Government Of National Unity Research Articles

The Long Decline of South Africa's ANC

ABSTRACT: Three decades after the African National Congress (ANC) won 62.7 percent of the vote that propelled Nelson Mandela into the presidency in 1994, the ANC's vote share plummeted to 40.2 percent of the national vote in South Africa's 2024 general election (down from 57.5 percent five years previously,= and well below the 50 percent predicted by preelection polls). Against thirty years of pessimistic academic literature predicting the opposite, the ANC accepted electoral defeat. But this left the ANC in a strategic quandary. Had it reached the upper 40 percent range, easy coalitions with small parties would have passed the 50 percent threshold. But with only 40 percent, the party reached back into the early years of democracy and formed a government of national unity—a multiparty coalition that left the ANC's most significant political opponents out in the cold. ANC (and national) president Cyril Ramaphosa has sidelined Africanist parties and created a coalition with decidedly centrist parties. The "broad church" which has bedeviled the ANC is at an end. Multiparty coalition government has arrived in South Africa, but questions remain: Can ANC electoral decline be arrested by this sharp move towards the center? And what, if any, substantive role is there for the ANC in the future if not?

Rooted in Society?

Abstract In 2010, Zanzibar, a sub-state within the United Republic of Tanzania, became a unique case of power sharing in Africa. The country conducted a referendum before establishing a government of national unity and entrenched it in Zanzibar’s Constitution of 1984. The aim was to make the power-sharing system durable and rooted in society to achieve peace and development. Nevertheless, a political system must be accepted, practised and routinised to be rooted in society. Usually, peace settlements involve elites, who negotiate, sign and occasionally benefit from the pact—and Zanzibar is not an exception. What is missing in peace negotiations is the broad-based participation of the citizens. Based on a survey and expert interviews, this article examines how power sharing in Zanzibar has nevertheless become rooted in society over time.

Rooted in Society?

Abstract In 2010, Zanzibar, a sub-state within the United Republic of Tanzania, became a unique case of power sharing in Africa. The country conducted a referendum before establishing a government of national unity and entrenched it in Zanzibar’s Constitution of 1984. The aim was to make the power-sharing system durable and rooted in society to achieve peace and development. Nevertheless, a political system must be accepted, practised and routinised to be rooted in society. Usually, peace settlements involve elites, who negotiate, sign and occasionally benefit from the pact—and Zanzibar is not an exception. What is missing in peace negotiations is the broad-based participation of the citizens. Based on a survey and expert interviews, this article examines how power sharing in Zanzibar has nevertheless become rooted in society over time.

A rapid mixed-methods assessment of Libya’s primary care system

BackgroundLibya has experienced decades of violent conflict that have severely disrupted health service delivery. The Government of National Unity is committed to rebuilding a resilient health system built on a platform of strong primary care.AimCommissioned by the government, we set out to perform a rapid assessment of the system as it stands and identify areas for improvement.Design and settingWe used a rapid applied policy explanatory-sequential mixed-methods design, working with Libyan data and Libyan policymakers, with supporting interview data from other primary care policymakers working across the Middle East and North Africa region.MethodWe used the Primary Health Care Performance Initiative framework to structure our assessment. Review of policy documents and secondary analysis of WHO and World Bank survey data informed a series of targeted policymaker interviews. We used deductive framework analysis to synthesise our findings.ResultsWe identified 11 key documents and six key policymakers to interview. Libya has strong policy commitments to providing good quality primary care, and a high number of health staff and facilities. Access to services and trust in providers is high. However, a third of facilities are non-operational; there is a marked skew towards axillary and administrative staff; and structural challenges with financing, logistics, and standards has led to highly variable provision of care.ConclusionIn reforming the primary care system, the government should consolidate leadership, clarify governance structures and systems, and focus on setting national standards for human resources for health, facilities, stocks, and clinical care.

The Paradox of Eternity Nature of Article 9(3) and Article 80A of the Constitution of Zanzibar, 1984 Over the Sustainability of Zanzibar Government of National Unity: The Glance of 2015-2016 and Perspective for Future General Elections

The Paradox of Eternity Nature of Article 9(3) and Article 80A of the Constitution of Zanzibar, 1984 Over the Sustainability of Zanzibar Government of National Unity: The Glance of 2015-2016 and Perspective for Future General Elections

SADC’s Zimbabwe Mediation in 2008 as Preservation of ZANU PF Power

The historic defeat of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) in the March 2008 harmonised elections was followed by the unleashing of a violent campaign against the opposition in the run up to the June 27 2008 presidential run-off. This triggered the mediation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Although the mediation culminated into a Government of National Unity (GNU) comprising ZANU PF and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations between 2009 and 2013, this paper argues SADC was largely complicit in the advancement of ZANU PF authoritarian consolidation. ZANU PF deployment of foreign policy within SADC was mainly designed to secure the region's solidarity whilst advancing domestic interests aimed at cementing political survival. The region became a crucial focus of attention by the government, but how this was used to consolidate ZANU PF's hold on power is yet to be unpacked in full.

Myanmar’s military coup: The Rohingya caught “Between the devil and the deep sea”

AbstractThis article explores the consequences of the recent military coup in Myanmar for the Rohingya crisis. Data from seven semi‐structured interviews were collected from academic and Rohingya leaders in the Australian cities of Sydney and Brisbane. The findings suggest that the regime change that has taken place will not resolve the Rohingya crisis unless the Myanmar government moves away from its current anti‐Rohingya, religious nationalism policy agenda. A military coup on 1 February 2021 overthrew the relatively new democratic government in Myanmar. The anti‐military movement now faces the military’s brutal force for restoring democracy in the country. The elected parliament members established an interim National Unity Government (NUG) to lead anti‐military protests. Regarding the military junta and NUG’s strategy concerning the Rohingya crisis, both aim to get international support for their endeavours. The Rohingya became a sacrificial lamb for both of these competitors. The Rohingya now face a dilemma in making the decision to support one or the other political parties, as the leaders of both parties were involved actively in instigating the Rohingya genocide in 2017. The situation for the Rohingya becomes complicated as they now find themselves caught between the ‘devil and the deep sea’.

Misunderstanding Myanmar

executive summary: This article examines how, in retrospect, the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 was a foreseeable consequence of domestic political dynamics in the country and the misperceptions of the international community about the hybrid civilian-military government. main argumentOn February 1, 2021, the military in Myanmar deposed the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military government to reassert direct military rule. The coup ignited a nationwide resistance against the new military junta, the State Administrative Council, involving many of the nation's decades-old ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), newly created People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and an opposition National Unity Government. Looking back, Myanmar's military saw the 2008 constitution and its hybrid government as the end point for political reform, not as the beginning of a transition. The military's actions during this decade reflect this. Attempts by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, and the international community to foster further political changes may have been contributing factors to the military's decision to stage a coup. Myanmar is now embroiled in a multifront civil war involving most of the country's largest ethnic communities, including the Bamar majority, with no end in sight. policy implications • Peaceful resolution of the conflict in Myanmar is not likely at this time. The U.S. and other nations should consider providing limited and targeted military assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. • The Biden administration should expedite implementation of the authorities provided in the BURMA Act, including the provision of nonlethal assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. The U.S. State Department should rekindle its ties to the EAOs to facilitate nonlethal assistance and efforts to form local governments in areas "liberated" by the EAOs and PDFs. • The U.S. Agency for International Development should shift the delivery of humanitarian assistance to local organizations operating in India and Thailand to more effectively provide aid to refugees and internally displaced persons from the civil war. • The U.S. and other nations should provide financial assistance for efforts to document possible war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the junta's military forces and coordinate this effort with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice.

Hiding in plain sight: IDP's protection strategies after closing Juba's protection of civilian sites

AbstractThis article examines how former Protection of Civilian site (PoCs) residents are staying safe and protecting themselves after the United Nations Mission in South Sudan's (UNMISS) handing over of the PoCs to the Revitalised‐Transitional Government of National Unity (R‐TGoNU). Using key informant interviews, questionnaires, and observations, we establish that those still residing in the PoCs do so with less humanitarian assistance, increased insecurity, and few authorities they can rely upon or turn to for protection. In response, it is shown how camp residents have developed their own safety and protection strategies at the cost of their ability to pursue livelihoods, move freely outside of the camps, and publicly express their identities. Although broadly stable, this situation is unsustainable and risks the safety of camp residents and the wider ongoing peace process. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for humanitarians and R‐TGoNU policymakers interested in their welfare.

Power-sharing and Identity-Politics Transformation in Zanzibar, Tanzania

Zanzibar has had a long unsettled political history from its colonial era to radicalized post-colonial politics. The core source of such politics is the cosmopolitan nature of the isles whereby races and identities reside on the island for a long time. Such nature made the political and social groups categorized and differentiated from others through identity. As a result, the struggle for the owner and ruler of the island becomes a high concern among the groups in the society. This situation resulted in turbulent politics for many years with violence, killings, and hostility. In 2010, Zanzibar inters in the negotiation to solve the political problem that marred the island for a long time. The Government of National Unity (GNU) which involves the sharing of power between the first and second winners was agreed upon as the structure of the leadership style of Zanzibar. This was done through referendum and constitution amendment. As political identity theory reveals that; political elites use identity groups for their political benefits. They organized and influence their political activities through the identity they are familiar with. So, in solving such an identity politics problem, the identity tragedy must be transformed and accommodated the rational politics. This paper seeks to examine the extent to which power-sharing transforms identity-based politics and is accommodated in Zanzibar. The study was conducted in three districts to represent Zanzibar. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from five in-depth interviews and two hundreds and eight seven questionnaires respectively. The in-depth interviews involved the GNU's current and former top leaders, members of the Cabinets, and political activists. The questionnaire involves the citizens from districts Mjini, Micheweni, and Kusini. The study found that to some extent the power-sharing successes in reducing the exercises of identity politics in Zanzibar. Three angles have been justifying that reduction. First is the existence and increase of political trust in society to large extent. The second one is the equal treatment of all identity groups, races, and regions by government institutions and society. The Last one is the exercises of political activities without the influence of historical and identity political narrations. This study pinpoints two important aspects of transformational identity politics through power-sharing. The first one is the role of leadership in transforming the mindset and bringing people together. The second one is social change due to generations' natural changes and opportunities. The study concludes that power-sharing can be the source of identity transformation from worst uses to recognition in the society. This will happen only if the power-sharing institution is set to consider the potentiality of mutual recognition of self and respecting social, cultural, and ideological differences in society.

PERSONALITAS ANGELA MERKEL DALAM UPAYA JERMAN MENGAKHIRI KRISIS LIBYA

Germany was one of the countries that actively pursued peace for Libya. The achievement of peace in Libya by Germany was carried out to overcome the surge in the number of refugees from the Middle East to Europe via the Mediterranean crossing. Angela Merkel's persistence in achieving peace in Libya was demonstrated by the holding of a series of peace processes known as the Berlin Process. This foreign policy cannot be separated from the influence of Angela Merkel as one of the policy-making units of the German government. Angela Merkel's role in ending the Libyan crisis is one of the next steps to rebuilding Libya. Commitments from external stakeholders influencing the conflict in Libya were successfully achieved at the Berlin Conference for Libya, a ceasefire agreement was reached, the Government of National Unity was confirmed, and the second Berlin Conference for Libya was held. Responding to this phenomenon, this study questions the role of Merkel's personality in Libya's peace efforts. In order to answer this question, the author uses a foreign policy analysis framework that identifies the relationship between the personality of the leader and the foreign policy taken. This study finds that Libya's peace efforts are a manifestation of Angela Merkel's dominant personality, namely the conciliator type and the participatory orientation.

АСЕАН и мьянманская дилемма

The article deals with the legitimacy of claims for power of the two Myanmar contesting political forces: the current government, formed by the State Administration Council and led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and the government in exile (National Unity Government) formed by the self-established Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and led by Mahn Winn Khaing Thann. It is argued that both governments have limited legitimacy due to incorrect procedures of their formation, though the current government is the only de facto ruling body (and should be treated as such). It has been found that both sides mobilize their supporters inside Myanmar who use practically identical methods such as positioning themselves as the only saviours for the nation, daemonising and de-humanising political opponents, intimidating local population who supports the opposite side, murdering political opponents (sometimes with their families), mass killing of civilians during terrorist attacks / antiterrorist raids, destroying critically important infrastructure, and seeking for international political recognition. All these findings lead us to conclude that ASEAN would not openly recognize any of these governments in order not to legitimize them, but will take steps towards holding a fair competitive parliamentary election in Myanmar, with both sides having the opportunity to secure people’s support and gain their votes.

Democracy in Myanmar: The failure of another Asian democracy in late modernity

Can Myanmar ever become a genuine democracy? It appears that ever since the exit of the British forces in the post-WWII era, any form of genuine democracy remains an impossible dream for that naturally wealthy regime. Democracy does not appear to be synonymous with Burma or what is now called Myanmar. On August 27, 2023, the Myanmar Junta expelled Timor-Leste’s ambassador over allegations of authoritarianism, calling the locallybased anti-coup shadow government a sham. The two Southeast Asian states have been at loggerheads since early 2021 due to widespread clashes in Naypyidaw over the National Unity Government (NUG) [(1):746]. The Southeast Asian nations have been locked in a crisis since the Myanmar military seized power (again) in February 2021 after another failed (and mostly public) experiment with democracy that had led to widespread political violence. The official Myanmar news agencies that remain the voice of the junta have condemned the anti-coup demonstrations. Most ASEAN states-Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei– have failed to attempt to broker any compromise that could solve the problem. Only Thailand and Timor-Leste have attempted to resolve the political violence. Jakarta tends to remain “neutral” or uncommitted to any arguments over Timor-Leste (and in this case the expulsion of the Timor-Leste Ambassador to Myanmar in late August 2023) because Indonesia (under Suharto) had not only annexed Timor-Leste under Suharto but also was committed to the widespread use of political violence and other human rights’ atrocities by the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) against the largely peaceful Catholics and Christians under former rebel leader Xanana Gusmao. The current crisis Napidydaw now faces invites many human rights observers and Amnesty International advocates to raise questions about Myanmar’s poor record since the British left after the post-WWII era. The paper attempts to explain why democracy remains a problem in Myanmar. It uses a seven-question democratic framework to determine feasibility of democracy in Myanmar today.

Okoliczności utworzenia Funduszu Kościelnego w okresie Polski Ludowej

This study analyzes the circumstances of establishing the Church Fund. This work introduces the reader to the relationship between the state and the Church in the years 1944–1950. It was an extremely important period due to the numerous legal changes that took place in the country, which particularly affected the Catholic Church, including due to the aspect of the termination by the Provisional Government of National Unity of the Concordat of February 10, 1925. The author also deals with the issue of the land reform carried out by the decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of September 6, 1944 and its legal consequences for the Catholic Church. Particular attention was also paid to the issue of the legislative process of the act on „dead hand goods”, which to a large extent changed the financial and legal position of the Catholic Church in our country. In this study, the dogmatic and legal method was used, and due to the time range, also the historical and legal method, necessary to discuss the issue under study.

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS SOCIO- ECONOMIC IMPACT - COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTIAL & PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

In Afghanistan, day to a day power struggle, rampant corruption, and numerous challenges increased and affected National Unity Government. The survival of the country was managed with the help of International Assistance. Afghanistan Analyst Network reports that mismanagement and electrical fraud exist in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2018 and 2019. Two parties in Afghanistan had created continuous political tension in the country. In several ways, the government of Afghanistan suffered due to violence and insecurity problems. The socio- political management was of the country not focused on efficiently maintaining security problems. Additionally, due to the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, ninety per cent of the Afghan people were suffering from economic, environmental crises and insecurity problems. The parliamentary election scheduled after the first election in 2004 led to several challenges due to slow preparations. The people of Afghans prefer to have a strong government was the lesson learnt by the presidential election in Afghanistan. The irregularities and fraud reveal the different types of voting patterns. The challenges of a presidential election in Afghanistan based on the voter turnout were examined in this study. The post-conflict state of the country caused the increase or decrease in voter turnout in Afghanistan. The change in the socio-political and economic, and security situation of the country was analyzed during the presidential and parliamentary elections. Parliamentary chambers of Afghanistan held over various years were analyzed based on the number of registered voters, ballots and valid votes.

Rząd tymczasowy RP wobec problemów terytorialnych w relacjach z Czechosłowacją. Część II: maj–czerwiec 1945 r.

The article is a continuation of the study on Polish–Czechoslovak relations in the months after the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland was formulated. It concerns the dramatic weeks from the end of World War II in Europe until the completion of the so-called Yalta Formula and the establishment of the Provisional Government of National Unity. During that period, the border conflict escalated to cover the issue of the post-war affiliation of the Kłodzko Valley, the Opole region and Lower Silesia. Trying to authenticate themselves to their societies, the governments of both countries pursued an aggressive policy in the matter of mutual delimitation, at times on the verge of open armed conflict. Both sought Soviet support for their territorial demands, trying to give the impression that they did not perceive Moscow’s cynical game, which provoked and then used the situation to make them even more dependent on each other. The article ends with the June round of Polish–Czechoslovak negotiations in Moscow, which were broken without any agreement on the key issue of the border.

Маоизм в Чили в 60-е годы. Раскол в Международном коммунистическом движении и чилийские левые

The split in the International Communist Movement and the Sino-Soviet party and state conflict had serious consequences for the left movement in Latin America, and in Chile in par-ticular. In Chile, adherents of the Chinese revolutionary expe-rience, and then the theory and practice of Maoism, stood out from the traditional political parties of communists and so-cialists in the mid-60s. At the heart of their differences with their parent parties were attitudes toward violent methods of revolutionary struggle, criticism of the dominant concept of the peaceful path of the Chilean revolution and the reformist line of the left. Dissident pro-Chinese groups did not immedi-ately accept the Maoist doctrine, limiting themselves to criti-cizing the pro-Soviet position of the Communists, but over time adopted the main provisions of the Maoist doctrine, in-cluding in those of its points that clearly contradicted the characteristics of the country. Maoism's opposition to the al-liance of communists and socialists created serious problems for the latter among their social bases. The strength of Chilean Maoism was limited, which over time led its parties and groups to a marginal position in the left camp. This article of-fers a study of the process of formation and development of the Maoist movement in Chile in the 60s, on the eve of the coming to power of the Government of National Unity.

Myanmar’s Coup d’état and the Struggle for Federal Democracy and Inclusive Government

This article reviews the first twelve months of the civil disobedience movement in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup d’état and its many dynamics and manifestations. Myanmar’s ‘Spring Revolution’ generated a shared sense of national unity—overcoming gender, ethnic, religious and class boundaries, but raising questions about the long-term sustainability of nonviolent civil resistance in a state where the military has for decades wielded political and economic power. Since the coup, Myanmar has been in turmoil, paralysed by instability which escalated after the military’s deadly crackdown on pro-democracy activists. The article charts the growth of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), its multiple methods of strategic resistance and non-cooperation, and the radicalisation of the resistance agenda. It analyses the formation of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the creation of the interim National Unity Government (NUG), the founding of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the inauguration of the People’s Defence Force (PDF). It examines the implications for Myanmar when the crisis reached a more complex phase after the military’s open use of force and terror on the broader civilian population prompted the NUG to declare war on the junta, and to urge ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and newly formed anti-junta civilian militias (PDF) to attack the State Administration Council (SAC) as a terrorist organisation. The NUG now opposes the military junta by strategic and peaceful non-cooperation, armed resistance, and international diplomacy. This paper considers whether the predominantly nonviolent civil resistance movement’s struggle for federal democracy and inclusive governance is laying the foundations for eventual transition to a fully democratic future or whether the cycles of violence will continue as the military continues to control power by using intimidation and fear. It notes that the coup has destroyed the economy and expanded Myanmar’s human rights and humanitarian crises but has also provided the opportunity for Myanmar’s people to explore diverse visions of a free, federal, democratic and accountable Myanmar. It finally examines the possibilities for future peaceful nation building, reconciliation, and the healing of the trauma of civil war.

The Failure of Constitution-making in Sri Lanka (2015–2019)

When the coalition government known as the National Unity Government of 2015 initiated the promulgation of a new constitution for Sri Lanka, it had embraced transparent and inclusive procedures that were never rehearsed in the constitutional politics since independence. As part of the progress, within one and half years’ time, the members of the steering committee set up by constitutional assembly, presented the interim proposals on the new constitution. Impressive progress was made by the government, yet the task of moving towards a new constitution experienced a deadlock and had to be discontinued. This article examines constraints experienced by the National Unity Government during 2015 and 2019 that at some point sabotaged the project of constitution-making. By utilizing the insights of Jon Elster in this regard, this qualitative study finds that political parties serving at both constitutional assembly and parliament have influenced the progress of the constitution-making and contributed to its failure. This study reveals that group interest and permanent passion (the loyalty to their own ethnic population) have encouraged certain groups and factions within the constitutional assembly and the parliament to wield it as a tool of political capital. Therefore, Government of Sri Lanka should rethink the parliament serving as constitutional assembly and adopt compulsory equilibrium between publicity and secrecy.

The impact of the pandemic on the Italian party system. The Draghi government and the ‘new’ polarisation

ABSTRACT In 2021, the Covid-19 pandemic dominated the agenda of Italian politics as much as it had done in 2020. Political conflicts within the parties were relegated to the background or else were heavily influenced by the debate concerning management of the health emergency. The global scale of the pandemic and the measures taken at European level to mitigate the economic impact helped first to put an end to the Conte II government and then to bring to office a government of national unity led by Mario Draghi. All the parties represented in Parliament joined the government with the sole exception of Brothers of Italy, which decided to remain in opposition. In this context, the parties found themselves having to grapple with the need to cooperate as governing partners while also maintaining their recognizable profiles. Moreover, the effective absence of the coalitions with which they had previously been associated forced the parties to consider potentially new alliances and what they would mean for future political equilibria. This article will explore the state of the Italian party system, taking as our point of departure these circumstances, which are of considerable significance both nationally and internationally. First, we shall consider the dynamics of the party system as a whole and then, in more detail, we will explore the dynamics within the main parties and their respective coalitions.