National Missile Defense System Research Articles

Kurt Gottfried

Kurt Gottfried

Debates on the Role of the US Theatre Missile Defense in Regional Deterrence of Russia and China

Studies on missile defense, both in Russia and abroad, have been tradition- ally focused either on capabilities of the US national missile defense system to parry Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear forces, or on regional deter- rence of North Korea and Iran by means of regional missile defense (theater missile defense, TMD). However, the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) emphasized the role of the TMD systems in the regional deterrence of the Russian Federation and China. So far this issue has received little attention and this paper aims to fill that gap. The first section identifies the key points of the MDR concerning the capabilities of regional missile defense for regional deterrence of the major nuclear powers. The author also examines the views of different represen- tatives of the US Department of Defense on this issue, and concludes that the US military-political leadership has a generally positive assessment of the capabilities of the TMD systems to contain Russia and China in case of a regional crisis. In particular, planners emphasize the role of the regional missile defense in countering the ‘anti-access/access-denial’ capabilities and the concept of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ ascribed to Russia. At the same time, US policymakers express in that regard serious concerns about Russia’s and China’s progress in the development of hypersonic missile systems. The second section examines the ongoing debates in Western expert so- ciety on the role of the regional missile defense in terms of deterring Russia and China. The author concludes that in this respect experts can provisionally be divided into two groups. The first group generally supports the arguments of the US military-political leadership and is optimistic about TMD capabili- ties for regional deterrence of Russia and China. The second group is more critical of these capabilities. They point out the lack of accurate data on the combat capabilities of such systems in active warfare and criticize question- able theoretical assumptions of their opponents. The third section provides a critical analysis of the arguments presented in this debate. The author concludes that the current concepts of deterrence based on the use of regional missile defense systems do not fully address possible implications for regional security and strategic stability. The Russian Federation and China possess significant nuclear arsenals, which already make nuclear escalation involving these countries and the United States possible. Adding yet another variable (TMD) into this equation only aggravates the situation.

The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA): its implications for Australia-United States relations

Australia is currently faced with a strategic and economic dilemma regarding its interactions with China and the United States (US). On the one hand, it should maintain and strengthen its strategic relations with the US as an ally in order to contain a rising China. On the other hand, Australia should ensure its economic growth by strengthening trade relations with China. This paper aims to examine the implications of the new China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) for the ANZUS strategic alliance. Through Qualitative Approach, this article analyzes the issues with the use of realist and liberal perspectives in international relations. By assessing two previous events involving the triangular Australia-US-China relationship (the case of the Taiwan conflict, and the US development of a National Missile Defense system), this paper concludes that ChAFTA may tend to undermine the ANZUS alliance. Three reasons for this conclusion are identified: a fundamental shift in the way Australia perceives China; ChAFTA offers more benefits to Australia than the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA); and finally Australia may consider ChAFTA as being more in its national interests in the international system than the ANZUS alliance.

From Star Wars to Earthly Matters: a Long American Walk towards the National Missile Defense System

The article is devoted to the development of the US missile defense policy from the end of Ronald Reagan's presidency in 1989 and the subsequent gradual abandonment of the Strategic Defense Initiative program until the adoption of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. The latter authorized the deployment of a national missile defense system. Analyzing this process, the authors use a comprehensive approach and consider the US missile defense policy not only as a result of changed international security environment, but also in the context of the gradual transformation of the US domestic politics after the end of the Cold War. The authors conclude that by the end of the 1990s, the key prerequisite for the decision to deploy the national missile defense system was not a qualitative deterioration of the international security environment, but rather the internal political victory of the Republicans over the Democrats for the opportunity to form national defense and security agenda.

The Peculiarities of the National Missile Defense

The view of both Moscow and Washington on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for a long time rested on the principle, formulated in the late 1960s, which held that anti-missile systems for defense of the territories were destabilizing, therefore limiting them would strengthen strategic stability. Since that time the USSR and then Russia always adhered to this principle, while the US at times rejected it (i.e. the SDI program of the 1980s) and by now has finally given it up altogether. Meanwhile , the majority of the independent leading experts assess the chances of the existing US missile defense to tangibly affect Russia’s nuclear strike capability as extremely low. However, the US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 seriously undermined political trust between Moscow and Washington. The unwillingness of the US to provide Russia with a legally binding commitment not to direct its BMD system against it (including technical constraints) contributes to the problem. In addition, the US missile defense system is being built as an open-ended system with no future restrictions on its expansion and improvement. Russia has responded to the creation of the US national missile defense system with the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces and initiation of its own Air-Space Defense (ASD) system. The difference of the concepts of the BMD system development in the United States and the ASD system in Russia lies in that the US system is intended to defend against limited attacks of intercontinental ballistic missiles against the North American continent or of medium-range missiles against the US allies in Europe and the Pacific region. The Russian ASD is a multilayered system designed to protect against a protracted air-space of-fensive by the US/NATO involving high-precision conventional weapons (including future hypersonic and space-based systems) and limited use of nuclear weapons. Although there has been a long break in a meaning ful US-Russian dialogue on missile defense, it is still possible to reach some positive agreements. If the US and Russia resume negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, it might open a window for a compromise on missile defense. Such a compromise can be based on an agreed threshold separating, on the one hand, missile defense systems that can significantly affect strategic stability by in-tercepting a large number of US or Russian ICBMs and SLBMs and, on the other hand – systems that will allow the US and Russia to protect their territories against at-tacks by third states or rogue regimes and would thus strengthen their mutual security. The first class of BMD systems would be subject to restrictions, while the second one would be given a green light. Moreover, in the second case there would reemerge an opportunity of the development of a joint defense systems of the two powers, which was declared in 2002 but never came true.

The problem of placement of the United States national missile defense in Europe in the context of Russia-NATO relations

The article analyzes the history and current state of the US national missile defense system deployment in Europe in the context of the evolution of NATO-Russia relations. The article concludes inappropriate NMD deployment in Eastern Europe and the destructive nature of the position of the United States for the European security system.

A Midcourse Correction For U.S. Missile Defense System

The U.S. secretary of defense made a surprise announcement bolstering the U.S. national missile defense system and effectively ending a controversial interceptor program.

Russian Grand Strategy and the United States in the 21st Century

Despite the initially cordial relationship between the United States and Russia following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Iraq War became a turning point in what evolved into the worst relationship between Moscow and Washington since the Cold War. From that point onwards, Russia persistently has exhibited aggressive behavior toward the United States, resulting in numerous crises. This article argues that this Russian assertiveness is deliberate, arising from a mixture of domestic and international factors. In light of recent developments in U.S.-Russian relations, especially the decision of American President Barack Obama to abandon the Bush Administration's scheme to deploy national missile defense (NMD) system in Eastern Europe, it is important to understand that Russia's grand strategy is aimed at promoting multipolarity and that Moscow is willing to apply limited military force to achieve its goals. The Obama Administration should engage Russia, but be prepared to confront it if necessary.

A Measurement Method of the Interoperability of Integrated Systems Based on Process Net

Interoperability is the key target of integrated architecture design, as well as the basis of the capability of integrated systems. Since interoperability plays an important role in fulfilling operational missions, this study proposes a quantification measurement method for the interoperability at architecture level by matching the missions with the initial conditions of executable model—Petri Net. First, the process net of the Petri net model is used to present the interoperation relationship between systems. Then the quality attribute for interoperation is assigned by incident matrix of system interoperation to accomplish the measurement on the interoperability of a heterogeneous set of integrated systems. Finally, the National Missile Defense System is taken as an example to illustrate the application of this method.

Stereotyped images of terrorists as predictors of fear of future terrorist attacks

Three studies examine how al Qaeda terrorists are perceived by Polish participants and how these perceptions are related to emotional reactions to terrorism and support for counter‐terrorism measures, such as the installation of the American National Missile Defence (NMD) system in Poland. In study 1 we combine qualitative and quantitative approach to test the terrorist perception and identify four images of al Qaeda terrorists: psychopathic criminals, strategists, ideologues and desperate combatants. The results of study 2 indicate that two images attributing irrationality to al Qaeda terrorists and unpredictability to their actions (psychopathic criminals and ideologues) are related to high perceived risk of future terrorist attacks, fear of terrorism and a tendency to catastrophize terrorism. Results of study 3 show that these two images are related to opposition towards NMD in Poland. Fear of terrorism mediates this relationship. The image of terrorists as rational strategists is not related to fear of terrorism and is related to positive attitudes towards installation of the NMD in Poland.

Review: Canada in Norad 1957–2007

CANADA IN NORAD 1957-2007 A History Joseph T. Jockei Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queerfs University Press, 2007. 225PP, $34.95 paper (ISBN 978-1-55339-134-0)Joseph Jockei, professor of Canadian studies at St Lawrence University, is an authority on post- World War II United States-Canadian defence relations. He has taken a particular interest in North American continental air defence, and this is his second book on the subject His first was No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, Ae United States and the Origins of North American Defense 1945- 1958, published in 1987.Canada in NORAD continues the story from 1957 to 2007 and is focused on the origins and history of the North American air (and now aerospace) defence agreement and the organization created by that agreement known as the North American aerospace or NORAD. The book looks at three aspects of NORAD: the trajectory and growth of United States-Canadian cooperation in North American air defence as the threat changed; NORAD as a United States-Canadian binational command; and the evolution of the agreement itself.The United States and Canada established NORAD to respond to the threat presented to North America by Soviet bombers. They realized that the speed at which those bombers could arrive, plus the lethality of their nuclear cargo, necessitated an immediate, coordinated response. It was clear that there would not be enough time to plan as each incident developed. Jockei convincingly argues that what made NORAD politically possible was the concept of Jockeis description of how the agreement works is excellent he notes that the commander of NORAD (by custom an American officer with a Canadian deputy commander) would the power to direct coordinate and control the operational activities of assigned while would remain in national hands (35). Command here means administration, discipline, training, pay, promotion, and the ability to or remove forces. A key point is that the assign or remove forces responsibility rests with each government and not NORAD.The agreement created NORAD as an integrated (binational) organization of United States and Canadian personnel where operational decision-making and financial responsibilities are shared. For example, the director of operations is usually a Canadian officer, and this was true on n September 200I. The Canadian deputy commander is frequently the acting commander of NORAD, since the United States commander is also the commander of at least one other United States and thus is frequently away. It is interesting to read about the trouble (perhaps exceeding his authority) the US commander took in 1958 to ensure that his Canadian deputy was familiar with the capabilities of NORAD's nuclear weapons in the event that he needed to declare that their use was warranted (27-9, 197).Both governments have strongly supported NORAD. Until very recently, it has usually been the American position that NORAD should be the primary vehicle for North American air defence, supported by other commands. Jockei cites a statement by NORAD's commander in 1967: Air and missile defense must be directed by a single individual and this individual must be CINCNORAD.... NORAD should be the primary command (75).It had been the United States' expectation that NORAD would have operational control of the national missile defence system (149). In 1999 there was discussion of giving it an expanded homeland defence function (161), thinking that continued to hold after 9/n (178). …

The U.S.–Russian Dispute Over Missile Defense

The current Bush Administration is considering a crash effort to put into place the European components of a U.S.-built national missile defense system (NMD) before the end of President Bush’s second term. While the debates in the United States are focused primarily on the failure and success of various flight tests, and on the cost of missile defense, the European general public wants to see a concrete plan of its deployment, to understand the design of the entire system, and have a clearer sense of a timetable. The European part of the U.S. anti-missile shield consists of interceptor missiles in Poland and radar installations in the Czech Republic linked with them. Initially, President George W. Bush’s missile defense plan had met with muted support at best in Central Europe, but the situation changed dramatically in short order, because the U.S. offered its partners a tremendous carrot—namely, significant help in modernizing the Polish armed forces, investments in the Czech Republic—along with the stick of exact obedience from these new NATO members. There is no doubt that the new U.S. bases in Poland and the Czech Republic will become a reality sooner rather than later. The ruling elites of these nations think that, as in the Cold War era, the Americans are playing a paramount role in guaranteeing Europe’s security from what they view as “a common enemy.” Some Americans may feel pride or even a bit of condescension in this dependency on the part of Poland and the Czech Republic. Indeed, it costs the United States less to defend its interests in Europe if these two Central European countries are more closely tied to the U.S.

Deterrence Is Dead. Long Live Deterrence

Twenty years ago philosopher Anthony Kenny (1985, ix) could confidently assert that deterrence was “the key concept for the understanding of the strategy and diplomacy of the age.” Obviously, much has transpired since Kenny made his claim. In 1989 the Berlin Wall was dismantled. Two years later, the Soviet Union disintegrated. In short order democracy was introduced into Eastern Europe and NATO expanded into what was once part of the Soviet Empire. In 1991 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, only to be pushed out by a coalition of nations led and organized by the United States. Later in the decade, Yugoslavia imploded. Concurrently, Pakistan joined the nuclear club. Then NATO went to war with Serbia over Kosovo. The United States unilaterally abrogated the ABM Treaty and began the deployment of a largely untested national missile defense system. And, of course, on September 11, 2001, terrorists brought down the Twin Towers in an act of inconceivable violence. Within weeks the United States drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and, in 2003, invaded Iraq and overthrew its Baathist regime.

The Strategic Defence Initiative: US Policy and the Soviet Union by Mira Duric (review)

542 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 the methods of the Soviet regime. This is an excellent piece of research in every sense. ChristChurch, Oxford CATHERINE ANDREYEV Duric, Mira. TheStrategic Defence Initiative: USPolicy andtheSoviet Union. Ashgate, Aldershotand Burlington,VT, 2003. vii + I90 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. C49.95. DURING the I980s thepotential (ordangers)of the StrategicDefence Initiative (SDI) became the most controversial issue in international politics. Indeed while working at the Royal United Services Institutein Whitehall, I recall a senior admiral observing that he did not know how defence commentators had managed without it. Mira Duric's monograph aims to assessthe place of the SDI in the process that culminated with the end of the Cold War. She brings a single-minded, no-nonsense approach to this complex process. She believes 'in reality' that SDI did not represent a threat but, in response to those inclined to boast that it brought the USSR to its knees in I989, she declaresboldly (andpersuasively)that 'one explanation alone is not sufficient to explain the end of the Cold War' (pp. I-2). Her book is designed to be a contributionto the historyofAmericanforeignpolicy, asshehasnot consulted Soviet documents. Duric has succeeded in fulfillingthe aimsshehas setherself.Her book offers a competent surveyof the issuesand, although occasionallyslightlyrepetitive, is clearand based on a thoroughstudyof an extensiveliteraturesupplemented by interviewswith the keyfiguresin the Reagan administration.Each chapter is concluded with a cogent synopsisof its arguments.These are advanced in short paragraphsaccompanied by numerous sub-headingsthat offer helpful signposts. Duric devotes some attention to the pre-SDI developments in ballistic missile defence, especially in the Soviet Union, that did a lot to undercut the provisionsof the Anti-BallisticMissile(ABM)Treatyof 1972. As she shrewdly points out, had the SDI technology a proven record of failurethen the Soviet Union would have encouraged the US to pour its resources into the effort. The main reasonwhy SDI became such a topical matterafter I98I had more to do with political issues and the personal enthusiasms of Ronald Reagan himself. He claimed SDI as 'his' idea, and it had the added convenience of serving as a counter-weight to the nuclear 'freeze' movement by presenting Reagan as a statesman genuinely looking for a solution to the intractable problemsof nuclearwarwhile maintainingAmerican strategicsuperiority. In her extended treatmentof the development of the rationalebehind SDI, Duric draws out a paradox. Despite Mikhail Gorbachev's claim that SDI would 'fomentmistrustand suspicion'between the Superpowers(p. 47), their relations were greatly improved by i988. In three summits, at Reykjavik (1986), Washington(i 987) and Moscow (1988), the 'atmosphere'in which the negotiationswere conducted was transformed.Reagan had a political motive for his summitry,especially in agreeing to the Reykjavikmeeting. He sought to out-flank his Democratic congressional critics, who had reduced the REVIEWS 543 funding for the programme and would continue to do so down to I988. Reagan, moreover, triedto give a bigger 'impulse'(pp. 68, 70) to the faltering arms reduction talksat Geneva. The summits, despite false starts,resultedin solid achievements. Probably the most importantwas the Soviet acceptance at the Washington summit of the 'zero option' and the removal of Russian intermediaterange nuclearforces (INF)from Europe. Reagan refusedto halt work on SDI because he genuinely believed that its defensive shield would eliminate nuclear weapons. Gorbachev (who believed that Reagan's offer to share SDI research, though sincere, would never be realized) gradually changed his tactics. He stopped frontal assaults on SDI, hoping that the concessions he made, especiallyover INF, would lead to an acceptance of the wisdom of the ABM Treaty. Arguably the existence of SDI hindered the signingof even more ambitioustreatiesto get rid of nuclearweapons, though its development also ensured the Soviet presence and an urgent readinessto reach such concordatsthat had previouslybeen lacking. Consequently, Duric concludes sensiblythat SDI contributedto the rapid dissolutionof the Soviet Union 'butit does not explain everything'(p. I28). It represented a technological and economic leap that served to expose as fraudulentthe Soviet Union's claimsto Superpowerstatus.Yetthe issue as Americanwealth and power continues to grow in relationto otherpowers has not been resolved. George W. Bush'scommitment to the national missile defence system(NMD) hasbeen obscuredby the attention and criticism devoted to his conduct of the 'waron terror'.Duric...

How Bosnia Armed: The Birth and Rise of the Bosnian Army by Marko Attila s> Hoare (review)

REVIEWS 543 funding for the programme and would continue to do so down to I988. Reagan, moreover, triedto give a bigger 'impulse'(pp. 68, 70) to the faltering arms reduction talksat Geneva. The summits, despite false starts,resultedin solid achievements. Probably the most importantwas the Soviet acceptance at the Washington summit of the 'zero option' and the removal of Russian intermediaterange nuclearforces (INF)from Europe. Reagan refusedto halt work on SDI because he genuinely believed that its defensive shield would eliminate nuclear weapons. Gorbachev (who believed that Reagan's offer to share SDI research, though sincere, would never be realized) gradually changed his tactics. He stopped frontal assaults on SDI, hoping that the concessions he made, especiallyover INF, would lead to an acceptance of the wisdom of the ABM Treaty. Arguably the existence of SDI hindered the signingof even more ambitioustreatiesto get rid of nuclearweapons, though its development also ensured the Soviet presence and an urgent readinessto reach such concordatsthat had previouslybeen lacking. Consequently, Duric concludes sensiblythat SDI contributedto the rapid dissolutionof the Soviet Union 'butit does not explain everything'(p. I28). It represented a technological and economic leap that served to expose as fraudulentthe Soviet Union's claimsto Superpowerstatus.Yetthe issue as Americanwealth and power continues to grow in relationto otherpowers has not been resolved. George W. Bush'scommitment to the national missile defence system(NMD) hasbeen obscuredby the attention and criticism devoted to his conduct of the 'waron terror'.Duric has only told the firstpart of what might turnout to be a long story,but she has told it well. Department of WarStudies BRIAN HOLDEN REID King's College London Hoare, Marko Attila. HowBosniaArmed: TheBirthandRiseoftheBosnian Army. Saqi Books in association with The Bosnian Institute, London, 2004. I72 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography.Index. fCI.99. THEvast amount of literaturegenerated as a resultof the Yugoslavwar in the I990S fails to deal comprehensivelywith the problem of armed forces in that war. HowBosnia Armed successfullyfillspart of this importantgap by mapping outthe creationandevolutionof theBosnianMuslimArmy(ArmijaRepublike Bosne i Herzegovine ARBiH) from the break-upof Yugoslaviain I99I to the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. It establishesthe originsof the ARBiH and looks at its evolution throughoutthe war, all the while settingit in the context of the Serbian preparations for the war and the Yugoslav People's Army's (JNA) decision to place itselfon the sideof the Serbs.Hence thebook provides the audience with an essential element in understanding the nature of the Yugoslavconflict, and a well-argued and well-documented historyof the key instrumentof the Bosnianpolicy. As Marko Attila Hoare notes, the ARBiH is one of the least known and talked about forces in the former Yugoslavia.Its origins are complex and its composition and coherence remained in flux throughout the conflict. The origins of the ARBiH can be found in the Doctrine of General People's 544 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 Defence which was devised to imitatethe successof the Partisanmovement in the Second WorldWarand by which all elements of the population would be engaged in the struggleagainstan occupation force. The ARBiH was founded by an amalgamationof forcesloyal to the Izetbegoviegovernmentin Sarajevo and as such lacked the resourcesavailable to the Army of Republika Srpska. It also lacked coherent organization and an efficient command structure. Nevertheless, despite its clear inferiorityin terms of arms and organization, theARBiH managed to preventthe SerbianforcesfromoverrunningSarajevo and by I995 secureda number of victorieswhich, accordingto Hoare, would have brought the Serbs to their knees had a political decision not been made to leave the conflictunresolved. The impact of political decisions on the development of the ARBiH is well documented in the book. The wavering of the Bosnian leadership under Izetbegovic, its earlyindecisions and the political infightingall contributedto weaken the army. In addition, the foundation of the ARBiH from a combination of the Territorial Defence forces (TO) still loyal to the government in Sarajevo, the Patriotic League (the militia of the Party of Democratic Action SDA led by Izetbegovic)and the Ministryof Interior forces led to the turf wars and disagreements which jeopardized the operationaleffectivenessof theARBiH. The arrivalin April 1992 of a number of JNA officers who decided to join the ARBiH led to an atmosphere of distrust. Hoare notes at various times the general...

Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence

This article argues that classical (or rational) deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate and prescriptively deficient. In its stead it offers an alternative theoretical framework – perfect deterrence theory – that makes consistent use of the rationality postulate and is in accord with the empirical literature of deterrence. Perfect deterrence theory’s axiomatic base, its empirical expectations and its most significant policy prescriptions are highlighted and contrasted with those of classical deterrence theory. The theory’s implications for current policy debates about a national missile defense system, arms control, US policy toward China and Russia, and inter-state negotiations in general, are discussed.

American National Missile Defense System

The construction of the American National Missile Defense System (NMD) has prompted discussion of restrictions on space activities in space law and in international law. An exploration of whether the NMD has ‘peaceful purposes’ and is ‘defensive’ highlights the shortcomings of these legal formulae. Without international consensus on what ‘peaceful purposes,’ ‘aggression’ or ‘self-defence’ constitute, there will continue to be disagreements over the legitimacy of space activities, such as the NMD.

An assessment of the intercept test program of the ground-based midcourse national missile defense system

An assessment of the intercept test program of the ground-based midcourse national missile defense system

Software technology issues for a US National Missile Defense System

The United States is currently developing a national missile defense (NMD) system designed to protect its territory from attack by strategic (long-range) ballistic missiles. In September 2000, President Clinton decided to defer the NMD deployment decision to the next president. President George W. Bush reaffirmed his administration's commitment to deploying a ballistic missile-defense shield by advocating an even larger NMD system in a speech at the National Defense University on May 1, 2001. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought both the sense of deployment urgency for protection, and the call to transfer resources, from NMD to more likely terrorist threats. We focus exclusively on identifying and examining key technical challenges, primarily software-related, inherent to NMD.

National missile defense (NMD)

President Bush has declared his desire for early deployment of a US National Missile Defense or NMD system to protect the nation against an attack of one or a dozen ICBMs carrying nuclear or, possibly, other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). He has the support of the Secretary of Defense, sizeable groups in Congress and the public who feel strongly that the US should have a means to provide protection against that threat, and the US has the technology to create that means. The author presents an overview of the perceived need for deploying such an NMD system which would entail the scrapping of existing ABM treaties.