National Duty Research Articles

Time orientations and emotion-rules in finance

This article explores how Anglo-American financial firms since the 1980s have operated and acted in an increasingly deregulated, risky, and uncertain arena. I look at these firms and their actions with a particular focus on “temporality” and requisite “emotion-rules,” where variations in emotion-rules correspond with organizational definitions of uncertainty. Firms impose specific emotion-rules, depending on national policies, official duties, and interpretations of each risk. In finance, caveat emptor (i.e., buyer or lender distrust) is an emotion-rule set in screening policies and data collection for credit risks and risks of fraud by personnel, and it gives rise to actual emotions. I argue that three time-orientations are significant in creating emotion-rules. If a past, present, or a long-term future is deployed to construct a future, that creates and frames an institution’s attempts to manage uncertainty. Looking exclusively at Anglo-American corporate finance policies and strategies (often deemed the international “one best way”), six modes of certainty constructions are presented. Each is assessed against the dispositions and emotional strategies required in highly-skilled careers, in specific organizational settings. The relative influence of individual perspectives, institutional rules and general typologies of social action is assessed and found to comprise one past view, three present views, and one future-oriented perspective towards the future. Implications are outlined for emotion-rules relevant to financial careers and office.

Building the Élan Vital of the Finnish Nation: Ivar Wilskman's Ideology of Gymnastics

If an ideology is a way of thinking that has prescriptive implications for politics, then Ivar Wilskman's (1854–1932) views concerning the value of gymnastics form an ideology. He was a pioneer of the Finnish gymnastics movement promoting physical exercise as a national duty for everyone. This article examines how Wilskman argued for gymnastics as the method to fitness and analyses the political lessons he drew from them. He based his doctrines on a mechanistic notion of bodily functions: To combat degeneration one had to be almost constantly in motion in order to accumulate élan vital which strengthened ‘will-power’, the source of collective, national power. Consequently, indolence bordered to crime. Wilskman also toyed with ideas of racial hygiene; although he did not advocate eugenics he demanded exercises – as an everyday substitute for gymnastics chopping of firewood would also do – to make ‘the small Finnish race’ survive in the era of imperialism.

Legal Aspects Regarding Cost Allocation Taxes

Increasingly, costs for governmental tasks are being passed on to those societal groups who presumably profit most from the fulfillment of those duties. Besides the common national duties such as lighting and road maintenance the above arguably also applies to expenses incurred by prudential regulation as well as services provided by private authorities. Typically, duties for cost allocation purposes can be qualified as cost allocation taxes, occasionally also as contributory fees. The legitimacy of cost allocation is generally questionable, especially when considering the individual cases. According to the prevailing doctrine the Confederation lacks the competence to introduce such taxes. A further issue arises when considering the equal protection clause.

Impossible to "wean" when more aid is needed

Kirigia and Diarra-Nama from the WHO Regional Office for Africa say that funding for health in the WHO Africa Region remains inadequate and that, in some countries, is significantly dependent on donor funding. They propose five strategies for these countries to “wean themselves off” donor funding. While each of the proposed strategies might have some value in itself, they will not succeed in the double objective the authors set: to wean countries from depending upon international health aid and to achieve the US$ 34 per person annual health expenditure target suggested by the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health1 – an amount that must now be adjusted to US$ 40 due to inflation.2 Of the five strategies proposed, only the second and third strategy – reprioritizing public expenditure and raising additional domestic revenue – would increase domestic financial resources for health. The other three strategies (reducing inefficiencies and corruption and increasing private sector involvement in health development) might improve efficiency but would not bring countries closer to the US$ 40 per person annual target. It could be argued that with increased efficiency, less money is required. However, the Commission’s target is based on need and does not factor in inefficiencies or corruption. Furthermore, even if countries were to reprioritize public expenditure and raise additional domestic revenue, this is unlikely to generate sufficient additional financial resources, particularly for those countries most dependent on international health aid. To test this, we estimated the impact of these two strategies for the 4 countries where – according to the WHO Statistical Information System – the external contribution to total health expenditure exceeded 40% in 2004 (Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe), plus four other countries where the external contribution to total health expenditure exceeded 40% in 2005 (Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia).3 Kirigia and Diarra-Nama propose reprioritizing public expenditure by adjusting military expenditure to the average of the countries of the WHO African Region. We estimated military expenditure per inhabitant by using data from the CIA of the United States of America4 – which are expressed as a percentage of GDP – and multiplied those with GDP per capita estimates of the International Monetary Fund.5 Using the average annual military expenditure of US$ 16 per person provided by Kirigia and Diarra-Nama, we find that the 8 countries of our selection already spend less than US$ 16 per person per year on the military. The proposed strategy would therefore not make a difference (Table 1). Table 1 Impact of strategies proposed to reduce dependency on aid The other strategy proposed to raise domestic financial resources for health is that all countries should aim for government revenue equivalent to 15% of GDP. Five out of the 8 countries of our selection already have higher government revenue. Three out of 8 countries would indeed increase financial resources if they followed the recommendation, but even if they spent 15% of these additional financial resources on health – in line with the Abuja Declaration6 – it would merely raise between US$ 0.8 per person per year (Rwanda) and US$ 1.5 per person per year (Madagascar). Furthermore, 6 out of these 8 countries still face a huge gap between current total health expenditure and the revised target made by the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health: in Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, total health expenditure is still below US$ 20 per person per year, even with 40% coming from international health aid. Even if some countries of the African region might be able to wean themselves from international health aid, others obviously cannot: they need increased aid, urgently. This can be achieved through sustained international health aid, which should not be seen as an act of charity to be overcome as soon as possible, but as an act of global solidarity, with health recognized as a human right that entails both national and international duties. For these reasons we agree with the position of WHO’s Director-General who has called for much greater, and more predictable, international health aid for Africa.7 We hope that her voice will be heard and understood throughout WHO and the wider international community. ■

Nursing leadership development: why should any nurse be led by you?

Nursing leadership development: why should any nurse be led by you?

International Human Rights and Consumer Quality of Life: An Ethical Perspective

This article represents an attempt to expand understanding of and dedication to global social justice through presentation and extension of the Rawlsian philosophical tenets regarding the definition and provision of basic commodities. The first section provides a literature review of Rawl's outlook on distributive justice, modifying his conceptual frame to avoid pitfalls regarding the duties of nations. Following a discussion of these obligations, the current status of the global community is described using data collected by the United Nations Development Program. The last section is designed to show how additional progress can be made, with an emphasis on solutions that must be implemented across nations. It is the authors' hope that macromarketing researchers will take a leadership role defining, disseminating, and evaluating the moral obligations that significantly impact the quality of people's consumer lives.

Shades of Gray? “The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs” in Context

Sixty years ago, Louis St. Laurent, then secretary of state for external affairs, delivered one of the most famous speeches on Canada's foreign policy: it was the first address by a Canadian foreign minister to outline the principles upon which Canada's relations with the rest of the world were based, and to delineate the key instruments for the application of those principles to international affairs. (2) From the outset, St. Laurent's elaboration of Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs was acknowledged by journalists and academic commentators as both an important pronouncement and a possible indication of how the new minister would guide the Department of External Affairs. (3) Memoirs by former diplomats and policy advisers have recalled the Lecture as a manifestation of fundamental change in the direction of Canadian foreign policy. (4) Accounts of Canada's policies and actions in world affairs in the early years of the Cold War have frequently relied on its text as a valuable indication of what mattered most not only to the makers of Canadian foreign policy at that time but also to Canadians generally. (5) In surveys of the development of Canada's international relations, the speech has been interpreted as a forward-looking tour d'horizon that anticipated the cardinal features of Canada's alignment and alliances in the primordial global clash of values and interests that so divided the postwar world. (6) Especially because the speaker would, within two years, become prime minister of a government generally identified with prosperity and active international engagement, the text has also been seen as an implicit--or explicit--repudiation of the relatively timorous policies and actions (or inactions) that characterized the era of William Lyon Mackenzie King. (7) In other words, the remarks have typically been seen as manifestations of a transformation in leadership and direction, one that is almost invariably depicted in favorable terms. This iconic use of the lecture has meant that it has often not been assessed in its contemporary context but rather has been viewed generally in the light of what came later. The purpose of this article is to take another look back at the Gray Lecture, to examine its purpose and its content, particularly as these were regarded by the speaker and by the author of the text, and to evaluate its significance. (8) To what extent did the speech herald a departure in Canadian foreign policy--and the rhetoric associated with it--and to what extent did it simply represent a reaffirmation of Canada's values and interests in international affairs? For St. Laurent, this was his first major speech as secretary of state for external affairs, a portfolio held since 1912 by the prime minister. The fact that King was still prime minister--and that he scrutinized the work of his former department--should alert us that no clarion call to revolution was likely from this podium at this time. (9) Nor was St. Laurent personally inclined to issue one: he had much less experience in national politics and international relations than his predecessor, he was new to the portfolio, his appointment was initially seen as temporary, and he did not have a professional background in diplomacy (as did his closest adviser and eventual successor, Lester B. Pearson). (10) A prominent and successful lawyer before he entered politics, St. Laurent had joined King's wartime cabinet out of a profound sense of national duty--a sentiment and conviction to which King appealed often to keep St. Laurent in government and ultimately to persuade him to stand for the leadership of the Liberal Party and succession as prime minister. Seen in that light, as well as in the context of King's determination to reduce his own workload, St. Laurent's shift to responsibility for Canada's foreign affairs made political sense. (11) Neither by temperament nor from experience was St. Laurent likely to risk the wrath of the cautious prime minister by a bold and novel statement. …

Book Reviews

Book Reviews

The Ethics of Refugee Policy. By Christina Boswell.

The aim of this book is to find a satisfactory philosophical framework within which to ground the duties on western states to assist refugees. In Chapters 1 to 5, Boswell reviews a number of established frameworks, from utilitarianism to social contract theory, and finds them all unsatisfactory. Her dissatisfaction stems largely from her criticisms of liberal universalism, the overarching family to which they belong. Liberal universalists perceive ethical principles to be external to the values of existing societies. In its purest form, liberal universalism demands moral impartiality between individuals, so that each person must give equal weight to the claims of others irrespective of whether they are specially related to them. When applied to the question of duties to refugees, Boswell contends that liberal universalism makes very high, potentially infeasible, demands of western states, as it calls on them to expand their assistance to refugees enormously, when they are already reluctant to meet their current obligations. It demands that western states do more, but fails to say how these states can become motivated to do more. When western states refuse to live up to its high ideals, liberal universalism can only condemn them as selfish. Such condemnation, Boswell argues, bolsters the impression of a conflict between national interests and ethical duty and, in her view, this plays into the hands of those who oppose further assistance to refugees.

From ?Obligatory Militarism? to ?Contractual Militarism??Competing Models of Citizenship

Since the 1973 War, the secular Ashkenazi middle-class groups, which traditionally had constituted the military's backbone, have displayed a lack of enthusiasm to continue to bear the military burden, a phenomenon that was publicly portrayed as a motivation crisis. We conceptualize this process as a shift from a subjected militarism that perceived military service as an unconditioned, mandatory national duty to a militarism, according to which military service is stipulated by the fulfillment of the individual's ambitions and interests, although it remained a formal obligation. Two sites of socializations—school memorial ceremonies and preparation for the military service—serve as mediating mechanisms between the structural, social change and the social agency. Both have been utilized by the dominant groups to re-shape the canon, military ethos in a manner that redefines their relations vis-A -vis the military in contractual terms.

Johann Woldemar Jannsen, Carl Robert Jakobson, Ado Grenzstein: Collaborators under Foreign Domination?

It is only 150 years since Estonians began to identify themselves as a nation with a language, culture and history of its own. This history was framed by Estonians' understanding of themselves as a “small people,” dominated by foreign powers. Alongside the “national awakening” and the battles against Baltic Germans or Russians, perceptions of foreign dominance have also been manifested through the articulation of concepts such as conformity, cooperation or “collaboration.” In its widest sense, “collaboration” can be defined as cooperation with foreign rulers based on conscious part-identities of the individual. The term can therefore be applied to instances of ideological, confessional or cultural domination as well as to circumstances of war or military confrontation. In the period of the “national awakening,” the growing verbal and ideological confrontation between the Estonians and their “foreign” Baltic-German and Russian overlords was played out on the pages of Estonian newspapers. This article analyzes the varying stances adopted by some of the main protagonists in these debates. In so doing, it highlights the need for a more thorough examination of individual motives for “collaboration,” beyond the categories of “treason” or “national duty.”

Reasonable Impartiality and Priority for Compatriots. A Criticism of Liberal Nationalism’s Main flaws

Distinguishing between reasonable partiality and reasonable impartiality makes a difference in resolving the serious clashes between ‘priority for compatriots’ versus cosmopolitan global duties. Defenders of a priority for compatriots have to acknowledge two strong moral constraints: states have to fulfil all their special, domestic and trans-domestic duties, and associative duties are limited by distributive constraints resulting from the moral duty to fight poverty and gross global inequalities. In the recent global context, I see four main problems for liberal-nationalist defenders of priority for compatriots: (i) Reasonable particularists often forget that associative duties for compatriots compete with many sub-national and trans-domestic associative duties. (ii) They tend to forget that associative national duties compete with other, strong special (contractual, reparative) obligations regarding not only citizens and residents inside nation-states but also trans-domestic obligations across state borders. (iii) They do not properly discuss the problem of unallocated duties in addressing global poverty and insecurity. (iv) The design of supra-national and global ‘mediating’ institutions, and the crafting of policies to remedy the misallocation of duties and to coordinate the required state activities is an urgent task neglected by liberal nationalists. In the recent context, reasonable partiality’s bias towards partiality is most unwelcome and morally dubious. Reasonable impartiality’s bias towards cosmopolitanism helps to stimulate a drastic shift in obligations and stimulates productive trans-national institutional design.

Local Officials and the Meiji Conscription Campaign

The creation of an effective military system was an imperative for the new Meiji government. Fearing threats from both the Western powers and dis contented elements at home, the Meiji leaders set out to establish a strong military force under the direct control of the central government. As with other aspects of state-building, they took as a model the military systems of continental Europe, particularly France and Prussia, both of which depended on commoner soldiers for most of their armed force. On 1872.11.28, the government issued a proclamation in the name of the emperor declaring that military service was a national duty (Ch?hei no Mikotonori ?8ft gB). The proclamation was followed shortly thereafter, in January 1873, by promulgation of the Conscription Act (Ch?heirei ifcft 73 ), which designated all men between the ages of seventeen and forty as theoretically liable for military service and specified the grounds under which a certain number of them were to be called up for active duty. These mea sures evoked hostile responses throughout the country, including armed upris ings and widespread draft evasion.1 Yet, ultimately the conscription system survived these challenges and took firm root in Japanese society. Modified in various regards over the course of the following decades, it remained a central feature of the life of the nation until its abolition in 1945 as a consequence of defeat in World War II. How was the initial resistance to conscription overcome and the system institu tionalized? Most research up to now has emphasized the legal measures taken by the central government to tighten the loopholes in the system that in the early years facilitated evasion.2 Relatively little attention has been given to the potential

Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Vogel

LEADERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: Essays in Honour of Robert Vogel Edited by Brian P. Farrell Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004. xxix, 273pp, $75.00 cloth (ISBN 0-7735-2643-9), $27.95 paper (ISBN 0-7735-2731-1)A natural consequence of the development of complex national defence organizations in the Second World War was a vastly expanded notion of national leadership, no longer usefully described in terms of discrete decisions by kings, cabinet, and military commanders. Charged with political, military, economic, and social responsibilities, servants of the state represented an array of institutions working toward a common goal in an environment that was more often competitive than communally supportive.Underscoring this diversity in performing national duties, editor Brian P. Farrell of the National University of Singapore offers a Festschrift celebrating the life and work of the late Robert Vogel. Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War is an eclectic anthology reflecting the wide range of interests of the McGill University professor's colleagues and students. Farrell has marshalled a rather unusual compilation of essays exploring the contributions of military, diplomatic, and even scientific fields during time of war.One of the most satisfying elements of this publication is Vogel's essay on Neville Chamberlain and the issue of appeasement during the interwar years. In an almost-completed draft, Vogel leaves an exceptional legacy of his work that underlines the difficulties of pursuing a position of strength when a state has limited capabilities to support an assertive foreign policy. This becomes an even more thoughtful piece on the propriety of making every effort to avoid war were the reader to contrast Chamberlain's efforts with a doctrine of preemption in the name of national interests. Aaron Krishtalka's essay on the old Tories and their impact on British foreign policy during the Chamberlain years and Trevor Burridge's sampling on Clement Atlee round out this section on statesmen and politicians. Krishtalka offers a unique perspective on party loyalties during times of crisis whereas little is to be gained from Burridge's decidedly uncritical assessment of Atlee.With the slightest of transitions, Neil Cameron opens the section on officials and diplomats by presenting a study on British war scientists. While Churchill's passion for the development of aerial mines and research undertaken by the committee for the scientific study of air defence on constructing a death ray are intriguing side-stories, Cameron describes interestingly how Britain saw Germany not only as a military opponent but as a scientific rival as well. Sidney Aster's offering on the diplomatic difficulties of Sir William Deeds in contending with Soviet foreign ministers Maxim Litvinov and Vyacheslav Molotov is especially commendable. …

Gandhi in his time and ours: the global legacy of his ideas

Preface 1. Introduction: The Gandhian Dialogic 2. An Incorporative Nationalism Forging a Nationalist Hegemony The Disciplined Nation Invented Histories of the Nation 3. Dialogic Resistance Popular Forms of Mass Resistance in India Satryagraha Individual Conscience Ahimsa Satryagraha Within the Indian Polity 4. An Alternative Modernity Hind Swaraj A Gandhian Civilisation The Contructive Programme Gandhi, Socialism, and the Doctrine of Trusteeship The Gandhian Critique Beyond India 5. Fear of the Nation Gandhi's Family Life Gandhi and Sexual Desire Marriage and Patriarchy Women and Satyagraha The Critique of Patriarchy 6. Dalit and Adivasi Assertion Dalits Adivasis Dalits, Adivasis, and the Indian Nation 7. Fighting Religious Hatreds Gandhi, Muslims, and Hindu Nationalists The 'National Duty' of the Hindu Patriot Gandhi and Christianity Partition and Gandhi's 'Finest Hour' Gandhian Anti-Communal Work Since Independence 8. Gandhian Activism in India After Independence The Bhoodan and Gramdan Movements The Naxalite Alternative The JP Movement JP's 'Total Revolution' The Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini Women and Anti-Liquor Movements in India Vahini and Women's Rights Chipko Andolan Narmada Bachao Andolan Gandhian Activism Since 1980 9. Gandhi's Global Legacy Some Contemporary Western Reactions Gandhi and the Pacifist Movement Gandhian Resistance on a World Stage The African-American Struggle in the USA The Revolt Against Apartheid in South Africa Petra Kelly and the German Greens 10. The Moral Activists' Lonely Path to Martyrdom Bibliography Index

The Taxation of Banking in an Integrating Europe

The banking sector is subject to explicit taxation and to bank regulation and supervision with quasi-fiscal implications. The assignment of national fiscal policy rights and duties regarding international banks in the EU varies with the fiscal instrument and with whether the international bank owns foreign branches or subsidiaries. Decentralized national policy-making in the EU gives rise to fiscal burdens on banks that differ internationally and with the national origin of banks in the same country. This paper discusses the international aspects of the overall fiscal regime facing banks in the EU and it evaluates some avenues for reform.

An Insight Into the Value Added Tax System Detailing Its Origins, Impact, Provisions and Regulations With Reference to India

The Value Added Tax was first introduced in France in 1954. It was the resultant effort of France and members of the European Economic Community (E.E.C) during the 1950s aimed at the simplification of commodity taxes. Currently more than 130 nations in the world have adopted the VAT system. In the last decade alone over 50 nations have introduced VAT. This includes implementation in China and most recently the addition of Australia to the list of VAT nations. The world over, VAT is payable on both goods and services as they constitute a part of the national GDR Excise duty and sales taxes are merged into the singularity of VAT. No tax is levied on exports with full input tax credit made available.
 The scheme of taxation adopted by most nations is very simple. The seller of goods and the service provider charge tax on sales, avail input tax credit and pay the difference as VAT to the goVernment treasury. The compliance system in VAT nations is also very simple. There is very less interface between the tax collector and the tax payer. However there are provisions for heavy penalization of VAT defaulters. VAT is administered nationally and is also levied on imports.

The Last White Terror: TheMaquis Blancand Its Impact in Liberated France, 1944–1945

If the Revolution is the woof of modern French history, counterrevolution and “white terror” is definitely its warp. Every revolutionary outbreak of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was accompanied by virulent counterrevolutionary responses, especially in western and southern France. Donald Sutherland describes these uprisings as the manifestations of a “massive, extensive, durable and popular” movement,1 noting that the violent counterrevolutionary wars of the 1790s were repeatedly echoed by renewed rebellions and “white terrorism” in 1815 and 1832 and that there were fears of royalist violence in 1848. These encounters bore all the typically savage signs of a civil war. Even the relatively minor “de Berry Revolt” of 1832 generated a fourteen-page report from a local prefect detailing scores of gruesome murders and pillages.2 These bitter conflicts also engendered the development of lasting royalist movements in areas such as Brittany.3 As late as the 1880s, Brittany was the base for a 6,000-man shock force of former Papal Zouaves that was plotting a legitimist march on Paris, and violent counterrevolutionary outbreaks were still being recorded in the early twentieth century, particularly in response to the separation of church and state in 1905. Activities such as draft dodging, always a crucial expression—in poorly integrated regions along the periphery—of opposition to the notion of national duty, still bore the characteristics of such cultural rejectionism as late as the time of World War I.4

“Our Best Boys”

Several scholars view the military to be a most forceful institution in constructing images of masculinity in society at large. Usually, military service can be described as a rite of passage to male adulthood, teaching toughness, and trying to eliminate what is regarded to be effeminate. Israel serves as an interesting case study to investigate the connections between gender and the military. Although participation in the military is compulsory for Jewish men and women and motivation to serve in the military is high, meaning that the military socializes most Jewish Israelis, this national duty is highly gendered. The author discusses the historical background of the Israeli Jewish ideal of manliness, its reinforcement by times of conflict and war, and its impact on the private and the public sphere.

A Patriot for Whom? The Afterlives of Bolingbroke's Patriot King

The transformation of patriotism into nationalism has become one of the accepted grand narratives of eighteenth-century British history. From its first appearance in English in the 1720s, “patriotism” as a political slogan expressed devotion to the common good of thepatriaand hostility to sectional interests and became a staple of oppositional politics. Though it was attacked by ministerialist writers, it was a liability only for those like the elder Pitt, whose attachment to patriotism when in opposition was not matched by his behavior when in government. However, the Wilkesite agitations and the debate over the American War decisively tainted patriotism with the whiff of factious reformism, and it was in just this context, in 1775, that Dr. Samuel Johnson famously redefined patriotism as “the last refuge of a scoundrel.” In the following half century, both radicals and loyalists fought over the appropriation of patriotism: the radicals to rescue it from the contempt into which it had fallen in the 1770s, the loyalists and the government to harness its potent discourse of national duty for the cause of monarchical revivalism and aggressive anti-Gallicanism. It is now generally agreed that the conservatives won, as the oppositional language of the early and mid-eighteenth century was thereby transformed into “an officially constructed patriotism which stressed attachment to the monarchy, the importance of empire, the value of military and naval achievement, and the desirability of strong, stable government by a virtuous, able and authentically British elite.”