National Security Affairs Research Articles

Торгово-экономические и научно-технические связи США и СССР в годы разрядки

The topic of cooperation between the USSR and the USA in the economic, scientific and technical fields during the years of detente in bilateral relations (1969–1979) has been developed by American and European historians, political scientists, economists and experts in international relations theory for 50 years. This review describes the main stages of evolution of the foreign historiography on this problem. The authors consider the development of trade relations, technological exchanges and cooperation in the field of science as a coherent whole due to their “multilayered nature” and cumulative impact on the overall dynamics and final results of the Cold War. It is noted that from the very beginning, the formation of investigative issues was greatly influenced by theoretical works, as well as memoirs and diaries of American statesmen, Presidents, Secretaries of State, Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, who were direct participants in the events. It is proved that in modern foreign studies, there is a tendency to belittle the significance of the experience of detente as a special model of relations between the East and the West. There is an attitude to the achievements of the exploratory programs implemented in those years as something situational and insignificant. Another conclusion concerns the difference in the emphasis of domestic and foreign authors regarding the choice of research issues. While the former tend to pay attention to the potential, implemented and missed opportunities of scientific and technical cooperation between the two superpowers during the period of relative thaw, the latter focus on studying the U.S. trade policy, but the transfer of technologies and high-tech products is considered in the context of discriminatory restrictions caused by the logic of the Cold War. While Russian authors, as a rule, emphasize the equal and mutually beneficial nature of cooperation in the scientific and technical sphere, American and European historians point to the USSR lagging behind in the development and introduction of new technologies into production by the mid‑1970s, a greater interest in cooperation and, as a result, a more vulnerable position in the negotiation and bargaining.

National security in presidential time: The politics of the National Security Council

AbstractThe National Security Council (NSC) is the preeminent national security feature of the modern U.S. presidency. The NSC is the president's council, but presidents have varied dramatically in how frequently they have convened formal meetings of the NSC since the NSC system was created in 1947. Under what conditions are presidents likely to hold NSC meetings? I argue that presidents are pragmatic about when to engage personally in national security affairs and that presidents are incentivized to conduct NSC meetings more frequently early in a presidency. Using a novel data set of all NSC meetings from 1947 to 1993, I find that presidents are likely to hold NSC meetings most frequently in the first year of office and that NSC meeting frequency is likely to decline substantially over a president's first 3 years in office, even after controlling for important international security conditions and domestic political factors previously thought to influence presidential national security behavior. The results affirm prior scholars' description of the NSC as a presidential mechanism for international crisis management but also suggest that time in office is an important determinant of presidential national security behavior.

The National Security Advisor in the Role as Coordinator and Counselor: H. R. McMaster and John Bolton in the Trump Administration

This article examines the roles of former National Security Advisors H. R. McMaster and John Bolton in the Trump administration. The article discusses four general roles performed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—administrator, coordinator, counselor, agent—and asserts that while McMaster served as a coordinator and Bolton served as a counselor, both failed to achieve a close relationship with the president. Probing the role and performance of President Trump’s second and third APNSA underscores both the significance of two partly influential APNSAs and apparent constraints in relation to what a president with an unconventional management style allowed them to do.

Never Again: An Excerpt from 11

Never AgainAn Excerpt from 11 Carlos Soto-Román (bio) Translated by Alexis Almeida, Daniel Beauregard, Daniel Borzutzky, Whitney DeVos, Patrick Greaney, Robin Myers, Jessica Pujol Durán, and Thomas Rothe (bio) Click for larger view View full resolution JORGE TACLA, IDENTIDAD OCULTA 25 (2013), OIL AND MARBLE POWDER ON CANVAS, 64 X 78 IN. /COPYRIGHT BY JORGE TACLA [End Page 50] Never again . . . Bearing in mind: 1st – The severe economic, social, and moral crisis currently destroying our country; the patriotic commitment to restore the (broken) national spirit to restore our (broken) justice system to restore our (broken) institutions aware that this is the only way: to uphold national tradition to uphold the legacy of our Founding Fathers to uphold the History of Chile aware that this is the only way: to guide the country’s progress and evolution into the future VIGOROUSLY — For having unlawfully buried a count of 15 weapons, a sizeable quantity of ammunition and explosives — For having participated in guerrilla warfare training — For stealing explosives — For inciting miners to seize armories — For inciting support of armed resistance — For having participated in the acquisition and distribution of firearms — For having found unlawfully buried explosives Citizens are hereby informed that today, __ of ________, _____ at 16:00, the following persons were executed pursuant to the provisions granted to Military Tribunals in times of war: [End Page 51] CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY I, the undersigned Director of the Office of Detainee Control, hereby certify that ________________________ was detained in the National Stadium from _______ to _______ ______________________________________ . SANTIAGO, ______ of _____________ 1973. Dir. Office of Detainee Control APPLICATION OF THE “ESCAPE LAW” 1. Shot 2. Shot 3. Shot 4. Shot 5. Shot 6. Shot DATE OF DEATH _______________________________ TIME _________________________ PLACE OF DEATH ______________________________ OBSERVATIONS ________________________________ Cause: Cervical thoracic trauma. Cause: Cardiopulmonary arrest. Head injury by firearm. Cause: Destruction of the thorax and cardiac region. Execution. SEPTEMBER 21, 1976 – WASHINGTON, DC THE WHITE HOUSE 7:33 The President had breakfast. 8:02 The President went to the doctor’s office. 8:10 The President went to the Oval Office. 9:05 The President met with John O. March Jr., Counselor. 9:20 The President met with Richard B. Cheney, Assistant. 10:15 The President met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs. 10:15 The President met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs. 10:15 The President met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs. 10:15 The President met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs. SPEECH AT CHACARILLAS (trumpets) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (torches) (applause) (cheers: Pinochet! Pinochet! Pinochet!) (trumpets) [End Page 52] My dear young people: The future of Chile is always in you, whose glory we are now sculpting Chile is you Homeland, flag, and youth thank you Mr. president, for everything you’ve done for Chile for our safety for our children god bless you . . . at first, when you start, you cry and try to hide it, so nobody notices. Then, you feel bad, a lump forms in your throat but you can hold back the tears. And then, [. . .] you get used to it. And in the end, you don’t even feel what you’re doing anymore . . . First the legs, then the sexual organs, then the heart. They fired the machine guns in this order. I was punched and kicked, pistol-whipped . . . They gave me electric shocks . . . Two men brutally raped me . . . I was submitted to torture. I was raped . . . They hit my ears, and they gave me electric shocks. They hit me in the groin, they hit my legs with wet sacks . . . I was tied to a post and doused with buckets of water . . . They simulated firing-squad executions and rapes . . . They tore the nails off my pinky toes . . . They made me listen to a tape with recordings...

Women reporters as experts on security affairs in Jordan? Rethinking gender and issue competency stereotypes

ABSTRACT Research on gender and issue competency stereotypes frequently deems security affairs a “stereotypically masculine” domain. Traditionally, men are seen as more credible authorities in arenas such as crime and the military, while women are assumed to be more credible in “stereotypically feminine” ones like childcare and health. But women’s roles in politics, media, and other influential sectors are rapidly changing in the Mediterranean and MENA region. To test the conventional wisdom, we conducted an original, nationally representative survey in Jordan (n=885) focused on the media sector, using an embedded experiment assessing beliefs about the suitability of men versus women to report and offer commentary on national security affairs—specifically, an internal security threat (a high-profile bank robbery). Strong patriarchal norms suggest that the country should be an “easy case” for theories positing bias against women as experts in stereotypically masculine issue areas. Our results, however, do not support this conventional wisdom, instead suggesting egalitarianism and even a modest credibility advantage for women on assumptions about expertise. Theoretically, we contribute by proposing three novel explanations for why and when women in patriarchal contexts may evade classic sexist backlash, and perhaps achieve greater credibility than men, as authorities in traditionally masculine domains.

Parameters Summer 2021

The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and Landpower issues. It furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.

The Ford Administration, the National Security Agency, and the “Year of Intelligence”: Constructing a New Legal Framework for Intelligence

Abstract:In the mid-1970s, Congress and the judiciary moved to regulate the National Security Agency (NSA) at a moment when such regulation might have restricted the growth of electronic surveillance. The Ford administration played a crucial role in preventing that from happening. It did so by controlling the flow of intelligence information to Congress and by establishing a flexible new legal framework for intelligence based on broad executive orders, narrow legislation, and legal opinions written by executive branch lawyers. This framework fostered a perception of legality that headed off calls for comprehensive legislation governing intelligence. The Ford administration’s actions protected NSA from meaningful regulation, preserved the growth of electronic surveillance, and sustained executive branch preeminence in national security affairs. The episode proved formative for the Ford administration officials involved—including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Antonin Scalia—and solidified the central role of executive branch lawyers in national security policymaking.

What Is the Social Responsibility of Social Scientists to Influence National Security Affairs?

Mainstream scholars of IR favor policy-relevant research, that is the agenda to influence government policymakers by offering policy recommendations. In this article, I offer a different perspective by presenting alternative arguments about social scientists’ responsibility to influence. By drawing on themes of public sociology and critical sociology, security studies and public policy, I argue that the core of this responsibility is to seek to influence policy via engagement with the public rather than with policymakers.

Extraordinary Renditions and State Secrets: A Human Rights Approach

One of the world’s main concerns over the past decades has been the phenomenon of terrorism. It is evident that terrorism must be eradicated, especially considering the huge threat it poses to the basic values of democratic societies. However, it must be kept in mind that arbitrary governments also represent a huge threat to these same values and, therefore, safeguards must exist to guarantee that state authorities act within the framework of law. Unfortunately, some governments misuse the ‘state secrets privilege’ argument, created to protect their right to confidentiality in national security affairs, to prevent their gross violations of human rights from being assessed by the judiciary, violating victims’ rights and promoting impunity. This is particularly true in cases involving so-called ‘extraordinary renditions’ used to fight terrorism. This article defends the premise that as much as the existence of secrecy is essential for the protection of every nation, no secrecy can serve as an excuse for governments to violate human rights and disregard the rule of law. In order to ensure that state secrets privilege is not used as a way to promote impunity for serious human rights violations, it is very important that mechanisms are implemented in order to have the claim of secrecy in national security related issues closely scrutinised by an impartial judicial organ. It is in the interest of democracy and justice that a fair balance is struck between the interests of national security and the protection of human rights.

Give an Hour's Van Dahlen to lead new White House task force on suicide

The board of directors of Give an Hour, a national nonprofit that provides free mental health services to those in need, including service members, veterans, their families and other at‐risk groups, announced June 19 that the White House, in partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), has appointed Barbara Van Dahlen, Ph.D., to lead the PREVENTS (President's Roadmap to Empower Veterans and End National Tragedy of Suicide) Task Force. The task force was created by President Donald Trump's executive order signed earlier this year, a press release stated. The PREVENTS Task Force will create a comprehensive national “Roadmap” that will weave together efforts by the federal government with state, regional, business, nonprofit, faith‐based, academic and community efforts. The task force will be co‐chaired by the secretary of the VA and the assistant to the president for domestic policy. Eight cabinet members will also be involved, including the secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security and Health and Human Services, as well as top officials from other key government entities, such as the Office of Management and Budget and National Security Affairs.

Danish Cold War Historiography

Abstract For decades, little research on Danish Cold War history was conducted either inside or outside Denmark. The relevant archives were closed, and generations of Danish contemporary historians were primarily interested in what happened during World War II. This is no longer the situation. Over the past 35 years, especially since the end of the Cold War, researchers have scrutinized Danish Cold War history in great depth. By now, scholarly research in Denmark on the Cold War, especially in the area of Danish national security affairs and foreign policy, has reached a level that merits international attention, and this survey article provides an overview. The article encourages Danish Cold War scholars to promote comparative research that incorporates Danish Cold War history into the wider international Cold War scholarship, to the benefit of both Danish and international research.

Inside the sausage factory: Decision-making in Israel’s national security policy

This essay examines three recent books by Israeli experts (two in Hebrew) dealing with structure and processes of the Israeli national security constellation, and common themes raised. These include the weakness of Israel’s Government and Security Cabinet in national security affairs; the quasi-presidential role of prime ministers in these issues and their preference for less formalized decision-making processes, based on subcabinet groups and personal staff; the preeminence of the military (including its often moderating influence) in staff and planning processes, and the parallel weakness of civilian bodies; and the disputable effects of the newish National Security Staff, meant to ameliorate the problems of the system. The essay concludes that while the problems presented may not be solvable, understanding of the structure and process is important, in order to manage expectations from them, as well as know how they can be negotiated and ‘played’ in order to get things done.

Japan’s National Security Council: Policy Coordination and Political Power

ABSTRACTIn 2013, Japan established its first-ever National Security Council (NSC) as the leading edge of ambitious reforms to its foreign-policy-relevant institutions. Within weeks, Japan’s new national security tripod was firmly in place: the top-level, political NSC ‘control tower’ as well as Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy and National Security Secretariat. Ever since, the NSC has played a central role in every major aspect of the Japanese strategic trajectory that has attracted so much global attention (and controversy) in the ‘Abe era’. This study analyzes the motivations driving Japan’s decision to establish an NSC, the institution’s key characteristics and functioning, and offers a preliminary assessment of the current and likely future implications of this historic institutional reform. Beyond the NSC’s impact on policy, of potentially greater long-term significance is its effects on Japan’s foreign-policy decision-making processes: in particular, expanded Kantei-centered political leadership of national security affairs and more ‘whole-of-government’ approaches specifically designed to transcend the ‘vertical hurdles’ traditionally dividing Japan’s powerful bureaucracies. The goal of these reforms is as straightforward as it is ambitious: to transform Japan’s ability to flexibly and independently cope with a rapidly changing, increasingly complex, and ever more uncertain security environment in East Asia and beyond.

Pakistan's Army Has a New General: Policy Implications

In this essay, I take on the circulating wisdom that Bajwa will somehow be a positive change for the institution he runs and the major policy levers he will control. I first assess the issue of the balance of power between civilian politicians and the army. Here, I argue that the army’s views of these issues are pre-eminent and will remain so for the policy-relevant future. While there may be some light between the inclinations of the army and the civilian government on some of these issues, ultimately the army’s preferences dominate. It is difficult to parse what — if any — role Pakistan’s citizens play in shaping these policies, in large part because the army has an inordinate role in shaping Pakistanis’ beliefs about critical national security affairs. The result of the army’s perduring and tenacious efforts to shape public opinion is that Pakistanis generally accede to the assessment of the army and tend to support the army in its various activities.

Pakistan's Army Has a New General: Policy Implications

In this essay, I take on the circulating wisdom that Bajwa will somehow be a positive change for the institution he runs and the major policy levers he will control. I first assess the issue of the balance of power between civilian politicians and the army. Here, I argue that the army’s views of these issues are pre-eminent and will remain so for the policy-relevant future. While there may be some light between the inclinations of the army and the civilian government on some of these issues, ultimately the army’s preferences dominate. It is difficult to parse what — if any — role Pakistan’s citizens play in shaping these policies, in large part because the army has an inordinate role in shaping Pakistanis’ beliefs about critical national security affairs. The result of the army’s perduring and tenacious efforts to shape public opinion is that Pakistanis generally accede to the assessment of the army and tend to support the army in its various activities.

مؤسسات صنع السياسة الخارجية في الولايات المتحدة الامريكية

Since 1945 ,the end of second world war ,the foreign policy became an affair that is not special for the American United States since it appeared after the cool war andthedemisof theSoveitunion in 1991 and the appearance of the united states as the first pole in the foreign policywith all itsIngredents, corporations andeconomical,politicaland social abilities beside the broad position ofit′ssoft power that enables U.S to affect allthegovermentsand the nations all over the worldand this reality led to theindulging inthe International policy as a superpowerwhether or notinterventedand almostanydecision taken byUSissort of intervention in world affairs. We had in our researchthe institutionsinvolved in the making of American foreign policy during the different periods till modern dayand involved in drawing the general framework which governs the process of political decision and the American policy in isolation or immersion particularly the role of President and Foreign Minister and Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of Defense and other entities contribute to the making of American foreign policy. What distinguishes US foreign policy on both moral and pragmatic, is that it had been to a lot of criticism, especially in cases of intervention, whether political, economic or military intervention and where it was always out with unexpected results  theseresultedue to a lack of management skills or lack of appropriate theories, and most critics were right but in contrast others considered America's interests and national security as part of global securitywhich America cannot be far of it . There are new efforts when a lot of importantthinker inthink tanks are recommending that State effortsto be( immersion) wise and reasonable, as in the case of invitations to intervene through subsidies or by combination with other countries (International Alliance) or by the United Nations (humanitarian intervention .)Many foreign-policy thinkers know very well that the complex problems facing America and some of them are verycomplex inthe field of foreign decision-making, some argue that there are urgent decisions the time doesn’t allow only to report the most importantones. Many thinkers call not to put restrictions on the hands of the Executiveauthorityas it increases the external decision making processexhautionand dangerousandincrease wastage and that this power was worth a slaponthe face butthinkers specializedinforeign policydon’t accepttoputa solid ropeon theexecutive arms and pretend to proposeabetter solutions toretreat ,at a minimum for us in northern Iraq we suggest tothepoliticalKurdishto understand orin try to understand America and its foreign policy to build a renewed strategyand sustainable to deal with such excessive force or (theproudnation, andundefeatableforce) researcher believes the late MohamedHassaneinHaikalsaying very rightly in this regardas he said( to understand America or trying to understandvital (to deal) withitwithout fear and ignorance creates without (lightly) are made by illusion ,enemityagainstAmerica is the easiestattitude andin these times is greatunbearablefault, while falling inAmerica′s love is greater fault with unbearablelosses.

Selling the Arc of Crisis: Promoting Foreign Policy Change during the Carter Presidency

AbstractThe Carter Administration came to Office seeking to continue a policy of détente. However, the Administration’s policy vis-à-vis the Soviets became more assertive throughout the Presidency, culminating in the Carter Doctrine. The current paper applies a conceptual framework for “issue selling” to argue that a more assertive foreign policy was being promoted by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his NSC staff since the early days of the Carter Presidency. By applying an assortment of issue selling strategies, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the NSC staff were able to exploit the communicative interactions amongst the political leadership to continuously promote a more forceful US policy towards the Soviets. By being able to interpret and define the problem representation facing the Administration, the APNSA was able initiate and continuously promote a wholesale policy transformation leading to the development of the Carter Doctrine.

The Utility of Nuclear Weapons Today: Two Views

No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National Security. By Thomas M. Nichols Atomic Assistance: How 'Atoms for Peace Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity. By Matthew Fuhrmann My colleague Steven Metz recently wrote a very thought provoking piece, entitled Thinking About Catastrophe: The Army in a Nuclear Armed World. Metz argues, nothing is more important to American security than weapons. Despite all the fretting over terrorism, hybrid threats, and conventional aggression, only weapons can threaten the existence of the United States and destroy the global economy. (1) Indeed, despite the end of the Cold War and hostilities between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the topic of weapons is vital today. Not a day goes by without reference to weapons in national and international newspapers. For example, the New York Times, in its February 18, 2016 online edition, reported that Belgium police discovered ten hours of video purportedly showing a Belgian official at the home of the Paris attacker, Thierry Werts. Belgium officials argued the terrorist organization network involved in the coordinated attacks on November 13, 2015, that left 130 dead may also have intended to obtain radioactive material for terrorist purposes. (2) Terrorist organizations attempting to acquire weapons to carry out their nefarious activities, and renegade nation-states also continue to challenge the international system and international law by attempting to acquire weapons. The most recent example occurred on February 7, 2016, when the hermit kingdom of Korea tested a bomb and launched a satellite, provoking sharp condemnations from Russia and China as well as South Korea. Despite the fact weapons could be considered obsolete since an attack by one country could result in massive retaliation by another, the United States maintains a huge arsenal on high alert and ready for war. The two books considered in this review discuss the utility of weapons in the post-Cold War era. No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National Security, by Thomas M. Nichols, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College in Newport, examines the current state of US doctrine and strategy, the effects of American thinking about weapons on international security, and the various ways the United States might reduce the overall threat of weapons. (12) Why is it so difficult for the major powers, and the United States in particular, to break their addiction? What role should weapons play in America's national security? These are the central questions guiding No Use. (5) While the United States has reduced its stockpiles, it still maintains a considerable number of them. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Are weapons still relevant in the post-Cold War world? Nichols has his doubts. He argues Cold War-era precepts about weapons have continued to dominate security policy and strategies by default. (6) While they may still be considered a good mechanism, other nations may see weapons as aggressive tools in the military arsenal of its opponents. For example, Russian officials, despite their displeasure with Korea for its most recent test and satellite launch, believe the North Korean regime is simply fighting for its own survival, using the logic that when a pack of wolves attacks you, only a fool lowers his gun. (3) Nichols succinctly argues, deterrence will not be strengthened by creating smaller or more accurate bombs or by drawing up military senseless campaigns of desultory strikes. (157) Nichols believes a Armageddon, in the current international system, is unlikely to take place between nation-states. In fact, he contends that without a real threat to the American civilization itself, nuclear weapons are now more an instrument of choice rather than [of] necessity. …

Israel's nuclear amimut policy and its consequences

In neither admitting nor denying its nuclear capabilities, Israel has adopted a policy of amimut, or ‘ambiguity’ in regard to its nuclear policy. By not acknowledging its nuclear capabilities, Israel has actually strayed from the traditional tenets of rational deterrence theory, which states that deterrence can be achieved when a state credibly communicates its capabilities and intent. Incredibly, despite the fact that Israel has not followed these tenets, it has still managed to achieve effective deterrence against non-conventional attacks, and furthermore avoid the automatic dire rebound results that typically accompany the build-up of arms in the international community. As successful as this approach has been, amimut has also resulted in the negative side effect of undermining Israeli democracy and perceived political control over national security affairs. This article explores the positive and negative impacts of this unique policy, and the consequences of maintaining or abandoning the policy of amimut.

Technique Trumps Relevance: The Professionalization of Political Science and the Marginalization of Security Studies

I explain here the disconnect between our discipline's self-image as balancing rigor with relevance with the reality of how we actually conduct our scholarship most of the time. To do so, I account for variation in social scientists' willingness to engage in policy-relevant scholarship over time. My theory is that social science, at least as it has been practiced in the United States since the early twentieth century, has tried to balance two impulses: To be a rigorous science and a relevant social enterprise. The problem is that there are sometimes tensions between these two objectives. First, historically the most useful policy-relevant social science work in the area of national security affairs has been interdisciplinary in nature, and this cuts against the increasingly rigid disciplinary siloes in the modern academy. Second, as sociologist Thomas Gieryn puts it, there is “in science, an unyielding tension between basic and applied research, and between the empirical and theoretical aspects of inquiry.” During wartime, the tensions between these two impulses have been generally muted, especially among those disciplines of direct relevance to the war effort; in peacetime, they reemerge and there are a variety of powerful institutional incentives within academe to resolve them in favor of a narrow definition of rigor that excludes relevance. My objective is to document how these trends in political science are marginalizing the sub-field of security studies, which has historically sought both scholarly rigor and real-world relevance. — Michael Desch.This essay is followed by responses from Ido Oren, Laura Sjobreg, Helen Louise Turton, Erik Voeten, and Stephen M. Walt. Michael Desch then offers a response to commentators.