National Intelligent System Research Articles

Development and Prospects of National Intelligent System for Testing General Language Competencies Deployed Through Neural Network Solutions

The article presents the results of approbation of the intellectual system for testing general language competences (ISTOK) developed by testologists, linguists, specialists in methodology of teaching foreign languages and in artificial intelligence. This system includes a range of tests assessing language ability at levels from A2 to C1 of the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR), as well as an adaptive placement test. All test materials are calibrated according to the CEFR. ISTOK is an adaptive testing system deployed through neural network solutions and providing assessment of receptive and productive language skills (reading, listening, speaking and writing) by using artificial intelligence and/or neurolinguistic models. The process of ISTOK development implied, apart from writing test items, putting together databases of writing and speaking assignments marked by professional assessors and assessment criteria for productive skills, as well as algorithms to identify various types of mistakes with the help of artificial intelligence. The results of various testing cohorts with the total number of test takers exceeding 5,000 demonstrated high reliability and objectified test validity. The new approach to language skills testing can be used for various purposes in higher education institutions, as well and to identify and/or confirm language proficiency of personnel in different organisations and businesses, while the principles of training and practical use of neurolinguistic models will find wide application in various fields of applied research.

The Canadian national intelligence culture: A minimalist and defensive national intelligence apparatus

This paper seeks to understand the nature and characteristics of Canadian national intelligence culture post–Cold War using the analytical insights of the strategic culture and intelligence culture literature. Previous studies have focused on an organizational description or historical studies of Canadian intelligence during the Cold War or after 9/11. Yet, no studies have examined the characterization of a national intelligence culture in Canada and proposed to contextualize the Canadian intelligence system in light of its national intelligence culture. Building on a culturalist approach of national intelligence systems, this paper proposes an operationalization of the national intelligence culture concept drawn on the strategic and intelligence culture literature. The paper concludes that Canada’s national intelligence culture is mostly defensive and minimalist. However, we note that recent changes in the Canadian intelligence apparatus have led to a gradual evolution of Canadian intelligence from defensive to offensive.

Person centered prediction of survival in population based screening program by an intelligent clinical decision support system.

To survey person centered survival rate in population based screening program by an intelligent clinical decision support system. Colorectal cancer is the most common malignancy and major cause of morbidity and mortality throughout the world. Colorectal cancer is the sixth leading cause of cancer death in Iran. In this survey, we used cosine similarity as data mining technique and intelligent system for estimating survival of at risk groups in the screening plan. In the first step, we determined minimum data set (MDS). MDS was approved by experts and reviewing literatures. In the second step, MDS were coded by python language and matched with cosine similarityformula. Finally, survival rate by percent was illustrated in the user interface of national intelligent system. The national intelligent system was designed in PyCharm environment. Main data elements of intelligent system consist demographic information, age, referral type, risk group, recommendation and survival rate. Minimum data set related to survival comprise of clinical status, past medical history and socio-demographic information. Information of the covered population as a comprehensive database was connected to intelligent system and survival rate estimated for each patient. Mean range of survival of HNPCC patients and FAP patients were respectively 77.7% and 75.1%. Also, the mean range of the survival rate and other calculations have changed with the entry of new patients in the CRC registry by real-time. National intelligent system monitors the entire of risk group and reports survival rates by electronic guidelines and data mining technique and also operates according to the clinical process. This web base software has a critical role in the estimation survival rate in order to health care planning.

National Intelligence Systems as Networks: Power Distribution and Organizational Risk in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

This article compares the intelligence systems of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Three questions drive the research: How are the national intelligence systems organized? How is power distributed among organizations in each country? What are the organizational risks? By employing Network Analysis to publicly-available data on intelligence agencies, collegiate bodies, and supervising organizations, authority relations and information flows were mapped. Regarding organizational configuration, similarities were found between India and Russia, as well as between China and South Africa. Brazil differs from the four countries. As for the power distribution, in Russia, Brazil, and India intelligence is subordinated to the government, and shows more centrality in the cases of China and South Africa. Finally, Russia runs the highest risk of having an intelligence system less able to adapt to strategic circumstances, at the same time being the most resilient among the five countries. Likewise, China has the highest risk of a single actor being able to retain information, acting as a gatekeeper. Network Analysis has proved to be a useful approach to promote a comparative research program in the Intelligence Studies field.

Intelligence, Crisis, and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India

This article analyzes why institutional crises are bound to happen and how they impact on national intelligence systems’ development. Punctuated Equilibrium theory is reviewed and employed to explain one institutional crisis in each of Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India. In Brazil, the case study is the fall of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) director in 2008, following the Satiagraha operation conducted by the Federal Police Department (DPF). In Colombia, the 2009 wiretapping scandal known as chuzadas is examined. In South Africa, the investigation in Project Avani (2006–8) is reviewed. Finally, in India the case study is the intelligence crisis following the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008. We found that institutional crises are inevitable because there are tensions between security and democracy, both being co-evolutionary dimensions of successful contemporary state building. However, the impacts of such crises vary across the four cases pending on three variables: (1) degree of functional specialization inside the national intelligence system; (2) degree of external public control over the national intelligence system; (3) whether effectiveness, legitimacy or both were the main drivers of the crisis. Our analysis of the four case studies suggests that the amount of positive institutional change in the aftermath of an intelligence crisis is greater in countries with more functional specialization and stronger external control mechanisms.

Academics as Strategic Stakeholders of Intelligence Organizations: A View from Spain

The political changes occurring since the end of the Cold War have led to a rethinking of the structures and procedures of national intelligence systems. Policies of openness and interaction regard...

Review: Legacy of Ashes

LEGACY OF ASHES History of the CIA Tim Weiner Toronto: Doubleday, 2007. 702pp, $35.95 cloth (ISBN 978-0385514453)Writing about national intelligence systems can be tricky work. Writing about American national intelligence is doubly so, and the decisive politicisation of the study of intelligence has become clear over the last decade. CIA, rightly or wrongly, has come to represent all that people feel is either or right about America's intelligence community and indeed America's foreign policy.No better example of the very wrong school can be found than Legacy of Ashes, an attempt at a definitive history of the CIA, written by Pulitzerprize winning journalist Tim Weiner, who covered the CIA for more than 20 years as the New York Times's national security correspondent. Aware of the personalities and fights in the capital, having interviewed 10 former directors of central intelligence, dozens of other senior intelligence officers, and enjoying access to many government officials, he would seem an ideal candidate to write a balanced account of the CIA's first 50 years. He has not done so.In the second sentence of his introduction, Wiener states his argument clearly: The most powerful country in the history of western civilisation has failed to create a first-rate spy service. 500 pages of text that follow attempt, through a breathtaking post hoc ergo propter hoc argument, to prove that CIA's putative failures surrounding 9/11 were the direct result of its preceding 50 years of botched operations. polemical style of the prose-which I must add is impeccable and pleasant to read-does not let up. If the CIA got it wrong, Weiner tells you about it in episodic, anecdotal, and high-impact style.On the surface this might suit most people. CIA has indeed made a big mess of a lot of big operations. North Korea's invasion of the south caught it by surprise, and the agency failed to predict the first Soviet, Chinese, and even Indian nuclear tests. Whether they succeeded or not, CIA covert actions in places such as Guatemala, Iran, Indonesia, and Cuba deserve much criticism.But a litany of failures does not a definitive history of the CIA make. Through the first third or so of the book, Weiner concentrates heavily on covert action but says little about the CIA's efforts to build up a picture of the world-the intelligence function which is its core, if not sole, mission. Worse, he discusses these covert actions in isolation from the global context of the Cold War. This myopia leads to an image of the agency as an unprovoked bully in cases when it was-at least in part-responding to aggressive opponents on the basis of explicit instructions from legitimate policymakers. While this does not excuse every action of the US government, it does put them in proper perspective. Weiner accuses the CIA of not understanding the wider world, but he seems to suffer the same deficit himself. …

Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States

This article argues for the value of a theory of ‘intelligence culture’ in understanding not only how national intelligence systems work but also how intelligence failures occur in those systems. A model of national intelligence cultures in the governments of the United Kingdom and United States of America is developed combining existing work on organisational culture in the two countries with the author's comparative analysis of different conceptions of intelligence culture in the two systems. This model is used to develop a failure mode analysis of the two systems, which is then tentatively assessed against representative examples from the two countries, culminating in application of the model to the failure of both intelligence systems to correctly estimate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capabilities prior to March 2003.

Sistemas nacionais de inteligência: origens, lógica de expansão e configuração atual

This article analyzes the formation of national intelligence systems in the modern state and the basic causes of institutional differences even among countries from the same constitutional tradition, like the United Kingdom and the United States. Considering intelligence systems as a sort of bureaucracy typically associated with the state's coercive core, one can trace their origins to three different historical matrices: 16th and 17th century European diplomacy, the Napoleonic form of war management at the turn from the 18th to the 19th century, and 19th and 20th century counterrevolutionary political policing. Following a logic of expansion and functional differentiation that is simultaneously horizontal and vertical, current national intelligence systems display great organizational complexity and dilemmas in their institutionalization which provide good examples of the virtual impossibility of complete democratization of the state in the contemporary world.