National Recovery Administration Research Articles

Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration

Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration

Corporatism, the NRA, and the Oil Industry

The National Recovery Administration (NRA) of the 1930s was the most extensive corporatist experiment in American history, and its administrative history challenges widely accepted conclusions in interest group theory. The NRA exemplifies almost every characteristic of government regulation of business which interest group theory has associated with the capture of bureaucratic agencies by private interests. A broad delegation of congressional power in the National Industrial Recovery Act gave bureaucrats little guidance in identifying the public interests to be promoted by the NRA, increasing the likelihood that the New Dealers would turn to the industries they regulated for aid in defining the goals of the program. Cooptation of the NRA appeared even more likely because trade associations were formally incorporated into the administrative agency responsible for the program. Yet, surprisingly, business efforts to control the program failed. As this case study of the oil industry under the NRA demonstrates, big business was neither the interest group sponsoring the NRA nor its beneficiary. Even the independents in the industry who did benefit from the act were forced to accept benefits as favors granted by these bureaucrats, who remained firmly in control of the program. The conclusion which emerges from a study of the NRA is that of the robustness of the American state and its capacity to coopt private interests in the pursuit of its own ideologically defined goals. Support for the pluralist conclusion that political power in the United States is widely distributed has suffered steady erosion over the last decade. Even prominent pluralists of the late 1950s and early 1960s have repudiated their earlier contributions, acknowledging theoretical deficiencies in their own paradigm. Criticism of pluralism has focused on two related assumptions of the plu-

The Great Experiment in Industrial Self-Government: The Lumber Industry and the National Recovery Administration

THE LUMBER BUSINESS provides key insights to the evolution and expansion of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because of its propensity toward overproduction, cutthroat competition, and chronically unstable markets. Disorder and chaotic activity eventually brought forth a leadership bent on alleviating these tendencies through trade association cooperation on both regional and national levels. Modernists in the industry, including many prominent national lumbermen, were foremost among those who pressed for greater industrial cooperation and a lessening of discord and strife.' Although the First World War served as the great

The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and Trade Association Issue, 1921–1933. By Robert F. Himmelberg. New York: Fordham University Press, 1976. Pp. 232. $20.00 cloth, $7.50 paper.

The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and Trade Association Issue, 1921–1933. By Robert F. Himmelberg. New York: Fordham University Press, 1976. Pp. 232. 7.50 paper. - Volume 37 Issue 2

The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933

The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933

The Origins of the National Recovery Administration Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933

This book is the history of the business community's efforts during the 1920s and early thirties to emasculate the federal policy, stemming from the sherman.

The Origins of the National Recovery Administration

The Origins of the National Recovery Administration

Carter Glass and the National Recovery Administration

Research Article| July 01 1975 Carter Glass and the National Recovery Administration A. Cash Koeniger A. Cash Koeniger Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google South Atlantic Quarterly (1975) 74 (3): 349–364. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-74-3-349 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation A. Cash Koeniger; Carter Glass and the National Recovery Administration. South Atlantic Quarterly 1 July 1975; 74 (3): 349–364. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-74-3-349 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsSouth Atlantic Quarterly Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 1975 by Duke University Press1975 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Drafting the NRA Code of Fair Competition for the Bituminous Coal Industry

D URING the summer and fall of 1933 the fledgling National Recovery Administration engaged in a tumultuous battle with the bituminous coal operators draft its industrial Code of Fair Competition. The tiring, seemingly endless negotiations consumed three months, involved the NRA director, General Hugh S. Johnson, personally more than those for any other industry, and forced President Franklin D. Roosevelt intervene time after time. Beginning his talks with the coal operators before the Recovery Act was passed in June, Johnson had pull every conceivable wire before he could present the President with a code in mid-September. Shortly after Roosevelt signed the code, Johnson proclaimed it the NRA's greatest achievement. He maintained that the coal fracas had been the NRA's hardest fight, a sentiment echoed by the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, which called it the most difficult problem yet be faced by the NRA.' In the midst of the struggle, a leading operator informed the government that it was physically impossible draft a single code for the sprawling industry. Yet over the summer by cajoling and bargaining, swapping and haggling, the NRA won the operators' agreement a coal code. When the fight ended, the New Republic noted that getting the coal operators agree to anything at all is a triumph.2

The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence

The massive depression of the 1930's detonated the crisis between harsh reality and the vision of material abundance and economic security created by the American industrial order. Amid widespread poverty there was increasing concentration of economic power and loss of individual initiative. Professor Hawley traces the pattern of this conflict. He analyzes the National Recovery Administration, the sources and nature of the antitrust ideology, the rise of Keynesianism, the confusion within the Roosevelt Administration during the recession of 1937-38, and the government career of Thurman Arnold. Attention is given to the administrators of the New Deal and to the beliefs, pressures, and symbols that affected their policy decisions. How and why these ideas and pressures produced policies that were economically inconsistent yet politically workable is also explained. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Public Responsibility and Federal Advisory Groups: a Case Study

HE PARTICIPATION of private groups in the electoral and legislative processes is time-honored, and an essential feature of democratic government. But the delegation of public power to private groups at a later stage in the governmental process has no theoretical foundation in democratic thought; it reflects rather the philosophy of corporativism. In the Schecter case the Supreme Court, in holding the National Recovery Administration to involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, glanced askance at the participation of industry committees in the rule-making function;1 and in the Carter Coal case,2 in holding the first Guffey Coal Act unconstitutional, the Court emphasized the fact that the delegation of legislative power was to a private body. Nevertheless the practice has made some headway. States have given the power of arrest to the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and have given public status to privately paid industrial police.3 In effect the integrated gives the power of licensing lawyers to the state bar association, and the Missouri plan gives the bar association a powerful voice in the choice of state judges. State unfair trade practice laws have virtually authorized trade associations to fix legally binding retail prices.4 The federal government has on a number of occasions entrusted to private groups the power of nominating persons to be appointed to public office.5 In the 1930's federal regulatory legislation introduced a number of devices which made official action dependent upon the approval of those who produced or marketed agricultural commodities.6 Recent legislative history also shows an increasing tendency to grant representation to private groups in the administrative process.7 No one would contend that the interest of the public rather than of special groups is invariably served when private groups are denied a share in appointive or rule-making or administrative functions. It does seem possible, however, as the Supreme Court has suggested, that delegating

The Trucking Industry and the National Recovery Administration

R ELATIONSHIPS between government and business have been studied by historians, political scientists, and the legal profession. Although many generalizations have been drawn from the studies, few of them have been based on detailed examinations of the interaction of particular groups of businessmen and individual government agencies. The rarity of case histories on the subject is not the result of absence of source materials. The National Archives alone has large collections of records documenting the relationships between individual firms, as well as groups representing a number of firms, and regulatory agencies of the Federal Government. The records of the National Recovery Administration, for example, include correspondence and reports containing information on the interaction of businessmen in over six hundred industries with public administrators of NRA. It is the purpose of this paper to show by use of these records how self-regulation (the description of NRA's friends) or government regulation (the description of its foes) affected the trucking industry. The experiences of this industry were not unique among industries for which codes were approved. On the other hand, no one industry was typical. And while generalizations about the impact of NRA upon industry as a whole are possible and suggestive, there is something to be gained by looking at experiences of particular industries in a concrete way.

Corporative Occupational Organization and Democracy in Germany

MERICAN Military Government in Germany has been charged with democratizing a totalitarian governmental structure. The particular brand of structure that developed in Germany under National Socialism and in Italy under Fascism has been termed the corporative state. The term was derived from the incorporation of occupational groups and their use as administrative agencies of government. In the United States the code groups developed under the National Recovery Administration have been the closest approach to occupational corporations. These groups, though their membership was voluntary, were allowed to develop codes governing fair practices and price floors. The codes were valid for the members and were enforceable in administrative courts if approved by government. The code groups were abolished as a result of a Supreme Court decision. More permanent have been the professional associations of lawyers, physicians, and the like. These associations, however, have refrained from fee regulation and have concentrated upon codes of ethical practices-codes not enforceable in government courts. The American Medical Association has been indicted for restraint of trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act when its regulations were deemed to have compulsory effect upon nonmembers.

Historical Development of Uniform Accounting

THis survey of uniform accounting practices is restricted to developments in the industrial field of the United States. In particular, attention is devoted largely to the efforts of trade associations, which have been the leading exponents of the use of uniform accounting. The influence of a few governmental agencies (the National Recovery Administration looms largest among these) is also examined. The survey is divided into the following chronological periods, each of which possesses some unique features regarding the development of uniform accounting: (i) pioneering years from approximately i875 to I90o; (2) period of increased activity from i900 to i919; (3) period of legal uncertainty regarding certain trade association activities from I920 to I925; (4) period of increased prestige of trade associations from I926 to I932; (5) period covered by and following certain New Deal laws.

The National Recovery Administration: Report of the President's Committee of Industrial Analysis.

<i>The National Recovery Administration: Report of the President's Committee of Industrial Analysis</i>.

Industrial Home Work under the National Recovery Administration. Mary Skinner

Previous articleNext article No AccessPublic DocumentsIndustrial Home Work under the National Recovery Administration. Mary Skinner PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Social Service Review Volume 11, Number 2Jun., 1937 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/632051 Views: 1Total views on this site Copyright 1937 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition

Direct social control of the industrial system presents dismaying difficulties and dangers. The National Recovery Administration revealed the complexity of the economic problems that arise when conflicts of self interest are replaced by direct governmental planning. The political consequences of a high concentration of economic power in the state are less clear but no less disquieting. Efforts to meet the growing criticism of the industrial system while avoiding these difficulties and dangers1 have taken a peculiar form in the United States. An effort has been made to preserve by law the conditions necessary for the continuance of If the prerequisites of competition could be preserved detailed controls of industrial policy would, it was hoped, be avoided. Direct appraisal of the treatment of the buyer would be unnecessary. Experience of this policy has, however, revealed the difficulty of giving specific meaning to the comfortable phrase of the economists, assuming free competition. It has brought disillusionment because of the increasingly wide divergence of actual business conditions from the free competition of economic theory. In consequence social policy shows signs of transformation into a policy of regulating an admittedly imperfectly competitive world. The prerequisites of competition have recently been reexamined by economists and prove to be very difficult of attainment. There must be a perfect market in the sense that, in the absence of general changes in the conditions of demand and supply, a slight reduction in price by one firm would shift all business in the market to that firm. Buyers may have no loyalties to sellers or preferences for the product of any one of them and they must be exceedingly well informed. Selleis must be sufficiently numerous for none of them to find it profitable to take account of the effect of changes in his output upon the market price.

The Effect of Price Controls on Non-Price Competition

It has been said that the National Recovery Administration operated under a law which gave it legislative, executive, and judicial functions. But in retrospect it seems to have scarcely passed beyond the legislative phase in most of the matters which came under its jurisdiction. The essential part of its record for the economist is the record of the attempts to formulate policy in connection with the code-making process. The NRA, which might have assumed historic importance as an effort to operate under a new national economic policy, in practical effect resolved itself into a great national forum for the discussion of the elements of such a policy. Questions of price control brought many divergent viewpoints into the national forum. Economists were in general opposed to such measures. Business men were much more divided in their opinions. But among these who favored some form of price control there were large firms and small firms, advertisers and non-advertisers, profitable and unprofitable concerns, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. In short it could not be said that business men of this persuasion conformed to any particular type. Arguments offered in favor of price control measures were of similar scope and variety. Very frequently their logic rested more on social grounds than on economic. An argument to which a number of economists listened with some sympathy was the plea for the preservation of the small enterprise as a means of giving fuller opportunities to individual initiative. An attempt was sometimes made to give this view a more acceptable economic flavor by insisting on the essential nature of the services performed by some of the firms which were on the verge of business failure. If these firms were not permitted to survive, it was argued, great social costs might be incurred in replacing them. Similarly in the raw materials industries, such as coal and petroleum, the demand for price control was frequently linked with the need for conserving natural resources. Both types of arguments stressed structural features of economic life. Thus they created resistance and uneasiness in the minds of economists who preferred to

The National Recovery Administration: An Analysis and Appraisal

The National Recovery Administration: An Analysis and Appraisal. By Leverett S. Lyon, et al. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1935. xxii+947 pp. Appendices and charts. $3.50.) Get access E. L. Bogart E. L. Bogart University of Illinois Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 22, Issue 3, December 1935, Pages 464–465, https://doi.org/10.2307/1892655 Published: 01 December 1935

The National Recovery Administration: An Analysis and an Appraisal, by Leverett S. Lyon, Paul T. Homan, Lewis L. Lorwin, George Terborgh, Charles L. Dearing, Leon C. Marshall

The National Recovery Administration: An Analysis and an Appraisal, <i>by Leverett S. Lyon, Paul T. Homan, Lewis L. Lorwin, George Terborgh, Charles L. Dearing, Leon C. Marshall</i>