THE DECLINE OF PUBLIC CONCERN OVER THE ATOM BOMB

Abstract

The article discusses the reasons for the decline of the atom bomb and nuclear warfare as a public interest issue. It is hypothesized that the decline in public interest came at the point in history when Americans perceived themselves to be powerless to protect themselves against nuclear attack and therefore could no longer define the Bomb as a traditional weapon. An historical analysis of data available from mass media supported the hypothesis indicating that the nuclear question has ceased to be an issue. To determine the impact of nuclear technology today as a public issue, an attitude survey was administered to college freshman at KU, measuring the relationship between powerlessness towards social and political events and compla­ cency towards the growth of nuclear technology. The questionnaire contained statements from the I-E powerlessness scale adapted from Melvin Seeman and statements measuring complacency toward nuclear technology constructed by the author. A Likert scale was employed. It was hypothesized that the greater powerlessness felt by the subject toward social and political events, the greater would be his compla­ cency toward the growth of nuclear technology. The results of the survey indicated that the mojority of subjects did not have sufficient preformulated opinions about nuclear technology to be complacent, and that nuc lear technology is no longer an issue. The atom bomb is a dead issue. It is no longer an editorial topic for local newspapers or a conversation piece at dinner tables. It is seldom mentioned at pol itical rail ies and mayor may not be included in national party platforms. The Bomb has ceased to be an issue except where the effects of atomic blast become an' environmental problem. The Bomb issue died quietly around 1963. Although men such as G·:>ldwater, McNamara, and Laird have tried to revive the issue, the American public has simply refused to renew interest in it. The Bomb may no longer be a public issue, but as a piece of technology, the stockpile of nuclear weapons has grown in quantity and complexity every year. In 1962, immediately before the end of the shelter craze the Un.ited States possessed around 174 ICBMls plus 80 Polaris missiles. In 1969 the United States had about l,0541CBM Is plus 656 Polaris missils (Bottome, 1971:120-122). It is the purpose of this paper to probe the reasons why the Bomb issue did not flourish as well as Bomb technology. There are at least ways to demonstrate that the Bomb has ceased to be a public issue. The first is a comparison of public reaction to the three gaps in the history of the arms race, the bomber gap, missile gap, and deterrent gap. The bomber gap began as a belief of many American lecders that the Soviet Union had the capability and desire to make a tremendous