Nature Of Human Rationality Research Articles

The Necessary Conditions for the Implementation of Articial Intelligence Ethics

The implementation of artificial intelligence morality is one of the most important themes discussed in the field of A.I. While many discussions focus on finding the right ethical system to implement, it is also important to address an important dilemma that comes with this possible innovation. Besides finding the right ethical system for A.I, we must also be aware of the conditions required to make possible the implementation of such a system. And these are not hardware requirements, but specific traits through which A.I. become more akin to humans. In this article, I will discuss what features do a.i. need to have in order to work with abstract ideas such as morality. To do this, I will first write a definition of human nature, based on past definitions written by various philosophers. And starting from this definition, I will highlight the most fundamental and essential human traits such as thinking and the nature of human rationality, communication, and the relationship between mind and body. After, I will compare these traits with a.i. to find out how close or far is the technology of achieving moral thinking. In order to accomplish these, I will use secondary sources of literature such as books and articles.

The Significance of Rationality in Reforming Ethics within Contemporary Professional Work

In the wake of judgement failures currently characterising professional audit practice, the article will argue that this case illustrates a larger problem associated with the technocratic deformity of practices within modern institutions. I will refer to the case of ethics, where human judgement has been offloaded to the performative practice of complying with codes and reduced to executing procedures. Getting to grips with what the issue is requires us to recognise the distinctive ethical nature of human rationality that cannot be replaced by machines. However, this distinctiveness is not sufficiently brought out in the current climate of work, where the conditions have instead reduced the capacities to engage in ethical judgment and to cultivate morality. Instead, the cognitive capacity to evaluate the ends of actions and the dispositions to act in that light are central to fostering morality. By drawing on the Aristotelian and sociocultural traditions, I point to the complexity and significance of rationality, and offer a way to rethink professional education practices that could reorient individuals’ thinking and cultivate ethical responsivity.

The Epistemology of Rational Constructivism

Rational constructivism is one of the leading theories in developmental psychology. But it is not a purely psychological theory: rational constructivism also makes a number of substantial epistemological claims about both the nature of human rationality and several normative principles that fall squarely into the ambit of epistemology. The aim of this paper is to clarify and defend both theses and several other epistemological claims, as they represent the essential epistemological dimensions of rational constructivism.

THE EVOLUTION OF HOMO ECONOMICUS

The article provides a review of the ways in which interdisciplinary research in modern economic thought gives a more realistic understanding of human behavior and economic decision making. On the one hand, economic imperialism drove wider application of economics methods across social sciences and brought about new interdisciplinary fields, such as law and economics, economic sociology, public choice theory, etc. On the other hand, the origin of behavioral economics, experimental economics, and neuroeconomics bridging psychology, neurobiology, and economics influences the change in the methodology used by the economics itself and fuels transformation of the model of rational economic behavior 'homo economicus', one of the central assumptions of the neoclassical economics. George Akerlof and Robert Shiller's animal spirits, prospect theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, research by Amartya Sen, Daniel McFadden, Vernon Smith, and other economists focusing on decision making either significantly limit, or supplement the homo economicus concept providing a deeper insight into the nature of human rationality. Behavioral economics has already become so strong as a separate discipline that it can be classified into two streams - Classical and Modern, and its main principles should be incorporated into a basic course of traditional economics. The achievements of behavioral economics yield higher quality of economic research and forecasting. Interdisciplinary approach to the human behavior studies and transformation of homo economicus offer new tools for the development policy making.

Uncertainty about the value of quantum probability for cognitive modeling

I argue that the overly simplistic scenarios discussed by Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) establish at best that quantum probability theory (QPT) is a logical possibility allowing distinct predictions from classical probability theory (CPT). The article fails, however, to provide convincing evidence for the proposal that QPT offers unique insights regarding cognition and the nature of human rationality.

“Mais où est le cul?”: Life and Form in Sade's Les Infortunes de la vertu and La Nouvelle Justine

I borrow Diderot's distinction between “esquisse” and “tableau” to explore the formal evolution of Sade's writing in relation to his representation of political economies. In comparing a specific scene in Les Infortunes de la vertu (1787) and La Nouvelle Justine (1799), I suggest that in the final version of Justine's story, amplification blurs generic categories and limits readerly involvement in the narrative. Sade's sketch, in contrast with his overblown pornographic tale of social chaos, provides an unmediated, livelier, and altogether more original commentary on social relations in the eighteenth century. Unburdened by archetypes and repetition, Sade's first version of Justine's misfortunes draws the reader's attention to the realist aspects of the story and to a surprisingly nuanced reflection on the nature of human rationality.

"Mais où est le cul?": Life and Form in Sade's Les Infortunes de la vertu and La Nouvelle Justine

I borrow Diderot's distinction between "esquisse" and "tableau" to explore the formal evolution of Sade's writing in relation to his representation of political economies. In comparing a specific scene in Les Infortunes de la vertu (1787) and La Nouvelle Justine (1799), I suggest that in the final version of Justine's story, amplification blurs generic categories and limits readerly involvement in the narrative. Sade's sketch, in contrast with his overblown pornographic tale of social chaos, provides an unmediated, livelier, and altogether more original commentary on social relations in the eighteenth century. Unburdened by archetypes and repetition, Sade's first version of Justine's misfortunes draws the reader's attention to the realist aspects of the story and to a surprisingly nuanced reflection on the nature of human rationality.

Rationality in Political Behavior

Public choice theory borrows the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics about the nature of human rationality and applies them to the explanation and prediction of behavior in the political domain (Downs, 1957). An attractive, and seductive, feature of the theory is a very strong rationality assumption (maximization of subjective expected utility) that appears to permit a great deal of explanation and prediction without the painful necessity of first constructing an empirically based theory of human behavior, in particular, a theory of the nature and limits of human rationality. To an important extent, deductive reasoning from the theory's basic postulates of rationality substitutes for a great deal of costly empirical inquiry. The frequent use of public choice theory today in political science calls for an examination of the assumptions of rationality that the theory employs. This paper carries out such an examination. The analysis focuses on three issues: the nature of the rationality assumption, the orthogonality of rationality and selfishness, and the possibility of altruism. Our inquiry will lead us to the conclusion that human rationality is much more complex than it is portrayed to be in neoclassical and public choice theories, and that much less can be derived by deductive means from the (amended) assumptions of rationality than has been supposed by the exponents of those theories. An important corollary to this conclusion is that a veridical theory of public choice requires a solid foundation of empirical fact about the nature of human goals and about the processes that people use in reasoning from their actions to their values.

Reviving liberty: radical Christian humanism in Milton's great poems

Milton s Great Poems Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes are here examined in the light of his lifelong commitment to the English revolutionary cause. The poems, Joan Bennett shows, reflect the issues Milton had dealt with in theological and public policy debate, foreign diplomacy, and propaganda; moreover, they work innovatively with these issues, reaching in epic and tragedy answers that his pamphlets and tracts of the past twenty years had only partially achieved. The central issue is the nature and possibility of human freedom, or Christian liberty. Related questions are the nature of human rationality, the meaning of law, of history, of individuality, of society, and everywhere the problem of evil.The book offers a revisionist position in the history of ideas, arguing that Renaissance Christian humanism in England descended not from Tudor to Stuart Anglicanism but from Tudor Anglicanism to revolutionary Puritanism. Close readings are offered of texts by Richard Hooker, Milton, and a range of writers before and during the revolutionary period. Not only theological and political positions but also political actions taken by the authors are compared. Milton's poems are studied in the light of these analyses.The concept of radical Christian humanism moves current Milton criticism beyond the competing conceptions of Milton as the poet of democratic liberalism and the prophet of revolutionary absolutism. Milton's radical Christian humanism was built upon pre-modern conceptions and experiences of reason that are not alien to our time. It stemmed from, and resulted in, a religious commitment to political process which his poems embody and illuminate.

The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (review)

Shorter Reviews125 triumph for sense or sensibility. And there are curious omissions; surely Godwin ought to have been mentioned. The larger question is whether Berger is not fighting a war that never was. Most of the developments in fiction which he cites in support of his claim that there is a war on are better construed as crises in the development of fiction itself than as attempts to supplant the social sciences. Surely the early English novel and the work of Zola demonstrate a frequent concern for near-scientific verisimilitude and an interest in social problems—but in large part arguments for and against literalness and verisimilitude stem from a concern about what makes for effective fiction qua fiction, not from concern about what fiction most effectively argues social issues. The same is true, I think, of the modern French novel, and even in the cases of Capote and Mailer. Even if there is a war on, claims like Berger's (pp. 249-50) that "Nonfiction works on social problems sell much better than novels on the same or any other subjects," display a kind of complaining tone and logical imprecision which might be tolerated in fiction, but which is out of place in the social sciences. Louisiana State UniversityMary Sirridge The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists, by Iris Murdoch; pp. 89. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, $5.95. We are brought up to believe that it is important to distinguish works of philosophy from works of literature; and we imagine that we know, roughly, how to make that distinction. Pressed to articulate our intuitions, we might observe that literature tells stories that may or may not be true, while philosophy demands the truth; that literature aims at pleasure, while philosophy aims at understanding; that literature is particular, while philosophy is universal; that literature plays on the emotions, while philosophy addresses itself to reason alone; that literature simply presents scenes from life, while philosophy demands that writing give an account of itself, and reach its conclusions by acceptable modes of argument. Each one of these distinctions can be traced to Plato, who invented philosophy by inventing its distinctness from art. If we believe that philosophy cannot understand itself without reexamining the distinctions and asking what they presuppose about the nature of human rationality, we will be likely to want to turn to Plato's texts with our questions. Modern Plato criticism has given us little help here—perhaps because critics have not themselves been troubled enough about the separation to be curious about its origins. Iris Murdoch's book promised to remedy that defect. A novelist whose best work is deeply philosophical, a philosopher who has stressed (in The Sovereignty of Good) the 1 26Philosophy and Literature special role that beauty can play in motivating us to know the good, she is at once a sensitive thinker about these issues, a Platonist believer in human perfectability, and an artist. I approached this book with the hope that puzzling texts in the Republic and Phaedrus would find in Murdoch a lucid and sympathetic interpreter. For the most part, these hope were disappointed. Based on the 1976 Romanes Lecture, the essay has as its core an examination of Plato's arguments against art in major works of the middle period, and an attempt to provide an account of good art that will avoid his objections. It has been expanded for publication by the addition of long expository passages summarizing parts of other Platonic works. There are briefer discussions of Freud, Tolstoy, and Kant. It is unclear what the book's intended audience is. The style is relaxed and popular; there is a disappointing absence both of sustained argument and of close examination of particular texts. But no reader not already well versed in Plato could derive much benefit from Murdoch's casual summaries of difficult metaphysical passages, or her breezy account of the theory of forms. And no reader who does not know The Sovereignty of Good is likely to see what motivates some of the elliptical remarks about moral growth and egoism; but for those who do know it, little is added. One also misses any attempt to...