Nature Of Virtue Research Articles

ВЕРБАЛІЗАЦІЯ ПОНЯТЬ "ЧЕСНОТИ" І "ВАДИ" У МОРАЛЬНО-ЕТИЧНІЙ ТРАДИЦІЇ АНТИЧНОСТІ ТА СЕРЕДНЬОВІЧЧЯ

Background. The article outlines the history of the formation of ideas about virtues and vices in the Antiquity and the transformation of their conceptual component over the following centuries. The research focuses on the analysis of their essence, the foundations of which were laid in Greco-Roman and Christian ethics. At the same time, it is in the Middle Ages that it reaches the peak of its cultural significance. Methods. The study is based on linguistic material that represents these concepts in the works of ancient and medieval writers. All the ideas presented are illustrated by examples from the original texts with translation. Results. The concepts of "virtues" and "vices" as key elements of the moral and ethical tradition of antiquity and the Middle Ages are considered, common and distinctive features in the views on their nature are revealed. Philosophers and theologians, guided by their own vision, distinguished different virtues/vices and named different numbers of them. The existence of many points of view on the nature of virtues and vices stemmed from a strong tradition of dividing moral and ethical categories into two systems: the dichotomous system, in which virtues were opposed to vices, and the triad system, where virtue was considered the middle ground between two extreme manifestations of certain inclinations or character traits. Conclusions. Mentions of virtues and vices can be found already in Homer, Aeschylus, Socrates and Xenophon, Plato gives four basic virtues to the ideal citizen, and Aristotle puts forward the theory of dividing virtues into dianetics and ethics and comprehends vices from the standpoint of morality. The doctrine of the four basic virtues was brought to Rome by Cicero and Seneca. Later on, the Christian tradition borrowed it and adapted it to the needs of the Church, adding the theological virtues, a list of which was formulated by the Apostle Paul and developed by Thomas Aquinas. He, as well as Pierre Abelard, speaks of the differentiation of vices and sins. The list of the Seven Deadly Sins was published in 590 by Pope Gregory the Great. We owe their appearance to the early Byzantine theologian Evagrius of Pontus, who developed the doctrine of the eight evil thoughts, and to John Cassian and Eutropius of Valencia. During the Middle Ages, virtues and vices (sins) became the subject of religious and moral discussions, and the Christian tradition settled on a dichotomous approach to their nature.

Manifestasi Filsafat Nilai Dalam Pendidikan Islam

Education is a tool for helping each person reach their full potential as a valuable, admirable person. Human characteristics result from values that allow for the precedence of thoughts, words, and deeds. This study aims to outline the value philosophy and how it appears in Islamic education. A qualitative approach to library research was used for this study. Measure the truthfulness of messages and derive conclusions using content analysis techniques used in data processing and analysis. According to the study's findings, value is etymologically related to price and estimated numbers of significant attributes that are beneficial to many individuals. However, values are criteria that exist in humans in the forms of good, just, and beautiful from a philosophical perspective. The Islamic notion of moral education is consistent with the theory of value in the philosophy of value, which has as its goal the revelation of good and true character. Islamic education, on the other hand, aims to delve into the nature of virtue and truth. Philosophers believe that human beings are defined as beings of value or quality because of how they grasp and apply the essence of goodness and truth

Анти-этика Сократа: Платон versus Аристотель

The purpose of this article is to compare the ethics that can be found in Plato’s Socrates with the ethics of Aristotle in the context of Plato’s and Aristotle’s understanding of the good. The first part analyzes Aristotle’s understanding of ethics. He proceeds from the fact that there is no good in itself, there are many of them. The highest good, according to Aristotle, is the good of polis; his ethics is determined by politics. The highest happiness is to live according to virtue; moral (ethical) virtue (ἀρετὴ ἠθικὴ) can be taught by suggestion and repetition of certain actions; the nature of virtue is connected with the middle, it is necessary to avoid both excess and lack of passions and actions in order to acquire the habit of sticking to the middle. The second part demonstrates the difference between Aristotelian and Platonic concepts of virtue. For Plato, the main thing is the good in itself, which is beyond being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), but at the same time it is the cause of all things, the cognizable and cognition as such (R. 509b6–10). Accordingly, the good of polis for him is by no means the topmost good; in general, polis and politics are only one of the levels of the so-called visible realm of existence, where opinion rules. Since the good itself goes beyond the limits of existence, a person striving for it must go beyond the limits of existence, and his own self: such transcendence is described in the dialogues “Symposium”, “Phaedrus”, “Phaedo”; in the “Symposium”, it is emphasized that only this transcendence allows to give birth to a genuine virtue, and not merely a ghost of it. Thus, virtue according to Plato can in no way be the middle, and it is also impossible to teach it; it is in this sense that the views of Plato’s Socrates may be called anti-ethics (the word “ethics” in Plato does not exist at all).

What Moral Exemplars Can Teach Us About Virtue, Psychology, and Ourselves

In this article, I discuss ethical lessons we can learn from the stories and beliefs of moral exemplars—and how these insights can complement and extend the knowledge we gain through theoretical study. First, exemplars teach us psychological lessons about the way in which virtue is developed and expressed: e.g., about role modeling and post-traumatic growth. Second, they teach us philosophical lessons about the nature of virtue itself and of particular ethical virtues: e.g., about how virtuous people deliberate and how they perceive the mean of virtue. Third, exemplars’ stories teach us personal lessons about our own lives and character: e.g., about how far we are from acting or even thinking like virtuous people—and how much better our lives would be if we were genuinely virtuous. I conclude by discussing an ethical puzzle moral exemplars have not helped me solve: apparent disunity of the virtues.

Tarnished Virtues: From Richardson to Beardsley

The starting point of the article is a statement about “tarnished virtues” by one of the characters of Poor Folk, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s first novel. The word combination evokes various associations, allusions, and numerous variants of interpretation. A remark on virtues made in the frame of an epistolary novel immediately recalls the novels of a coryphaeus of the genre, 18th-Century English writer Samuel Richardson, especially his first one, in which the word “virtue” appears in the title – Pamela Or, Virtue Rewarded. However, Richardson’s comprehension of virtue seems to be quite narrow, a fact that had been already noticed by his contemporary writer Henry Fielding, who wrote a parody on Pamela. A brief analysis of the parody discovers a common vision on the nature of virtue by both Fielding and Dostoevsky, which becomes even clearer when one finds out their mutual reference point – Cervantes’ Don Quixote. The article explores other novels by Richardson, his influence upon European literature as well as his inner correlation with such writers as Karamzin and Pushkin. Besides, the article investigates the question – raised by its author some years ago – of a certain similarity between the plotlines of Clarissa and Poor Folk, the appearance of “Lovelace” in Dostoevsky’s first book, and the sudden turn of the plot from Richardson’s glorification of virtue to Dostoevsky’s dramatic realism. A few interpretations of Poor Folk are briefly analyzed, including that of Aubrey Beardsley, who illustrated the novel. Several explanations of the sentence on “tarnished virtues” are explored, and finally, the author offers a new one.

«Добродетели потускнели»: От Ричардсона до Бердслея

The starting point of the article is a statement about “tarnished virtues” by one of the characters of Poor Folk, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s first novel. The word combination evokes various associations, allusions, and numerous variants of interpretation. A remark on virtues made in the frame of an epistolary novel immediately recalls the novels of a coryphaeus of the genre, 18th-Century English writer Samuel Richardson, especially his first one, in which the word “virtue” appears in the title – Pamela Or, Virtue Rewarded. However, Richardson’s comprehension of virtue seems to be quite narrow, a fact that had been already noticed by his contemporary writer Henry Fielding, who wrote a parody on Pamela. A brief analysis of the parody discovers a common vision on the nature of virtue by both Fielding and Dostoevsky, which becomes even clearer when one finds out their mutual reference point – Cervantes’ Don Quixote. The article explores other novels by Richardson, his influence upon European literature as well as his inner correlation with such writers as Karamzin and Pushkin. Besides, the article investigates the question – raised by its author some years ago – of a certain similarity between the plotlines of Clarissa and Poor Folk, the appearance of “Lovelace” in Dostoevsky’s first book, and the sudden turn of the plot from Richardson’s glorification of virtue to Dostoevsky’s dramatic realism. A few interpretations of Poor Folk are briefly analyzed, including that of Aubrey Beardsley, who illustrated the novel. Several explanations of the sentence on “tarnished virtues” are explored, and finally, the author offers a new one.

Using the VIA Classification to Advance a Psychological Science of Virtue.

The VIA Classification of Character Strengths and Virtue has received substantial attention since its inception as a model of 24 dimensions of positive human functioning, but less so as a potential contributor to a psychological science on the nature of virtue. The current paper presents an overview of how this classification could serve to advance the science of virtue. Specifically, we summarize previous research on the dimensional versus categorical characterization of virtue, and on the identification of cardinal virtues. We give particular attention to the three-dimensional model of cardinal virtues that includes moral, self-regulatory, and intellectual domains. We also discuss the possibility that these three clusters be treated as fundamental elements of a virtue model, meaning that they clearly and directly contribute to both individual and communal flourishing across various cultures. This discussion includes a summary of previous speculations about the evolution of adaptations underlying the human capacity for using behavioral repertoires associated with the three virtues, as well as discussing ways in which they simultaneously enhance community and individual, in the last case focusing particularly on evidence concerning mating potential. We then discuss the relationship between the evolutionary perspective on virtues and Aristotle’s concept of the reciprocity of the virtues. Finally, we provide speculations about the nature of practical wisdom. While accepting the potential value of future revisions to the VIA model, that model even under its current conditions has the potential to generate a number of intriguing and testable hypotheses about the nature of virtue.

Virtue and Vice in Our Relationships with Robots: Is There an Asymmetry and How Might it be Explained?

In previous work, drawing on virtue ethics, I have argued that we may demonstrate morally significant vices in our treatment of robots. Even if an agent’s “cruel” treatment of a robot has no implications for their future behaviour towards people or animals, I believe that it may reveal something about their character, which in turn gives us reason to criticise their actions. Viciousness towards robots is real viciousness. However, I don’t have the same intuition about virtuous behaviour. That is to say, I see no reason to think that “kind” treatment of a robot reflects well on an agent’s character nor do I have any inclination to praise it. At first sight, at least, this is puzzling: if we should morally evaluate some of our relationships with robots why not all of them? In this paper, I argue that these conflicting intuitions may be reconciled by drawing on further claims about the nature of virtue and vice and the moral significance of self-deception. Neglecting the moral reality of the targets of our actions is little barrier to vice and may sometimes be characteristic of it. However, virtue requires an exercise of practical wisdom that may be vitiated by failure to attend to the distinction between representation and reality. Thus, while enjoying representations of unethical behaviour is unethical, acting out fantasies of good behaviour with robots is, at best morally neutral. Only in the rare circumstance where someone might be forgiven for mistaking a robot for a real animal or person may spontaneous responses to robots be virtuous.

The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues: its significance for virtue epistemology

Several contemporary virtue scholars (e.g. Zagzebski in Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Kvanvig in The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1992) trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications showing that Plato had already conceived of and had begun developing the concept of intellectual virtues in his discussion of the ideal city-state in the Republic. I argue that the Platonic conception of rational desires satisfies the motivational component of intellectual virtues while his dialectical method satisfies the success component. In addition, I show that Plato considers episteme as the primary intellectual virtue. Episteme, which is quite similar to Pritchard’s (in: Pritchard, Millar, Haddock (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) conception of understanding, is a cognitive achievement that cannot be attained by luck or testimony. The realization that Plato was the first to conceive of and develop the concept of intellectual excellences is not merely of historic significance. I illustrate, through the example of Zagzebski’s (1996) virtue theory, how the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues could prove promising in contemporary debates on virtue epistemology theories.

Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond ed. by Jacqueline Klooster and Baukje van den Berg

Reviewed by: Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond ed. by Jacqueline Klooster and Baukje van den Berg Scott Goins Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond. Edited by Jacqueline Klooster and Baukje van den Berg. Mnemosyne Supplements 413. Leiden, NE and Boston, MA: Brill, 2018. Pp. x + 293. Hardback, $119. ISBN: 978-90-04- 36581-0. This fine collection of papers examines the Homeric poems as Mirrors for Princes. Although other works have studied pedagogical aspects of the Homeric poems, there has been no full-scale examination of Homer as an educator for rulers. The present study presents many facets of the topic, ranging from Homer’s original pedagogical intent, to classical, medieval and modern views of Homer as a guide for those in positions of authority. In their Introduction, the editors note the emphasis the ancients placed on Homer as an educator. While observing that the Iliad and the Odyssey have a greater scope than serving simply as Mirrors for Princes, Klooster and van den Berg show that many passages in the poems have clear educational intent. Homer’s applicability for kingly education is the focus of the first article, in which Irene de Jong shows that the Homeric poems are replete with advice given to the young by a father or a father-figure. De Jong interestingly notes that the paternal (or quasi-paternal) advice often has negative consequences. The piety of Homeric kings is the subject of the following essay by Will Desmond, who focuses on the king’s numinous status. Desmond contends that Homer is most interested in extraordinary figures like Achilles and Odysseus, who “begin to take on aspects of the separate numinous types, and become alternately warrior, bard, prophet, and priest” (53). The book next turns to Homeric reception in antiquity. Jacqueline Klooster surveys interpretations of Phoenix’ ideal of the hero as a “speaker of words and a doer of deeds” (Iliad 9. 443). Examining several sources, she notes that ancient authors interpreted Phoenix’ words positively but often misapplied them in debates over the value of rhetoric and the nature of virtue. Patrick Lake next looks at Plato’s ambivalent attitudes towards Homer. Lake examines several Platonic quotations of Homer and notes that Plato does not dismiss the value of the poet. Instead Plato frequently “misappropriated and misinterpreted” (102) Homer’s [End Page 254] words in making his philosophical points. Misinterpreting Homer is also the subject of Elsa Bouchard’s essay on how ancient scholars viewed the apparent failures of Agamemnon as a leader. In their enthusiasm for authority, exegetes including Aristotle and Porphyry would go to extraordinary lengths to rehabilitate Agamemnon’s actions. Next, Maria Gerolemou examines how the wandering Odysseus is treated as an ideal for the ruler in Polybius’ Histories. Polybius saw Odysseus as a model for traveling rulers and generals, particularly in times of war. Like Odysseus, who was adaptable and observant, leaders such as Hannibal and Scipio are cognizant of the topography of areas where they will do battle. Jeffrey Fish’s following article on Philodemus’ On the Good King According to Homer is especially rewarding, since it examines new texts of Philodemus that Fish is editing. In Philodemus the Homeric king is a model of the Epicurean ruler, who cultivates friendship, peace and sobriety. The theme of virtuous simplicity as depicted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Virgil and others is the subject of the next essay by Casper de Jonge. De Jonge links Dionysius’ praise of the simple life as depicted in the Odyssey with the Augustan emphasis on simplicity. David Driscoll follows with a chapter on how intellectuals use Homer to engage in repartee with rulers in Plutarch’s Quaestiones Convivales. Driscoll claims that these scholars are ultimately depicted as petty in trying to make capital of their erudition. Elina Pyy’s article on the heroic ideal as seen in Silius Italicus’ Punica contends that Silius values most aspects of the Homeric heroic code but rejects the primacy given to earning glory. The heroes depicted in the Punica fill the heroic ideal only partially. Pyy sees the Punica as reflecting “Lucanian cynicism” and “the inevitable yet deplorable decline...

Genes and Virtue: Exploring How Heritability Beliefs Shape Conceptions of Virtue and Its Development.

In this paper, we provide an overview of our ongoing project in the Genetics and Human Agency Initiative sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation. Our project focuses on the ways that lay beliefs about the heritability of virtue influence reasoning about the nature of virtue, parenting behaviors, and the development of virtue in children. First, we provide philosophical perspectives on the nature of virtue and suggest that viewing virtue as a malleable skill may have important advantages. Next, we review theory and research that highlights the ways that lay heritability beliefs potentially undermine conceptualizations of virtue as a malleable skill. Finally, we discuss how lay heritability beliefs might ultimately affect parent-child interactions and child virtue development. The paper thus provides a brief description our project's theoretical foundation and a general look at the empirical questions it will tackle.

The objective character of virtues in Marsilio Ficino’s “Platonic theology”

Marsilio Ficino did not write a methodical, complete treatise on ethics, but the ethical questions are discussed in most of his writings, including his opus magnum entitled Theologia Platonica. The most important sources for Ficino’s ethical considerations are Platonic and Neoplatonic texts and this is strongly reflected in Theologia; one of the aspects of this dependence regards the nature of virtues: they are seen as unchangeable, indivisible and that is why they are objective. The main purpose of the paper is to present the objective character of virtues in Platonic Theology by invoking their definition, role and status with references to Plato’s works.

Virtue, Situationism, and the Cognitive Value of Art

Virtue-based moral cognitivism holds that at least some of the value of some art consists in conveying knowledge about the nature of virtue and vice. We explore here a challenge to this view, which extends the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. Evidence from social psychology indicates that individuals’ behavior is often susceptible to trivial and normatively irrelevant situational influences. This evidence not only challenges approaches to ethics that emphasize the role of virtue but also undermines versions of moral cognitivism, because the value of art cannot consist in teaching us about traits that do not exist. We thus recommend a new account of the cognitive value of art: art teaches how context and character interact to produce action.

HABITUS E VIRTUDE EM PEDRO ABELARDO: UMA DUPLA HERANÇA

Pedro Abelardo apresenta na sua obra uma teoria da virtude de natureza, à primeira vista, aristotélica. Ao que parece, essa concepção também contém diferentes elementos estoicos, que não se opõem necessariamente à visão do Estagirita. Todavia, o essencial da interpretação da Escola do Pórtico acerca da virtude difere da explicação dada por Aristóteles. No presente estudo, pretendemos examinar, primeiro, a índole da virtude como habitus na obra de lógica de Abelardo. Nesse caso, não há dúvida de que predomina a influência aristotélica. Em seguida, indicamos outras particularidades da virtude encontradas, desta vez, em tratados éticos e teológicos do nosso protagonista, as quais se revelam antes de caráter estoico. Em suma, projetamos identificar as diferentes fontes antigas e os principais intermediários latinos usados por Abelardo para elaborar a sua própria teoria da virtude. Trata-se de deixar clara a influência filosófica dominante em Abelardo sobre essa questão da virtude, já que este lógico não pode harmonizar teses substancialmente inconciliáveis.

The Nature of Virtue and its Teachability in Plato, Aristode, and Miskawayh

The Nature of Virtue and its Teachability in Plato, Aristode, and Miskawayh

James Beattie, Practical Ethics, and the Human Nature Question

This article begins by examining James Beattie's conception of speculative ethics, which he regards as the study of the foundation and nature of virtue. This leads to a discussion of the moral sense, or conscience, which Beattie claims is part of the nature of every rational being and which is designed to lead us to a virtuous life. Given this, I ask why Beattie thought himself warranted, or even needed, to dispense practical ethical advice. Answering this involves looking at Beattie's views on the importance of proper education, as well as the role played by his acceptance of providential naturalism. Beattie's answer is not only consistent with his ‘lecturing others’ as to their practical duties, his understanding of the relation between the speculative and the practical also allows him to respond to what contemporary ethicists call the Application Problem. A comparison with Reid's ethical thought will help bring out this latter point.

CONSENT, CONVERSION, AND MORAL FORMATION: Stoic Elements in Jonathan Edwards's Ethics

ABSTRACTThe contemporary revival of virtue ethics has focused primarily on retrieving central moral commitments of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and the Neoplatonist traditions. Christian virtue ethicists would do well to expand this retrieval further to include the writings of the Roman Stoics. This essay argues that the ethics of Jonathan Edwards exemplifies major Stoic themes and explores three noteworthy points of intersection between Stoic ethics and Edwards's thought: a conception of virtue as consent to a benevolent providence, the identification of virtue as a singular and transformative good, and an account of moral formation as simultaneously self‐directed and received. Common ground between Edwards and the Stoics illustrates the value of recognizing Stoic moral thought as a philosophical framework that can enhance and undergird Christian ethicists' understandings of moral development and the nature of virtue.

Nature, Virtue, and the Nature of Virtue

Nature, Virtue, and the Nature of Virtue

The Pursuit of Martyrdom in the Catholic Church in Korea before 1866

The first century of the Catholic Church in Korea was characterised by recurrent and often severe persecutions. Consequently a cult of martyrs developed from early in the Church's history. Wider Catholic concepts relating to martyrdom and spirituality, in particular belief in a corrupting world and the significance of martyrdom in offering a means of release, set individuals on the path of martyrdom. They were then informed and encouraged by the development of the cult itself, and the solidarity and support of the Christian community. However, Korean Christians also carried with them Confucian and Buddhist concepts concerning the nature of virtue, asceticism, world-renunciation and self-sacrifice, and they subscribed to a set of social values which saw kinship ties and posthumous reputation as paramount. In the area of martyrdom these indigenous concepts and values complemented and reinforced those derived from Catholicism.

HUME AND THE SECOND-QUALITY ANALOGY

In this paper I consider Hume's position on the analogy between moral qualities and secondary qualities. Although some have suggested that Hume's use of the analogy is important to his moral philosophy, others have disputed its significance to Hume. My position in this paper is that Hume believes there are indeed similarities between moral and secondary qualities that illuminate the nature of virtue. This paper is divided into two parts. In the first, I consider Hume's point(s) in raising the analogy by arguing for four similarities between moral qualities and secondary qualities that he likely had in mind; and in the second, I respond to various objections alleging that Hume did not, and indeed, could not, rely on the analogy in any substantial way.