Naval Acquisition Research Articles

Revisiting Large Scale Defence Acquisition: Uncertainty and Acquisition Responsiveness

AbstractThis article re‐examines the model for large‐scale defence acquisition, aiming to establish a more adaptable framework that can effectively navigate the uncertainties of a dynamic and evolving operational environment. Drawing upon principles derived from Beer's Viable System Model (VSM), coupled with software engineering concepts from DevOps and innovation frameworks, the article proposes the development of a preliminary acquisition framework. The primary objective of this endeavour is to refine the framework, facilitating the creation of naval platforms that possess enhanced future‐proofing capabilities. Simultaneously, the aim is to minimize the time gap between significant acquisition decisions and achieving initial operating capability, all while upholding the fundamental requisites of the prevailing acquisition frameworks. Considering the extended operational lifespan of valuable assets, which can exceed two decades, there is a discernible risk that naval resources might become obsolete due to technological advancements driven by evolving adversarial threats. To counteract this potential scenario, it becomes imperative to regard naval acquisition as a continuous process, necessitating ongoing evolution and timely updates that align with the swiftly changing environmental conditions. This article asserts the significance of embracing a future‐proofing mindset. Such an approach holds the potential to curtail expenses associated with the swift and cost‐effective implementation of new capabilities as we advance into the future.

A Methodology for Analyzing on the Correlation of Factors Affecting the Acquisition of Military Weapons Systems : Focused on Factor Analysis of Naval Ship Acquisition Delay Cases

Naval weapons systems of the Republic of Korea are acquired through the Defense Planning Management System. Recently, acquisition of some naval ships have been delayed, and the causes of the delays have been recognized as inappropriate project management at the Execution Phase. However, we argue that the delay problem in naval ships acquisition should be approached, with due regard for the entire Defense Planning Management System. That is, We should try to investigate from Planning Phase to those of Programming, Budgeting and Execution Phases. Therefore, in this study, we investigated the actual cases of the delay in naval acquisition at all phases of the Defense Planning Management System. Based on the investigation, we tried to identify the naval ship Acquisition Delay Factors and find out the Weights of those factors. As the next step, we calculated the Influence Measures on the naval missions, including the Cost of Naval Capability Gap derived from the delays in acquisition of naval ships. As a final step, we calculated the Acquisition Delay Measures based on the interrelationship between the Acquisition Delay Factors and the Influence Measures. Then we evaluated and analyzed what the results stand for. Finally, we made suggestions for future improvement. The improvement suggestions we made for preventing delay in acquisition of naval ships in this study are as follows. First, we need a shift in perception. It is necessary to measure the Acquisition Delay Factors in acquiring naval ships and manage them from the Planning Phase. Second, resolution must be concerted efforts. All relevant agencies, not just a few, should work together to resolve the problems of acquisition delay. Third, analysis must be based on the accumulation of data. This allows the elaborating of naval ship Acquisition Delay Factors and Delay Measures. If this research method is applied to other military weapons systems in the future, we may be able to not just identify the Acquisition Delay Factors in acquisition of other military weapons systems, but also pursue improvement in those cases.

Revitalizing the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

In 2007, the US Navy, in conjunction with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, promulgated the first new naval since 1986 with the release old Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. (1) Only 15 pages, the new proved to be concise and succinct. It defined core capabilities that would contribute to national security by either preventing war or by building partnerships. The also outlined maritime strategic imperatives and implementation priorities in a cogent and well-reasoned manner. (2) No revisions to the Cooperative Strategy have been released despite significant changes in the domestic and international landscapes since 2007. In October of 2010, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, issued a guidance memorandum entitled Executing the Maritime Strategy. He stated: We continue to be forward deployed and engaged around the world, delivering the core capabilities of our Maritime Strategy, which I released three years ago. Our Maritime Strategy remains relevant. It has been affirmed by events over the past few years and by the recent conclusions from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel Report commissioned by Congress. (3) The 2007 Cooperative Strategy serves a purpose as the Navy's strategic base document, but it needs further development in four key areas in order to better guide naval acquisition decisions in an increasingly austere budgetary environment. First, the Cooperative Strategy needs to fully address the means (fleet requirements) necessary to connect the strategy's ways and ends. Second, it must better define potential maritime threats. Third, it needs to be completely aligned with the National Security Strategy. Fourth, it should outline a for maximizing cooperative maritime capabilities with our partner nations. The Cooperative Strategy asserts that the US Navy will dominate in all forms of maritime warfare, but it does not prioritize capabilities or competencies in a way that informs lawmakers and the public about the future fleet. The purpose of this article is to address these issues and illustrate why it is crucial for the Navy to specifically justify and articulate its force requirements to Congress and the American people. In order for the Navy to be on the strongest possible footing in the future and to stay ahead of pending budget cuts, it is necessary to revitalize the Cooperative Strategy to include force requirements before defense reductions. The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower Soon after its release, the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower generated significant debate in the military, academic, and defense analytic communities. Some concerns that were expressed included criticism that the was not really a strategy because it failed to define and link its ends, ways, and means? Another perspective asserted that the document fails to differentiate clearly and prioritize present day threats, accordingly it lacks focus. (5) In a critique in the Spring 2008 Naval War College Review, William Pendley argued that this lack of focus resulted in a list of core capabilities in search of a strategy. (6) Finally, a number reviewers pointed out that the maritime had lost its linkage to the overarching National Security Strategy. Analysts were principally concerned with the document's omission of the specific means with which naval strategists intend to achieve the articulated ends. The ways were spelled out very clearly through core capabilities: * Forward Presence. * Deterrence. * Sea Control. * Power Projection. * Maritime Security. * Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response. (7) The stated that the six capabilities comprise the core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships. …

Development of Product Model Management System for Naval Shipbuilding

Since the concept of integrated product development environment (IPDE) was introduced from the US Department of Defense, the Korean navy has made efforts to apply the concept to its naval design and production. Recently, the Korean navy has supported a project for naval shipbuilding to achieve the advanced defense acquisition program. This project focuses on the integration of naval shipbuilding information. The Product Model Management System (PMMS) for Korean naval acquisition was a partial result of the project. The architecture of PMMS and the product structure of a naval ship are proposed in this paper. Also, the data acquisition process among acquisition program administration offices and contractors is defined for the construction of three-dimensional naval ship product models in PMMS. By constructing the product model on previous Korean naval ships, the PMMS was confirmed to a suitable innovative acquisition strategy. PMMS is on the leading edge of new product and process innovations in the Korean naval shipbuilding.

A Comparative Study of U.S. and Foreign Naval Acquisition, Design, and Construction Policy and Practices

In an effort to reduce the cost of Navy ships without significantly reducing capability, the U.S. Navy has performed a series of ongoing investigations into areas of potential cost reduction. One of these investigations was a literature study done at the University of Michigan Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering to identify and compare acquisition, design and construction practices in a number of different countries. Recommendations for potential cost saving changes to the U.S. Navy system, including reduction of administrative costs, design to cost, and changes in labor policies, were made based on the comparisons. This paper is a modified version of the final report submitted to the Department of the Navy.