Nature Of Doctrine Research Articles

Review: The Future of Welfare

The fascinating thing about this interesting volume of essays is the way it shows that the various interpretations of the Christian doctrine of human nature are back at the centre of political discussion. I have put it like that, emphasising the variety of interpretations, because the Christian understanding of humanity is much more subtle than single-minded exponents of any particular version of the doctrine are likely to allow. It is often said, for example, that political conservatism is solidly based on the doctrine of original sin. This angle on Christian teaching holds that humanity is intrinsically unruly and selfish, fallen by nature. The biblical myth of Adam, Eve and the fruit of the forbidden tree is usually cited, either as metaphor or history, to explain the disordered and disobedient nature of humanity. If this is your basic insight on human nature, it is argued, then you realise the folly of trying to appeal to the good in human beings, their altruism. Humanity is incurably self-centred, so wise leaders will base their policies on self-interest, will build incentives into social structures, as well as providing protections against lawlessness by means of police forces and standing armies. The function of the state is simply to guarantee the negative freedoms of the individual, by providing necessary protection against unwarranted interference. Liberated in this way, ambitious and self-interested people will generate wealth that will benefit all, not excluding those at the bottom of the social pyramid, who will receive the scraps that trickle down from the tables of the rich. One of the implications of the theory was that if you were at the bottom of the pyramid it was your own responsibility. The full Darwinian power of this theory has not been seen at work in Britain for some lime, but there was a determined effort to re-visit it during the Thatcher years.

Rule 4? Gender Difference and the Nature of Doctrine

Any attempt to talk about God today must accept the challenge of feminist theology. This article examines some aspects of the feminist critique of traditional christology and suggests a possible response in terms of “rule 4”. That is, reflecting on George lindbeck's claim that there are three regulative principles at work in the shaping of the classic doctrines of the incarnation and the trinity, the author suggests that feminist theology has brought to light a fourth rule: only those things may be claimed as theologically essential in the interpretation of Christ as could equally well be claimed for an imaginative Christa.

Salvation, Liberation and Christian Character Formation: Postliberal and Liberation Theologians in Dialogue

This article analyzes North American postliberal theological assessments of Latin American liberationists by focusing on Stanley Hauerwas’s and George Hunsinger’s critical reflections on Gustavo Gutiérrez’s theology. Both conclude that Gutiérrez tends to conflate salvation with socio‐political liberation. The author argues that reading Gutiérrez’s theology from a regulative doctrinal perspective (as articulated in George Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine) reveals a doctrinal structure holding salvation and liberation as a unity without confusion. Furthermore the author suggests that there is a mutually beneficial complementarity between Hauerwas and Gutiérrez regarding central aspects of their views on cultivating appropriate Christian character.

The role of theology in current evolutionary reasoning

A remarkable but little studied aspect of current evolutionary theory is the use by many biologists and philosophers of theological arguments for evolution. These can be classed under two heads: imperfection arguments, in which some organic design is held to be inconsistent with God's perfection and wisdom, and homology arguments, in which some pattern of similarity is held to be inconsistent with God's freedom as an artificer. Evolutionists have long contended that the organic world falls short of what one might expect from an omnipotent and benevolent creator. Yet many of the same scientists who argue theologically for evolution are committed to the philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism, which maintains that theology has no place in science. Furthermore, the arguments themselves are problematical, employing concepts that cannot perform the work required of them, or resting on unsupported conjectures about suboptimality. Evolutionary theorists should reconsider both the arguments and the influence of Darwinian theological metaphysics on their understanding of evolution.

Jürgen Moltmann as a Doctrinal Theologian: The Nature of Doctrine and The Possibilities for its Development

Moltmann derives much of the power of his theology from his willingness to endure the tensions of paradox, a willingness signalled early in his career with the title of his work, The Crucified God. Such paradoxes, however, leave unanswered questions and the need for further explorations. It is the argument of this article that an aspect of Moltmann's theology in particular need of exploration is the area of the status of Christian doctrine and its appropriate development. There is a major tension, we will suggest, between the disavowal of‘doctrine’, ‘dogma’, ‘tradition’ and ‘system’ as helpful concepts, and the strongly doctrinal and systematic content of Moltmann's theology. This tension, we believe, has something to do with the ambivalence in Moltmann's attitude to the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment, to ‘modernity’. We shall try to show that Moltmann operates with a mixture of internal criteria (based on key doctrines) and external criteria (based on perceived human needs) for assessing authenticity in doctrine. Finally, within the dynamic of Moltmann's theology, with what we shall identify as its emphasis on historicality, there are resources for advancing an account of the theological significance of the development of doctrine. We explore these and ask why Moltmann himself has not put them to greater use.

Kant on the Impossibility of the "Soft Sciences"

In this paper we will address a general problem Kant's philosophy which has drawn little attention from the philosophical community. The problem roughly is how Kant's treatment of the Anticipations of Perception stands relation to what he has to say Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (henceforth MAN)' about the scientific status of such disciplines as chemistry and psychology, i.e., whether these ought really to be considered sciences. Kant says MAN that in every special doctrine of nature only so much science proper can be found as there is [applied] mathematics it (470). Since Kant suggests, the chapter on the Anticipations of Perception the Critique of Pure Reason (henceforth KRV),2 that qualities, being measurable, can be anathematized, Kant may be taken as implying that the study of qualities can constitute science proper. Soft sciences like psychology (and, for Kant his time, chemistry) are traditionally taken to be the study of

Future conflict and military doctrine

One of the major tasks of the new appointment of Director General Land Warfare is that of producing an authoritative, coherent military doctrine for all levels of the army for every type of conflict. But before this can be done the nature of doctrine itself must be understood and defined, as well as the contingencies for which it is planned. As the first holder of this post, Major General Willcocks takes us through these processes, exploring the nature and basis of future conflict, notions of peace, conflict and war and how they inter‐relate, and the nature of military responses to the spectrum of future conflict with which we might be faced.

The Relation between Text and Experience in Narrative Theology of Revelation

This article presents a critique of the narrative theology of revelation developed in Ronald Thiemann's Revelation and Theology and George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age. Both these writers are critical of any theological method that employs a correlation between scripture and human experience, because such a correlation assumes either a foundation of knowledge in experience or the possiblitiy of meaningful experience independent of concrete narrative. It is argued here that only a dialectical conception of the relationship between experience, text, and tradition can do justice to the character of biblical revelation.

Reconsidering Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian

RECONSIDERING AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN FREDERICK J. CROSSON University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana IN A RECENT issue of this journal 1 Bruce Marshall argued that the position of Thomas Aquinas on faith and reasonin particular on the meaning of assertions about God-can be read as fundamentally convergent with that of the contemporary theologian, George Lindbeck. The claim is striking because , as Marshall acknowledges, the traditional reading of Aquinas is quite different. Traditionally-Gilson is Marshall's example -it has been thought that the conclusion of a demonstration of God's existence or unity could be true, could correspond to reality, quite independently of the religious doctrines concerning the revealed mysteries of the Godhead. But Marshall argues that, in fact, the texts of Aquinas explicitly deny that the non-believer is really succeeding in talking about God at all. The claim is a challenging one, and one from which there seems much to learn, because it is not only bold-and so promises a significant shift in the traditional understanding of Aquinas's meaning-but confronts many of the texts which seem to warrant that traditional understanding. Even if his reading is wrong, which I believe it is, there is benefit in thinking through the reasons why it is wrong and in clarifying not only what Aquinas taught but also what is at issue. I propose to do three things: first, to state the interpretation which Marshall, enlarging on Lindbeck, wants to give of the 1 Bruce D. Marshall, "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (July 89) : 353-402. The article is followed by George Lindbeck, "Response to Bruce Marshall," 403-406. 481 482 FREDERICK J. CROSSON position of Aquinas on the possibility of natural knowledge of God; second, to examine several instances of Marshall's reading which are integral to his arguments but which I think are wrong, i.e., misconstrue the texts he is dealing with; third, to reflect briefly on one of the larger issues which seem to me involved in the questions here discussed, namely the commensurability of the teachings of the major religious traditions. I In Lindbeck's view,2 the propositions about God (or "the Ultimate Mystery") which religious doctrines assert can have " ontological truth " or correspond to reality only if the categories in terms of which those propositions are formulated are adequate to express that reality. This condition may be called the " categorial truth " of the doctrine, and " can thus be described as potential ontological truth, ... a religion has this kind of truth when its ' categories ' are capable of being used to describe what is ultimately real" (359).3 The categorial truth of religious doctrine is thus a necessary condition for its teachings to be "ontologically true," i.e., to correspond to what is. But it is not a sufficient condition. The categories employed by the teachings must be used in the proper way: the composing and dividing of the categories (e.g., "Father," "person," "nature") must be a composing and dividing which asserts what, according to the religious doctrine, really is combined and separated. But for the utterances 4 of a believer to be ontologically true, they 2 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984). 3 Page numbers without other citation will be to Marshall's article; see note 1. 4 Lindbeck also seems to make it a necessary condition of " ontological truth" that the utterance be performative in J. L. Austin's sense. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 68 et pass. Since Marshall does not dwell on this in his article, I only note it here. For a brief but incisive criticism of this condition, see Paul Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics," Faith and Philosophy 5 (Oct. 1988) : 409-11. It may be that Lindbeck was led to stress utterances as the locus of truth, curious though that seems, because the alternative is to make what is uttered true, and that would be independent of the person's practice in a way that utterance seems not to be. AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN 483 must also be consistent or cohere with the paradigmatic propositions of the religion, with its revealed...

THE SYMBOLIC DIMENSIONS OF PRETEND PLAY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE CHURCH

“. . . human experience is shaped, molded, and in a sense constituted by cultural and linguistic forms. There are numberless thoughts we cannot think, sentiments we cannot have, and realities we cannot perceive unless we learn to use the appropriate symbol systems ... to become religious involves becoming skilled in the language, the symbol system of a given religion.” — George Lindbeck 1 “My child is not learning anything. All they do in there is play.” — disgruntled parent after observing a preschool church school class. 1George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984), 34.

Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian

AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOWGIAN BRUCE D. MARSHALL St. Olaf Oollege Northfield, Minnesota, 1JHE PURPOSE of this essay is to discuss the relation between Thomas Aquinas' account of religious and heological truth and a " posrtliberal " one sruch rus that sketched in George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine. Most reviewers assume that Lindbeck's .app:voach is on this point incompatible with the mainstream of the tmdition, and Colman O'Neill, writing :in The Thomist symposium on Lindbeck's book, thinks it oontradicts Aquinas in particular. This paper presents the case to the contr:ary. Afte'I." outlining O'Neill's problem, it argues thart he mis11eads Lindbeck 'and, .at greater length, that Aquinas''S views on t:ruth :are, as Lindbeck affirms, compatible with postliberal emphases. I O'Neill's basic problem with Lindbeck's: "cultural linguistic " understanding of truth is thwt Lindbeck " would clearly have us puTify [Christi.an] language by ridding it of extra-linguistic accretions-in particular the intrusion of reference to objective reality. In the end the only thing that matters is scriptural discourse verified by action." 1 Lindbeck may not intend this " purification," 2 but whatever the intention, his 1 Colman E. O'Neill, "The Rule Theory of Doctrine and Propositional Truth," The Thomist 49 (1985), p. 422. 2 So Lindbeck writes: "The great strength of a cognitive-propositional theory of religion is that •.. it admits the possibility of [ontological] truth claims, and a crucial theological challenge to a cultural-linguistic approach is whether it also can do so." The Nature of Doctrine: Religion a,nd Theology in a, Postlibera,l Age (hereafter ND), (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 63-4. 353 854 BRUCE D. MARSHALL view of •religious truth entails a raidical rejection of 1any claim that Christian beliefs !are onto1ogioally true, in other words, tha;t they rre£er or correspond •to reality. The reruson rllor this putative entailment lies in Lindbeck's manifest oontention (to be explained below) that truth claims in any l'eligion, including Christianity, are subject to 1a twofold criterion of coherence: they must fit wirth the wider linguistic (especially scriptural) paradigms of the 11eligion, and also with a range of practices appropriate to the belief the truth of which is being claimed. But, says O'Neill, Christian beliefs are not true because they cohere with anything, they are true (like all true propositions) "because of their reference to the real." a By introducing ;an irreducible element of coherence into his interpl'etation of Christian truth claims, Lindbeck inevitably " attaches to the ·term ' propositional truth ' .a purely pra.gmatic signification," so that " a quite precise philosophical option has: been ma.de in faV'or of the moral or pragmatic definition of truth." 4 O'NeiiH'is point is that " ontological " or " propositional " truth has here been equa,ted with nothing more than the con£ormity of one's life to the patterns narrated in the !biblical story (O'Nei1l's "·scriptural dis-·oourse verified by 1action ") , •such tha;t " no claims to objective truth" need be made for the story or any a.ssociated beliefs.5 Tihis, O'Neill alleges, is ·a " novel definition of ontological truth." 6 We ought to !'eject this novelty in favor of the under- •standing of Christian beliefs and their truth articulated by 'Ihomas Aquinas, whel"e it is firmly maintained against " the moral or pmgmatic definition of truth " that " propositions are true because of their I"eference ·to .the real." In order to undevstand the issues ·raised by O'Neill's criticism , it is important to bear in mind the distinction-often made but often overlooked ais well-between truth :and justis O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 430. 4 O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 429. 5 O'Neill," Propositional Truth," p. 420. 6 O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 431. AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN 355 fica.tion. The very isisue of what it means to say that propositions 1 are true can be distinguished from the issue of ho,w one justifies, warrants, or tests the truth of propositions. So, for example, one might maintain that in regard to propositions, "true" should be defined as "oorresponds to reality," or perhaps "fitly expresses experience," or perhaps "is...

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article: Introduction to the Old Testament. By Werner H. Schmidt. II Samuel. By P.K. McCarter, Jr. In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism. By John Macquarrie. Human Experience of God. By Denis Edwards. Faces of Jesus: Latin American Christologies. Edited by José Míguez Bonino. The Identity of Christianity. By Stephen Sykes. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. By George A. Lindbeck. Science, Action, and Fundamental Theology: Toward a Theology of Communicative Action. By Helmut Peukert. God, Jesus and Belief: The Legacy of Theism. By Stewart R. Sutherland. From Athens to Jerusalem: The Love of Wisdom and the Love of God. By Stephen R.L. Clark. City of Sokrates: An Introduction to Classical Athens. By J.W. Roberts. The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Translated and with commentary by Seth Bernadete. Aristotle: The Politics. Translated and with an Introduction, Notes and Glossary by Carnes Lord. The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley. Edited by Anthony Manser and Guy Stock Sartre and Marxist Existentialism: The Test Case of Collective Responsibility. By Thomas R. Flynn. Wittgenstein on Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation. (Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1). By Colin McGinn. Time and Narrative, Volume One. By Paul Ricoeur, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Derrida on the Mend. By Robert Magliola. The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political Thought in the 20th Century. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. Rationality and Relativism: In Search of a Philosophy and History of Anthropology. By I.C. Jarvie. The Bible in the Medieval World: Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley. (Studies in Church History. Subsidia 4). Edited by Katherine Walsh and Diana Wood. Warlords and Holymen: Scotland AD 80–1000. By Alfred P. Smyth. Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages. By C.H. Lawrence. Reflection of the Awakened, attributed to Sadruddin Al‐Qunawi. Edited by Sayyid Hasan Askari. Zohar: The Book of Enlightenment. (The Classics of Western Spirituality.) Translated by Daniel Chanan Matt. Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance. Edited by Brian Vickers. The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science: Kepler's‘A Defence of Tycho against Ursus’with Essays on its Provenance and Significance. By N. Jardine. A History of Christianity in India, Vol. I: The Beginnings to AD 1707; Vol. II: 1707–1858. By Stephen Neill. Radical Religion in the English Revolution Edited by J.F. McGregor and B. Reay The Damiens Affair and the Unraveling (sic) of the Ancien Régime Nicholas Wiseman and the Transformation of English Catholicism. By Richard J. Schiefen. Mission, Church and State in a Colonial Setting: Uganda 1890–1925. By Holger Bernt Hansen. The Governance of Jesuit Colleges in the United States, 1920–1970. By Paul A. Fitzgerald. Martin Niemöller. By James Bentley

The Nature of DoctrineThe Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. George A. Lindbeck

Lindbeck's central thesis can be simply stated. He contends that the cultural-linguistic view of religion, long current in the social sciences, can provide theology, and especially ecumenical theology, with useful insights into the nature of doctrine. But to engage this thesis adequately, as it is unfolded in the course of the book, is not so simple. Although compact, the book ranges widely over not one but three related subjects-religion, theology, and doctrine-and it draws on a wealth of resources from outside as well as inside the domain of theol-

Book Review: The Nature of Doctrine

Book Review: The Nature of Doctrine

The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age, by George A. Lindbeck. SPCK. London, 1986. Pp. 142. £10.00.

The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age, by George A. Lindbeck. SPCK. London, 1986. Pp. 142. £10.00.

Lindbeck’s New Program for Theology: A Reflection

LINDBECK'S NEW PROGRAM FOR THEOLOGY: A REFLECTION GEORGE LINDBECK HAS WRITTEN an important and what promises to be an influential book. In a sense he has written two books. One study (as the title indicates) is on the nature of doctrine. There his original and suggestive 'rule-theory' reading of doctrine is developed. The second study (as the sub-title indicates) is yet more ambitious . Here Lindbeck articulates a new paradigm (a culturallinguistic paradigm ' borrowed ' principally from Wittgenstein and Geertz) . This paradigm is geared to understanding religions as analogous to languages and cultures as well as to understanding theologies as largely grammatical enterprises. No minor ambition this. The book, therefore, is not simply a modest programmatic statement of the new ' Yale school 'however couched in the typically modest and cautious prose we have all become accustomed to from Lindbeck. I will forego summary of the argument of the book as a whole, and instead confine my remarks to three major moves in this argument. Two issues I shall discuss at some length: viz. Lindbeck's interpretation of the major alternative model for theology as 'experiential-expressive'; and, second, Lindbeck's own ' cultural-linguistic ' approach to 'truth' claims in theology. A third issue I will discuss very briefly-viz. his suggestive interpretation of doctrine by means of rule-theory. All these issues are clearly major strands in the overall argument. It must be clearly stated, however, that, even if Lindbeck is erroneous (as I shall suggest he is) in his interpretation of what he names ' experiential-expressive ' theologies, he might still claim that his cultural-linguistic model for theology nonetheless is more adequate than alternative models. He could still claim, for example, that a cultural-linguistic model is more 460 LINDBECK'S NEW PROGRAM FOR THEOLOGY 461 comprehensive in its scope or more attuned to some contemporary social-scientific and some linguistic philosophical analyses of religion than alternative models. Similarly, even if his model has problems which this present book does little to resolve (e.g. on truth-claims) , Lindbeck could still claim that the interpretation of doctrine, as principally second-order rules not first-order referential propositions, could still stand. My own beliefs, indeed, can be summarized as follows: first, Lindbeck's analysis of the alternative model he names 'experiential-expressive ' is seriously, even fatally, flawed; second, his own ' cultural-linguistic ' model needs to manifest far more than the present work does its ability to handle the question of truthclaims in theology to avoid (as he himself sees) the obvious charges of 'relativism', 'confessionalism ', and even 'fl.deism'; third, Lindbeck's interpretation of the nature of doctrine is nonetheless both original and suggestive, although questions on the non-propositional character of the 'rules' he enunciates are, to me at least, not yet clear. To state my own conclusions thus bluntly should not indicate that even I (' experiential-expressivist ' as Lindbeck clearly believes I am) should be unable to learn from this learned and careful programmatic work. Indeed, I believe, as my second and third beliefs cited al;>ove suggest, that, even if my other criticisms are correct, Lindbeck has nevertheless aided us all by his interpretation of doctrines as principally second-order rules rather than simply first-order propositions. If that is true, then the title of the book (The Nature of Doctrine) and thereby the sections of the book on doctrine are his most important and enduring contribution. The sections discussing the subtitle ('Religion and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age ') are the most problematic. To provide a. new paradigm for interpreting doctrine is a major contribution. It is an especially welcome contribution from George Lindbeck, the major theological contributor in North America to genuine ecumenical dialogue among the major confessions. Although Lindbeck's interpretation of doctrine clearly does cohere with his interpretation of religion and theology, I fail to see how his grammati- 462 DAVID TRACY cal reading of doctrine entails a grammatical reading of theology or a cultural-linguistic reading of religion. But just this question of ' coherence ' or ' entailment ' between the title and sub-title of this programa.tic work seems to me the greatest puzzle of Lindbeck's argument as a whole. In fact...

D’Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos

159States as international persons — In general — Recognition of acts of foreign States and governments — Act of State doctrine — Nature of doctrine — Act of State doctrine not relevant to jurisdiction — Conflict of laws — The law of the United States

Analogy and technology in Darwin's vision of nature.

One of the most significant analogies in the history of science is Charles Darwin's comparison of nature with plant and animal breeding. The analogy of artificial and natural selection is the hallmark of all of Darwin's accounts of organic evolution his last notebook on transmutation, his early drafts of 1842 and 1844, his epistolary summaries of his theory,' and his later published works. It is one of those flourishes that give his writings their enduring appeal. Darwin's use of the analogy certainly sets him apart from Alfred Russel Wallace;2 and he sought to maintain that analogy even at some cost. In the 1860s, when the use of analogy seemed to put his doctrine in jeopardy and he accepted Wallace's criticism that the analogical presentation invited misunderstanding, Darwin still felt that the "connection" between artificial and natural selection was a genuine advantage.3 Twentieth-century students have had a variety of insights into Darwin's use of the breeding analogy in his doctrine of nature. The analogy has been recognized as a rhetorically effective reflection of

The Gnostic Influence on Psychology: Effects of the Common Heresy

Judeo-Christian theology has been plagued throughout its history by heresy concerning, among many things, the doctrine of God and of human nature. Psychology, possessing a generally fluid doctrine of human nature –- from the dualistic to the holistic, from the analytical to the existential, from the “dark shadow” to the supreme good –- has also been plagued by anthropological heresy. This article tentatively suggests that historical psychology has built its anthropology upon philosophical presuppositions in the tradition of the Gnostic heresy.

MENSENMACHT

SUMMARY In reading the De Regno of St.Thomas Aquinas, a theologian comes across many points that ask for further inquiries. All the more so as it turns out to be a theological reflection on human power rather than a philosophical treatise. How does St.Thomas reflect about human power? For me the striking issue is his so called naturalism. St.Thomas's use of natura leads up to a description of this naturalism as a basic attitude, wherein a theologian, thinking about human existence, searches at all times after its fundamental data and never contents himself with bare facts. The next question is: what in fact does St.Thomas reckon as belonging to the natura of human existence? Some remarks, almost carelessly made in the De Regno about servi, servitus, attract attention. In the second part, I have gathered his ideas about slavery. Theoretically St.Thomas rejects the doctrine of Aristotle about the natural slave and tries to harmonize the factual servitus with his naturalisme. But the rejection of Aristotle's theory makes no difference at all in practice. This emerges from a reading of his commentaries on some passages of the pauline epistles. The third part of this article is an attempt to understand critically the point of view of St.Thomas by confronting his ideas about slavery with those about tyranny, a connection he has made himself in the De Regno. Thus an inconsistency comes to light: appropriating God's place is condemned as the great sin of tyrant while in slavery the master is said to represent Christ; and this legitimates the submission of the servi. So we are compelled to seek for a broader scope of vision. Slavery comes in view as a symptom of the almost incurable dilemma of Christendom, the dilemma of human power over men and loyalty to the kingdom that is not of this world. And here St.Thomas's naturalism can maybe open new ways. In spite of the inconsistencies that can be pointed out, principally this naturalism dictates a continual search for the fundamental data of human existence, as the only possible way out of the dilemma. In our own times a growing body of scientific knowledge about human behaviour and natural processes does give us new possibilities of understanding natura. Theologically St. Thomas points in the De Regno to divine providence as belonging to the natura. So it could be that in his doctrine of providence nature again surpasses nurture: is God giving us space for a free and fearless searching for natura, even with regard to human power?