National Party Platforms Research Articles

Immigration Clashes, Party Polarization, and Republican Radicalization: Tracking Shifts in State and National Party Platforms since 1980

Abstract Studies of U.S. politics increasingly aim to make sense of two key trends: party polarization and Republican Party radicalization. Surprisingly, however, party divergences on immigration have been largely overlooked. Drawing on state and national political party platforms since 1980, we document the rise of attention to immigration, the polarization of substantive party positions, and the sharp GOP turn toward restrictive measures. After pinpointing the timing and relative trajectories of national and state-level agenda shifts, we explore potential drivers and establish two sets of flashpoint events worth further study: highly visible and mostly deadlocked congressional battles over immigration grand bargains, and bottom-up reverberations from the widespread 2006 immigrant rights protests and post-2008 Tea Party organizing. We find that grassroots Tea Party efforts were intervening accelerators rather than original causes of the Republican embrace of tough immigration restrictions. The article concludes by stressing the chronological layering of successive party polarizations—from 1960s divergences around civil rights, through clashes about abortion and LGBTQ rights from the late 1970s to the 1990s, and followed by immigration polarization in the 2000s. This process of layering polarizations on top of one another may have supercharged recent GOP turns toward ethnonationalism and tolerance for threats of violence.

Candidate-centric systems and the politicization of ethnicity: evidence from Indonesia

ABSTRACTWhen and why do electoral candidates politicize ethnicity? From the literature, we might expect this behaviour to occur during democratic transitions or under proportional rules. However, empirical support for these arguments is mixed. This article presents a new approach, arguing that candidate-centric rules offer candidates incentives to politicize ethnicity. The argument is tested in Indonesia with empirical evidence drawn from coding newspaper reports on campaign events, endorsements and group appeals. Indonesia used party-centric rules from 1997 to 2004, and even though the country democratized during this period, the politicization of ethnicity actually declined. I show how party-centric rules, coupled with a national economic crisis, encouraged candidates to campaign on broad national platforms of reform and development, thereby appealing to the poor rather than to ethnic groups. Between 2004 and 2009, the system became more candidate-centric and the politicization of ethnicity increased. I argue that changes in the system freed candidates from national party platforms and motivated them to campaign on their local connections with ethnic groups. This study is particularly pertinent amidst the push for direct candidate-centric elections in the developing world and the lack of literature on how such rules could affect ethnic politics.

Measuring Governors' Political Orientations Using Words as Data

AbstractThis article introduces a parsimonious measure of the expressed political orientation of U.S. state governors that compares word choices in their “State of the State” speeches to the language of state and national party platforms. The technique used to generate this measure is Wordscores, a method that relies on the use of reference texts to generate a set of ideal points for gubernatorial rhetoric. I discuss the conventions and substantive content of governors' speeches and the choice of party platforms as reference texts before presenting the average “partisan signal” in speeches by 97 governors in all 50 states between 2000 and 2006.

Ideology and Party Responsibility Within the Law and Justice Policy Domain

This study examined both Democratic and Republican state and national party platforms in the law and justice policy domain. By using content analysis to establish the ideological position of state and national parties, this article seeks to determine predictors of party preferences and party unity in this critical area of public policy. Results indicate that national party committees tend to take moderate positions on law and justice policy issues, whereas their state counterparts tend to be more conservative and liberal within Republican and Democratic committees, respectively. This article also found variation within predictors of party unity.

Obesity and the Political Process

Obesity and the Political Process

Elections: Voter Support and Partisans’ (Mis)Perceptions of Presidential Candidates’ Abortion Views in 2000

Although the 2000 Republican and Democratic national party platforms show the parties at opposite poles on abortion policy, Governor George W. Bush publicly supported a vaguely defined “culture of life,” rather than the constitutional amendment barring abortion that was advocated by his party. In light of Bush's campaign strategy, this article uses national survey data to examine the accuracy of citizens’ knowledge of the candidates’ abortion policy positions. Interestingly, pro‐choice Republican voters were much less likely to defect from their party in 2000 than in 1996, suggesting that the Bush campaign's efforts to avoid public opposition to his abortion position were successful.

‘More mighty than the waves of the sea’: toilers, tariffs, and the income tax movement, 1880–1913

Social movements are at once the symptoms and the instruments of social progress. Ignore them and statesmanship is irrelevant; fail to use them and it is weak. Walter Lippmann In the spring of 18...

Rhetorical Bipartisanship: National Party Platforms and American Indian Politics

Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Charles C. Turner; Rhetorical Bipartisanship: National Party Platforms and American Indian Politics. American Indian Culture and Research Journal 1 January 2002; 26 (1): 107–122. doi: https://doi.org/10.17953/aicr.26.1.0h2j522183856361 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest Search

Ideological Integration in the Democratic and Republican Parties, 1956-1992

In recent years scholars have observed a process of organizational nationalization in both the Democratic and Republican parties. This study updates data from two earlier studies, which attempted to determine if organizational nationalization of the parties was associated with ideological nationalization of party platforms. State and national party platforms between 1956 and 1992 are content analyzed to determine the extent of ideological integration. Similar to the two earlier studies of ideological integration, the data show only a modest movement toward intra-party integration, and little evidence of the development of a highly ideological and nationalized party system.

National Party Platforms of 1980: Supplement to National Party Platforms, 1840-1976. Compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982. Pp. 234. $14.95, paper.)

National Party Platforms of 1980: Supplement to National Party Platforms, 1840-1976. Compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982. Pp. 234. $14.95, paper.)

National Party Platforms of 1980: Supplement to National Party Platforms, 1840-1976. Compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982. Pp. 234. $14.95, paper.)

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Building Support for the ERA: A Case of “Too Much, Too Late”

A case can be made that non-ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) is a classic example of “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” After all, the ERA had received overwhelming support in both houses of Congress, passing by a vote of 354 to 23 in the House and 84 to 8 in the Senate. Both major political parties had repeatedly supported the ERA in their national party platforms; not until 1980 did one party (the Republican) adopt a stance of neutrality. Every President from Truman to Carter had endorsed the amendment. And, by the end of the campaign for state ratification, more than 450 organizations with a total membership of over 50 million were on record in support of the ERA. While the amendment was before Congress in 1970-72, lobbying for the ERA was heavy and well-organized, and no countervailing forces were ever mobilized in any effective way. In view of this broad base of political and public support for the amendment, and little visible opposition, a reasonable prognosis in 1972 was that it would be ratified by the required 38 states long before the original deadline of March 22, 1979, set by Congress.However, the ratification process was far more complex than either political observers or amendment supporters recognized initially. Although an intensive lobbying effort had been waged to push the amendment through Congress, supporters naively believed that it would be quickly ratified in the absence of pre-existing state groups poised to press for passage and without major allocation of national organizations' resources.

Building Support for the ERA: A Case of “Too Much, Too Late”

A case can be made that non-ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) is a classic example of “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” After all, the ERA had received overwhelming support in both houses of Congress, passing by a vote of 354 to 23 in the House and 84 to 8 in the Senate. Both major political parties had repeatedly supported the ERA in their national party platforms; not until 1980 did one party (the Republican) adopt a stance of neutrality. Every President from Truman to Carter had endorsed the amendment. And, by the end of the campaign for state ratification, more than 450 organizations with a total membership of over 50 million were on record in support of the ERA. While the amendment was before Congress in 1970-72, lobbying for the ERA was heavy and well-organized, and no countervailing forces were ever mobilized in any effective way. In view of this broad base of political and public support for the amendment, and little visible opposition, a reasonable prognosis in 1972 was that it would be ratified by the required 38 states long before the original deadline of March 22, 1979, set by Congress.However, the ratification process was far more complex than either political observers or amendment supporters recognized initially. Although an intensive lobbying effort had been waged to push the amendment through Congress, supporters naively believed that it would be quickly ratified in the absence of pre-existing state groups poised to press for passage and without major allocation of national organizations' resources.

Building Support for the ERA: A Case of “Too Much, Too Late”

A case can be made that non-ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) is a classic example of “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” After all, the ERA had received overwhelming support in both houses of Congress, passing by a vote of 354 to 23 in the House and 84 to 8 in the Senate. Both major political parties had repeatedly supported the ERA in their national party platforms; not until 1980 did one party (the Republican) adopt a stance of neutrality. Every President from Truman to Carter had endorsed the amendment. And, by the end of the campaign for state ratification, more than 450 organizations with a total membership of over 50 million were on record in support of the ERA. While the amendment was before Congress in 1970-72, lobbying for the ERA was heavy and well-organized, and no countervailing forces were ever mobilized in any effective way. In view of this broad base of political and public support for the amendment, and little visible opposition, a reasonable prognosis in 1972 was that it would be ratified by the required 38 states long before the original deadline of March 22, 1979, set by Congress.However, the ratification process was far more complex than either political observers or amendment supporters recognized initially. Although an intensive lobbying effort had been waged to push the amendment through Congress, supporters naively believed that it would be quickly ratified in the absence of pre-existing state groups poised to press for passage and without major allocation of national organizations' resources.

National Party Platforms. Vol. 1, 1840–1956; Edited by Donald Bruce Johnson. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 1035. $35.00.)

National Party Platforms. Vol. 1, 1840–1956; Edited by Donald Bruce Johnson. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 1035. $35.00.)

National Party Platforms, 1840–1972, 5th edition. Compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson and Kirk H. Porter. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 889. $20.00.)

National Party Platforms, 1840–1972, 5th edition. Compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson and Kirk H. Porter. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 889. $20.00.)

National Party Platforms, 1840–1972, 5th edition. Compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson and Kirk H. Porter. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 889. $20.00.)

National Party Platforms, 1840–1972, 5th edition. Compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson and Kirk H. Porter. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 889. $20.00.)

Elections and Public Policy

In the absence of historical opinion survey data, studies of the linkage between popular voting and American public policy have been confined to relatively recent time periods. Questions about these linkages, however, necessarily have a temporal dimension—what is the relationship between voting and policy over time?This paper establishes criteria for citizen policy choice that do not depend on opinion surveys. Data drawn from national party platforms and U.S. statutes, and aggregate voting data are compared to determine the extent to which majority choices are translated into national policy over time. Analysis of these data suggests that whether or not voters are completely aware of all of the implications of their actions, over time, popular majorities appear to govern.

Elections and Public Policy

In the absence of historical opinion survey data, studies of the linkage between popular voting and American public policy have been confined to relatively recent time periods. Questions about these linkages, however, necessarily have a temporal dimension—what is the relationship between voting and policy over time?This paper establishes criteria for citizen policy choice that do not depend on opinion surveys. Data drawn from national party platforms and U.S. statutes, and aggregate voting data are compared to determine the extent to which majority choices are translated into national policy over time. Analysis of these data suggests that whether or not voters are completely aware of all of the implications of their actions, over time, popular majorities appear to govern.

THE DECLINE OF PUBLIC CONCERN OVER THE ATOM BOMB

The article discusses the reasons for the decline of the atom bomb and nuclear warfare as a public interest issue. It is hypothesized that the decline in public interest came at the point in history when Americans perceived themselves to be powerless to protect themselves against nuclear attack and therefore could no longer define the Bomb as a traditional weapon. An historical analysis of data available from mass media supported the hypothesis indicating that the nuclear question has ceased to be an issue. To determine the impact of nuclear technology today as a public issue, an attitude survey was administered to college freshman at KU, measuring the relationship between powerlessness towards social and political events and compla­ cency towards the growth of nuclear technology. The questionnaire contained statements from the I-E powerlessness scale adapted from Melvin Seeman and statements measuring complacency toward nuclear technology constructed by the author. A Likert scale was employed. It was hypothesized that the greater powerlessness felt by the subject toward social and political events, the greater would be his compla­ cency toward the growth of nuclear technology. The results of the survey indicated that the mojority of subjects did not have sufficient preformulated opinions about nuclear technology to be complacent, and that nuc lear technology is no longer an issue. The atom bomb is a dead issue. It is no longer an editorial topic for local newspapers or a conversation piece at dinner tables. It is seldom mentioned at pol itical rail ies and mayor may not be included in national party platforms. The Bomb has ceased to be an issue except where the effects of atomic blast become an' environmental problem. The Bomb issue died quietly around 1963. Although men such as G·:>ldwater, McNamara, and Laird have tried to revive the issue, the American public has simply refused to renew interest in it. The Bomb may no longer be a public issue, but as a piece of technology, the stockpile of nuclear weapons has grown in quantity and complexity every year. In 1962, immediately before the end of the shelter craze the Un.ited States possessed around 174 ICBMls plus 80 Polaris missiles. In 1969 the United States had about l,0541CBM Is plus 656 Polaris missils (Bottome, 1971:120-122). It is the purpose of this paper to probe the reasons why the Bomb issue did not flourish as well as Bomb technology. There are at least ways to demonstrate that the Bomb has ceased to be a public issue. The first is a comparison of public reaction to the three gaps in the history of the arms race, the bomber gap, missile gap, and deterrent gap. The bomber gap began as a belief of many American lecders that the Soviet Union had the capability and desire to make a tremendous