NATO Policy Research Articles

RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE FIELD OF STATE QUALITY ASSURANCE OF DEFENSE PRODUCTS: STATE OF LEGAL REGULATION AND NATO EXPERIENCE

The entry into force of NATO standards (AQAP) in Ukraine as the VST creates a regulatory basis for the functioning of a modern system of state quality assurance of defense products. It should ensure the transition from the existing system of control of defense products during production with subsequent acceptance control of already manufactured products to a system that establishes requirements for the implementation of quality management in production and control over its compliance within the framework of the execution of a defense contract. Such a transition should become a prerequisite for reducing the likelihood of risks to ensure the quality assurance of defense products. This requires improving the risk management system, in particular, optimizing approaches to their identification, assessment and substantiation of rational ways to level the identified risks. Today in Ukraine, the risk management system in the field of state quality assurance of defense products is at the stage of formation and normalization. Taking into account the orientation of the development of the Ukrainian Defense Forces towards achieving compatibility with NATO member states, it is advisable to consider the system adopted in the North Atlantic Alliance as the main guideline for the development of the risk management system. An analysis of the effectiveness of the legal support for the quality assurance system for defense products and the main principles of NATO policy on risk management in this area has been carried out. It has been established that the effective functioning of the quality assurance system for defense products in NATO countries is ensured by risk management, the basis of which is a widely known and tested management tool - the so-called risk management, the implementation norms of which are regulated by NATO standards. The system of state quality assurance of defense products in Ukraine should be based on a risk-oriented approach, the implementation of which should be synchronized with the practical implementation in Ukraine of the requirements for state quality assurance based on the NATO Quality Assurance Agreement STANAG 4107.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY IN POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EMISSION NEUTRALITY AT A TIME OF ENERGY CRISIS

The armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine has caused an accelerated energy transformationin the countries of the European Union. That has happened not only because of the Russian fossilfuel embargo but, more importantly, the reorientation of fossil fuel export rules and, thanks tothe common policy of NATO and EU member states, the imposition of multiple sanctions onthe Russian economy, which appear to be the most effective way to cut off the aggressor from thefunds necessary to finance equipment and weapons. As of August 2022, coal from Russia cannotbe imported to the European Union; the embargo on energy carriers is part of the sanctions withwhich the EU wants to persuade Russia to end the war with Ukraine.This article attempts to present issues related to the search for alternatives to fossil fuels in allsectors of the economy. The direction of the search is to choose “green energy”, i.e. hydrogen,which, due to its potential broad application, is already starting to be treated as an instrumentof emission neutrality. A significant number of EU countries have decided to achieve emissionneutrality by 2050, which means the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by approximately95% as compared to the baseline year of 1990. Achieving carbon emission neutrality, however,will oblige the EU countries involved in the project to be highly technologically advancedin eliminating emissions not only in the electricity sector, but also in other sectors (includingindustry, transport and heating sectors). These areas still function thanks to fossil fuel emissions(coal, oil and natural gas), the direct substitution of which by electricity from RES is impossible,for which reason Poland, as well as the rest of the European Union, is looking for alternatives tofossil fuels in all sectors of the economy.The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres (publication of March 23,2022) stated that it would be folly to undo now (during a time of war and sanctions againstRussia) all previous efforts to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and appealed to accelerate theimplementation of technologies and policies necessary for the transition to low-emission energysystems (Walewska, 2022). This view, of course, first of all concerns the end of hostilities in Ukraineand the withdrawal of Russian troops and the implementation of the climate package agreed in Glasgow, at the UN COP26 climate conference, which took place from October 31 to November 13, 2021 (https://ukcop26.org/).

The Strategic Culture of Trump’s America NATO Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Approach

Systemic imperatives are considered the major shaping factor of domestic intervening variables in neoclassical realism. The present article aims to study how the first shapes which variant of American strategic culture and its subcultures tends to manifest under certain structural conditions, having as object of research the Trump’s Administration NATO policy from 2017 to 2019. It was found that systemic conditions in the strategic environment, as interpreted by Trump’s foreign policy executive, favored the expression of a hardline unilateralist subculture of American strategic culture, heir of the Jacksonian tradition. However, the foreign policy executive as a whole is diverse and tends to vary between hardline unilateralists who aim to make NATO more conditional in terms of burden-sharing and conservative nationalists who reassure allies of US commitments to Europe's collective defense.

The USA and the Ideological Principles of NATO Policy in the Black Sea Region

The paper examines the role of the United States of America (USA) in shaping the ideological principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) policy in the Black Sea region. While NATO's cooperation programs with Black Sea countries and the clash of interests between NATO and Russia in this region have been widely discussed, less attention has been paid to the USA's contribution as NATO's leading member state to the alliance's ideological tenets in regions with high conflict potential. This analysis explores the interplay between the USA's conceptual policy framework towards the Black Sea region and its littoral states, as evaluated in the USA's National Security Strategies of 2015, 2017, and 2022, and the ideological principles of NATO's policy in the Black Sea region. A discourse analysis of official documents from both the USA and NATO is applied. The article focuses on the period since the 2014 change in the legal status of Crimea and Sevastopol, a time marked by increased USA and NATO patrols in the Black Sea and expanded NATO security cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia. The author concludes that there is a direct correlation between the USA's ideological perception of the Black Sea region as part of its European policy and NATO's ideological incorporation of the region into the Euro-Atlantic security sphere. The United States promotes ideological principles supporting the development of democratic institutions in Black Sea countries and freedom of navigation, competing with Russia for the region's transit potential. NATO's adherence to the ideological principle of protecting democratic states and supporting the USA's stance on freedom of navigation furthers the United States' interests in deepening economic, military, and political cooperation with the littoral states while maintaining its leadership role.

Organizing for future war and warfare: Complexity as ‘folk theory’ in NATO policy

Geopolitical and societal changes are increasingly narrated using the concept of complexity. In a range of policy contexts, from climate to finance and peacekeeping to defence and security, complexity is often prominent. This article explores the contemporary expressions of complexity in defence and security scholarship and policy. To understand the expressions of complexity, we view it as a ‘folk theory’ – what others have called a category of practice. We illustrate how this folk theory has gained prominence in NATO policy regarding the organizing of future war and warfare as one example of a policy context in which expressions of complexity are produced and promoted. Specifically, we examine NATO’s future warfighting concept – multi-domain operations – and explore how the concept offers a way and a new language to make sense of an uncertain future and make it governable from the present. We discuss some consequences of a ‘folk theory’ becoming the explanation rather than one of many explanations of the future defence and security landscape. As a representative of folk theory, complexity offers a strong performative master narrative for a variety of orientations, yet one whose practical relevance for the organization of security can be questioned.

European security and Finland’s policy during the Russian aggression against Ukraine

The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of Finland on regional policy of NATO and the Russo-Ukrainian war. The article explores political, economic and military aspects of Finland and Ukraine in the light of the Russian aggression while considering their relationships and foreign policy goals on a regional level. The author draws attention to various aspects of Helsinki domestic and foreign policy that is directed to set a balance in the region and, at the same time, to support Kyiv militarily and economically in confrontation with Moscow. Finland’s active policy of promoting stability can be described as a two-track policy, whereby EU membership and intensified military cooperation with Western partners provide a basis for the maintenance and development of relations with Russia. The author focused on energy resources and its importance for Finland that has a long history of energy trade with Russia. The trade is practically one-directional, as Finland lacks domestic fossil fuel reserves in comparison with its substantial demand for energy, whereas Russia has significant export volumes. Along with the above-mentioned issues, the author is observing aggressive Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea region. Despite peaceful relationships with Finland, Moscow does not mind to remind neighboring countries who calls the tune in the region. Pursuing this purpose, Russia increases military activity in the Baltic Sea region with relatively frequent airspace and territorial water violations. As a result, there is a risk that collisions or provocations might lead to a rapid and uncontrolled escalation. So, Finland finds its important to keep open channels for political dialogue and to seek ways to re-activate existing confidence-building measures. Finland-NATO relationships are taken into consideration as well. The author described the process of Finland’s accession to the alliance. After almost 30 years of close partnership with NATO, Finland joined the Alliance on April 4, 2023. Its partnership with NATO was historically based on its policy of military non-alignment, which changed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Following Russia’s aggression, Ukraine has requested materiel assistance from the EU and NATO member countries. To date, Finland has donated 23 defence materiel packages to Ukraine. The combined value of all defence materiel packages submitted so far is now over EUR 2 billion.

NATO and the global colour line

Abstract This article explores the role of NATO in the upkeep of what W. E. B. Du Bois termed the global ‘colour line’—namely a racialized division of the world. Formally, the organization views itself as a defensive alliance, focused on safeguarding the freedom and security of its member states. However, building on works that reveal the racialized founding and workings of international relations, I argue that this seemingly defensive aspiration is premised on an antagonistic, racialized conception of the global order that is tantamount to what Du Bois conceived as the ‘colour line’. For one thing, it is premised on the metropolitan notion that values such as freedom, security, stability, human rights, democracy and rule of law are endogenous to transatlantic alliance and, by extension, the global North. Furthermore, by positioning itself as a line of defence against threats to these values also presumes that such ‘good values’ are lacking beyond the geographical limits of this alliance. Empirically, this article will focus on NATO's policy engagement in the Middle East and its strategic concerns with ‘threats’ of terrorism, conflict, fragility and instability emanating from the region that undermine the freedom and security of the NATO states.

Doctrinal Aspects of the US, NATO and EU Policies in Military Space

Exploration of an outer-space initially and currently is closely related to militarization. All spacecraft, in one way or another, have a dual purpose and can be used for both peaceful and military purposes – from the use of launchers for orbital and suborbital flights to telecommunication systems. In the doctrinal documents of the USA, NATO and the European Union space is considered, among other functions, as a source of “space threats” and as an environment for potential military operations. Military space forces and Commands are structurally separated into a special category within the Armed Forces of Western countries. Comparative analysis of NATO and EU space strategies shows significant differences. NATO places an emphasis on the use of already existing space resources of its member states to implement its traditional goals and objectives, without concentrating on the formation of collective structures advancing space technologies. EU, in contrast, actively integrates technological inputs of its member states with powerful economic potential, initiates and develops collective inter-state projects and structures for space exploration. EU in recent times pays special attention to attempts to ensure European strategic autonomy from the USA and third countries in the space sector. The increasingly intensive entry of private enterprises into the outer space sector has been a characteristic feature at the beginning of the 21st century, their role is expanding, and cooperation of businesses with the state is strengthening on a commercial basis in the form of public-private partnerships.

The Genesis of the NATO — EU Relationship in the Context of the Historical Transformations of the World Security System

Abstract. The article presents the results of comprehensive research into the history and current state of cooperation between the two leading international organisations in Europe in modern times: NATO and the EU. The author analyses the genesis of NATO-EU relations from the post-war world order of the mid-twentieth century to the present in three periods: preliminary (unofficial) — from the 1950s to 2000, the establishment of cooperation (2001–14) and dynamic cooperation (from 2014 to the present). The article provides an explanation of the reasons for the absence of official relations between the organisations until the end of the twentieth century, the role of the Western European Union (WEU), the change in US strategic priorities after the end of the Cold War, and the impact of russian aggression on the intensification of the EU-NATO cooperation. The author emphasises the importance of joint work in countering hybrid threats, cybersecurity, and military mobility, among other things, which are crucial in the current geostrategic confrontation. The author reviews the regulatory, legal, institutional and functional support for the emergence and development of transatlantic cooperation in the context of historical changes in the global security system. The article outlines the achievements, problems and prospects of cooperation between the organisations and their role in the international arena in the context of current security system challenges. It is noted that the EU needs to strengthen cooperation with the Alliance as a key to increasing its global influence. The events surrounding the russian-Ukrainian war have demonstrated the difficulty of combining the interests of the EU and NATO without the patronage of the United States, which is no longer prepared to guarantee European security monopolistically. Europe’s main problem is the lack of a leading state capable of backing up its international influence with economic and military resources. The EU cannot overcome its supporting role in relations with NATO in the average term. Progressing in ‘small steps’ is the only correct strategy for the EU in the security sphere. The first step has already been decided: activation of reserves and development of new capabilities of the military-industrial complex (MIC), which will be the best contribution of the union to deter russian aggression. Keywords: NATO, EU, WEU, security system, USA, Alliance, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Türkiye’s Black Sea Policy for Energy Security

Türkiye’s foreign policy has recently taken on a more autonomous trajectory, less directly tied to European Union (EU) or NATO policies. Notably, the Black Sea region stands out as an area where Türkiye has charted an independent and distinctive course. The Black Sea region’s growing importance underscores the need to define Türkiye’s policy that contributes to stability in the region. Recent conflicts involving Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, as well as the interest of non-regional actors, have heightened the region’s security concerns and energy security risks. Understanding Türkiye’s role in this context is essential for international relations scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War environment of military competition was replaced by an environment of cooperation and collaboration in the Black Sea region, combining political, economic, and cultural goals. However, the emerging conflicts between some littorals, such as Russia and Georgia in 2008 and Russia and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, have caused a change in the perception of security and stability of the region. Thus, the interest of external actors in the Black Sea has increased and their attempts have begun to demonstrate a greater presence in the region. This has induced circumstances that increase the risk of conflict in the region and threaten energy security. Furthermore, the region has attracted the interest of non-littoral states, which has led to new challenges. In light of these developments, the authors seek to provide an objective examination of Türkiye’s Black Sea policy, emphasizing its growing significance within the region’s evolving dynamics and energy security concerns. In addition, the main pillars of Türkiye’s Black Sea policy under the principle of regional ownership will be discussed.

The impact of French-Israeli relations on the Middle East, Egypt and Turkey as a model, 1948-1962 CE

France was the first to put forward the idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, so the FrenchIsraeli relations had a great impact on the Middle East, especially Egypt and Turkey, since the establishment of Israel in 1948 until 1962 . Israel and France had strong relations. France supported the Balfour Declaration or Declaration in 1917 AD, and it also supported the decision to partition Palestine at the United Nations in 1947 AD, and economic relations between them grew strongly, and several trade agreements were concluded between the two countries, including the 1956 Paris Agreement. The French-Israeli relations had a significant impact on Egypt, as Israel, upon its establishment, was in a necessary need to obtain French support, and France was among the signatories to the Tripartite Declaration in 1950 AD, and France entered as a result of the Egyptian support for Algeria and the rest of the Maghreb countries in the tripartite aggression against Egypt. Egypt in 1956. Also, the Israeli-French relations affected Turkey, and a large number of Jews lived in Turkey, and they had a role in Turkish society, and since the Arab-Turkish relations were good, Turkey voted against the decision to partition Palestine at the United Nations in 1947, which further improved Israeli relations Turkish Turkey's fear of the Soviet incursion into the Middle East. Because of the improvement in French-Israeli relations, Israeli-Turkish relations improved, and Turkey had to harmonize its foreign policy with the policy of NATO, which it joined, even though France and Turkey are in one alliance, but it followed a different policy with France towards the Algerian issue, especially that between Turkey and Algeria. Historical and cultural ties and ties. Keywords: French-Israeli relations, the Middle East, Egypt, Turkey .

Environmental protection in NATO policy

Environmental protection issues emerged in NATOs political concepts in the last decades of the 20th century. Until the end of the 1980s, the Alliance was preoccupied with Cold War confrontation. In the 1990s, the geopolitical and geostrategic situation shifted. New countries joined the Alliance, and interest in environmental protection increased globally. The Pact member states began to realise the importance of environmental security. New concepts and trends emerged. Appreciating the importance of environmental protection, NATO quickly joined the mainstream of scientific research and practical projects. Their goal was, and is, to understand the causes of environmental degradation and its implications, especially in the context of safety, and to take appropriate remedial measures. NATO has been facing environmental security challenges for many years. This includes climate change, extreme weather conditions, sea level rise, risk of flooding, depletion of natural resources, land degradation, desertification and pollution. These are factors that can ultimately lead to humanitarian disasters, regional tension and violence. NATOs latest 2030 Strategic Concept highlights the security impact of climate change resulting from a lack of proper environmental protection as the Alliances primary focus.At a time of progressive environmental threat, accompanied by rapid climate change, the activities of the Alliance in the field of ensuring environmental security cannot be overestimated.

Russia – NATO Uneasy Ties: Transformation, Cooperation to NATO Accession

Russian Federation re-emerged on the global map in December 1991. It was one of the Soviet Republics since the communist party took over in 1922, and after about two decades, it became one of the two superpowers. The Soviet communist ideology was a deterrent to the United States-- the capitalist superpower. The US established a collective security organization for Western European countries called NATO to contain the expansion of communism. The fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the cold war; however, the Alliance was not dissolved. Since the last decade of the twentieth century, Russia and NATO have transformed and sought ways to cooperate. However, the accession policy of NATO became a threat to Russia. The article contributes to understanding deep-rooted issues between Russia and NATO. It examines their transformation and cooperation phases. It deals with the post-cold war accession policy of NATO and Russian concerns over it. The paper analysis various forums of their cooperation and inquiries why NATO's membership was not extended to Russia. It further delves into the significance of Ukraine for Russia. Diverse research methodologies are adopted in this research work.

The evolution of NATO policy in the conditions of the russian-Ukrainian war

Abstract. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of NATO policy within the context of the russian-Ukrainian war. The North Atlantic Alliance consistently demonstrates its commitment as a reliable guarantor of peace, security, and stability for its member countries. The foundation of NATO’s accomplishments lies in its dependable and effective institutional structure, well-regulated political consultation mechanisms geared towards consensus-building, and the aspiration to constantly maintain and improve the balance of transatlantic interests. The russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a critical reassessment of NATO’s role and its development prospects, primarily regarding the imperative of strengthening the Alliance’s defensive potential, the expansion of its operational scope, and the refinement of its security missions. The new Strategic Concept outlined NATO’s priorities, core objectives, and approaches. It also identified the main threats to Euro-Atlantic security and proposed countermeasures for the next decade. The Alliance reacted to the kremlin’s aggressive intentions by activating its defence plans and deploying additional military formations on NATO’s eastern flank, backed by significant air and naval potential. Moreover, the Alliance enhances the reliability of nuclear forces, strengthens the operational capabilities of conventional armed forces and anti-missile defence assets, and reinforces the resilience of member countries for collective defence. An analysis of Ukraine’s relations with NATO amidst the large-scale russian aggression underscores that the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people could facilitate a quick accession of Ukraine to the Alliance following the end of the war. An invitation to Ukraine at the 2023 Vilnius Summit opens prospects for establishing long-term sustainable peace in Europe. Keywords: NATO, russian aggression, Strategic Concept, NATO expansion, Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

Perception of resilience in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Poland

ObjectivesThe purpose of the article is to present the place of resilience in the security strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Poland. This is particularly important in the context of the Russian Federation's military aggression against Ukraine and Moscow's attempts to destabilize other regions. In light of such a stated goal, the following research problem was established: will the concept of resilience to threats become a key concept for NATO and Polish security policy in the third decade of the 21st century?MethodsThe research methods used in the research process primarily included analysis of source materials (legal acts), scientific studies and publications of government institutions.ResultsThe results of the study confirmed the thesis that the concept of resilience now occupies a very important place in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance and Poland. This is their response primarily to the aggressive policies of the Russian Federation: the attack against Ukraine, threats against NATO (including Poland), the attempt to destabilize the situation in other regions of the world. NATO, including Poland, has realized the need to build efficient collective defense mechanisms and resilience to military and non-military threats.ConclusionsConclusions of the research indicate that the North Atlantic Alliance is increasing its emphasis on creating resilience to threats. Unfortunately, in Poland, the apt provisions of the National Security Strategy regarding resilience and universal defense have so far remained only in the realm of declarations.

National Defense and Environmental Protection: On the Czech Armed Forces´ Approach to the Development of Environmental Legislation in the Czech, EU and NATO Context

The aim of this study was to create an overview of the Czech Armed Forces' development in approach to environmental protection from 1989 to 2022. Using the methods of analysis, synthesis and comparison of the Czech, EU´s and NATO´s environmental legislation, we created a comprehensive and previously unpublished overview of environmental protection within the Czech Armed Forces. Found outputs were set into illustrations depicting the activities in the environmental field with internal links between civil legislation, EU's requirements, and NATO's policy in chronological order. We conclude that the year 2000 represents a key milestone from which the approach to environmental protection have stagnated. Among the reasons for the stagnation, we identify commanders' concerns about "green approach" to troop training and the lack environmental education within defence department.

Developing an enduring role for NATO’s fight against terrorism

ABSTRACT As NATO drafts its next Strategic Concept, it faces a persistent and more diverse threat from terrorism than when the 2010 Strategic Concept was written. In addition, the Alliance faces greater threats from geopolitical competition, leading to its member states shifting resources away from the fight against terrorism. In drafting of the next Strategic Concept, NATO must continue to prioritize the development of an enduring and sustainable approach to maintain its focus on terrorist threats. This essay argues that a sustainable and enduring approach to fighting terrorism requires NATO to adopt three key tasks (1) improving the Alliance’s defensive capabilities, (2) maintaining its ability to respond to crises and (3) focusing on intelligence sharing. In order to ensure this approach is sustainable for the Alliance, NATO must implement these key tasks by focusing on and integrating terrorism within NATO policy and increasing collaboration with allies and multinational partners.

Transformation of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy After 2014 Regarding Ukraine Crisis

This research aims at analysing the nature and transformation of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy since 2014. Having been founded in the post-Cold War peace environment, the Common Security and Defence Policy had an expeditionary characteristic compatible with the European Union’s soft/normative power. However, this peaceful security environment changed after the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. With new security parameters, the transformation of the Common Security and Defence Policy needs to be analysed in an academic context. In this regard, the research question of the article has been conceptualized as “To what extend has post-Ukraine Crisis security perception affected Common Security and Defence Policy transformation?”. There are two main findings of this research. First, the characteristics of the Common Security and Defence Policy have evolved from being expeditionary to being territorial/collective defence in nature. Second, the fragmentation in the European Union is deepening in terms of defence and security policies. This research suggests that the likely outcome is that the European Union will choose to conform to the United States’ NATO policies in order to deter the Russian Federation

NATO’S STRUGGLE FOR A CHINA POLICY: ALLIANCE, ALIGNMENT, OR ABDICATION?

NATO has promised to address China as “an alliance” but struggles to define underpinning principles. This article explores NATO's policy options and prospects. It traces the evolution of NATO China policy from 2017 on; assesses NATO's ability to pull China under its resiliency policy regime; and evaluates NATO's capacity to address wider issues of global order. The article concludes that NATO is not able to develop a politico-military strategy in line with classical alliance policy. Instead, NATO has pursued an incremental alignment policy to nourish its internal consensus and stave off the dire prospect of leadership abdication. Pushed by China's implicit support for the war in Ukraine, NATO must now become more politically explicit about China, global order, and NATO's approach to it.

NATO-EU: security policy in the XXI century.

The article characterizes the state and development of the security policy of NATO and the EU in the 21st century. The main provisions of the EU security system are disclosed. Attention is focused on the key aspects of the formation of a strategic partnership in the specified period. Challenges to European and global security that consolidate NATO and EU efforts to deepen cooperation are outlined. There are terrorism, Russian aggression, hybrid, and now full-scale war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, the strengthening of the role of China, Brexit, climate change, 5G, cybercrime, the global remilitarization race, increasing defense budgets, the coronavirus pandemic, and others. It is noted that both the EU and NATO are looking for adequate tools for responding to these challenges and tools for adapting to the new state of affairs. It was emphasized that Russian aggression and an attack on a sovereign democratic state have become the biggest threat to European security. The modern architecture of European and world security largely depends on whether a collective action will be able to provide support for Ukraine, protect values and stabilize the existing world order. Documents, official publications, statements of leaders, etc. were analyzed. The main principles and directions of NATO-EU cooperation in the field of security, as well as the priorities of political-strategic and diplomatic cooperation, which ensures the coordination of plans, have been accumulated. The strategic partnership is based on strengthening cooperation on crisis management, enabling NATO to support the EU in crisis management and operations through the sharing of resources, operational planning and management. It was concluded that the closer convergence of EU and NATO security policies in 2016 was activated by the EU policy, which was aimed at strengthening Europe’s collective security through cooperation with its strategic partners, starting with NATO. It was noted that one of the key principles of cooperation between the EU and NATO is a single set of forces. This means that joint member states do not have separate armed forces for NATO and separate ones for the EU. That is why the EU and NATO are working to streamline the priorities and bring together the processes of defense planning, cooperation in civil and military operations, military exercises and the development of the defense industry. The senior leadership of the EU and NATO also coordinates political activities and diplomatic matters to ensure a coherent and common approach in the Euro-Atlantic community. A separate important item in the list of joint measures between the EU and NATO is the improvement of military mobility, which should significantly contribute to the increase of joint defense capabilities. It is revealed how the intention to strengthen the partnership is reflected in the NATO 2030 development strategy and in the new strategic concept of NATO – 2022. It is concluded that according to the Strategy, the EU acts as an important and unique partner of NATO and that these organizations play a complementary, harmonious and mutually reinforcing role in maintaining international peace and security. Neither NATO nor the European Union has all the tools needed to respond to Russia’s malign activities or to challenges involving other non-military threats. Faced with these threats, they need to work together and have many tools, political, diplomatic, economic, military, which facilitate countermeasures. And despite the existence of different views on the role of the EU and NATO in the implementation of security policy, their mandates in the sphere of security and defense coincide and complement each other more and more. However, it is obvious that there are more common themes for NATO and the EU in the defense sphere than dividing factors.