National Constitutional Courts Research Articles

Transition from Austrian to American Model of Judicial Review in the European Court of Justice

Legal scholars distinguish between two main models of judi cial review — the American model and Austrian (European) one. In the American model, the scope of discretion and the relative role of the constitutional court in the political system are noticeably higher than in the Aust rian one. The author traces the history of the origin of these two models, explains the differences between them and raises the question of whether the boundaries between these two ideal types are too rigid or whether a gradual transition from the Austrian model to the American one (without formal constitutional reform) is possible. The author provides the answer drawing on the real case of such transition that occurred in the European Court of Justice in the 1960s. This case is unique precisely because the change in the system of the judicial review was the result of the gradual “migration” from one model to the other, rather than the result of an outside reform. Similar to Baron Munchausen, who pulled himself out of the swamp by his own hair, the European Court of Justice was able to independently, through its own decisions, alter the order of the judicial review in the European Union, bringing it closer to the American model. In the final part of the article, the author places this transition into a broader historical context, demonstrating that the success of the construction of a new European legal order was not predetermined and consisted of the decisions taken by the judges in each specific case. However, any national constitutional court finds itself in a similar situation after a change of the political regime. As a rule of thumb, new constitutional courts are created according to the Austrian model and are institutionally similar to the legislative branch of government, but in order to make judicial review efficient, they need to transform into the American model, becoming more similar to the courts of general jurisdiction. In this respect, the experience of the European Court of Justice can be extremely useful for them.

What Future for the Eurozone After Karlsruhe?

The paper analyzes the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court rendered on 5 May2020 (2 BvR 859/15,2 BvR 980/16,2 BvR2006/15,2 BvR 1651/15), wereby the latter heavily criticized the democratic legitimacy of the Public Sector Purchase Program of the European Central Bank (aimed, by purchasing negotiable debt securities issued by governments, public agencies and international institutions located in the euro area, to support the economy of the Member States and to increase the eurozone's inflation rate up to 2%), de facto disapplying the judgment of the CGEU of 11 December 2018, by which that Program had been instead previously validated. The author places the decision in the context of the long-standing and conflicting relations, on the one hand, between Member States and European institutions and, on the other hand, between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union, outlining the possible repercussions of the decision on a legal, economic, political and institutional level and, ultimately, on the very survival of the eurozone.

The Role of the Constitutional Courts in the European Judicial Network

The constitutional courts play a paramount role within the European judicial area and form a specific branch of the judicial network, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights. Within the European Union (EU) with its specific compound structure, in which national legal orders and Union law reciprocally influence, complement, determine and affect each other, national constitutional courts and the CJEU are not only assigned with the common task to enforce EU law, but also to preserve its limits, first and foremost the principle of conferral and the constitutional identities of the Member States. The respect for these limits is an essential prerequisite for the Member State’s participation in the EU and repeatedly enshrined in the Treaties. In order to be able to fulfil this common tasks all sides need to engage in sincere cooperation and a dialectic process, the potential of which must not be curtailed by hierarchical perceptions.Whereas the national (constitutional) courts are obliged to respect the CJEU’s authority to ultimately decide on the interpretation of EU law in principle, it is the CJEU’s obligation to take their referrals seriously and thoroughly adress concerns brought forward. The constitutional courts of the Member States are assigned with the constitutional responsibility to accompany the process of European integration in order to ensure that sovereign rights are only transferred in line with the respective provisions as well as that the excercise of competences respects the limits laid down in the Treaties and does not interfere with the constitutional identities of theMember States. It is of course again for the CJEU to review whether EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies act within their mandate in the first place including a quite large tolerance for different interpretations. To the extend the CJEU, however, fails to assume this responsibility, it is for the constitutional courts of the Member States to step in. The desirable success of the European integration largely depends on an orderly, sustainable and generally accepted process in the long run to which the network of constitutional courts can make a decisive contribution, provided it is designed and lived as a true cooperation among equals. In this regard it is not only necessary to intensify the joint efforts, but also to evaluate possibilities to enhance the involvement of the national courts, in particular the establishment of a reverse preliminary ruling procedure. duty to give reasons, administrative measure, participation, administrative procedure

Some Remarks on the ‘Shechita Case’ of the ECJ

This study strives to answer why the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) ‘Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België’ judgment, delivered on 17 December 2020, triggered heated reactions. Similarly, sharp criticisms were articulated regarding the recent decision of the Belgian Constitutional Court (Grondwettelijk Hof), where the Court upheld the national legislation on the ban of slaughter without prior stunning per the aforementioned ECJ judgment. This study examines the historic, theological, and scientific background of shechita and halal slaughter with reference to the aforementioned framework. Furthermore, the study strives to introduce the pros and cons of the issue to help the reader decide whether the ritual slaughter — the slaughter of animals without prior stunning but following certain rules aimed at sparing animals from useless suffering — is as humane as the modern non-religious method, where the slaughter is conducted with prior stunning. This study also examines the different theological interpretations on the acceptability of stunning animals before slaughter. In the second part, the study briefly introduces the freedom of religion-related case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and thoroughly analyses its Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek decision. Moreover, it examines the ECJ’s two ritual slaughter cases, namely the Liga van Moskeeën and Œuvre d’assistance cases, which preceded the Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België case. As a brief excursus into the jurisprudence of the national constitutional courts, this study also introduces two cases brought by the constitutional courts of Germany and Poland. Finally, the third part thoroughly analyses the Advocate General’s opinion and the judgment delivered in the Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België case of the ECJ to highlight the reasons for the different interpretations of the very same EU law.

СУД ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА: НАРАСТАЮЩИЙ КРИЗИС ЛЕГИТИМНОСТИ

The review is focused to the problem of reducing the legitimacy of the EU Court, which is noted in the works of a number of scientists. In this context, the review analyzes court cases concerning the extraterritorial effect of EU law, as well as the observance and protection of human rights, considered by the EU Court in recent years. The positions of the EU Court cause not only criticism of representatives of the academic community, but also resistance of national constitutional courts.

Ensure the Inviolability of Personal Life in the Conduct of Police Preventive Activities

The paper addresses the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, in particular, issues related to personal data. The development of information technology has had a significant impact on the dangers of illegal processing of personal data. The European Court of Human Rights considers the inviolability of private life as a precondition for human autonomy, independent development and protection of human dignity. According to the norms of international law, the right to respect for private life is recognized as one of the most important and fundamental rights, the protection of which is indicated by the legislation of Georgia. The aim of the paper is to analyze the legislation and practice of police law in the field of protection of the right to privacy and to offer relevant recommendations, taking into account the standards set by European and national courts. Human rights legislation must ensure the protection of all human beings against the abuse of state power. Interference with rights must be based on the principle of proportionality. The use of policing should not pose an excessive threat of fundamental human rights violations. Interference with a particular right must be done under principle of proportionality to achieve a certain public good. In clarifying the issue of alleged violation of the right, special attention should be paid to the severity and probability of the expected threat to legal good. The Constitution of Georgia, EU and Council of Europe data protection standards, national legislation, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the National Constitutional Court are analyzed around the topic. In addition, the reports of the State Inspector, the Public Defender and the relevant scientific literature are used to study the above issues.

National Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Charter: A Comparative Appraisal of the German Federal Constitutional Court'sRight to Be ForgottenJudgments

AbstractThe binding legal force that the Charter acquired with the Treaty of Lisbon has led some national constitutional courts to adopt an entirely new approach to EU fundamental rights. Most notably, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, and the German Federal Constitutional Court have explicitly made the Charter a yardstick of constitutional review. This article compares and contrasts the approaches of these three courts to the Charter. It shows that the strategies of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts have many characteristics in common, including that national constitutional rights are treated as a primary source and the Charter as a mere secondary benchmark in the majority of cases. The most distinctive feature of the Italian Constitutional Court's strategy is that it mainly aims to prevent ordinary courts from circumventing constitutionality refences by directly applying the Charter. The article concludes by arguing that it has many advantages when national constitutional courts adopt the Charter as a yardstick of constitutional review. It is for the constitutional courts and the CJEU to ensure that these benefits are not outweighed by some serious drawbacks of constitutional review in light of the Charter.

Requirement to Rebalance or to Amend the EU Treaty (TEU and TFEU) in Concordance with National Constitutional Law?

The article explains and analyzes, whether there is a legal requirement to rebalance or amend the EU Treaty (TEU and TFEU) in concordance with national constitutional law due to a conflict of competence between the national supreme courts and national constitutional courts and the European Court of Justice. In short, the article has the following conclusions or findings: (i) National constitutional law and EU constitutional law (lex superior) are not in all instances in judicial congruence due to a conflict of competence. (ii) Under EU law as interpreted by the ECJ, even national constitutional law is under EU law primacy or supremacy, cf. e.g. 1) ECJ case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, para 3, 2) ECJ case C-285/98, Kreil, and 3) ECJ case C-399/11, Melloni, para 58. (iii) Nevertheless, in three instances the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) has been overruled by national supreme courts and national constitutional courts under or due to national constitutional law, cf. 1) the Landtova case from the Czech Republic (the Czech Constitutional Court’s decision Pl. US 5/12 of 31 January 2012), 2) the Ajos case from Denmark (the Danish Supreme Court’s judgment of 6 December 2012 published in U.2017.824H) and 3) the ECB judgment from Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht’s judgment of 5th May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, etc.). (iv) The major focal point of the conflict of competence is the applied legal methodology by the ECJ with implied powers or derivation from the coherence of the EU Treaty or the EU treaties to treaty-giving power and legislative power for the ECJ. In reality, the said applied legal methodology gives the ECJ judicial circular competences or Kompetenz Zu Kompetenz (both treaty-giving power, legislative power and judicial power). (v) A solution to this judicial Gordian Knot or way out of the said conflict of competence could be to rebalance or amend the EU treaty. (vi) A suggested amendment to the EU Treaty is to add a section 4 to Art. 19 TEU. This suggested section 4 of Art. 19 TEU would constitute a new legal mechanism regarding EU law and national constitutional law. This legal mechanism could be that a conflict of competences with regard to ultra vires (outside conferred competences) would result in a renewed legislative process under e.g. Art. 294 TFEU. If the ECJ’s interpretation was upheld by the EU’s legislative power, the national courts must accede to this renewed legal basis. If the ECJ’s interpretation is not upheld via EU’s legislative process, the said interpretation by the ECJ is invalid. The same as above-mentioned would apply with regard to EU principles, which principles could only apply on an EU constitutional level, if they were made statutory via the Treaty, cf. Art. 1 TEU.

Статус Конституційного Суду України як судового органу

У статті розглянуто статус Конституційного Суду України як судового органу влади. Розкрито зміст дискусії між Гансом Кельзеном і Карлом Шміттом щодо природи конституційного суду. З'ясовано зміст і наслідки конституційної реформи 2016 року в частині статусу Конституційного Суду України. З'ясовано аргументи щодо відповідності Конституційного Суду України критеріям ст. 6 Європейської конвенції з прав людини. Зроблено висновок про те, що шлях створення окремого конституційного суду, який був обраний в Європі внаслідок «перемоги» аргументів Ганса Кель-зена над аргументами Карла Шмітта, навряд чи варто піддавати ревізії. Така ревізія ставить під сумнів сам факт існування, авторитет і роль Конституційного Суду в механізмі захисту прав людини, а також юридичну силу його рішень, власну юрисдикцію, його інституційну незалежність, що забезпечується саме судовим статусом (за Кельзеном), створює невизначеність щодо місця в судовій системі шляхом потенційної конкуренції з Верховним Судом як «найвищим судом у системі судоустрою України» (ч. 3 ст. 125 Конституції в чинній редакції). Відповідне занепокоєння (щодо конкуренції з Верховним Судом) набуло свого конкретного вияву під час визнання останнім Конституційного Суду України політичним органом, а також заперечення Верховним Судом поширення на Конституційний Суд України ст. 6 Європейської конвенції з прав людини. Визнання позасудового статусу Конституційного Суду України або ж його політичного, а не правового характеру принижує його роль і не сприяє злагодженому функціонуванню судових механізмів захисту прав людини. Європейський суд із прав людини неодноразово визнавав національні конституційні суди «судом, встановленим законом» саме в розумінні відповідної ст. 6 Конвенції. Судовий статус Конституційного Суду України не заперечувався Венеціанською комісією, навпаки - він схвалювався.

National Constitutional Courts As Veto Players in the EMU Crisis

The European Union’s response to the crisis of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been met with intense criticism. Critics highlight that both the reforms of the EMU legal framework and national austerity measures implemented under Memoranda of Understanding have limited national governments’ discretion in shaping national policies to an unprecedented degree. National actors in many member states therefore challenged EMU crisis response before national courts. While courts are considered reluctant to interfere with momentous legislative decisions, especially in a sensitive field like that of budgetary and fiscal rules, some judgments did indeed strike down individual crisis measures. The EMU case therefore allows us to better understand court behaviour in times of economic crises. Drawing on the literature on courts as veto players, the article analyses when, and under what conditions, national constitutional courts exercise their veto powers in the constitutional review of EMU reforms.

Human dignity as a universal legal value

The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis about human dignity as the initial and universal legal value. The investigation belongs to philosophical and legal anthropology and axiology. In the process of research, phenomenological and analytical methods in their unity and complementarity were used. The article draws attention to the tendency of increasing interest to the value component of law in contemporary legal philosophy and doctrine. Traditionally, justice is recognized as the main legal value embodying the high purpose of law. It is a complex value and embodies a certain ratio of no less universal legal values based on human experience, such as human dignity, freedom and equality. Since the mid-twentieth century, human dignity has become the “new key concept” for law. This was due to the desire to prevent a recurrence of the state of barbarism – massive and large-scale humiliation of it during the Second World War. As an expression of a person’s intrinsic value, his subjectivity, human dignity is considered as a value basis of human rights as a whole, as well as an independent right, the inviolability of which is enshrined in the fundamental international documents and constitutions of developed countries. It finds protection in the practice of national Constitutional Courts (primarily the German Federal Constitutional Court), the European Court of Human Rights and other legal institutions. The ethical priority of dignity in the system of legal values emphasizes the universality of human rights, which are based on the initial and unconditional recognition of the other in his uniqueness, regardless of his belonging to a particular community.

Bring Back the Politics: The PSPP Ruling in Its Institutional Context

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that the conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union is the story of a clash foretold, if one takes seriously constitutional courts as institutions designed to be “dogs that bite.” The German Court consistently developed a doctrinal tool to guide its role as guardian of the national constitutional order and the democratic principle, and enforced it when the constitutional control of monetary policy measures so required. I analyze the PSPP ruling, focusing on where the Court concluded that the lack of a satisfactory statement of reasons by the European Central Bank prevented it from reviewing the proportionality of the program. I argue that the Court, after conducting a substantive assessment, applied a weak remedy, thereby deferring the last word on the constitutionality of the PSPP to the political branches. In doing so, the Court opens space for the political assessment of a controversial monetary policy, enhancing the politicization of the Economic and Monetary Union, and provides a doctrinal toolbox for national constitutional courts that face competence creep of EU law in their jurisdictions. I conclude that, ultimately, the main merit of constitutional courts’ interventions in the EU integration is that they are in a privileged position to allow for the politicization of technocratic processes.

Framing and managing constitutional identity conflicts: How to stabilize the modus vivendi between the Court of Justice and national constitutional courts

In the last decade, constitutional identity review mechanisms have emerged in several Member States. The proliferation of these mechanisms increases the risk of jurisdictional conflicts and is a permanent threat to the primacy of EU law. As it is highly unlikely that the conflict over the “last word” will be settled soon, solutions for stabilizing the delicate modus vivendi between the ECJ and national constitutional courts are needed. This requires the identification of a common problem. The article seeks to establish a new framework for the comparison and systematization of identity review mechanisms in the Member States. First, it develops a typology of identity reviews in the EU judicial space, thereby making it possible to distinguish identity reviews that are particularly prone to conflict. The article then identifies essential features of national settings that might determine and foster the emergence of such conflict-prone identity reviews. These features serve as a basis for the development of tailor-made solutions to manage jurisdictional conflicts and stabilize the modus vivendi between the ECJ and national constitutional courts.

The Federal Constitutional Court Rules for a Bright Future of Constitutional Pluralism

AbstractThe ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Right to be forgotten II case is an example of constitutional pluralism in action. It demonstrates how a pluralist-minded court can elevate itself from and above the constitutional confines of its own legal order. By integrating the material standards of another legal order in its own review of constitutionality a national constitutional court contributes directly to the strengthening of the fundamental rights of individuals against the national authorities within the overall system of European legal order.

DIJALOZI IZMEĐU USTAVNIH SUDOVA DRŽAVA ČLANICA EUROPSKE UNIJE I SUDA EUROPSKE UNIJE

In the context of the discourse on constitutional identities, national constitutional courts enter into various forms of dialogue with the Court of Justice of the EU. After having engaged for an extended period of time in exclusively indirect dialogues that were more or less successful and were realised through their own practices, national constitutional courts started making use of the possibility offered to them pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, i.e., the preliminary ruling procedure. The paper aims to prove that the dialogues which constitutional courts engage in with the Court of Justice of the EU are the most successful forms of their communication. For that purpose the paper compares these dialogues with indirect forms of communication between constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the EU. It is in this context that the paper, following introductory considerations in the second part, considers the concept of constitutional identity from the viewpoint of the Court of Justice of the EU and the viewpoint of national constitutional courts. The third part of the paper analyses different forms of indirect dialogue between constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the EU and draws conclusions about their effectiveness. The fourth part analyses particular procedures instituted before the Court of Justice of the EU by constitutional courts and points out the pros and cons of these procedures. Finally, the paper concludes that the procedures instituted by national constitutional courts pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are the most direct and the most efficient forms of their communication with this Court.

„A gazda bekeríti házát”? : A Német Szövetségi Alkotmánybíróság PSPP-döntésének jelentősége és az európai integrációért viselt alkotmányos felelősség realitása

A nemzeti alkotmánybíróságok és az EUB kapcsolatát, illetve az uniós jog abszolút primátusát a tagállami alkotmányok felett az alkotmányértelmező testületek az európai alkotmányos párbeszéd eszközével igyekeztek és igyekeznek a mai napig a fenntarthatóság medrén belül tartani, míg az e relációk meghatározása iránti igény időközben életre hívta az alkotmányos identitás védelmének szükségességét. Az elmúlt évek tudományos diskurzusában mind többször találkozhattunk a „nyílt kenyértörés” pillanatával, mikor az e testületek közötti viszony meghatározatlanságából fakadóan a testületek és az általuk védelmezett jogforrások összeütköznek. 2020. május 5-én úgy tűnik, hogy a Német Szövetségi Alkotmánybíróság PSPP tárgyában hozott döntésével e pillanat elérkezett, bár talán kevésbé lesznek hevesek az ezt követő folyamatok, mint azt elsőre gondolnánk. A tanulmány bevezetője röviden érinti az EUB és a nemzeti alkotmánybíróságok közötti hatásköri kérdéseket, majd – annak fő részében – e német döntés alkotmányjogi magvának, az integrációért viselt alkotmányos felelősségnek (Integrationsverantwortung) az elemzéséből kiindulva írja le annak elméleti és gyakorlati fontosságát, várható hatásait és utóéletét az alkotmánybíráskodást végző nemzeti fórumok és az EUB közötti kapcsolat vonatkozásában, kitekintve a releváns EUB-gyakorlat megállapításaira is.

The Role of the German and Italian Constitutional Courts in the Rise of EU Human Rights Jurisprudence: A Response to Delledonne & Fabbrini

The widespread understanding that the ECJ’s early fundamental rights jurisprudence in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) and other cases was developed in response to judgments of the German and Italian Constitutional Courts has recently been questioned. Delledonne and Fabbrini claim both that the conventional account is chronologically inaccurate – the European Court’s famous fundamental rights decisions came before those of the German and Italian courts – and that it relies on an understanding of postwar human rights leadership by these national constitutional courts which a closer look at their actual record does not support. This paper demonstrates however that there is substantially more evidence that the Court of Justice was responding to the concerns of the German and Italian constitutional courts than is frequently set out by either critics or supporters of the more conventional approach. The Court of Justice’s famous fundamental rights decisions did indeed come after this issue had been first highlighted in judgments of the German and Italian constitutional courts; the threat to the uniform application of European law posed by the fundamental rights aspect of these judgments was prominently noted in the writings of ECJ judges; and the caution shown by the German and Italian constitutional courts in reviewing postwar domestic legislation on human rights grounds is not in conflict with an active role in promoting the ECJ’s new human rights jurisprudence. In short therefore, there is considerable evidence that the ECJ was motivated to create its new human rights jurisprudence by the possible threat to the uniform application of European law posed by the German and Italian constitutional courts.

Dalle tradizioni costituzionali comuni all’identità costituzionale il passo è breve? Riflessioni introduttive

SOMMARIO: 1. L’identita costituzionale: un crocevia nel rapporto fra ordinamenti - 2. Un’istantanea del dibattito - 3. Visto da Lussemburgo: la prospettiva della Corte di giustizia. From common constitutional traditions to constitutional identity: is it a short road? A critical introduction ABSTRACT: Constitutional identity has lately emerged as the most relevant argument underlying the dialogue between the national constitutional courts and the European Court of Justice nowadays. As a matter of fact, this new identitarian seam of the constitutional discourse represents the real battlefield between the national constitutional dimension and the European one. In order to analyse the main features of the EU legal landscape upon which this discussion takes place, this essay investigates the gradual development of the use of the common constitutional traditions as well as the progressive emergence of the concept of constitutional identity as a fundamental element of the whole EU integration process up to including in the Lisbon Treaty a specific provision on this matter, i.e. Art. 4, 2 TEU.

Protocol No 16 to the ECHR: Managing Backlog through Complex Judicial Dialogue?

European Court of Human Rights – Protocol No. 16 – Advisory Opinions – Managing backlog – Unpredictable effects – Complex judicial dialogue – Interplay with preliminary rulings of European Court of Justice and national constitutional courts –Bosphoruspresumption – National courts in charge of judicial diplomacy – Increased burden for national courts

Jak chronić prawa podstawowe własnych obywateli w sytuacji prymatu prawa unijnego? Garść refleksji na kanwie orzecznictwa FSK i TSUE dotyczącego Europejskiego Nakazu Aresztowania (ENA)

Orzeczenie niemieckiego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (FSK) z 14 grudnia 2015 r. w sprawie Identitätskontrolle ma kluczowe znaczenie dla rozumienia granic możliwości ochrony krajowych praw podstawowych w Unii Europejskiej. FSK de facto przeprowadził w nim kontrolę zgodności wynikającego z prawa Unii Europejskiej obowiązku bezwarunkowego wykonania Europejskiego Nakazu Aresztowania (ENA) z konstytucyjnymi gwarancjami ochrony prawa do godności, ostatecznie jednak dochodząc do wniosku, że gwarancje konstytucyjne zasadniczo pokrywają się z unijnymi. Wydając swoje orzeczenie, choć było ono ewidentnie różne od dotychczasowego orzecznictwa TSUE na temat ENA, FSK stwierdził brak potrzeby zadania pytania prejudycjalnego. Pomimo to, w ewidentny sposób orzeczenie to wpłynęło na późniejszy rozwój orzecznictwa TSUE, przede wszystkim na wyrok w sprawie Aranyosi i Căldăraru. Ponadto wydaje się, że w znacznym stopniu wpłynęło ono także na dalszą dynamikę relacji pomiędzy krajowymi sądami konstytucyjnymi a TSUE w zakresie ochrony praw podstawowych. Tym samym można nawet posunąć się do stwierdzenia, że ma ono kluczowe znaczenie dla zrozumienia dynamiki procesu dialogu sądowego wewnątrz UE.