National Missile Defense Research Articles

Model-based specification and testing applied to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system

Cognitive Concepts LLC (CC) is a small business that specializes in software reliability engineering. In the past several years CC has become convinced that the best available practice for software reliability on complex systems is model-based specification and testing (MST). CC completed a small business innovative research project with the Missile Defense Agency in 2004 in which the goal was to demonstrate the feasibility and value of applying MST on some aspect of the National Missile Defense (NMD). This paper describes the results of that research effort.

Publisher's Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept System for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Publisher's Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept System for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Negotiating to Control Weapons of Mass Destruction in North Korea

AbstractNegotiations to control and perhaps eliminate North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appeared to achieve positive results in the 1990s. But these positive trends reversed direction in 2001–2004 under President George W. Bush. Why? This essay weighs six possible explanations. 1. progress in the 1990s as a mirage; 2. cultural differences; 3. distrust of international agreements; 4. perceptions regarding the utility of WMD; 5. internal divisions within each government and society; and 6. ulterior motives.The evidence suggests that the sixth explanation carries the most weight. Top leaders in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as well as in the United States had priorities other than arms control. Each side used arms control negotiations as an instrument to promote its political and economic agenda in other realms. Pyongyang demanded large and certain rewards to give up its main bargaining chips. North Korea's negotiating behavior suggested some willingness to freeze or eliminate WMD programs if the price were right. But Kim Jong Il's regime clearly saw its nuclear and missile capabilities as major assets not to be traded away except for very substantial security and economic rewards. For its part, the Bush White House probably worried that any accord with Pyongyang would impede Washington's larger political, military, and economic ambitions, including deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). There was also a subjective element: President Bush probably loathed Kim Jong Il and did not relish the prospect of making any compromises with evil incarnate. For enlightened self-interest to prevail, the parties could benefit from greater empathy and a quest for mutual rather than one-sided gain.

Publisher’s Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Publisher’s Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Publisher’s Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [ Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Publisher’s Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [ Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Publisher’s Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [ Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Publisher’s Note: Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues [ Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 (2004)

Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues

This issue of RMP has, as a special supplement, the report of an APS study group on the physics and engineering issues that must be addressed in designing a missile defense system capable of intercepting a hostile missile while it is still burning, the so-called ``boost phase.'' The challenges for boost-phase intercept are significant, chiefly because of the short time window during which detection, decision, launch, and interception must occur. Some aspects of the problem have not previously been analyzed in such depth in the public domain. This study was made on the basis of unclassified information and so is presented here in its entirety.

Using Genetic Algorithms to Aid in a Vulnerability Analysis of National Missile Defense Simulation Software

The National Strategy for Homeland Defense, published by the then U.S. Office of Homeland Security in July 2002, directs all U.S. government agencies to conduct vulnerability analyses of their sensitive systems. This policy applies to Department of Defense systems, including the simulation packages used to design and exercise national missile defense. Many, if not most, of the previous vulnerability analyses of missile defense simulation platforms have utilized traditional reverse engineering techniques along with a review of all documentation and publicly available sources. These experiments have produced some useful information, though the amount of platform specific data recovered has been limited. The use of genetic algorithms (GAs) has been shown to be an effective method of performing boundary analysis and parameter optimization. In this paper, we show how GAs can be used to extract information concerning how particular parameters affect heavily parameterized missile defense simulation system performance. This information would be very valuable to researchers as part of a greater vulnerability analysis of national missile defense software.

Boost-Phase Missile Defense Debate Continues

Boost-Phase Missile Defense Debate Continues

Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence

This article argues that classical (or rational) deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate and prescriptively deficient. In its stead it offers an alternative theoretical framework – perfect deterrence theory – that makes consistent use of the rationality postulate and is in accord with the empirical literature of deterrence. Perfect deterrence theory’s axiomatic base, its empirical expectations and its most significant policy prescriptions are highlighted and contrasted with those of classical deterrence theory. The theory’s implications for current policy debates about a national missile defense system, arms control, US policy toward China and Russia, and inter-state negotiations in general, are discussed.

Containing missile proliferation: strategic technology, security regimes, and international cooperation in arms control

The proliferation of ballistic missiles that can deliver weapons of mass destruction halfway across the world is a matter of growing urgency and concern, as is the fate of agreements limiting the development of such deadly weapons. The Bush administration's scrapping of the ABM Treaty and pursuit of a huge National Missile Defense initiative are dramatic evidence of this concern. Yet there remains much uncertainty about the viability of missile defense. If defenses fall short, strong security regimes will be necessary to contain missile proliferation. Since 1987, more than thirty states have agreed to restrict their transfer of missiles and related technologies under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). During the MTCR's first decade, several regional powers were thwarted from advancing their missile ambitions. Subsequently, however, states such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Israel have tested medium-range missiles and others have expanded their missile arsenals. Dinshaw Mistry critically examines the successes and limitations of the MTCR, and suggests five practical ways to strengthen the regime. The author's exhaustive research offers new and detailed insights on the technology and politics of missile programs in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries. Mistry also shows how international cooperation, security regimes, and U.S. foreign policies of engagement and containment with these states can halt their missile programs. Mistry's book is the first comprehensive study of the MTCR and of international efforts to contain missile proliferation. Policymakers, scholars, and the general reader will find this book a valuable contribution to the subjects of arms control, ballistic missile proliferation, multilateral cooperation, and international security regimes. Dinshaw Mistry is assistant professor and director of Asian studies at the University of Cincinnati. He has written extensively on technology and politics, regional security, and international cooperation in The New York Times, Security Studies, Contemporary Security Policy, Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs, and other publications.

The Presentation of Risk and Uncertainty in the Context of National Missile Defense Simulations

Risk perception and uncertainty management are important components of military decision making, especially in time-stressed and resource-limited environments. The purpose of this experiment was to understand the interaction of integrality of information, presentation mode, and information frame on situation awareness (SA) and decision-making (missile allocation) in a National Missile Defense (NMD) paradigm. Results of the information frame manipulation (expected gain v. expected loss) support earlier findings that subjects are loss averse. SA Accuracy was higher with graphical displays than alphanumeric displays. The implications for NMD are discussed.

The paradox of instability and stability: United States “Primacy”, China, and the National Missile Defense (NMD) debate

The paradox of instability and stability: United States “Primacy”, China, and the National Missile Defense (NMD) debate

Whatever Happened to Arms Control?

Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future. By Michael Krepon. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 304 pp., $59.95 (ISBN: 0-312-29556-1). Russian–US arms control, the strategic nuclear balance between Russia and the United States and, to a lesser extent, US deployment of theater and national missile defenses have in recent years dropped off the list of important issues for international diplomacy. This shift has not occurred because those who champion arms control are misguided, or because nuclear weapons are no longer unimaginably destructive. Nor does it reflect a judgment that arms control failed during the Cold War, or that missile defenses produce only positive results. Instead, this change in focus reflects the facts that the Cold War has been over for more than a decade and that the security threats and agendas that once dominated foreign and defense policy have been replaced by the war on terrorism, the need to deal with the general spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and a growing realization that Islam is being used by the kleptocracies of the Middle East to hide totalitarianism, poverty, and hate. Under these circumstances, it is not clear how arms control with Russia, a junior member of NATO through its participation in the Partnership for Peace Program, would have much impact on anyone's security. In Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future (a veritable tour of the global nuclear landscape), Michael Krepon addresses the changing strategic and political developments that have …

Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense

On December 17, 2002, President George W. Bush ordered the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). Proponents of missile defenses, both inside and outside the Bush administration, argue that, absent NMD, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater U.S. vulnerability that this entails will signiŽcantly limit the United States ability to secure it foreign policy goals. “A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argues, “could give rogue states the power to hold our people hostage to nuclear blackmail—in an effort to prevent us from projecting force to stop aggression.”1 Similarly, Walter Slocombe as undersecretary of defense in the Clinton administration asserted, “Without defenses, potential aggressors might think that the threat of strikes against U.S. cities could coerce the United States into failing to meet its commitments.”2 To what extent do the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them threaten U.S. interests and impede the United States ability to pursue its Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Book Review: Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense

Book Review: Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense

The “China Threat”, National Missile Defense and American public opinion

(2003). The “China Threat”, National Missile Defense and American public opinion. Defense & Security Analysis: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 35-54.

American National Missile Defense System

The construction of the American National Missile Defense System (NMD) has prompted discussion of restrictions on space activities in space law and in international law. An exploration of whether the NMD has ‘peaceful purposes’ and is ‘defensive’ highlights the shortcomings of these legal formulae. Without international consensus on what ‘peaceful purposes,’ ‘aggression’ or ‘self-defence’ constitute, there will continue to be disagreements over the legitimacy of space activities, such as the NMD.

European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

Because of their distinctive histories, cultures, and geopolitical contexts, Europeans and Americans have generally contrasting perspectives on national missile defense. Few U.S. policymakers have recognized the depth of European skepticism, and even opposition. As a result, much political capital has been expended in futile endeavors to persuade Europeans of the true wisdom in U.S. policy. For a real dialogue on national missile defenses, it is necessary for each side of the Atlantic to understand the deeper reasons which have shaped the other's policy perspective.

Strategic threats and national missile defenses: defending the U.S. homeland

Homeland Defense: The Threat of Direct Attacks with Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Assessment and Prioritization The History of the Modern U.S. National Missile Defense Program The Changing Architecture of the U.S. National Missile Defense Program Risk, Cost, and Benefits The Deployment and Non-deployment Schedule for the NMD Looking Beyond the Current System and Deployment Plan The Role of Other Nations in Ballistic Missile Defense Conclusions and Future Options Notes