Naval Development Research Articles

Management of the Development Programme of the Navy – a concept for the Polish Naval Forces

The purpose of this article is to propose a model for planning the development of the naval forces in a medium-sized state through a process of their accurate and effective modernisation, on the example of Poland. Taking up such a subject arises from the delayed results of the current modernisation efforts. In order to achieve the aim mentioned above, it is recommended to solve the research problem by defining a suitable methodology facilitating the planning of naval development. The working hypothesis states that the methodology for the planning development of the naval forces should define a scope of modernisation activities undertaken with the use of tools and methods typical of management and quality sciences. The Allies’ guidelines on acquisition of defence resources stated in the NATO standardisation publications have been also taken under consideration in the research analysis. This modus operandi allows the Authors to fill a research gap in an interdisciplinary approach toward planning the process in question. The study is of conceptual nature. However, it enables the creation of well - aimed and justified programmes for the development of the Polish Naval Forces. The article displays a new perspective in the research analysis, which was formerly conducted by Authors in the years 2020 and 2021, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

American Discourses on China's Motivations for Naval Development under Xi Jinping

This article examines the security and defense discourse in the United States on China's ambitious naval development in the Asia‐Pacific region. American scholars and experts highlight four motivations for Chinese naval development: (1) the consolidation of China's territorial sovereignty; (2) the feasibility of A2/AD strategy; (3) the protection of China's overseas interests; and (4) leadership endorsement. Xi Jinping has increased the quality and quantity of China's naval capabilities and attempted to enhance his prestige by portraying himself as the driving force behind the development of China's powerful navy. Since then, the United States has not merely watched China's naval development but has considered China's navy a rival force. There are multiple ongoing debates regarding the purpose of China's naval development, including whether China aims to challenge US maritime supremacy. Some scholars are focused on China's territorial and strategic motivation, inferring the aim of posing a direct threat to US national security, but China posits that its purpose for naval development is not to confront US maritime hegemony. Some believe that the Chinese navy is not capable of doing so, and others explain that China is not aiming for a military crusade capable of causing a power transition, but rather focusing on the expansion of maritime interests.

River Defense and Fleet Building: The Song Navy in the Wars against the Jin and Mongol Forces

Abstract The Song dynasty established a standing naval force, which was ignored by some historians since Song lost its defensive wars to the Jin and Mongol forces. This article examines improvements and innovations of Chinese naval operations during Song and pays particular attention to how the state economic reforms and state-centered financial system supported naval development. Song’s population growth and demographic changes also provided manpower for the government to maintain a huge army while establishing a large navy. As the new age of naval and siege warfare emerged, gunpowder weapons and new naval technology became more widespread. The Chinese military adapted to naval warfare during the Southern Song because it was economically and technologically possible. The south’s mastery of riverine warfare created a substantial defensive advantage against the north. Thus, when the Mongols later mastered riverine warfare, they penetrated throughout the south.

‘Rather a Sham’: The 1931–1933 British Naval Mission to China and the Failure of Anglo-Chinese Naval Diplomacy during the ‘Nanjing Decade’

This article explores the 1931–33 British Naval Mission to the Republic of China. An undeniable failure in its stated objective of fostering the reform and reorganization of the Republic of China Navy (ROCN), this Mission has been almost entirely overlooked by both historians of the interwar Royal Navy and scholars of Anglo-Chinese relations during the ‘Nanjing Decade’ (1927–1937). Utilizing British Admiralty and Foreign Office documents, as well as the official reports and private correspondence circulated by the Mission’s head – and sole member – Captain H.T. Baillie-Grohman, this article demonstrates that British policymakers had little faith in the Mission’s ability to achieve tangible short-term reform within the ROCN. Instead, British officials understood the Mission as an expedient way to foster long-term Anglo-Chinese goodwill which could be exploited once the Republic of China had attained a true measure of political and economic stability. However, even these vague long-term diplomatic objectives were doomed to failure in the face of the Nanjing Government’s severe economic limitations and lack of interest in naval development during the early 1930s.

Explaining Indonesia’s Under-balancing: The Case of the Modernisation of the Air Force and the Navy

The current maritime challenges that Indonesia faced had not led to the development of the navy and air force. While theories of neoclassical realism highlighted the importance of domestic factors when determining responses at the strategic level, inefficiencies within the state bureaucracy had often been the bane of prudent policies. Our article attempts to engage with the neorealist concept of under-balancing to look at the reasons why there is stagnation in Indonesia’s naval and air force development. The proponents of under-balancing blamed inefficient bureaucracy as the cause of the issue. Our study on Indonesia’s naval and air force development indicated that inefficient bureaucracy was not the only driver of under-balancing. Looking at the agenda of naval and air force modernisation, this research argues the lack of commitment from the government, limited economic sources and the different modernisation priorities at the military unit level that had greatly contributed to the mismatch between systemic pressure and the response, in this case through naval and air force development, against it.

LEGAL REGULATION OF NAVAL FORCES ACTIVITY: WORLD EXPERIENCE

Background. The analysis of the evolution of the regulation of the navy cannot be carried out without considering the reflection of the relevant aspects in the naval historical thought. These scientific researches first of all have no legal orientation and have as their subject the content and nature of the activity of the navy, in particular in measuring its formation and development. At the same time, their generalization and evaluation in the legal dimension would be useful in the context of determining the relationship between historical thought and the development of naval law. An analysis of recent research and publications has shown that, despite aspects of the attention of legal historians to the issue of regulatory support of the armed forces, there is no relevant works on the evolution of the legal regulation of the navy. The aim of the article is to correlate global historical thought and legal support for the activities of the navy. To solve this goal, it is necessary to determine the development of relevant historical thought, to characterize its implementation in the works on naval doctrine and strategy, to assess the importance of relevant works for the development of naval law. Materials and methods. In the course of the research historical-legal, comparative, systemic, epistemological, hermeneutic, biographical methods were used. Results. The reflection of aspects of legal regulation of activity of naval forces in works of historians of fleet is investigated. The formation of the history of the navy from the seventeenth century in terms of special research and works on naval tactics and strategy is considered. It is proved that at the first stage these researches had the character of empirical generalization and provision of tactical activity of the sailing and then mechanized fleet, but from the end of the XIX century this experience was gained in the development of a maritime strategy. Conclusion. Historical studies of naval development first emerged at the appropriate scientific level as part of the development of naval tactics and strategies by French, British and American authors, whose works constitute an interconnected universal and universally recognized system of scientific research begun in the late seventeenth century. At the first stage, these studies were in the nature of empirical generalization and ensuring the tactical activities of the sailing and then mechanized fleet. But from the end of the XIX century this experience was gained in the development of a naval strategy, which gained universal character and indisputable authority for the naval forces of the most countries. In addition to use in works on naval tactics and strategy, the history of the navy from the eighteenth century reflected in biographical works, and in the twentieth century the most of the relevant historical works began to have the character of memoirs. Because the world-renowned fundamental works on naval strategy and tactics belong primarily to American and British authors, the domestic dimension of historical scientific research in this area is extremely limited. Thus, these issues require new research. Keywords: naval forces, history of navy, naval law, naval doctrine, naval strategy.

Study of maneuverability and behavior in the sea of the Light Cabotage and Logistics Support Vessel (BALC-L)

Colombia's hydrographic wealth is of great importance for the development of the economic sectors throughout the country, and together with neighboring countries such as Peru and Brazil, different needs arising from the difficult access to their more remote populations are shared. This is why, humanitarian missions are carried out through the ships of the Colombian Navy (ARC), which are at the service of the most remote civilian populations, providing, for example, response to disaster situations or covering logistics support. However, in the framework of these operations, problems have arisen due to the absence of having adequate vessels for navigation in shallow waters. To combat the problem, the ARC and the Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (MINCIENCIAS) have designated resources for Science and Technology Corporation for Naval, Maritime and Riverine Industry Development (COTECMAR) and Colombian Naval Academy (ENAP) to carry out research for the design of a new prototype vessel called BALC-L (Light Boat Logistic Support Vessel) that will meet the needs of logistics and disaster response. This paper focuses on studying and analyzing the behavior of the BALC-L ship in shallow waters, coastal areas and deep-water operations by means of numerical simulation, in order to know its movements and operational limitations under these conditions. This research presents a theoretical introduction, numerical simulation results and the validation of the data obtained from maneuverability and behavior at sea.

Ships over Troubled Waters: Examining Naval Development in Asia

What accounts for the growth of naval power in Asia, and are we witnessing a new naval arms race? Through a unique quantitative assessment of naval development in Asia, I show that economic and geostrategic factors are driving naval development in the region. Additionally, I examine the growth of naval might in China, Japan, India, and South Korea, and find evidence of a potential naval arms race in Asia. The article’s findings point to the importance of testing for regional variation in naval development and using specific weapons systems to test for evidence of an arms race.

Naval Robot Systems and Development of the U.S. Naval Power

Naval Robot Systems and Development of the U.S. Naval Power

Indonesia’s Prospects As World Class Maritime Power

The possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) allows a country to enhance their bargaining position. This approach is coercive rather than peaceful. The idealistic approach using “peaceful” methods to deter the national security threats remains valuable, however, especially for Indonesia as a maritime nation. Indonesia has three factors which obstruct its development as a maritime power. First, there are limited regulations regarding the condition of “secure” regional security in ASEAN. Second, there are limited military funds. Finally, the sea level conditions in the Indonesia waters (known as brown and green sea) are not conducive to naval development. One solution is to leverage the Indonesia Military’s international relations to enhance national maritime power.
 Keywords: Weapon of Mass Destruction, Maritime Power, Internationalism

Qing Dynasty Perceptions of Zheng He and His Voyages

In the conventional narrative, the voyages of Zheng He are said to mark a climax in China’s history, after which the nation would turn inward and reject naval development and its associated engagement with the wider world. In this narrative, Confucianism is responsible for what is presented as China’s inward turn. This article challenges this narrative by examining a consistent strain in Confucian thought of the late Ming and early Qing. It demonstrates that China’s most important Confucian thinkers regarded Zheng He and his voyages as dangerous because of Zheng He’s eunuch status. Criticizing neither naval development nor engagement with the world, these thinkers saw in Zheng He’s voyages the seeds that had led to the fall of the Ming.

Китай: военно-технические и военно-морские аспекты лидерства

The rapid growth of Chinese military capabilities and the increasing role of the military – especially the naval – factor in the PRC politics in recent years can be perceived as a shift away from Beijing’s policy dating back to the “Reform and Opening-up”, which was expressly passive and peaceful. Meanwhile, the overall Chinese military potential growth is the result of the systematic implementation of policies rooted in the Deng Xiaoping’s era decisions. At the moment, the PRC is quickly closing the gap between the U.S. and Russia in the development of military technologies, and is even gaining leading positions in some areas. The study is aimed at revealing the origins of the current rise of China’s military power and its capability to reinforce its new proactive approach to world politics with necessary military resources. The main focus is on the analysis of the PRC naval forces as – along with the nuclear forces – they are the main tool for global projection of the state power. The study also addresses China’s other military capabilities, which enable it to influence the shaping of a new world order. It seems that in the 2020s, the PRC will already be able to support its foreign policy by using force efficiently, whereas containing China can be very costly and risky. The new Chinese blue water Navy will provide the mainstay of these capabilities, which will be additionally supported by the growing expeditionary capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force and the PLA Ground Force. The far-reaching plans to develop a maritime component for the PRC nuclear forces is another important factor influencing the Chinese naval development in a major war. The expected expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and the possibility of the country’s approach to a third great nuclear power status will greatly limit the U.S. ability to deter China in Asia and around the world.

Corporate naval supply in England’s commercial empire, 1600–1760

Britain’s imperial and commercial success rested on maritime links. Whether trading wool across the Channel to Europe, seeking spices in South Asia or importing sugar from the Caribbean, shipping was an essential resource. Yet, to undertake these trades, merchants required naval supplies – finished ships, timber to build them and stores to fill them – that were not always easily accessible. This challenge was particularly apparent in the early seventeenth century for trading corporations whose specific needs demanded innovative approaches to the naval supply problem. This article examines the responses of English corporations to the challenge of supplying its international shipping by focusing on activities on each side of the Atlantic. First, it assesses the development of the East India Company’s docks at Blackwall and Dundaniel, before turning to a detailed study of ship-building and supply in Virginia and New England. In doing so, this article highlights the importance of naval supply to Britain’s north Atlantic empire, both in terms of the rhetorical support for empire and the economic incentives of participants. This reveals how traditional interpretations of Britain’s naval development have too often focused on state-driven activities (particularly from the very end of the seventeenth century) and failed to examine the complex, sometimes chaotic attempts by private individuals and corporations to overcome the naval supply challenges common to this early period of globalisation.

Koncepcje i działalność polskiej centralnej administracji morskiej w latach 1918–1921

The article presents the initiatives and operations of the organization (Stowarzyszenie Pracowników na Polu Rozwoju Żeglugi „Bandera Pol-ska” (Employees’ Association for Naval Development “Polish Flag”), individuals such as Kazimierz Porębski and national institutions – Navy section at Ministry of War Affairs, within Ministry of Public Works, Mi-nistry of Industry and Commerce and finally the emergence of Department for Naval Affairs within the Ministry of War Affairs as the beginning of naval administration of the Second Republic of Poland.

Wading tiger, swimming dragon: A study on comparative Indo-Sino naval development

In this article, I study the newly commissioned ships and ships in development in the Chinese and Indian navies to analyze how the Chinese People’s Liberation Army–Navy (PLA-N) and the Indian Navy view the other’s modernization. I argue that the Chinese and Indian navies’ development can be explained by defensive realism and that they will take steps according to this view. I predict that the Indians will focus on developing a navy that can defeat the PLA-N in Indian-dominated waters, while the PLA-N will develop anti-submarine assets to counter the Indian nuclear triad.

Russia’s Naval Development — Grand Ambitions and Tactical Pragmatism

ABSTRACTIncreased activity and more aggressive behavior at sea have revitalized interest in the Russian Navy. Moscow communicates grand naval ambitions through official doctrines, while in reality the Navy is being developed as a predominantly coastal defense force. In the light of a troubled Russian economy, this raises the question of whether the Russian Navy is in fact increasing in strength, as the official rhetoric suggests, or rather is a declining force. This article examines how current geopolitical and economic factors influence Russian naval development. It argues that despite an inevitable decline in inventory, the Russian Navy is adapting pragmatically to the strategic and geopolitical circumstances and should be recognized as a capable potential adversary in the years to come.

СУЧАСНА ІСТОРІОГРАФІЯ ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-ПРОПАГАНДИСТСЬКОГО ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ У ВІЙСЬКОВО-МОРСЬКИХ СИЛАХ ЗБРОЙНИХ СИЛ УКРАЇНИ

The main idea of the article is to study the historiography of information and propaganda in the Navy of Ukraine.Information and propaganda support of the Navy of Ukraine during 1992 – 2014 evolved in the anti-Ukrainian environment, in fact under conditions of the information war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, remaining an important factor in the development of the national navy, the training of military seamen in the national and historical traditions of the Ukrainian people, and the only effective tool for influencing the consciousness of naval servicemen.During the years 1992 – 2014, the Navy of Ukraine gained a considerable experience in organizing information and propaganda support. Unfortunately, ignoring the experience of the previous years of building the national navy has led to the fact that today we are forced to take into account the problems of organizing information work in the forces in the context of hybrid warfare, and to reassess its place in providing troops through the prism of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.The analysis of the research shows a certain interest of our scientists in the history of the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, its Naval Forces, the formation and development of the structures of moral education and the organization of moral and psychological support. Instead, the historical experience of organizing the information and propaganda support of the Navy of Ukraine during 1992 – 2014 remains unexplored. The peculiarities of the information work organization during the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation in February-March 2014 remain little explored.The study of historiography makes it possible to argue that previous researchers considered information and propaganda support mainly in the field of practical work in specific periods, without touching on a historical retrospective. The organization of information support in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is mainly covered in educational literature. The scientific works mainly covered and detailed those conceptual approaches that were already laid down in the guidance documents, and did not touch on the issues of information and advocacy in the context of the conduct of warfare.

Small Navy, Big Responsibilities: The Struggles Of Building Indonesia's Naval Power

From its inception, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) has struggled to reconcile its relatively small capabilities with its large responsibilities. This paper argues that significant reforms need to be carried out in order to improve the overall capacity of the TNI-AL and build Indonesian naval power. The Global Maritime Fulcrum vision provides this opportunity, however, it must be sustained by the political leadership in the long term as developing naval power does not happen overnight. To that end, this paper discusses four chief problems that the TNI-AL continues to face today, namely (1) a lack of a comprehensive maritime outlook, (2) stringent budgetary conditions, (3) a continental-oriented command and control structure, and (4) “turf wars” between related agencies in the government. This paper also briefly contrasts and compares Indonesia’s experience with China’s experience with naval development under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Although both countries are arguably different from one another in one way or the other, this exercise serves to highlight three lessons that may be applicable for Indonesia in managing its naval development and understanding the complexity in building its naval power. These lessons include (1) a need for strong and sustained political will in developing naval power and (2) having a clear strategic objective for naval development, and (3) a significant amount of resources are required to build naval power.

Kratki pregled značajki razvojne tehnologije idejnog rješenja za američke ratne brodove

In present study, a history analysis and review of last 30 years for U.S. naval ship concept design development trend is proposed. Based on the development of naval ship concept design model history, the three features of development process are further summarized. The first is that model-based system engineering (MBSE) becomes the basic of naval ship concept design, while the second one is that the multi-discipline crossing and combination becomes a general innovation model. And the third one is that systematization oriented naval system integration is the developing goal. Some detailed examples are presented to illustrate these three characteristics. Finally, the technology difficulties in naval ship concept design are also presented.

China’s Naval Base(s) in the Indian Ocean—Signs of a Maritime Grand Strategy?

The article assesses China’s Indian Ocean strategy against the backdrop of its naval base development in Djibouti. It argues that China’s naval force posturing stems from a doctrinal shift to ocean-centric strategic thinking and is indicative of the larger gameplan of having a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s maritime strategy comprises four key components. First, to channel naval reinforcements for securing its maritime trade and economic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—even as it strengthens the Maritime Silk Road initiative. Second, to develop logistical and operational capacities for a permanent far-seas presence, including preparedness for maritime combat and non-combat operations. Third, to undermine India’s geo-strategic influence in the IOR as the two lock into a near zero-sum game maritime competition. Fourth, to overcome the threat of US naval dominance and deter its coercive tactics by enhancing the costs of military conflict. Beijing’s ultimate objective is to emerge as a ‘global maritime power’ capable of commanding the far seas and oceans.