Naval Victory Research Articles

Book Review: Britannia's Palette: The Arts of Naval Victory

Book Review: Britannia's Palette: The Arts of Naval Victory

Patriotic and Despondent: Japanese Society at War, 1904–5

JVL has been written about the bravery or foolhardiness of soldiers in their bloodcurdling attempts to capture Port Arthur, and about the monumental Battle of the Sea of Japan under the magisterial command of Admiral T?g?, who proved the impossible by defeating the Baltic Fleet. Small wonder the Russo-Japanese War captured the imagination of many around the world in 1904-5. It was a spectacle on a grand scale where the plucky Japanese took on the Russian bear. Its appeal was so great that a few adventurous and wealthy Westerners, such as Prince Karl von Hohenzollen, even visited Japan as war tourists to witness first-hand how the were fighting the war. Western images of the war, in prints and on postcards, depict the diminutive and the overbearing Russian, in many guises and poses.1 The glaring gap between the caricatured and the reality of their military and naval victories only added to the mystique of the soldier who was hailed as the model modern-day warrior. To top it all, the nation seemed united in its patriotism in the face of a great calamity, willingly sacrificing its men for the sake of the greater good. This was the Japan and the that international observers saw, thanks in no small part to Japan's highly successful propaganda machinery, which sought to tightly control images of Japan and the disseminated abroad.2

The Figure of the Hermit in Charlotte Smith's "Beachy Head"

In The Guardian, October 2, 2007, Jon Henley tells the tale of Keith Lane, a fifty-seven year old window-washer who patrols the cliffs of Beachy Head nightly, talking would-be suicides out of ending their lives. Though he has saved twenty-nine people since his wife took her own life there in 2004, the combined forces of the Coastguard and volunteers from the Beachy Head Chaplaincy Team put an end to his rescue efforts, charging that he is only seeking publicity and that he has no right to put his own life at risk. This contemporary tale suggests the timeliness of the ethical dilemmas highlighted by the figure of the hermit who concludes Charlotte Smith's posthumously published Beachy Head. Beachy Head moves spectacularly from a sweeping and panoramic cosmological, geographical, and historical vision, to a regional portrait of the Sussex downs, to a series of village vignettes, before concluding with the single and isolated figure of "the lone Hermit" (686) in the final lines of the poem. This inward telescoping movement is accompanied and countered by the climbing of the poetic speaker who starts out reclined in contemplation on that "stupendous summit, rock sublime" (1) of Beachy Head and then proceeds upward "[a]dvancing higher still" as "the prospect widens" (309-10) until the view is so elevated that only the limitations of the human eye prevent the sight of London while "in the distant north it melts away / And mingles indiscriminate with clouds" (482-83). The political, moral and historical lessons learned from this prospect are. however, far different from those taught by the traditional, reassuring 18th-century prospect poem which, as John Barrell and Jacqueline Labbe have shown, is associated with the class and gender privilege of the landed gentry and the male poet. As Smith's poetic speaker moves upward, the historical, political and scientific victories of European civilization and of Britain, in particular, are radically undercut just as soon as they are delineated and celebrated. Thus the subject of England's resistance, as "Imperial mistress of the obedient sea" (151), to Napoleonic ambition and her illustrious history of naval victories is easily abandoned, as the speaker asserts: From even the proudest roll by glory fill'd, How gladly the reflecting mind returns To simple scenes of peace and industry[.] (167-69) The remarkable geological and archeological findings revealed by these hills only serve to highlight the limitations of human pride and scientific accomplishment: Ah! Very vain is Science' proudest boast, And but a little light its flame yet lends To its most ardent votaries; (390-92) And the magnificence of nature humbles even the finest work of art: Ah! hills so early loved! In fancy still I breathe your pure keen air; and still behold Those widely spreading views, mocking alike The Poet and the Painter's utmost art. (368-71) Similarly, skeletal remains of exotic elephants are witness to the vulnerable mortality of the greatest of the Roman Imperial campaigns: Hither, Ambition come! Come and behold the nothingness of all For which you carry thro' the oppressed Earth, War, and its train of horrors--(419-22) The cultural/natural histories that constitute this meditative climb thus culminate in a recognition of dark ephemerality not to be outdone in power and eloquence even by that later master of mutability, Percy Shelley. All, with the lapse of Time, have passed away, Even as the clouds, with dark and dragon shapes, Or like vast promontories crown'd with towers, Cast their broad shadows on the downs: then sail Far to the northward, and their transient gloom Is soon forgotten. (434-39) The reader of Beachy Head, then, follows the poetic speaker and "the wanderer of the hills" (442) in her continued ascent until, precipitously, in line 671, the focus drops from "Where Beachy overpeers the channel wave" to the cave of the hermit far below. …

Conrad's Europe (review)

Reviewed by: Conrad's Europe Brian Richardson (bio) Andrzej Ciuk and Marcin Piechota , eds. Conrad's Europe. Yearbook of Conrad Studies (Poland). Opole: Poland, Joseph Conrad Society, 2005. 130 pp. ISBN 83-7395-132-6 This volume collects papers from the "Conrad's Europe" conference at Krakow in September 2004. The essays orb around a few related, highly topical themes: Joseph Conrad as a European or Eastern European, Conrad's work in the context of European literature, and general issues of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Postcolonial topics are frequently addressed and the presence of Edward Said is often felt. Among the essays devoted to politics, history, and ideology, there is Sylvère Monod's impressive, wide-ranging survey, "Conrad and European Politics," and Allan H. Simmons's outstanding essay on Conrad and English politics and culture. Simmons admirably delineates the many nuances of Conrad's local, national, cosmopolitan, and class identities; this piece can be recommended as essential background reading for the study of Conrad's relations to these various imagined communities. Keith Carabine contributes an astute meditation on the well-known essay, "Autocracy and War," in light of Conrad's rarely discussed piece, "The Heroic Age," originally written for the hundredth anniversary of the battle of Trafalgar and subsequently included at the end of The Mirror of the Sea. Carabine meticulously discloses the many nuances and revealing silences in the latter essay, concluding that "as a committed European who recoils before the 'watchwords' of his day that engender 'the animosities of peoples' and of nations, Conrad refuses to contribute on the anniversary of Britain's most famous naval victory to the 'din' of war-talk" (89–90). Grazyna Branny offers a vivid if at times idiosyncratic account of the time Conrad spent in Krakow, and Fiona Tomkinson deftly traces Conrad's negotiation between concepts of British and French nationalism along with ideas of royalism and radicalism in two late novels set during the Napoleonic Wars, The Rover and Suspense, though her reflections on the spectral nature of nationalism is less compelling. Christopher Cairney attempts to find traces of the Byronic in Marlow, Nostromo, and Martin Decoud but does not succeed in making a [End Page 291] convincing case. Josiane-Paccaud Huguet provides a reading of the idea of Europe in "Karain" and Lord Jim by drawing on Jacques Lacan and his notion of the Name of the Father. Anne Luyat does a competent job examining the correlation between the political "grotesques" in Conrad's work and the language they use or deform as they communicate. Andzej Busza outlines the history of his personal study and teaching of Conrad and in doing so situates the work in a European literary context that extends from Gustave Flaubert to Fyodor Dostoyevsky. In an essay that could be fruitfully developed and further extended, Jakob Lothe discusses the role of narrative in identity construction among individual characters and Conrad himself. Tanya Gokulsing's article, "Polishness, Modernism, and the Manipulation of Time: Conrad's Use of 'Now' in Almayer's Folly," argues persuasively that Conrad's use of tense, especially the repeated use of the word now, is rooted more in European modernist experimentation with temporality and possibly even Henri Bergson's ideas of durée than a mere lack of facility in idiomatic English: "Conrad was far more self-conscious in his handling of even the very grammar of English than has previously been suggested," she affirms (154). Another especially compelling paper is Asako Nakai's "Europe as Autobiography? A Personal Record" which suggests that this text, like "Heart of Darkness," locates different cultural or national territories in a chronological order, as spatial difference is often represented as temporal difference. Even more intriguingly, Nakai reads A Personal Record as embodying an emergent autobiographical theory that prefigures late twentieth-century theories of self-writing; this is most evident in the text's positing of multiple beginnings. Joanna Kurowska takes up the issue of racism in Conrad advanced by Chinua Achebe. The focus of her paper is one of Achebe's most compelling arguments, that Conrad's Africans typically lack the facility of speech. In her careful analysis of language and communication in "Heart of Darkness" and...

Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902

should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines ... and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. --President William McKinley 21 December 1898 The United States topples an unsavory regime in relatively brief military action, suffering a few hundred fatalities. America then finds itself having to administer a country unaccustomed to democratic self-rule. Caught unawares by an unexpectedly robust insurgency, the United States struggles to develop and implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy. The ongoing US presidential campaign serves as a catalyst to polarize public opinion, as the insurrectionists step up their offensive in an unsuccessful attempt to unseat the incumbent Republican President. These events--from a century ago--share a number of striking parallels with the events of 2003 and 2004. The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 was America's first major combat operation of the 20th century. The American policy of rewarding support and punishing opposition in the Philippines, called attraction and chastisement, was an effective operational strategy. By eliminating insurgent resistance, the campaign successfully set the conditions necessary for achieving the desired end-state. After a brief review of the conflict, this article will examine the strategic and operational lessons of America's successful campaign. It will consider the belligerents' policy goals, strategies, and their centers of gravity. (While neither side planned their campaign using these strategic concepts, these terms will be used in analyzing the campaign to facilitate understanding.) Without addressing the considerations of any particular ongoing campaign, the article will identify lessons applicable for winning today's counterinsurgencies. In order to determine the relevance of the campaign today, this article will consider changes in the international environment that mitigate the direct application of methods successfully employed in the Philippines. To apply some lessons, one must identify alternative ways more appropriate for modern norms that achieve the same ends. Historical Overview Annexation Unfamiliar to many, the major events of the insurrection that followed America's victory in the Spanish-American War bear review. Admiral George Dewey's May 1898 naval victory over the Spanish fleet was followed in August by a brief, face-saving Spanish defense and surrender of Manila. Filipino forces had vanquished the Spanish from the rest of the country, but the Spanish surrendered the capital to US Army forces under Major General Wesley Merritt. Filipino forces were under the command of Emilio Aguinaldo, a 29-year-old member of the educated class known as the illustrados. Having led an insurrection against Spanish rule in 1896, Aguinaldo, the self-proclaimed President, was wary but hopeful that the American victory would facilitate Philippine independence. US President William McKinley decided to annex the archipelago for two principal reasons, one ideological, the other interest-based. He announced his decision to a group of missionaries, citing America's duty to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and Christianize them. (1) Like many, he believed the Filipinos were too backward to capably govern themselves. (2) The practical consideration in an era of unbridled colonialism was that a weak, independent Philippines would be a tempting acquisition for other colonial powers. Insurrection Filipinos were shocked when it became known that the Treaty of Paris provided for the United States to purchase the islands from Spain for $20 million. Buoyed by their success in defeating nearly all of the Spanish garrisons, Filipino insurgents under Aguinaldo attacked American forces in Manila on 4 February 1899. …

Laying the Foundation of U.S. Power in the Pacific

Book reviewed in this article: David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Involvement: American Economic Expansion across the Pacific, 1784–1900 This is the third volume in David Pletcher's trilogy on U.S. territorial and economic expansion in the nineteenth century. The first1 dealt with the acquisition of Texas, Oregon, and California, the second2 with the expansion of trade and investment in Latin America from 1865 to 1900. The volume under review covers American economic and territorial expansion across the Pacific before 1900. The process began with the voyage of the Empress of China to Canton in 1784. Through subsequent decades, the China market drew the United States to other Pacific regions, from the northwest coast of North America to Japan and India. Yet for Americans generally, the huge Pacific basin—much of it still uncharted—long remained an abstraction. American trade with China led the way to the Orient, but that trade never favored the United States. Chinese tea, porcelains, nankeens, and silks enjoyed a more lucrative market in the United States than did American exports of ginseng, sea otter and other furs, sandalwood, and opium—most acquired outside the United States—find markets in China. What hampered the China trade was the monopoly exercised by the Hong merchants in Canton and the Chinese restrictions on trade outside Canton. Following Britain's success in gaining access to other Chinese ports through its naval victory over China in the Opium War of 1839–1842, U.S. merchants in Canton pressed Congress for a naval force and a commercial treaty to give American merchants greater security against mistreatment, as well as wider access to the China market. These objectives the United States gained in the Treaty of Wang-hsia in July 1844. The treaty granted the United States all essential privileges won by the British. The American treaty became the model for all subsequent Chinese commercial agreements. The treaties never operated consistently because Westerners and Chinese never shared their ultimate intent: whether to expand Western trade or to protect Chinese interests and traditions.

Islam and Muslims in the Southern Territories of the Philippine Islands During the American Colonial Period (1898 to 1946)

The United States gained authority over the Philippine Islands as a result of the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Treaty of Paris (1899), which recognized American wartime territorial gains. Prior to that time the Spanish had general authority over the northern region of the Islands down to the Visayas, which they had ruled from their capital at Manila on Luzon for nearly three hundred years. The population in that Spanish zone was Christianized as a product of deliberate Spanish policy during that time frame. The area to the south, encompassing much of the island of Mindanao and all of the Sulu Archipelago, was under Spanish military control at the time of the Spanish American War (1898), having been taken over in the previous fifteen years by a protracted military campaign. This southern territory was held by the presence of Spanish military units in a series of strong forts located throughout the settled areas, but clear control over the society was quite weak and, in fact, collapsed after the American naval victory at Manila Bay. The United States did not establish its own presence in much of the southern region until 1902. It based its claim over the region on the treaty with the Spanish, and other colonial powers recognized that claim as legitimate.

Saint Pie V (review)

Reviews 153 is described by Le Goff as 'exhaustive', yet it does not contain reference to interesting work that he himself cites on p. xiv, and it includes Chaucer despite the author's assertion (p. xviii) that Chaucer had to be excluded from the coverage of the volume! John O. Ward Department of History University of Sydney Lemaitre, Nicole, Saint Pie V, Paris, Librahe Artheme Fayard, 1994; paper; pp. 432; 3 maps, 8 plates; R.R.P. FF150.00. Pius V was one of only two grand inquisitors to become pope and one of only five popes to become a saint in the last 1000 years. These two accomplishments illustrate the contrasting impressions of him. One side condemns him for his persecution of heresy, his harsh treatment of Jews, including then enclosure in the Roman ghetto, his support for religious war in France, and his excommunication of Queen Elizabeth of England. The other praises him for his efforts to reform the Church according to the decrees of the Council of Trent, to eliminate abuses, immorality, and ignorance, to promote devotion to Mary, to support educational institutions and seminaries, and to establish the tridentine liturgy. Yet most contemporaries would have remembered him primarily for his role in the Holy League that led to the great naval victory of the combined Christian forces at the battle of Lepanto in 1571. Michele Ghislieri was a Dominican friar with a peasant background. He became a cardinal in 1557 as a result of his uncompromising work in the papal inquisition, work that earned him the patronage of the Carafa pope, Paul IV. His election as pope in 1565 was something of a surprise but nonetheless a clear indication that the papacy would not revert to the situation that existed earlier in the century, when Alexander VI, Julius II, and Leo X demonstrated in different ways the worst features of the Renaissance papacy. H e was a Counter Reformation pope rather than a Renaissance one. In one respect he was a medieval pope, for Nicole Lemaitre argues that spme of his aspirations, such as the conversion of the Jews and the recovery of Jerusalem, were linked to his millenarian views that Christ would return and join the faithful in Jerusalem to establish his kingdom on earth. W h e n he died in 1572, the Jews had not converted, 154 Reviews Jerusalem was still in the hands of the infidel, and Christ had not yet returned. Nonetheless, the universal church canonized him in 1712. Lemaitre begins her biography with a justification, almost an apology, for undertaking such a task. But no apologies are necessary, for she produces a tour de force that demonstrates a mature understanding of the sixteenth-century context, and she succeeds in placing Pius V in that context. However, perhaps she devotes too much attention to some issues and not enough to others; for example, describing the battle of Lepanto in great detail but devoting far too little attention to the diplomatic activities of Pius V in France during the Wars of Religion. Her prose is lively, her erudition is commendable, and her biography of this unsympathetic and unappealing pope, while not making him sympathetic and appealing, makes him understandable. A. Lynn Martin Department of History The University of Adelaide Long, James R., ed., Philosophy and the God of Abraham: essays in memory of James A. Weisheipl, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991; paper; pp. x, 296; R.R.P. CAN$31.00. In the words of Edward A. Synan ('Aquinas and the children of Abraham', p. 203): 'The career of James A. Weisheipl, OP, was marked by passionate devotion to the problematic of medieval scientific conceptions as well as to the theological traditions of his Church and Order, and the Thomistic tradition pre-eminent in both'. This provides a fair guide in fact to the general character of the collection itself, except that one must note that the emphasis falls quite definitely on Thomistic philosophy within the theological traditions of the Church. To this extent, the essays fail to do full justice to Weisheipl's philosophical concerns, especially his contribution to natural philosophy. Weisheipl is perhaps best known for his biography...

Secrecy, Technology, and War: Greek Fire and the Defense of Byzantium, 678–1204

Secrecy, Technology, and War: Greek Fire and the Defense of Byzantium, 678—1204 ALEX ROLAND In 678, Constantinople was in extremis. For the fifth consecutive year, an Arab fleet, raised and dispatched by the great Caliph Muawija and based at the captured peninsula of Cyzicus, just south of Constantinople, was combining with an army before the European walls of the city to besiege the Byzantine capital. Seemingly powerless to drive off the newly established naval power of the Arabs, the Byzantines huddled within their walls and prayed. Their prayers were answered by a man named Kallinikos, a Greek architect or engineer who had recently escaped from his Arab conquerors in Syria in order, it is said, to bring a new and decisive invention to the Byzantines. He had invented what came to be called Greek Are, a napalm-like substance that burned in water and could be projected great distances from the bows of ships. Relying on his weapon, the Byzantines succeeded in driving off the Arab fleet and lifting the siege of Constantinople. The Arabs, for their part, encoun­ tered a killer storm in their flight for home and lost most of the remaining vessels that had not been scorched by Kallinikos and his fire.1 One or two generations later, the story was repeated. A powerful Arab fleet and army appeared before the walls of Constantinople in Dr. Roland is professor of history at Duke University. He wishes to thank I. B. Holley, Jr., Pamela Long, Seymour Mauskopf, Rod Paschall, Dennis Simms, and Everett Wheeler, who read the manuscript and provided helpful criticism. Thanks also to the T&C referees for more of the same. ‘This likens the tale to another famous naval victory, the triumph of Queen Elizabeth’s fleet over the Spanish Armada in 1588. The Armada was driven off in part by fire ships and suffered grievously in storms on the return voyage around the British Isles. See Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston, 1959), in which the victory achieves the same religious and symbolic significance that the Byzantine triumph of 678 came to enjoy.© 1992 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/92/3304-0001$01.00 655 656 Alex Roland 717 and again laid siege to the city.2 Once more the Christians unleashed their secret weapon, this time an apparently improved version that was even more effective than the original. The invading army was held at the walls while the fleet was torched and defeated. The Arabs fled once more in 718, never again to pose a serious threat to the Byzantine capital. In the second victory, the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne saw “a historical fact of far greater importance than the battle of Poitiers.”3 Coming within fifteen years of Charles Martel’s victory over the Muslims advancing into southern France, the repulse of the Arabs at Constantinople blocked further Muslim expansion and left Euro­ pean civilization to find an independent course into the modern world. Others have echoed Pirenne. Romilly Jenkins called the first repulse of the Arabs “a turning point in the history of mankind.”4 George Ostrogorsky said that the Arab attack of 678 “was the fiercest which had ever been launched by the infidels against a Christian stronghold, and the Byzantine capital was the last dam left to withstand the rising Muslim tide. The fact that it held saved not only the Byzantine Empire, but the whole of European civilization.”5 What was this remarkable weapon, this Greek fire that so many historians have seen as a decisive technology in the evolution of the West? To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it was a misnomer wrapped in a misconception, confused in translation, veiled in secrecy, and embellished with apochrypha. The composition and use of Greek fire was a state secret that died with the Byzantine empire, in fact disappeared long before Byzantium ran its course. To this day historians have been unable to agree on the composition and use of Greek Are, in spite of repeated attempts by chemists and historians to discern its nature from a fragmented historical record.6 2The return of an Asian invading force a generation after a first failed attempt is...

This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power by Kenneth J. Hagan

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 633 Interestingly, Omissi finds that the experience in air control did foster two innovations of some importance: low-pressure balloon tires and auxiliary fuel tanks. These are but some of the revelations to be found in this well-turned monograph. Lee Kennett Dr. Kennett is research professor of history at the University of Georgia, where he specializes in military history. Among his publications are A History ofStrategic Bombing (1982) and The First Air War, 1914-1918 (1991). This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power. By Kenneth J. Hagan. New York: Free Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 434; illustrations, bibliography, index. $27.95. Kenneth Hagan’s This People’s Navy is a thoughtful and enjoyably written history of the U.S. Navy that tells us much about the relationship between naval strategy and naval technology. Hagan stresses the conventional distinction between the guerre d’escadre and guerre de course (attempts to win the naval war either by destroying the enemy’s battle squadrons or by driving opposing commerce from the seas). According to Hagan, “The competition between these two strategies . . . constitutes the real essence of American naval history from the Revolution to the present” (p. 20). Wisely, Hagan does not try to claim victory for either school, and he is especially critical of Mahan’s claim that “history” has somehow decided in favor of the guerre d’escadre, no matter what changes take place in the technology. Unlike Mahan, Hagan is very sensitive to the ways that strategy and technology are ruled by circumstances. He is even willing to commit the ultimate naval heresy, admitting that many times it makes no difference who wins the naval war. In 1775, the American colonies resolved to fight the world’s greatest sea power. Britain proceeded to win the sea war, smashing the tiny flotillas and blockading American ports—but the Americans won anyway because defeating Britain on land was all that mattered. (Much is made of the temporary FrancoAmerican sea control won near Yorktown, but by then the war was decided; if the British army had any hope of retaking and holding territory it would never have been trapped in coastal enclaves like Yorktown.) The Spanish-American War was merely the colonial mugging of a naval invalid. Vietnam, Korea, the Mexican and Indian wars, even the War of 1812 and World War I fill out the list of wars in which the U.S. Navy played at best a supporting role. As often as not the side enjoying overwhelming naval superiority settled for less than victory, or flat-out lost. Only two major U.S. wars were in any sense decided by sea power—the Civil War and World War II. The Union navy prevented the Confeder­ ates from marketing cotton and being freely supplied by England, 634 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE dooming rebel armies to eventual defeat. World War II in the Pacific was the ultimate guerre d’escadre—the only time two major efficient steam navies have gone head-to-head, fighting to the last ship for sea control. But even these resounding naval victories left no clear strategic lessons. Both the Civil War and World War II were won by massive naval build-ups that began after fighting had broken out. In both cases, battle fleets built during peacetime had little or no effect on the war. Ironclads and aircraft carriers proved to be crucial, not the ships-of-the-line and battleships favored by peacetime navalists. The “secret” of U.S. naval success might easily be keep your navy small until you know what you will need—then build a lot of them. Given the absence of clear strategic necessity, Hagan is correct to note that naval construction is mainly shaped by domestic socialpolitical decisions. Countries build the type of navies they think they need. And Hagan is probably right when he suggests that the United States will now decide to do with even less ofa navy. As long as Germany and Japan remain disarmed at sea, the United States has no real naval rivals. The prolonged attempt to prop up the Soviets as a serious naval challenge is collapsing, and...

The painted word: British history painting: 1750-1830

In the latter half of the 18th century, history painting ranked at the top of the hierarchy of genres which governed the theory of art in England. Hence portrait painters like Reynolds would base their portraits on the great models of antiquity, and landscape painters such as Wilson and Turner embellished their views with classical or historical subjects. This marked admiration for the Italian grand manner, fostered by the grand tour, gave way to the development of new, British, subjects, as a result of increasing prosperity coupled with military and naval victories around the world. London became the international centre of printmaking and print-selling (a position maintained until the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars); Boydell's Shakespeare Gallery and Macklin's English History Gallery were established; and large numbers of history paintings were commissioned from figurative painters such as Reynolds, West, Northcote, Fuseli and Romney - serving as models for prints which became better known than the originals. This catalogue, based on an exhibition at the Helm Gallery, illustrates the interdependence of paintings, drawings and prints of the period, and in so doing seeks to make a contribution to a better understanding of a relatively neglected area of British art.

The naval battles of Roger of Lauria

Roger of Lauria's family was exiled from the kingdom of Sicily by Charles I of Anjou for its support of the Hohenstaufen cause but in the service of Aragon he became the most feared and renowned warrior of his generation. His six great naval victories during the War of the Sicilian Vespers closely determined the outcome of that struggle. Lauria's fame has been diminished by the minor place awarded to the War of the Vespers by modern medievalists and by its overshadowing by the Hundred Years War. But in fact it was an extremely important war in medieval history, witnessing the decline of the papacy and the kingdom of Sicily and the rise for a brief time of a new power in the Mediterranean: Aragon. Moreover, it was in this war that medieval warfare first began to acquire attributes characteristics of the later middle ages: supremacy of archers and infantry over mounted and mailed knights, appearance of disciplined and professional companies of mercenaries led by professional war leaders, and decline from chivalric warfare into nationalistic hatred and ferocity. Lauria's success lay in the superior qualities of his crews and in his own genius. Handling galley fleets successfully required mastery of the difficult nexus between land and sea for Mediterranean galley warfare was more amphibious than naval in the modern sense of the word. Lauria proved to be the greatest master of the science in the middle ages; a war leader deserving to be ranked with Richard Coeur de Lion, the Black Prince, and Nelson.

L'Ile Maurice et la France dans la deuxième moitié du siècle

The Île de France (Mauritius) and France in the second half of the 18th century. Labourdonnais's successful campaign against the British in India in 1746 encouraged the view that Mauritius was of great strategic importance. The idea was supported by a majority of people, both English and French. In fact, Mauritius was not that useful to France in the I750's : its agriculture was poor, though it improved by 1767. Its greatest hour was during the American war of Independence. Even then, French naval victories were inconclusive : hence the recourse to privateering. Mauritius played a less significant role by 1800. Thanks to their intelligence reports, the British could easily have captured it before, but they prized the Cape of Good Hope even more. However, to vindicate national honour, they concentrated on Mauritius subsequently and captured it in 1810.

The Years 375 to 371 Bc: A Case Study in the Reliability of Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon

Neither the chronology nor the interpretation of the history of the years 375 to 371 BC is yet settled. The date of the peace that followed the Athenian naval victory over Sparta at Alyzeia in Scirophorion 375 is put variously in the second half of 375 or 374 or even in spring 374. The status of the Boeotian cities at the time of the peace as well as the role of the King and the participation of Thebes are controversial, and this affects the interpretation of the peace itself.

The Batalha de Lepanto in the Portuguese Oral Tradition

ON May 20, 1571, an alliance was signed between Spain, Venice and the papacy with the purpose of containing Turkish power in the Mediterranean. John of Austria was designated as commander-in-chief of the forces of the league. When the allies obtained a great naval victory over the Turks at Lepanto on October 7, 1571, the event was celebrated in Spanish ballads and poems soon after.' Fray Miguel Ferrer's ballad Sepa se por todo el mundo / la victoria y alegria, published in Barcelona in the same year, must be one of the earliest Spanish poems on the battle, for it claims to retell the story segun consta por las cartas que han venido.2 The number of compositions commemorating the victory of the Christian forces was significant enough after it had taken place for Juan Granado el Andaluz to claim in a pliego suelto of November 14, which consisted of some Coplas

Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age under Pope Julius II: Text of a Discourse of Giles of Viterbo, 1507

The discourse of Giles of Viterbo (1469–1532) on the Golden Age is here published for the first time. It is edited from what seems to be the only extant version, found in manuscript in the Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital of Évora, Portugal. The discourse was delivered by Giles in a somewhat different form in Saint Peter's basilica in Rome on Dec. 21, 1507, at the request of Pope Julius II and in his presence. The king of Portugal, Manuel I (1495–1521), had written to Julius from Abrantes under date of Sept. 25, 1507, to announce to him some great news. The king, recently informed of three important events regarding his interests in the Far East, now wanted to communicate his information to the pope: the Portuguese, under the leadership of Lourenço de Almeida (?-1508) had landed in Ceylon and obtained from the most powerful ruler there an agreement to pay an annual tribute to the Portuguese crown; on March 18, 1506, de Almeida won an important naval victory over the Zamorin of Calicut; and in the same year another Portuguese fleet discovered the island of Madagascar.

Naval victory of June, 1665

Naval victory of June, 1665

Naval victory of june, 1665

Naval victory of june, 1665

Blue Hurricane (review)

Book Reviews323 book does not give the reader as much as he would like to know about this unusual person. Butler the man is presented by copious citations from contemporary descriptions; but where one would like something penetrating and revealing , the volume is often anecdotal or even trivial. Stormy Ben Butler whets the appetite for more because Butler, despite his questionable practices, was an important man. A first-rate biography might even sell—Butler would have liked that. William E. Highsmith Gadsden, Alabama. A Letter for Posterity: Alex Stephens to his Brother Linton, June 3, 1864. Edited by James Z. Rabun. ("Emory Sources and Reprints"; Atlanta: Emory University Library. 1954. Pp. 24. $0.75.) the well-known rift between jefferson Davis and Alexander Stephens— •the chief executive officers of the Confederacy—is further clarified by this document, which may aid future historians in their estimates of the two men. It was not entirely a matter of ill health which "exiled" the frail Vice President from Richmond during most of the war years; having opposed secession, Stephens favored peace negotiations on the chimerical basis of "a final & total seperation of the States" and in 1863 proposed a harebrained scheme for direct consultation with Union leaders to that effect. His plan had no chance of success . Quite apart from the impending military decisions at Vicksburg and Gettysburg—Stephens apparently viewed Lee's invasion of the North as a deliberate attempt to wreck his peace proposals—the Vice President's cogitations were incompatible with the plans of the Confederate war cabinet, which had long since been committed to the appeal to arms. Even so, by June 3, 1864, Stephens had no qualms in describing Jefferson Davis as an "unprincipled untruthful, unreliable bad man," who "has but one idea and that is to fight it out. He looks to but one mode of obtaining peace and that is to conquer it. Moral or political causes & effects he knows nothing about." Thwarted and angry, often resorting to name-calling, the Vice President branded Davis as an "arch aspirant after absolute power by usurpation a la mode Louis Napoleon" and "a weak, sly, hypocritical, aspiring knave." In view of this letter, one may well doubt the qualities of intellectual brilliance usually ascribed to Alexander Stephens. As shown here, his mind was cloudy, his cherished schemes were quite unrealistic, and the tone of his expressed grievances was querulous, often childishly petulant. Charles T. Miller Iowa City, Iowa. Blue Hurricane. By F. Van Wyck Mason. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954. Pp. 307. $3.75.) in blue hurricane, van wyck mason continues his fictional account of the naval history of the Civil War, this time from the vantage point of the Union forces. An historical novelist sometimes feels himself forced, by the necessities 324civil war history of his fictional narrative, to distort or even misrepresent historical events. Since this narrative is not hampered by the demands of probability, the author is happily free from this fault. Mr. Mason's historical reconstruction is satisfactory. He does not portray the total "River War" in the West. Episodes such as that at Belmont, where the Union gunboats apparently acquitted themselves with sometìiing less than distinction, are not part of the action of the novel. But such military events as are shown—notably the remarkable naval victory at Fort Henry, the river action at Fort Donelson, and the naval engagement at Memphis—are ably presented. Social history, particularly life among the profiteering set in St. Louis, seems authentic. If Mr. Mason's historical novel is unexceptionable as history, it is unfortunately not as novel. The plot is preposterous and the characterization crude. Surely it is enough, if not too much, to have a hero discover he is a bastard and kill his father only to learn he is not a bastard and did not kill his father. But Mr. Mason gives us also a heroine who becomes a victim of amnesia, is installed in a house of ill fame, and, retaining her virginity, is the chaste vessel who leads the hero back to the path of rectitude. Other characters appear: the cowardly deserter who regains his courage, the courtesan...

SUPERIOR SCIENCE WON NAVAL VICTORY OVER UNDERSEA RAIDERS

School Science and MathematicsVolume 46, Issue 6 p. 579-579 SUPERIOR SCIENCE WON NAVAL VICTORY OVER UNDERSEA RAIDERS First published: June 1946 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-8594.1946.tb05896.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume46, Issue6June 1946Pages 579-579 RelatedInformation