Following the 24 November 2007 Federal election, the Rudd Labor Government began work on its promises to re-shape Australia's industrial relations system. Industrial relations had been a central issue--many thought the central issue--in that electoral campaign. The Howard Liberal-National Coalition Government went to the polls some two years after enactment of its highly controversial Workplace Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005. Despite the Howard Government's best efforts--via legislative amendment, enormous public spending on pro-WorkChoices advertising and the corralling of employer associations into publicity campaigns in defence of WorkChoices--the clear anti-employee bias of the new industrial relations regime rendered WorkChoices increasingly unpopular. It cost the Coalition the government benches, Howard his electoral seat and the Coalition parties their ability to commit themselves--at least in the short term--to the sorts of employer-focused, individualised industrial relations that they had championed for the previous two decades. The most potent symbol of this trend was the introduction (in 1996) of individual statutory agreements--Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs)--to override awards and collective agreements. The 2005 WorkChoices amendments further encouraged employers to use AWAs to erode collectively bargained conditions, by allowing the making of AWAs without any 'no-disadvantage' test, and with fewer procedural requirements. A particularly effective media and community organising campaign by the union movement against WorkChoices had harnessed voter support for Labor's wider policy agenda in support of 'working families'. So unpopular was WorkChoices and so central was its unpopularity to Labor's successful electoral campaign, that the new government appears to have had no option but to engage with industrial relations legislative reform as an important, early part of its legislative agenda. These particular circumstances have opened up a series of questions of fundamental significance for the future of Australia's industrial relations, its institutions, labour market and society. Whatever the Rudd government finally decides (and what the parliament with its 'hung' senate finally allows) is of potentially immense historic importance. This moment comes after nearly two decades of employer association activism that has successfully influenced governments of both persuasions in favour of a national industrial relations system far more decentralised and much more focused on the wants of individual employers. During the last 11 years too, unions have faced marginalisation and de-legitimation through policy, law and official discourse. The not unexpected outcomes include an industrial relations reality that is far more individualised, unprotected and insecure for large sections of the workforce. In broad terms, these are some of the experiences and trends that the Australian electorate voted against. So, where will the legislative process go now? The Rudd Government's first step in dismantling aspects of the WorkChoices framework was the enactment of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Transition Act). The Transition Act delivered on a promise to prohibit the making of new AWAs, however it did not deal with many other contentious matters, including unfair dismissal laws. Through the government's policy statements and other media releases, we know something--but by no means all--of what further changes the new government plans to make. Some aspects of WorkChoices, such as reliance on a legislated safety net of minimum employment conditions, will clearly stay; however, other matters are still open to consultation and debate among newly-formed consultative bodies as well as among traditional employer associations, trade unions and other lobby groups. In that context, it is timely to review the state of industrial relations law and policy in Australia. …
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