NATO Area Research Articles

Новое вино в старых мехах? Об арктической стратегии администрации Дж. Байдена

The article examines the new U. S. Arctic strategy adopted by Joseph Biden’s administration in October 2022. The new strategy develops the policies of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump. This continuity is particularly relevant to such issues as the promotion of the United States’ national interests in the Arctic, strengthening cooperation with NATO allies, increasing the U.S. military presence in the region, promoting the concept of Alaska’s sustainable development, developing dialogue and cooperation with the indigenous population of Alaska. However, the document also has a number of significant differences from previous strategies. The Strategy‑2022 pays much more attention to the problem of climate change. Under Obama, the development of climate action strategies was still in its initial stage, under Trump it was almost completely ignored, but for the Biden administration it has become a priority again. The Strategy‑2022 differs greatly from the Strategy‑2013 in its confrontational spirit, and, continuing the traditions of the Trump administration, it sees the Arctic as a region of likely conflicts, not peace and cooperation. Moreover, it has strengthened Trump’s policy of confrontation with Russia and China in this region. Washington’s military construction plans, the intensification of exercises in the areas adjacent to the Russian Federation, the launch of the process of including Sweden and Finland in NATO creates prerequisites for a smooth inclusion of the Arctic in the NATO area of responsibility. This significantly increases Russia’s military vulnerability in the northern and northwestern strategic directions. The Strategy‑2022 has a certain inconsistency. On the one hand, the document declares the U.S. commitment to international cooperation in the Arctic. On the other hand, it obviously contains hegemonic aspirations in the region. Washington’s position on the resumption of cooperation with Russia in international institutions, including the Arctic Council, remains uncertain. In fact, the Arctic becomes one of new fronts of the long-term competition between the United States and Russia. Such a turn creates concerns not only for Russia, but also for other nations who would like to see the Arctic peaceful, safe and prosperous.

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

ABSTRACTThis analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.

NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean

The NATO area covers more water than land. The Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the Black Sea geographically and strategically unite the allies. NATO is a maritime alliance because almost all Member States have a maritime orientation and are highly dependent on maritime trade. To protect its interests on the seas and oceans NATO countries built up and maintained strong naval forces. Twenty of the 28 Member States of the Alliance has its own Navy - naval forces. Also, the Alliance has developed a highly-trained naval capacity for immediate response - Standing NATO naval forces consisting of naval ships of Member States. The use of naval power is more frequent, while more than 80 percent of local interventions and wars were conducted from the sea and over the sea. After the Cold War, NATO has dominated in the global maritime domain with robust naval forces and conducted several key naval operations to project the power and influence events on the ground. NATO naval operations have been conducted from the Balkans to the South Asia and North Africa. In the post-Cold War security environment, the Mediterranean is an area of central geopolitical and geostrategic interest to NATO. Also, NATO has a strong economic and energy interests in the Mediterranean. In that region, the naval component of the Alliance is extremely active. NATO maritime activities began during the early 1990's. NATO conducted out of area operation - Operation Sharp Guard, a naval blockade of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Significant naval forces, including attacks from the distance from the sea, participated in Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia. After the terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO has increased the capacity of naval forces in the Mediterranean and established Operation Active Endeavour. This naval operation today transformed in Operation Sea Guardian and NATO with naval forces exercised full control and supervision of all maritime activities around the Mediterranean. Today, NATO has the Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 (SNMG 1) and Standing NATO Maritime Groups 2 (SNMG 2), Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCG 1) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCG 2). NATO's Standing Naval Forces are no longer associated with a single area, but they must be ready for use anywhere. At present, NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean conduct maritime security operations and provides assistance in dealing with refugees and the migration crisis in the Aegean Sea. Today, NATO is a maritime alliance in action, actively preparing for the maritime century.

Community and City. Naples, Bagnoli: former Nato area

The observation of urban reality complexity, through a new sensibility towards the environment, the nature and the earth, is slowly changing the sense and the value of some practices of architectural and urban acting, not only in the academia, but also in the institutional/politic field. In this way, it is possible to define a new kind of urban landscape, the productive landscape, whose main component is represented by the land and by its multi-functional value. A experimentation of the concept has been applied to the ex Nato area in west Naples (Italy). The area was occupied by the U.S. Army for 50 years. In 2013, it was finally freed, and through an agreement with the Municipality of Naples (in the person of the Mayor Luigi de Magistris) and the Banco di Napoli Foundation, what once was a place where wars were decided, today it becomes a place to build peace and sociality. The project of an agricultural natural park stems from a public demand and from the active participation of citizens that promoted the use and management of this area. The realization of this project for the Municipality of Naples is an example of how the interests of citizens, institutions and professionals can meet. Therefore, the guiding principles of Naples municipality “interest” can be summarized as follows: the identification of a young segment of the population as the first recipient of the area reuse, the expression of the social function of the project to be implemented in order of a recovery of social cohesion, a conformation of an urban self-governing community of users and residents, activation of spontaneous processes among the users, direct participation of the citizens, support of public institutions, adoption of environmental sustainability.

Участие ФРГ в международном кризисном регулировании (1991–2012)

The article discusses the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the struggle against new challenges of the world security sphere. In this regard the main focus is on the usage of German armed forces (Bundeswehr) for International Crisis Management (ICM), first of all – outside the NATO area. Although Germany has been taking part in this type of activities since 1991, only in 1994 German Bundestag formulated and approved the mechanism of parliamentary control over the Bundeswehr usage outside the NATO area. The author attempts to define the periods of this process and cover practical German involvement in ICM activities of the NATO, the European Union and the United Nations Organization. In this sense it is necessary to compare the forms and the average number of soldiers, which were used by Germany in ICM operations by each of these three international structures. It is also rather important to define the main regions (countries) where German troops were used in ICM activities, and the reasons for it. Yugoslavia was the first region where Bundeswehr served for stabilization of the situation in areas of internal military conflicts. By the year 2014, the main regions of the German International Crisis Management participation became Afghanistan and Horn of Africa.The article also examines the perspectives of the Federal Republic of Germany’s involvement in ICM, considering the current and possible future results of the Bundeswehr reform, while Bundesehr was and is the main country’s instrument in ICM.

Gulf War: The German Resistance

As it became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2003, Germany stepped up its opposition to war with Iraq. The stage was set for a repeat of Germany's uncomfortable position during the 1991 Gulf War. At that time, as most of Germany's allies rallied behind Washington, Germany made only financial contributions, and hundreds of thousands of Germans took to the streets to protest against the war. Yet, since 1991, Germany had come a long way in its attitudes towards military force. From a policy of complete abstention from military deployments beyond NATO's area (so-called 'out-of-area' missions), Berlin had moved to participation in a range of operations in the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan. The new crisis over Iraq threatened to undo this progress. Thus, it is worth examining the limits to, and possibilities of, reunified Germany's willingness to use military force abroad.

German Foreign and Security Policy after Kohl and Kosovo

What Does A Government New To Office Do When The Idealistic principles that guided its members in opposition face the hard realities of power? Recent German experience in the realm of foreign policy provides an instructive case study – not least because Germany's history in the first half of the twentieth century has created tremendous sensitivities in this sphere. Following a history of opposition to German military participation in actions beyond the NATO area, the parties of Germany's political left were immediately confronted with the need to make decisions on foreign and security policy when they were elected to govern in 1998. Pacifist principles or aspirations proved unsustainable in practice, and a policy consistent with that pursued by the outgoing conservative-liberal coalition was adopted. The new government developed a pragmatic foreign policy, incorporating the use of military means, notwithstanding the existence of a domestic political culture suspicious of the employment of military force.

Sécurité et interdépendance

Security and Interdependence, by Lord Robertson Europe's experience since the Second World War, through the European Union and NATO, demonstrates that interdependence contributes to security. The NATO area has thus become a haven of stability in which war has become impossible. NATO nevertheless remains vulnerable to crises in the Euro-Atlantic region, as was the case in Kosovo, where intervention was required. The continent's security also involves close cooperation with Russia and the countries of the Partnership for Peace. Moreover, the durability of the Transatlantic ties implies fairer burden-sharing within the Alliance, that is, the emergence of a stronger European security and defence identity within the latter.

The future Germany and the future of NATO

The events of 1989 have raised questions about NATO's future and purpose. Two different views are held by Germany and the USA. The Germans seek the political and economic unification of the EC, the construction of a European pillar within a demilitarised NATO, and a pan‐European collective security system. In contrast, the Americans seek to preserve NATO as a military alliance responsible for western European security under American leadership and to equip NATO with competences extending beyond the NA TO area. Whilst insisting on greater western European burden sharing and security coordination, the Americans see the roles of the CSCE and the WEU as complementary to NATO's.

European security and out of NATO area crises

European security and out of NATO area crises

Europe in the Western Alliance: Towards a European Defence Entity

Part 1 The pressures for change: towards European defence entity?, J.G.Siccama European defence cooperation - why now?, J.Steinberg. Part 2 Europe and the NATO area: thinking about the unthinkable - some guidelines, P.Lellouche problems of transition, N.J.Haagerup and C.Thune. Part 3 Europe and the world outside: European responses outside Europe, J.Chipman Europe and global security, R.D.Vine. Part 4 The reform of European institutions: European institutions and defence, T.Taylor European SACEUR?, J.Eberle comment on a European SACEUR, G.F.Treverton.

Behind the Brussels Breakdown

IT has become almost a commonplace to say that the breakdown of the Brussels talks has left British policy in disarray, and that neither Whitehall nor Westminster now know which way to turn. The anger hlas gone out of the debate; the sense of shock has faded; but the confusion remains. The latest in the series of Chatham House Memoranda 1 suggests that the experts and those who help to mould public opinion are as confused as the policy-makers themselves. Mr. Andrew Shonfield (writing on the economic implications of the breakdown) argues that we must now demonstrate to the world that ' Britain's European policy is here to stay '. So he warns us against making any worth-while concessions to our partners in the European Free Trade Association and urges us to be 'beastly to the French'. But what are the implications of such an attitude towards France? It is possible to imagine all kinds of European structures or unions-some without Britain, others without Germany, others again without Italy. But any European construction without France is inconceivable. That is the strength of General de Gaulle's position. Moreover, a British policy of being ' beastly to the French might divide Belgium beyond repair. Mr. Leonard Beaton (who deals with the strategic implications) confesses that he saw the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations 'with considerable relief'. It will, he hopes, keep the Americans in Europe. Moreover, he considers that 'we should buy that American presence in Europe with a very substantial capacity to deploy military force in other parts of the world '-in particular, Asia, Australasia and the Middle East. He goes on to say that 'a greater allied effort must be made in the NATO area in Europe, and we and the French must match the Americans in our effort there'. What Mr. Beaton wants, evidently, is that Britain should maintain her great power status on an undiminished global scale. At this point one takes a deep breath. Surely, the whole of the Common Market argument has turned on the assumption that Britain is no longer a world Power, and that other means than those to which we have been accustomed must now be found for maintaining, as far as

Attitudes of NATO Countries Toward the United States

Self-Criticism has been a characteristic of NATO ever since it was established. We are perhaps too inclined to pull up our institutions by the roots from time to time to see how they are growing. But whether this is a good habit in the ordinary way or not, it is something that was virtually bound to happen in 1957, after the most critical twelve months that the Western nations had experienced since the Second World War. Nineteen fifty-six began with a widespread feeling of relief that the danger of a major war in Europe (the only kind of war that seemed possible) had greatly receded. Before this feeling of relief had time to wear off, there supervened a series of crises that shook NATO to its foundations. There was a virtual state of war in Algeria (itself a part of the NATO area), and many of France's best troops were withdrawn from Europe to fight it; there was an increasingly bitter dispute involving three members of NATO over the future of Cyprus; there was the Suez crisis, which also involved both NATO interests and troops from the NATO area; and there was the Hungarian revolution, which greatly damaged, if it did not destroy, the hesitantly re-emerging belief in Soviet good faith.

The Role of NATO's Air Forces

tion of the world, happily still hypothetical, Western Europe would presumably be the area of first contention if not of final decision. But how is Western Europe to be defended? Under the rules of traditional or conventional warfare the role of the NATO tactical air forces would be to interdict the enemy's air and land power and so reduce the disparity between Communist and anti-Communist strength in the air and on the ground. NATO's air forces, which on paper number over five thousand planes, would thus serve as a screen which-it is hoped-would diminish the enemy's initial striking power to the extent that his forces pene rating the West's defense perimeter would at most equal in strength those of the Allied Air Command in the NATO area. But in view of the possible use of nuclear weapons would the tacti al air forces still play the same role?