Two major positions have emerged in the debate about the nature of kin- ship. One argues that kinship can only be analysed from the framework of the bio- logical necessities of human reproduction. The other argues that this position is nothing more than ethnocentric view of kinship derived from European culture and that only a broader cultural approach can provide a meaningful analysis of kinship. In this approach it is necessary to analyse kinship around the world from a perspec- tive derived from within each different culture. Recent developments have pointed out the inadequacies of both of these positions and call for a new approach to kin- ship. This article suggests one possible approach that goes beyond the debate be- tween biology and culture. It based upon the complementarity of human social behaviour. Czech Sociological Review, 2001, Vol. 9 (No. 2: 201-210) I would like to begin with a quote from a 1960 article in the journal, Philosophy of Sci- ence, in which Ernest Gellner began a debate about the nature of kinship. Gellner wrote: Suppose an anthropologist observes, in a society he is investigating, a certain kind of recur- ring relationship between pairs of individuals or of groups. (It may be a relationship of au- thority, or a symmetrical one of, say, mutual aid, or of avoidance, or whatnot.) Suppose the autochthonous term for the relationship is blip. The crucial question now is: Under what conditions will the anthropologist's treatment of the blip-relationship fall under the rubric of kinship structure? It will be so subsumed if the anthropologist believes that the blip- relationship overlaps, in a predominant number of cases, with some physical kinship rela- tionship. (Gellner 1960: 187; Italics in original work) That the anthropological study of kinship ultimately rests upon the biological foundation of human reproduction is not a novel idea. Since the modern study of kinship began in the middle of the 19th century there has been an intimate connection between kinship and biological processes. This relationship continues to be expressed today. A number of anthropologists (e.g., Fox, Goodenough, Holy, Scheffler) have agreed with Gellner that the processes of reproduction, birth, and nurturance, in one form or another provide the essential foundation of kinship. Furthermore, the biological processes often are taken to represent human nature and are seen to provide the necessary constant for systematic cross-cultural comparison. Culture, by comparison, is to be considered an epiphenome- non. It is useful for describing particular systems of kinship and describing human behav- ioural variety, but it is dependent upon human nature (defined in biological terms) and cannot serve as the framework for comparison. Comparative analysis is the foundation of science. In kinship, for Gellner, et al., this hinges on biology. On the other side of the debate in the Philosophy of Science were John Barnes and Rodney Needham. They countered Gellner's position by arguing that kinship was primar- ily a matter of culture. It was the interpretation of the processes of reproduction and not
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