National Rally Research Articles

The populist discourse on the environment: framework and evidence from Europe and the Americas

ABSTRACT What is the relationship between populism and the environment? Existing research answers this question by identifying empirical patterns emerging from the positions of specific populist parties. These patterns, however, are not leveraged to propose an overall framework for how populism itself relates to environmental positions. We adopt a deductive approach that draws from populism’s essence to articulate what we should expect. Populism is an ideologically ‘thin’ discursive approach centered on people-centrism and anti-elitism. The environment, as other substantive matters, is therefore a second-order issue. Given this, we should expect considerable variations across populists in their environmental positions. At the same time, we should expect the consistent anchoring of those positions in people-centrism and anti-elitism – in consonance with the specific factors pertinent to those parties that ultimately define their environmental positions. Our approach systematizes analytically the literature’s observations, corrects some of its empirical limitations, and allows for reflection on the environmental commitment of any one populist party. We undertake a cross-regional analysis of four cases to illustrate our argument: Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, the US Republican Party led by Donald Trump, Spain’s Podemos led by Pablo Iglesias, and Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro’s socialist regime in Venezuela.

Hybridization of the French National Rally Party

Hybridization of the French National Rally Party

The French Left’s Delicate Unity

ABSTRACT: In many respects, the French left is one of the strongest in Europe. Its loose coalition of parties—the New Ecological and Social Popular Union (NUPES)—makes up the biggest opposition bloc in the National Assembly, counting dozens more seats than the far-right National Rally.

Heart rate variability, recovery and stress analysis of an elite rally driver and co-driver during a competition period.

To ensure both optimal health and performances, monitoring physiological and psychological states is of main importance for athletes. It is well known that monitoring heart rate variability and using validated questionnaires is useful for monitoring both the health and training status of athletes of different sports. Motorsports such as rally require high levels of physical and mental preparation thus information about psychophysiological status of rally athletes is fundamental. The aim of this study was to assess the autonomic regulation, stress, recovery conditions of one driver and one co-driver competing at the Italian National Rally Championship during their competition period. Heart rate variability parameters, acute recovery and stress states were assessed the day before, during the two days of race and the day following the races. Results showed that driver and co-driver had a sharp decrease of mean RR intervals, root mean square of successive differences between normal heartbeats, and standard deviation of the N-N interval during race days, while the stress index showed the inverse trend, and this behaviour was clearly visible in the Poincaré plots and power spectrum density graphs. The acute recovery and stress states questionnaire showed significant differences in recovery and stress scoring for the driver but not for the co-driver, although the trends were similar. This study describes the psychophysiological demands of a rally competition period suggesting that a daily evaluation of heart rate variability, recovery, stress states is useful for monitoring health status in rally athletes and could be implemented to make decision about training and recovery strategies.

The French Left's Delicate Unity

ABSTRACT: In many respects, the French left is one of the strongest in Europe. Its loose coalition of parties—the New Ecological and Social Popular Union (NUPES)—makes up the biggest opposition bloc in the National Assembly, counting dozens more seats than the far-right National Rally.

For things to remain the same, everything must change? Studying National front’s and National rally’s platforms on education

ABSTRACT The Rassemblement national, or National Rally (previously known as Front national, or National Front, until 2018) has been the only European far-right party that has constantly been among the major political organizations of its country since the 1980s. However, its agendas, ideas and proposals on education are relatively unknown and have barely been studied. Its manifestos, from its rise in the 1980s to the mid-2000s, showed a mix of a conservative perception of school curricula, an intense hostility towards teachers and a market-oriented approach of education (including school vouchers). Since the party has been led by Marine le Pen in 2011, the National Front/National Rally’s agenda seems to have substantially changed, and now promotes state schools and professionals working in them, while opposing any cuts in educational spending. The idea this research wants to investigate is that such a shift is actually limited, as it does not change what could be theorized as a ‘pedagogical core’ of the French far-right, defined here as a stable corpus of proposals and beliefs towards education. This core has remained remarkably stable since the first platform of the party released in 1973: selective, pessimistic about the outcomes and effects of mass schooling, nationalistic.

Approaches of Populist Far-Right Parties in Europe to the Immigration Issue: The Case of The French National Rally Party

Göç mevzusuyla toplumların yaşadıkları ekonomik, toplumsal, kültürel ve güvenlik kaynaklı sorunlar arasında doğrudan bir bağ kuran ve göç ile göçmen karşıtlığını temel politika söylemlerinden biri olarak benimseyen popülist aşırı sağ partiler günümüzde Avrupa siyasetinde giderek daha etkin hâle gelmektedir. Popülizmin gerçek halk ile yozlaşmış elitler arasında var olduğunu iddia ettiği karşıtlık tezine ilave bir aktör olarak göçmenleri de ekleyen ve elitistleri onlara destek vermekle itham eden söz konusu partiler, etnik milliyetçilik ve yabancı düşmanlığının bir sentezi olan yerlicilik vasıflarıyla diğer siyasi topluluklardan ayrışmaktadırlar. Krizlerden beslenen ve göç konusunu da bir kriz olarak devamlı Avrupa toplumlarına lanse eden popülist aşırı sağ partiler, mevcut müesses nizam fırkalarının halkın bu konudaki duyarlılıklarını anlayamayacağını ve sorunlara çözüm üretemeyeceğini savunarak tek gerçekçi alternatifin kendileri olduklarını iddia etmektedirler. Kıtadaki popülist aşırı sağ partiler ailesinin en eski üyelerinden biri olan Fransa’daki Ulusal Birlik Partisi de göç ve göçmen konularında benzer yaklaşımları benimsemekte ve bu çerçevede göçmen azınlıkların Fransız toplumuna entegrasyonları noktasında çokkültürcülük karşıtı katı bir siyasi duruş sergilemektedir.

The Anthropocene as framed by the far right

The Anthropocene as framed by the far right

Understanding Civilizational Populism in Europe and North America: The United States, France, and Poland

This article tests the salience of the concept of “civilizational populism” in the European and North American contexts. Right-wing populism is increasingly successful across a range of countries in Europe and North America. While right-wing populism is oriented toward nationalism and nativism, many right-wing populist parties increasingly perceive, as Brubaker puts it, the “opposition between self and other” and “the boundaries of belonging” not in narrow “national but in broader civilizational terms”. Yilmaz and Morieson describe this phenomenon as “civilizational populism”. Using Cas Mudde’s ideological/ideational definition of populism, Yilmaz and Morieson describe civilizational populism as “a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people”. Civilizational populism appears to be widespread across Europe, and it is also present in the United States, although there is curiously little research on this phenomenon, and Yilmaz and Morieson’s conception of civilizational populism has not been extensively tested. To test the salience of this concept, this article examines three distinct manifestations of civilizational rhetoric in three different countries: the Trump administration in the United States, National Rally in France, and PiS in Poland. The article asks the following two questions. What role does civilizationalism play in populist discourses? How do the civilizational populists in France, Poland, and the United States define “the people”, “elites”, and “others”, and what are the similarities and differences between the parties/movements examined? The article finds that all three parties/movements may be termed “civilizational populists” under the definition given by Yilmaz and Morieson. It finds that the civilizational populists examined in the article posit that “elites” are immoral insofar as they have both turned away from the “good” religion-derived cultural values of “the people” and permitted or desired the immigration of people who do not share the culture and values as “the people”, instead belonging to a foreign civilization—Islam—with different and even antithetical values. However, the article finds that “the people”, “elites”, and “others” are described by Trump, Le Pen, and Kaczyński in significantly different ways.

The European Policy of National Rally as a Resource for Legitimization of the French Far Right

Nowadays the National Rally (NR) is the main force of French Eurosceptics. European issues play a special role in the party’s representation and its ideological and political program. In addition, European issues are an important strategic resource for the legitimization of the National Rally. The purpose of the article, dedicated to the European part of NR’s policy, is to highlight several aspects of the problem. First of all, the article analyzes the evolution of the party's discourse on the issue of European integration. The author also examines the key concepts and vocabulary that forms the modern discourse of the NR. Finally, studying the interactions of the far right in the European Parliament allows us to show how Marine Le Pen’s European policy contributes to her legitimization.

Between the System and the Opposition: The Evolution of the Electoral Portrait of the National Rally, 2017–2022

The French electoral cycle that ended in 2022 proved that far-right leader Marine Le Pen has succeeded in establishing herself as the recognised standard-bearer of the French opposition. The success of the 2022 elections was another milestone in the successive electoral ascent of the Rassemblement Nationale: in the 2012 presidential election, Marine Le Pen obtained 17.9% of the vote, 21% in 2017, and in 2022 she received 23% in the first round and 41% in the second. This expansion of the electoral base was accompanied by a change in the party's electoral profile, as evidenced by the sociological research that was the main source for this article. First of all, the author demonstrates which social categories were responsible for the rise in Le Pen's popularity and how the party's rhetoric and, at times, policy positions were transformed in response to the mood of voters. She also analyses the correlation between the unstable socio-economic situation and the strengthening of the extreme right, suggesting the extent to which the vote for Le Pen is influenced not only by the financial and social status of the voter, but also by the anxiety triggered by worsening economic issues and the mainstreaming of immigration and security issues. Finally, an examination of the values of Le Pen's electorate allows one to look at the perspectives and constraints of the “Marinism” strategy in a broader context.

Electoral competition dynamics and Syrian refugee discourses and policies in Germany and France

ABSTRACT Among European countries, Germany has implemented the most generous policies toward Syrian refugees. Contrarily, its main partner within the EU, France, viewing the refugee crisis primarily as a matter of security, has avoided them. I argue that these divergent approaches are closely linked with electoral competition dynamics. Electoral competition dynamics have shaped the expected outcomes of adopting pro-Syrian refugee policies for ruling centrist parties in these countries. The risk posed by the centrist right-wing voters’ shift to the far-right due to the enactment of pro-refugee policies for CDU in Germany was eased to a great extent by a type of cordon sanitaire, other parties’ exclusion of Alternative for Germany (AfD) from coalitions. However, the electoral risk posed by the rise of a Populist Radical Right Party (PRRP), the National Rally (RN), against the Republic on the Move (LREM) has been higher in France. As a result, centrist French Presidents have been electorally more constrained or vulnerable in adopting generous refugee policies. By comparatively analyzing the Syrian refugee discourses and policies in Germany and France, this study permits us to better evaluate and understand the domestic sources of refugee politics in liberal democracies.

Transformation of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: Reform of National Rally and its Political Influence

In April 2022, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Ally, not only entered the second round of the French presidential election again, but also achieved a new high in the election results of French far-right parties with 41.45% of the votes. Similarly, in the June parliamentary elections, the National Ally’s seats increased from 9 to 89, which is undoubtedly a further affirmation of the National Ally reform. Since 2011, Marine Le Pen who has carried out top-down reform of the National Ally put forward a series of strategies, including anti-European integration, de-demonization, and networking, which made a breakthrough in the European parliament elections and French municipal elections, leaving a great impact on the political ecology of French political parties and European politics. Radical right-wing populist parties, represented by the French National Ally, have a voter base that should not be underestimated and become important in the political arena of Western Europe.

Traditional Values in the Discourse of the French Populist Radical Right: The Case of the National Rally

The migration crisis has become a trigger activating radical right-wing forces and movements. Contemporary right-wing forces, seeking to distinguish themselves from extremist right-wing movements, are resorting to populism, updating their political agenda: they use traditional conservative values in their rhetoric, but give them a new interpretation. In particular, the traditional values are complemented by gender equality and minority rights. The article analyses the transformation of the right-wing family agenda in the new social and political context, based on the conceptualisation of radical right-wing populism by H.-G. Betz and C. Mudde. The author considers the case of the French National Rally, examining the speeches of party leaders, party programmes and media materials through discourse analysis. The author identifies two trends: (1) since the 1980s, the traditional anti-migrant rhetoric of the right has been extended to include the family agenda, and the category of family as the core of the nation was gradually transformed into a tool to protect the nation from external influence; (2) party renewal under the leadership of Marine Le Pen entailed the updating of the family agenda to include protection of women’s rights, the modern interpretation of family, actualization of issues of European and national identity, including the interpretation of the women’s role as active protectors of national identity. In the author’s view, this process fits into the overall efforts of right-wing radicals to move into the political mainstream and the emergence of right-wing populism.

The Rassemblement National and COVID-19: How Nativism, Authoritarianism and Expert Populism Did Not Pay Off during the Pandemic

AbstractThe article examines the response of the French National Rally (Rassemblement National – RN) to COVID-19. It combines computer-based and qualitative content analysis of Facebook posts and press releases to uncover the salience and frames of the infection. I find that the RN used an ambivalent strategy to respond to the pandemic, linking an unexpected problem to its core ideological tenets, while also adapting its programmatic profile. Specifically, the RN interpreted COVID-19 in terms of immigration and defence. Diagnostic frames drew on nativist, authoritarian and populist tenets to identify the origin of the infection (migrants), and to attribute blame for its spread (lack of border controls). Moreover, prognostic frames used disagreement within the scientific community to criticize governments' policies and propose alternatives. While this strategy allowed the RN to address an issue outside its ‘comfort zone’, its support base remained stable. These results point at the radical right's strategic use of expert knowledge and populist logics to try to improve its credibility in mainstream public debates.

Трансформация евроскептицизма партии “Национальное объединение” (2017–2022)

In the spring of 2022, French presidential elections were held in which Marine Le Pen, the leader of the Eurosceptic National Rally party, came in second place. The electoral dynamics of this party are positive, which increases the likelihood of the transformation of the French political mainstream. The populist National Rally (NR) is gradually becoming a systemic party. This has an impact on the public environment, which makes studying the mainstream parties relevant. The situation of the NR is affected by the transformation of traditional party Euroscepticism. In order to analyze and give reasons for these changes, the article carries out a content analysis of the 2017 and 2022 election programs of M. Le Pen, the leader of NR. The application of simple and substantive content analysis methods made it possible to trace the evolution of her program agenda during the 2017–2022 election cycle. The author concludes that the transformation of Euroscepticism from a ‘hard’ to a ‘soft’ form was aimed at attracting a broader constituency. The change in the NR's agenda-setting means abandoning the previous demands to withdraw France from the EU, the Eurozone and the Schengen zone. Along with this, M. Le Pen proposes to transform the European Union into the European Alliance of Nations, in which the intergovernmental principle will prevail, which is opposed to the excessive supranationality in the EU. The question of France's role in the world was also a prominent feature in the 2017 and 2022 programs of the NR leader. However, no evolution of the program in this direction has been detected. At the same time, there was a transformation of M. Le Pen’s attitude towards Russia. Previously, the NR could be called a promoter of Russian interests in France and the EU (taking into account the activities of deputies from this party in the European Parliament). However, Russia's special military operation in Ukraine forced the NR to change its opinion about the Kremlin's foreign policy.

The Transnational Networks of the European Radical Populist Right and the Beacon of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy

Radical right parties in Europe have been in negotiations since 2018 in order to form a single, unified group in the European Parliament. Today, there are two competing caucuses: one, which is considered the “extreme right” by European standards; and another, which is a collection of far-right, Euroskeptic parties. A unified caucus would challenge the leadership of mainstream conservatives and Christian Democrats in the Parliament and be a show of strength by the radical right. For those who are at the origin of this attempt, namely Marine Le Pen from the French National Rally and Matteo Salvini, leader of the Italian Lega, the goal is also to mainstream their ideology by reaching an alliance with the Hungarian Fidesz party and the Polish Law and Justice Party. Both have become the beacons of illiberal democracy and role models for Western parties that used to be labeled “extreme right” and in need of a break from their past. However, tactical as well as ideological issues have, so far, prevented this unification of the radical right from becoming a reality.

The Terrorist and the Girl Next Door: Love Jihad in French Femonationalist Nonfiction

This paper explores the theme of Love Jihad in “true sex crime” novels, French mass-market paperbacks where a journalist or author recounts the temoignage of women who suffered sexual violence at the hands of Muslim men. Semiotic analysis of visual and textual representations shows a melodramatic triangle of female victims, Muslim male perpetrators, and heroic readers. These stories reflect, dramatize, and sexualize broader social constructions of the monstrous Muslim; from Far-Right conspiracies of The Great Replacement to femonationalist debates about veils and republican values. In the final section, the paper explores how visual and verbal tropes from these popular discourses reappear in political speech and media from the National Rally.

프랑스 극우 내셔널리즘과 인종주의: 민족전선(Front National)의 민족적 포퓰리즘(National Populisme)과 탈악마화(dédiabolisation) 노선

Due to deindustrialization, the decline of the French Working Class has been considered as the chief factors behind of the National Front’s success, as well as the proliferation of the anti-immigration discourses during a Economic Crisis. With these two socio-economic factors, the political choice of the ‘silent majority’ we observed in the post 68 period is one of the most important background in which the National Front hereafter develop itself as a mass party. The 68 Movement creates new political situation in which the New Right group takes part, and they play role as a bridge between the Old Right wing and the Far Right group. After the electoral alliance between the National Front and the Rally for the Republic led by Gaullistes, the Far right wing could arrange a basic condition to win over the public. This situation become a first sept to the political alliance between the National Front and the republican super elites, such as Bruno Megret and Yvan Blot. Founded by Neofascist groups, the National Front thus could dilute its negative image with the Republican elitism. Expelling even Jean-Marie Le Pen, its founder, who denies the Holocaust, the National Front keeps its distance from the past related to the Fascism and follows its dediabolization. The National Front changes its name to the National Rally to establish the image of a normal party which protects only the interests of French people. (Changwon National University / shindongkyu@changwon.ac.kr)

The Covid-19 Pandemic and the Political Situation in France before 2022 Elections

The article explores the political situation in modern France the year before the next presidential election. It is revealed that during Emmanuel Macron’s presidency, a social divide between wealthy and poor social groups has taken root in the country manifested in the “yellow vests” movement and a wide-range public disagreement with the reforms proposed by the government. The negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, which overlapped with the previous contradictions and aggravated them, is discussed. The article also shows that, apart from the “National Rally”, no other political forces now represent a real opposition to Macron’s policy, thus helping him to keep relatively high chances for re-election. This is especially true in case of two traditional parties – the Republicans and the Socialists – which have suffered from a profound internal crisis. In conclusion, regarding a likely contest between Macron and Le Pen in 2022, prospects of changes in domestic and foreign policy of France after the election are formulated. The author concludes that even in the “Le Pen wins” scenario, any innovations will have a limited impact, taking into account the role of continuity in the French state policy and the growing moderation of the far right platform.