NATO Enlargement Research Articles

Deception and Farce in Post-Soviet Russian Policy vis-à-vis NATO's Expansion

Of all the assumptions pervading the conventional wisdom about Russian foreign policy few have been more universally accepted than Russia's supposed opposition to NATO expansion. Because Russia's principal source of profit has come from rental value of natural resources from the world market, Russia's foreign policy has largely been conducted in the interests of the exporters of those resources. Compliance with NATO expansion, Moscow's decision-makers apparently believe, can only promote the pecuniary interests of that group. Given this dynamic, and confirmed by an examination of the historical record, I conclude that Moscow's leaders have acquiesced to and even supported NATO expansion.

A Special Relationship: U.S. and NATO Engagement with the Partnership for Peace to Build Partner Capacity Through Education

A new security environment dramatically different from that which defined NATO's mission at its inception poses different challenges for collective action. Newly emerging global threats such as terrorism, cyber attacks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction confront both existing Alliance members and its global partners. NATO must also consider the nature of partnership itself, and the role NATO might play in building its partners' capacity to address global threats, participate in coalition operations, and enhance defense reform.These themes - security and partnerships - were key to the NATO Lisbon Summit (held in November 2010) and the newly crafted NATO Strategic Concept. According to the recommendations of the Group of Experts on NATO's new strategic concept, For NATO 2020, the twin imperative is assured security for all its members and dynamic engagement beyond the treaty area to minimize threats.1 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified building partner capacity as a critical element in promoting and sustaining security. In an article in the May- June 2010 issue oi Foreign Affairs, Secretary Gates wrote, [There] has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.2One way in which the United States, its NATO Allies, and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Partners are cooperating to enhance security through building defense institutions and developing human capital is in the context of professional military and civilian defense education. Many believe that education - changing mindsets and restructuring the approach to military teaching and research - and not military hardware offers the best opportunity for success.What follows is an exploration of those innovative initiatives that NATO - both collectively and as individual members and Partner nations - is taking to support PfP members in building Partner capacity in the area of education. The central point is that these initiatives are important: from building reliable partners, to deterring conflict in Europe and Eurasia (specifically the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus), to strengthening Partner nations from within. I will demonstrate a link between the complex security issues facing the Alliance and the role of education and training in transforming individuals, military academic institutions, and societies. Education and training transformation is a high-priority mission that will need to be sustained for decades in order to contribute to more reasoned decisions, better leadership, and ultimately a region at peace. This sustainment is critical - and will be highlighted as essential for the programs' success.NATO's Partnership for PeaceNATO launched the Partnership for Peace in 1994 as a means of promoting reforms, increasing stability, and enhancing security relationships both between and among Partner countries and NATO.3 PfP provides a forum for Partners to individually tailor their relationships with NATO, agree on common activities, and implement them at a level and pace that is acceptable to each government. In this way, the Partners self-differentiate their levels of cooperation with the Alliance.4 Although several non-aligned, developed states joined PfP (e.g., Austria and Switzerland), the majority of the new PfP countries were former Communist states from the Warsaw Pact or the former Soviet Union. Thus, NATO viewed new avenues for cooperation as an important aspect of changing mindsets, such as encouraging support for democracy, as well as enhancing security through increased military interoperability.Since PfP was established, twelve former members have joined the Alliance.5 NATO enlargement has replaced the traditional orientation toward containment of the Soviet Union and Russia as the Alliance's principal policy direction. …

Hard power in the Black Sea region: a dreaded but crippled instrument

The Russia–Georgia war of August 2008 re-established the saliency of hard power in the Black Sea region. Yet security realities have turned out far differently than most at the time expected. NATO enlargement is off the table, but NATO’s partnerships – not least of all with Georgia – are far from moribund. Russia’s discontent with the international order is overshadowed by its despondency about itself. Its radical defence reform has produced turmoil rather than coherence. Its geopolitical advances have produced few geopolitical advantages. Georgia and Ukraine each retain the capacity to dishearten supporters and exasperate antagonists. The loss of Abkhazia and South Osetia has neither weakened Georgia nor its president. Ukraine’s pre-emptive concessions to Russia have neither diminished Russian pressure nor Ukraine’s determination to resist it. Although Turkey remains a determinant regional actor, it is more preoccupied with Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and its own domestic problems than with its northern neighbourhood. For all this, the region remains defined by asymmetry of interest, capacity and perception – and distrust. It would be unwise to expect predictability and prudent to expect the unexpected.

Lašas, A. (2010) European Union and NATO Expansion: Central and Eastern Europe

Lašas, A. (2010) European Union and NATO Expansion: Central and Eastern Europe

NATO AS AN EXTERNAL DRIVER OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN POST‐COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

So far, economic analyses of NATO enlargement have been restricted to aspects of regional security while political analyses focused on indirect peace‐building effects on democracy in the first place. Our panel regressions for 25 post‐communist countries for the period from 1996 to 2008 reveal that direct incentives provided by NATO pre‐accession are important for broad‐based institutional development. Results are even more robust than for variables measuring EU pre‐accession or NATO membership effects. This supports the argument that NATO can act as a transformative power and should strengthen its political agenda.

Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine: In or Out of European Regional International Society?

For the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine a ‘European choice’ (defined as the aspiration to join Euro‐Atlantic structures) remains an ambiguous opportunity. NATO enlargement is now firmly off the agenda, leaving the future status of the WNIS mainly dependent on engagement with the EU. Critics of the EU’s ‘eastern’ policy — often referred to as ‘enlargement lite’ — contend that it risks leaving the WNIS on the fringes of the European mainstream with their fate dependent upon whether negative or positive determinants of EU integration ultimately prevail. Meanwhile, the WNIS constitute an ‘in between’ sub‐region of post‐enlargement Europe that can be construed as part of the outer layer of Europe’s regional international society or, alternatively, at the intersection of two overlapping regional international societies. EU international society on the one side and on the other a conjectural ‘Eurasian’ regional international society premised on influences of the Soviet legacy and the lure of deeper integration with Russia.

Nuclear Arms Reductions after New START: Incremental or Transformative?

Ratification of the New START agreement by the United States and Russia opens the door to further progress as between Moscow and Washington on strategic nuclear arms reductions. As well, fulfillment of New START requirements and post-New START agreements will add credibility to Russian and American claims for international leadership on nuclear nonproliferation. New START also helps to clear the way for progress on the larger Obama denuclearization agenda, including ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and an international agreement to regulate production of fissile materials. However, nothing is guaranteed in politics, including arms control politics, and New START could backslide on account of U.S.-Russian disagreements over missile defenses, NATO enlargement or other issues.

Georgian readiness for NATO membership after Russian-Georgian armed conflict

The history of the cooperation between Georgia and NATO had started long before the Rose Revolution. Nowadays, Georgia belongs to the countries which want to join NATO. This article gauges the Georgian readiness for its accession to NATO. Study on NATO enlargement provides requirements on future members of NATO, even though it avoids such an explicit formulation. This article concludes that Georgia is not yet ready to join NATO because it has serious deficiencies in the area of democracy building, military readiness, and settling territorial disputes with its neighbours. The only area where the situation is satisfactory is the support of the public for the accession.

Security Education during the Process of Democratization and Internationalization: The Czech Lessons

In the recent two decades, security education in the former Eastern bloc has been developing dynamically. This process is exemplified by the changes implemented in the Czech Republic. After the fall of communism, a decline of security education was apparent. After the NATO enlargement and during the war on terror, new approaches to security education at primary and secondary schools have been introduced (mostly in population protection). Some universities have accredited security study programs comprising the state specified minimum security education standards. Authors analyze and suggest study programs to prepare both population and university students for emergencies. The process of internationalization of security education and the transfer of know-how to new democratic regimes are illustrated in the article.

A Strategy Based on Doubt: Russia Courts Southeast Europe

Russia's role in the Balkans waned in the post-Cold War period until President Dmitry Medvedev's Serbia visit in October 2009. The visit marked a sharp turn in Russia's approach to the region, with the new and more assertive rhetoric suggesting Russia's willingness to engage in ‘infighting’ the western military and energy security interests. Revived Russian interest in a new security mechanism for Europe to replace NATO, talk of establishing a Russian base in the Serbian town of Niš, and the likelihood that the entire length of the Southern Stream gas pipeline through Serbia will be guarded by the Russian Army, show that Russia is serious about countering NATO in the Balkans. The article examines the strategic reasons for the shift in Russian policy, specifically with a focus on why it is in Russia's vital interest to prevent a future expansion of NATO. The author briefly explores the consequences of the renewed Russian strategic interest for the region on the processes of policy- and identity-formation in Southeastern Europe. He relates the specific strategic concerns that led to Russian proposal for a new security mechanism for Europe to collectively identity problems of the Balkans. Russia's attempted strategic marriage, it is argued here, with Serbia is based on of convenience. Russia's opposition to further NATO expansion is grounded in rational security concerns; yet the sparseness of Russia's genuine strategic partners in Europe makes efforts to dissipate escalation of animosities between Russia and NATO less effective. Hence the paradox: the less successful Russia is in galvanizing opposition among the small countries in Europe against further NATO enlargement, the more likely it is that its new security policy will escalate to more drastic and antagonistic postures towards NATO.

Security and military balance in the Black Sea region

This paper analyses the current security challenges and military balance in the Black Sea region. The region, which has been going through vast political and economic transformations since the end of the Cold War, has become a platform for great power rivalry in the last few years. NATO expansion and Russian resistance to it, combined with the existing protracted conflicts, resulted in the first major regional war in a decade. The Russia–Georgia war of 2008 proved that regional actors still perceive the use of force as an acceptable tool of foreign policy. The changing military balance and abrupt increases in military expenditure from some actors suggest that the likelihood of other interstate conflicts in the region is high. Providing security and stability in the Black Sea seems more difficult than the pre‐August 2008 war period.

How has NATO enlargement impacted on NATO-Russia relations?

Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation have been turbulent, particularly since the end of the Cold War and the ‘second wave’ of NATO expansion. Despite some initial evidence of cooperation between the two, this has not been present in the majority of cases, and Russian concerns have often been sidelined. Vital in understanding this relationship is the attitudes of both to the Baltic States, and the strain that their status brought to early Russo-NATO engagement. Indeed, perhaps the greatest tension has been caused by NATO expansion into those states, illustrating a central concern in contemporary international society.

Russia's Response to the NATO Enlargement

Russia's Response to the NATO Enlargement

Smashing Atoms: Post-START Rationality and Cold War Hangover

Success in the completion of a U.S.-Russian initial post-START nuclear arms reduction agreement is only the first step in a broader program of mutual deterrence and reassurance. There remains the uncertainty whether significant reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear forces can be the gateway to additional cooperation on nonproliferation, disarmament and missile defenses – among other issues. Standing in the way of further cooperation in nuclear matters between Washington and Moscow are contentious issues of high politics, including NATO enlargement, Russia's possible role in any U.S.-NATO missile defense system, and U.S.-Russian differences over nuclear containment of Iran.

Уоррен Кристофер и Мадлен Олбрайт о проблеме расширения НАТО

This article deals with comparison of views on the NATO enlargement of two Secretaries of State in Bill Clinton’s administration – Warren Christopher’s and Madeleine Albright’s ones. Special attention is given to the secretaries’ argumentation of the necessity of the NATO enlargement. The author believes that Christopher’s and Albright’s positions had a bit of differences, but there were not radical divergences on that problem between them.

United States of America and the problem of Kosovo and Metohija

Since the break-up of SFRY, one of the key factors in the development of the Kosovo issue has been the USA. Washington will keep on playing the crucial role in further searching for a solution for this problem. Finding of a compromise solution will require to identify and re-examine relevant national interests and foreign policy objectives. The continuity of American interests in Europe since 1989 and in Serbia since 1999, respectively, points to the fact that in the foreseeable future, Washington will not change its three basic goals and they are as follows: NATO enlargement, consolidation of democratic political systems and legitimisation of humanitarian interventions. The last goal has a priority - the independent Kosovo should contribute to the legitimisation of the principle of humanitarian interventions. Consequently, one can conclude that during the September session of the United Nations General Assembly Washington will endeavour to block opening of the talks on the status of Kosovo, while it will keep on defending the unilateral secession of Pristina as a sui generis case. Initiating of talks between Belgrade and Pristina demands the creation of a striking, but also a specific and feasible idea that would be acceptable for all relevant factors in the process. The frameworks of such an idea are given in the conclusion of the paper.

Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990*

Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990*

Integration of Euro-Atlantic Norms and Values: Changes in the Military Culture of the Balkans

In the recent past societies in the Balkan states have undergone profound changes during the period after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The fragmentation of this previous regional power into a variety of successor states is the de ning feature of the region. After the recent round of wars in the Balkans, the nations in the region imposed new roles and forms for their security forces, primarily in line with the requirements set forth in the NATO and EU enlargement processes. Through the process of integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, the Balkans were pushed to adopt many of the values of the “Western” world, primarily the achievement of democracy, rule of law, and independent political systems that are open to criticism and changes. Within these processes in the Balkans, the legitimate use of military force is also a serious issue, as it has a direct bearing on the region’s stability. Recent achievements in the political penetrated deeply inside the military organizations, and were manifested through the behavior and actions of several nations’ military forces. Additional challenges facing the region relate to the area of security sector reform, with particular relevance placed on the effort to promote the adoption of theories and practices of security affairs that are part of the programs of the Partnership for Peace and NATO. An analysis of military culture in the region since the rst civil war in Slovenia in 1991 to the latest armed con ict in Macedonia re ects that changes in the military cultures in the region have become deeply ingrained in the military staff. As a consequence of many events that had an impact on regional security, a military culture developed (in the shadow of a larger security culture) that has had a wide range of impact on the regions’ military forces. In order to form a more objective opinion about military culture in the Balkans, it is important to draw a number of comparisons between the states in the region: type and level of social system, values, traditions, interests, as well as social-cultural similarities that decrease the likelihood of using military force to achieve political goals.

Stretching the umbrella: NATO's eastern expansion

This article discusses how obtaining membership in NATO has played a role in advancing Western values in former Warsaw Pact countries over the last 20 years. The author elaborates on why it was desirable for these post-Communist governments to attain NATO membership, and how the membership of these former Cold War enemies has since fundamentally expanded the strategy of the organisation. Analysis points to the conclusion that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the US compelled NATO to evolve again in its strategy and priorities, and once again triggered NATO expansion.

El keynesinianismo militar en la expansión de la OTAN

En este trabajo se hace abstracción de los intereses geoestratégicos concernientes a la preservación y fortalecimiento de la posición hegemónica de Estados Unidos, que animan al proceso de expansión de la OTAN hacia Europa Oriental, para analizar los aspectos propiamente económicos del proceso, en particular en lo relativo a la vinculación entre el financiamiento de la ampliación de la OTAN y la industria militar de este país. Se concluye que a pesar de la vaguedad y disparidad en las estimaciones sobre los “costos de expansión”, tanto la ambición del proyecto como los subsidios por parte del gobierno de Estados Unidos que ya están en juego, la expansión de la OTAN será uno de los ejes protagónicos del fuerte impulso a la reactivación del gasto en defensa que está implementándose y al que nos referimos como keynesianismo militar.