Abstract

This essay examines three recent books by Israeli experts (two in Hebrew) dealing with structure and processes of the Israeli national security constellation, and common themes raised. These include the weakness of Israel’s Government and Security Cabinet in national security affairs; the quasi-presidential role of prime ministers in these issues and their preference for less formalized decision-making processes, based on subcabinet groups and personal staff; the preeminence of the military (including its often moderating influence) in staff and planning processes, and the parallel weakness of civilian bodies; and the disputable effects of the newish National Security Staff, meant to ameliorate the problems of the system. The essay concludes that while the problems presented may not be solvable, understanding of the structure and process is important, in order to manage expectations from them, as well as know how they can be negotiated and ‘played’ in order to get things done.

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