship on warfare in the middle ages. As such, it is an indispensable textbook and a notable achievement.

The Cambridge History of Warfare

First published over a decade ago as the Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West , this revised text has unfortunately lost the elegant illustrations and the informative box inserts on specific topics but not its comprehensive and insightful survey of the history of warfare from the third millennium to the present day. The book’s four-part structure and the substantive material of the seventeen essays by seven contributors remain the same as before. In Part One, Victor Davis Hanson’s three essays chart the emergence and evolution of the infantry as a foundational instrument of warfare from the hoplite troop phalanxes of the Greek polis to Philip II of Macedon’s reinvigorated mixed phalanxes of foot and accompanying horse, which his son Alexander adeptly commanded to conquer Persia in the fourth century BC, and then to the smaller and more adaptable Roman legions. Essays by Bernard Bachrach, Christopher Allmand and the editor comprise Part Two: the continuities of warfare from the late third century to the later medieval period are first explored, with the once pre-eminent chivalric notion of the superior mounted knight in the latter period being dismissed, whereas, through to the sixteenth century, the considerable changes wrought in tactics and army composition by the development in weapons technology—initially pikes and bows and then, significantly, firearms—are explored. In Part Three, two essays each by the editor and John Lynn along with one by Patricia Seed consider warfare in the early modern age. Not only do these pieces emphasize the emerging importance of naval warfare from the fifteenth century—either defensively in home waters or offensively in the conquest of an overseas empire and the protection of trade—they also vouchsafe the significant influence on warfare of its political and geo-strategic contexts as dynastic conflicts, including their often strong confessional complexion, gave way to global wars between states and their armies and then whole nations in arms. Finally, in Part Four, five essays by Williamson Murray, and one written jointly by Murray and the editor, narrate the history of warfare through the industrial and imperial age of the nineteenth century to the two world wars of the twentieth century and then the post-1945 world. Of all the chapters, this last one has undergone substantive revision because of the occurrence of wars in Chechnya, the Balkans, Afghanistan and, most recently, Iraq since the book’s original publication.

Decision at sea: five naval battles that shaped American history

From thunderous broadsides traded between wooden sailing ships on Lake Erie, to the carrier battles of World War II, to the devastating high-tech action in the Persian Gulf, here is a gripping history of five key battles that defined the evolution of naval warfare - and the course of the American nation. Acclaimed military historian Craig Symonds offers spellbinding narratives of crucial engagements, showing how each battle reveals the transformation of technology and weaponry from one war to the next; how these in turn transformed naval combat; and how each event marked a milestone in American history. These battles include: Oliver Hazard Perry's heroic victory at Lake Erie, one of the last great battles of the Age of Sail, which secured the Northwestern frontier for the United States; the brutal Civil War duel between the ironclads Monitor and Virginia, which sounded the death knell for wooden-hulled warships and doomed the Confederacy's hope of besting the Union navy; Commodore Dewey's stunning triumph at Manila Bay in 1898, where the U.S. displayed its navy of steel-hulled ships firing explosive shells and wrested an empire from a fading European power; the hairsbreadth American victory at Midway, where aircraft carriers launched planes against enemies 200 miles away - and where the tide of World War II turned in the space of a few furious minutes; and Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf, where computers, ship-fired missiles, and smart bombs not only changed the nature of warfare at sea, but also marked a new era, and a new responsibility, for the United States. Symonds records these encounters in detail so vivid that readers can hear the wind in the rigging and feel the pounding of the guns. Yet he places every battle in a wide perspective, revealing their significance to America's development as it grew from a new Republic on the edge of a threatening frontier to a global superpower. Decision at Sea is a powerful and illuminating look at pivotal moments in the history of the Navy and of the United States. It is also a compelling study of the unchanging demands of leadership at sea, where commanders must make rapid decisions in the heat of battle with lives - and the fate of nations - hanging in the balance.

SU-CC-ValA-03: A Directional Algorithm for An Electronically-Collimated Gamma-Ray Detector for Intraoperative Localization of Radiation Sources

Purpose: An electronically‐collimated gamma‐radiation detector for intraoperative localization of sentinel lymph nodes and metastases is under development. Analogous to Compton telescopes and Compton cameras, localization is achieved using the coincidence detection of Compton‐scattered gamma rays. Electronic collimation allows the device to operate without physical collimation, providing high sensitivity while also allowing directional information to be determined. We report on implementation of algorithms to calculate the direction to the source.Methods and Materials: Two approaches to direction reconstruction were evaluated. The first technique backprojects each event onto the surface of a sphere centered on the device's primary detector. To use Fourier filtering methods for deblurring, the sphere's surface is mapped by stereographic projection onto a plane, filtered in Fourier space, and then projected back onto the sphere. The second technique also backprojects events onto the sphere, then determines the rectangle that circumscribes the backprojected cone; localization is obtained by intersection of all circumscribed rectangles. Results: Performance of the algorithm has been evaluated using randomly generated ideal Compton‐scatter events from point sources for our detector geometry. Direction angles are calculated within 5% accuracy for source positions up to 45° off‐axis for the filtering approach and ∼30° for the circumscription approach. Error in calculated direction angles depends on the arbitrary diameter of the sphere; optimally, the sphere should intersect the source. The circumscription technique converges to an estimate of direction angles in ∼50 events; the filtering approach requires ∼1000 events. Conclusion: The two methods complement each other in speed and field‐of‐view. Monte Carlo simulations and experimental testing of a prototype system are ongoing as a separate part of the overall project; data from these will further supplement evaluation of the algorithms. Acknowledgment: Supported by Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego; Contract No. N66001‐05‐C‐6024.

TH‐D‐330A‐02: An Electronically‐Collimated Gamma‐Ray Detector for Intraoperative Localization of Radiation Sources

Purpose: We are developing a radiation detector for locating radiation sources, e.g. for intraoperative localization of sentinel lymph nodes and metastases. The design emphasizes compact size and portability, wide field of view, and efficiency and accuracy in source localization. Room‐temperature cadmium‐zinc‐telluride (CZT) detectors and electronic collimation via Compton‐scatter detection are used to achieve the design goals. Method and Materials: The detector design was simulated in GEANT4 to assess feasibility and optimize the design. The simulation model was a 6‐sided box with one detector module on each end and two modules per side. One end is the primary scatter detector; the other modules detect the scattered photons, operating in coincidence with the primary module. The simulations allowed variations of detector dimensions, pixel size, energy resolution, and source energies. Experimental measurements with a 3‐module partial prototype were used to validate the simulations; each module is a 16×16‐pixel 38×38×5‐mm3 CZT detector. Results: The simulations indicated ∼15% of incident gamma rays produce valid direction measurements; 30–70% of these events are Compton‐photoelectric interaction pairs. The measured angular resolution varied from a few degrees for 100‐keV gamma‐rays up to about 10° FWHM at 1 MeV. Above ∼1.5 MeV, multiple Compton‐scatter events limit accurate measurement of Compton cone angles; below ∼50 keV, few Compton‐scatter events occur. Experimental validation with the prototype system is in progress.Conclusion: Efficiency and angular resolution vary with source energy but reasonable performance seems achievable for radioisotopes from Am‐241 through Co‐60. Ongoing work is investigating the effect on performance of design parameters such as pixel size and detector thickness. Coupled with concurrent development of real‐time methods to calculate the directional information, this system provides localization of radiation sources with high sensitivity. Acknowledgment: Supported by Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego; Contract N66001‐05‐ C‐6024.

Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century (review)

Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century. By Michael A. Palmer. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. Pp. 377. Cloth, $29.95.)For thousands of years, military thinkers have pursued the key to successful battlefield leadership, but serious efforts to distill similar lessons for naval warfare have emerged only over the past four centuries. In Command at Sea, Michael A. Palmer provides an effective overview of the evolving command process, examining major fleet actions over the past four hundred years to discern leadership traits that made the difference between success and failure. Using an impressive combination of printed primary and secondary sources, Palmer goes beyond simple collective biography or battle narratives to examine contemporary strategy, tactics, traditions, and communications technology, while incorporating historiographie insights and challenging accepted interpretations.Palmer's analysis of naval warfare between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries identifies several themes, viewing commanders either as centralizers, who sought to bring order into battle's chaos while micromanaging their subordinates, or decentralizers, who favored working with their subordinates to outline objectives, while relying upon the initiative of individual commanders for execution. The theoretical battle between centralizers and decentralizers continues to the present day. Palmer's book begins with a vignette of Admiral Horatio Nelson's dramatic 1798 victory over the French at the Battle of the Nile, presenting Nelson, a decentralizer, as an ideal naval commander who achieved decisive victories of the sort that eluded so many of his predecessors and contemporaries.Roughly two-thirds of the book concerns command and control during the age of sail, and especially the evolution of signal systems. Through the seventeenth century, with the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the later intermittent struggle between Britain and France, the standard battle formation was the line ahead. While making tactical sense by maximizing firepower, this formation proved a command and control nightmare. Although navies developed rudimentary signal flags, the commander's flagship, located in the center of the line, could not easily be viewed by the bulk of his forces, especially when battle lines stretched for several miles and the smoke and confusion of combat undermined control. Signals were missed, ignored, or misinterpreted, paralyzing a centralized command, making the pursuit and destruction of an enemy fleet nearly impossible. Many historians have linked the unyielding devotion to this strict tactical doctrine to the string of indecisive battles, but Palmer argues that additional factors also shaped victory or defeat. Decentralized commanders, though often more successful, risked foolhardy action by their overly aggressive or timid subordinates. In examining dozens of battles, a slowly evolving paradigm emerged as commanders studied success and failure and gradually developed more effective systems. Although prominent commanders played a central role, so did theorists such as French Jesuit Paul Hoste, whose 1697 treatise on naval warfare rationally examined the impact of the military revolution at sea.The tremendous technological changes during the nineteenth century revolutionized naval warfare, but had little initial impact upon command and control. …

On their own terms: science in China, 1550-1900

List of Maps, Illustrations, and Tables Chinese Dynasties Abbreviations Preface I. INTRODUCTION Prologue Finding the Correct Conceptual Grid What Should Be the Literati Theory of Knowledge? Late Ming Classicism in the Context of Commercial Expansion Printing Technology and Publishing Naturalization of Anomalies in Ming China and Early Modern Europe 1. Ming Classification on the Eve of Jesuit Contact Ordering Things through Names Collecting the Collectors Late Ming Statecraft, Mathematics, and Christianity Mathematics, and Christianity II. NATURAL STUDIES AND THE JESUITS 2. The Late Ming Calendar Crisis and Gregorian Reform Development of the Ming Astro-calendric Bureau Evolution of the Late Ming Calendar Crisis Gregorian Reform Jesuits and Late Ming Calendar Reform 3. Sino-Jesuit Accommodations During the Seventeenth Century European Scientia and Natural Studies in Ming-Qing China Literati Attacks on Calendar Reform in the Early Qing Ferdinand Verbiest and the Kangxi Emperor 4. The Limits of Western Learning in the Early Eighteenth Century The Kangxi Emperor and Mei Wending The Rites Controversy and Its Legacy French Jesuits in the Kangxi Court The Newtonian Century and the Limits of Scientific Transmission to China 5. The Jesuit Role as Experts in High Qing Cartography and Technology Mensuration and Cartography in the Eighteenth Century Cartography, Sino-Russian Relations, and Qing Imperial Interests The Jesuit Role in Qing Arts, Instruments, and Technology III. EVIDENTIAL RESEARCH AND NATURAL STUDIES 6. Evidential Research and the Restoration of Ancient Learning Early Qing Critiques of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming Medical Works and the Recovery of Antiquity Chen Yuanlong and the Mirror of Origins Encyclopedia Revival of Ancient Chinese Mathematics 7. Seeking the Truth and High Qing Mathematics High Qing Views of the Investigation of Things Mathematics in an Age of Evidential Research Nativism and Early Nineteenth-Century Mathematics IV. MODERN SCIENCE AND THE PROTESTANTS 8. Protestants, Education, and Modern Science to 1880 Protestant Missionaries in China Protestants and Modern Science in Shanghai Introduction of Modern Mathematics and the Calculus The Shanghai Polytechnic and Reading Room 9. The Construction of Modern Science in Late Qing China Early Science Primers Edkins's Primers for Science and the Problem of Darwin in China From the Scientific Book Depot to the China Prize Essay Contest Prize Essay Topics and Their Scientific Content Medical Missionaries since 1872 and Medical Questions as Prize Essay Topics Natural Theology, Darwin, and Evolution V Qing Reformism and Modern Science 10. Government Arsenals, Science, and Technology in China after 1860 From Chinese Working for Missionaries to Missionaries Working for the Dynasty Post-Taiping Reformers and Late Qing Science The Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai Technical Learning in the Jiangnan Arsenal and Fuzhou Navy Yard Naval Warfare and the Refraction of Qing Reforms into Failure Reconsidering the Foreign Affairs Movement 11. Displacement of Traditional Chinese Science and Medicine in the Twentieth Century Western Learning Mediated through Japan Naval Warfare and the Refraction of Qing Reforms into Failure Science and the 1898 Reformers From Traditional to Modern Mathematics Modern Medicine in China Influence of Meiji Japan on Modern Science in China APPENDIXES 1. Tang Mathematical Classics 2. Some Translations of Chemistry, 1855-1873 3. Science Outline Series, 1882-1898 4. Partial Chronological List of Arsenals, etc., in China, 1861-1892 5. Table of Contents for the 1886 Primers for Science Studies (Gezhi qimeng) 6. Twenty-three Fields of the Sciences in the 1886 Primers for Science Studies 7. Science Compendia Published in China from 1877 to 1903 8. Some Officially Selected Chinese Prize Essay Topics from the Shanghai Polytechnic 9. Scientific Societies Formed between 1912 and 1927 Notes Bibliography of Chinese and Japanese Sources Acknowledgments Credits Index

ROYAL NAVAL PSYCHIATRY: ORGANIZATION, METHODS AND OUTCOMES, 1900–1945

In contrast to the Army and to a lesser extent the Royal Air Force, psychiatry in the Royal Navy has received scant coverage. In part, this neglect was a function of the smaller numbers involved but it also reflected a tacit view that as the ‘senior service’ with a long tradition of successful engagements, there were relatively few psychiatric casualties of battle. In 1924, for example, Surgeon Captain Meagher claimed that only 16 cases of shell shock were reported by the navy in the last year of the First World War, though he did concede that medical officers preferred to use the term ‘neurasthenia’ of which there had been at least 20,000 cases during the entire period of the conflict. 1 ‘Anxiety neurosis’, suggested the official history of the Second World War, ‘was less common in the Navy than the other services’, a conclusion explained by the close-knit nature of ships’ crews, effective selection processes and pride in the performance of duties. 2 More recently, on the basis of UK and US experience, Grossman argued that ‘in the twentieth century, psychiatric casualties during naval warfare have been nearly nonexistent’. 3 The impersonal nature of naval combat and the fact that battles were often conducted at a great distance were cited as reasons why sailors rarely broke down on warships. Whilst no evidence has emerged during the period of this study to suggest that the Royal Navy suffered from a crisis of morale, psychological disorders were not negligible during the First and Second World Wars and their incidence cannot be explained solely by the dilution of the regular service by volunteers, reservists and conscripts. In this paper, using original and once classified sources, we chart the rise of the Royal Naval psychiatric service and identify issues unique to combat at sea. We ask to what extent was the organization itself, and the fact that psychiatrists rarely served on warships, responsible for the apparently low prevalence of psychological disorders.

Modern Aspects of the Law of Naval Warfare

Modern Aspects of the Law of Naval Warfare

Maritimer Imperialismus: Seemachtideologie, seestrategisches Denken und der Tirpitzplan 1875 bis 1914

Maritimer Imperialismus: Seemachtideologie, seestrategisches Denken und der Tirpitzplan 1875 bis 1914. By ROLF HOBSON (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004; pp. 388. Eur 34.80). ALTHOUGH Dr Hobson is a Norwegian researcher, this book (based on his doctoral dissertation) originally appeared in an English-language edition as Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875–1914 (Leiden, 2002). The text has not been revised for this German translation, which was arranged by the German Military History Research Institute in conjunction with the author's current base at the Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo. It revisits a field that has been scrutinised meticulously since the papers of the Imperial German Naval Office (Reichsmarineamt: RMA), and those of Alfred von Tirpitz, the State Secretary for the Navy from 1897 to 1916, were opened for investigation. Following Jonathan Steinberg's pioneering Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (1965), Volker Berghahn's Der Tirpitz-Plan: Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II (1970) and Michael Epkenhans's Die Wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, 1908–1914: Weltmachtstreben, industrieller Fortschritt, soziale Integration (1991) have investigated the German fleet's construction history; Ivo Lambi's The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862–1914 (1984) has traced the development of naval war planning; and Holger Herwig and Paul Kennedy, among others, have placed Tirpitz's build-up in a broader political perspective. The British response to the German challenge has been studied with almost equal thoroughness, Jon Sumida and Nicholas Lambert introducing major revisions to Arthur Marder's standard history of Admiralty policy. It might well seem that there is little more to say. Nonetheless, Hobson fairly claims that most previous work has lacked an overtly comparative perspective, and in the first section of his book he provides a lengthy overview of international politics in the later nineteenth century. He highlights the emergence of modern industrialised and technological ‘arms races’ and stresses the distinctive environment for naval (as opposed to land) warfare created by international maritime law and its protection for neutral rights, notably in the 1856 Declaration of Paris. Although this discussion is largely based on secondary sources, it is judicious and clearly organised. His second section, which deals with the emergence of modern naval strategic doctrine—the British ‘Blue Water’ school, the French Jeune Ecole, and above all the contribution of Alfred Thayer Mahan—is similar. Because of this unusually long lead-in, however, only the latter half of the book draws heavily on primary and under-exploited sources, including the RMA and Tirpitz papers at Freiburg but also published contemporary books and articles. In fact, part of the novelty of Hobson's approach lies in an attempt to reconstruct the professional debate in Germany about naval doctrine, including the views of Tirpitz's critics such as Karl Galster. By doing so he is better able to highlight the distinctiveness (and the grave shortcomings) of Tirpitz's own views. He places much emphasis on Tirpitz's June 1894 Dienstschrift IX on operational doctrine, and his secret July 1897 memorandum to the Kaiser on construction policy. In the former document Tirpitz borrowed from Mahan the notion that a modern navy was essential to promote peacetime commercial development (and he later made this insight a centrepiece of RMA navalist propaganda). In the second he made clear that the primary target of German building was to be Britain rather than, as previously, France and Russia.

Ships on Hero Stones from the West Coast of India

Hero stones have been erected since early times to remember those who died in battle, and have been reported from various provinces of India. Most show land-battles, but those in the Archaeological Museum, Goa and Eksar in Mumbai show naval warfare. The Old Goa stones belong to the Kadambas who ruled Goa from 950–1300 AD. The Eksar stones to the reign of king Bhoja of Malwa in 1020 AD. Similar hero stones with boat motifs of the 18th to 19th centuries AD have been reported from Aramda in Gujarat. This paper examines these stones and assesses their significance for the maritime history of India. © 2005 The Nautical Archaeology Society

:Sea-Power in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Catalan-Aragonese Fleet in the War of Sicilian Vespers

Lawrence Mott's study of the War of Sicilian Vespers provides a view of the internal organization and operations of a mediaeval fleet. While the conflict of 1282-1302 between France and the crown of Aragon for control of Sicily had broad geopolitical implications, it was also notable for having been fought primarily at sea. Mott draws on previously overlooked archival materials, most notably the battle fleet accounts of Roger of Lauria discovered in the Archives of the Cathedral of Valencia, in order to produce a detailed account with insights into the mechanics of naval warfare in this early period. Mott provides detailed information about ship construction, manning, naval tactics and strategy, and especially administration, illustrating how the fleet was created, organized and maintained despite its composition: a polyglot of different groups, including a significant but previously unknown Muslim contingent. He also offers a military biography of the inexplicably obscure naval commander Roger of Lauria, among the great maritime leaders of all time. Challenging assumptions concerning the war and mediaeval warfare in general, Mott demonstrates that it was remarkable fleet organization and leadership, not luck as many have claimed, that defeated the French and ultimately removed them as a major player in the Mediterranean for several centuries. Finally, Mott puts the details and statistical and typological information of his account in perspective with an analysis of the nature of sea power and its changing character over time, challenging the assumption by recent scholars that Mahanian doctrine does not apply to mediaeval naval warfare.

Managing Military Transformations: Agency, Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution

How did the U.S. Navy successfully manage the carrier revolution? This hallmark case challenges traditional explanations of organizational change. Decisive reforms were enacted. The new vision of naval warfare thrived before the “old” battleship-centric orthodoxy was discredited, before it was fully understood, and before its champions seized power within the service. This article posits a modified principal-agent framework to explicate systematically the interplay between new interests and ideas that lie at the crux of managing the diffusion of innovations within military organizations. The main finding is that the nebulous exploration and outcome of transformation rests on strategies employed by service entrepreneurs for lowering the material cost of oversight and invoking established managerial norms that align incentives and “common knowledge” for change within military hierarchies. Evidence from the U.S. Navy's interwar experience with carrier aviation illustrates this administrative dimension to organizational change. The conclusion reviews directions for extending the argument, and lessons for managing contemporary military transformation.

Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War (review)

Reviewed by: Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War Michael J. Bennett Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. By Robert M. Browning Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002. Pp. 497. Cloth, $34.95.) Retrieving the naval war into the Civil War is one of the goals of Robert M. Browning's Success Is All That Was Expected. The leading authority on the Atlantic Blockading Squadrons, Browning contends that the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron fixated on the capture of Charleston, South Carolina, to the detriment of the blockade and the Union war effort. This fixation was borne not of strategy but upon political goals and the personal demons of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavas Vasa Fox. As the birthplace of the Confederate rebellion, the symbolic power of the capture of Charleston was obvious. Less obvious were the misguided energies that Fox expended on the capture of Charleston. Browning argues that Fox, who led the aborted rescue mission to Fort Sumter in 1861, never forgot his failure to relieve the beleaguered garrison. This failure created a fixation on the part of Fox and the navy to capture Charleston—similar to that of the army's on Richmond—whatever its cost of success. The book is the first comprehensive study of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. As in his previous work, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North [End Page 102] Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War (1993), Browning canvasses all of the strategic, logistical, personal, and economic facets of the blockade. He skillfully connects political and strategic events in Washington with events on water of the South Atlantic coast. This is no easy feat. At times, the detail provided concerning this portion of the blockade almost overwhelms the reader. Much of this attention to detail arises from the fact that Browning is unearthing fresh history. In addition, Browning provides new ways of looking at the war from the logistics of the blockade to the often stressful cooperation between the navy and the army in combined operations. Both of these topics have been understudied. Browning is doing the heavy shovel work which historians have neglected for more than 130 years. This is not to say that the book is a poorly told tale: in fact, Browning has given us some of the finest historical narrative to date. This accomplishment cannot be understated. Too often, historians have lost sight of the fact that one of the craft's missions and one of the sources of its power is the telling of a good story. Browning recreates one of the initial meetings planning the South Atlantic Expedition. In attendance were Lincoln, Secretary of State William Seward, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Fox, and Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont. Fox arrives late, plants himself on the couch next to Lincoln, and lights a cigar. DuPont watches in amazement as the assistant secretary proceeds to blow cigar smoke into the president's face. The book does have its problems. At times, it fails to develop fully its analysis of the blockade's weaknesses. Part of the problem with warfare generally and naval warfare particularly, is that it is more difficult to wage war than anyone realizes. As the book shows, a lack of strategy and a lack of supplies, when added to personal agendas of the strategists, can unravel the best laid plans of generals and admirals. One does receive the impression from Browning that war is a difficult business but an examination of why it is difficult in 1861 would have enhanced the book's analysis. To that end, the conclusion of the book might be better suited being placed in the introduction because it displays the themes that Browning will explore in the narrative. Another criticism is that like too many other naval historians, Browning succumbs to the use of unexplained jargon. If the field is to grow, novices need to have nautical and naval terms explained to them in the text. Readers may not be acquainted with the expressions "slush" (refuse grease and fat), "Thunderbolt moorings" (a device by which a ship...

HMS Scott ring laser gyro navigator integration

HMS SCOTT is a United Kingdom ocean survey vessel that hosts a state-of-the-art deep ocean mapping system which was designed, developed, and is currently maintained and periodically updated by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego, (SSC San Diego). A recent update of this system consisted of the replacement of an obsolete and very costly to maintain inertial navigation system. Another reason for updating the ship's inertial system was to provide higher accuracy attitude data, than was previously available with the old inertial system, to the high resolution multi-beam sonar system in order to produce improved bathymetric charts. After conducting a market survey of suitable inertial navigator systems, the Kearfott SEANAV ring laser gyro navigator (RLGN) system, using a monolithic T-24 gyro, was selected to replace the old inertial system. The selection of the SEANAV RLGN was based on its relatively low cost, high reliability, and, particularly, the roll and pitch data accuracies of typically less than 1-arc-minute. This attitude data accuracy was key to enable a significant improvement in the bathymetry data accuracy. Two SEANAV systems were integrated with GPS receivers, a system master time code generator, and electro magnetic (EM) log and Doppler sonar speed sensors to provide the navigation portion of the mapping data. Operational testing of this updated system aboard HMS SCOTT, in November, 2003, showed a marked improvement in the quality of the map product due, in part, to the improved attitude data provided by the SEANAV RLGN system.

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Cracking the Code

Since the earliest days of recorded history, cryptography—the science of encrypting and deciphering messages—has played an important and quite frequently decisive role in influencing world events. The defeat of the Persian forces of Xerxes in the Battle of Salamis near Athens in 480 B.C. was primarily due to a secret message successfully sent from Persepolis to the Greeks five years earlier, warning them about the Persian preparation for war. Two millennia later, in 1587, the interception and deciphering of encrypted messages between the imprisoned Mary Queen of Scots and her rebellious followers led to her execution and the crushing of hopes to restore Catholicism in England. The Allied Forces' access to the highly sophisticated Enigma codes and code machines in World War II was a serious blow to Nazi naval warfare and significantly contributed to the collapse of the Third Reich. Currently, with millions of financial transactions conducted over the Internet every day, the importance of encrypted messages has become even more obvious.

Interview with Joel Baumbaugh, RSO at Space and Naval Warfare Systems San Diego

Interview with Joel Baumbaugh, RSO at Space and Naval Warfare Systems San Diego