If we should watch a city coming into being in speech, I said, we also see its justice coming into being, and its injustice? Probably, he said. When this has been done, can we hope to see what we're looking for more easily? Far more easily. Is it resolved that we must try to carry this out? I suppose it's no small job, so consider Plato, Republic1 The Problem is under consideration here: the problem of those children of history who created the situation of and therefore bear responsibility for it. Joel Kavel White Racism: A Psychohistory2 Shame is directly about the self. In guilt, however, it is not the self but the act that is the central focus of negative evaluation.3 Discourse about race and in the United States includes a concept of white guilt but no concept of white shame. This reveals much about white moral psychologies and problems of race in America.4 In this essay I argue that whiteness operates with an impoverished concept of responsibility that overemphasizes guilt and underemphasizes moral shame.5 In contrast, I argue for a concept of responsibiUty that values both guilt and shame. I explore some of the impUcations of my analysis for race relations in America. I would like it to be clear from the start that I am not asking white people to feel more shame. Moral shame, in itself, is not especially praiseworthy. However shame can motivate us to try to reconnect, to work for forgiveness and reconciliation. It can arouse justified anger, which works to correct injustices, or to see them corrected. Appropriate moral shame, and a desire to avoid this negative emotion, can therefore motivate us in valuable ways. Typically, it is this motivation and the action it produces that are valuable, not the emotion itself. In other words, we need not waUow in moral shame. But of course shame, even moral shame, can have bad results. It can drive us apart. It can lead to dissociation. It can engender vicious anger. It can evoke narcissistic rage. AU of this is more likely for people with poorly integrated psychologies. I do think that better integrated moral psychologies could lead to better integrated communities, and conversely. But my primary aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of aspects of mainstream white moral psychology, the preoccupation with guUt, and how this bears on race relations in America. Political Philosophy and Moral Psychology Tommie Shelby argues that philosophical analyses of should focus on the political reality. For Shelby, ideology - not individual morality - should be primary in our thinking about racism.6 Lawrence Blum disagrees. According to Blum, in order to preserve the strong condemnatory force of racism we must consider it primarily as a matter of individual immoraUty. Blum defines racism as personal antipathy toward people who are perceived to be of other races. He worries that if we insist on using the term more broadly to refer to an ideology, then racism may devolve into amorally neutral concept of poUtical discourse and lose its meaning as a form of personal immorality.7 Both of these current approaches are flawed. Shelby's view leaves no room for emotion. He conceives of ideology in exclusively cognitive terms, as distortion of belief. As such, his conception of is insensitive to moral psychology. The deficiency in Blum's view is twofold: he makes no room for ideology in his account of and he restricts his account of the role of emotions to the moral psychologies of individual racists - personal antipathy. I explore how ideology and moral psychologies are co-constitutive, and how certain aspects of whiteness are the result. My focus is not on per se, but on aspects of whiteness that reinforce and perpetuate the unsatisfactory state of race in America. I argue that American liberalism and individuaUsm (ideology) form and are formed by moral psychologies that overemphasize guilt, and thus conceive of the responsibility of white people exclusively in terms of their voluntary acts. …