It is natural to think of the world as containing, not just different individuals, but also different kinds of things. Such a thought has occupied philosophers in different ways. Metaphysicians might think about what kinds are, and under what conditions a kind counts as natural. Philosophers of science might concern themselves with the nature and status of conceptions of kind arising from different scientific disciplines. Philosophers of language might ask what, if anything, is distinctive of a natural kind term, compared with other linguistic items, and how we should understand the semantics of such terms. The advertised aim of The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds is to foster ‘fruitful interaction between philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of science on the topic of natural kinds’ (p. 23). Is it successful in this aim? The book comprises eleven papers, in addition to an introduction by the editors. In the vast majority of cases, these papers succeed in converging on the same questions and issues from differing perspectives in a genuinely interesting way. I do not have space to discuss every paper in the volume, so I will confine myself to commenting on some of these fruitful interactions.