In the last two decades, the philosophy of artefacts has grown into a substantial field. Various philosophers have proposed and discussed ways of determining the nature and identity conditions of artefacts; others have scrutinised possible definitions of artefact functions. Simultaneously, cognitive psychologists have gathered empirical evidence about how people identify and distinguish artefacts. Furthermore, these two discipli nary groups appear to be interested in each other's proposals and results (Margolis and Laurence 2007). A shared starting point in this literature is that artefacts and their functions deserve independent treatment. Most philosophers agree that artefact kinds are not natural kinds; most cognitive psychologists agree that people distinguish artefacts from natural objects. In consequent attempts to develop an appropriately autonomous account of artefacts, two intuitions have commanded virtually all attention. One is that artefacts are related, more intimately than natural objects, to intentional actions. Some authors stress that recognising intentions is important or even necessary in identifying artefacts; others offer conceptual or empirical reasons to reject this. The other intuition is that artefacts are identified and recognised by their functions. Some authors regard artefact functions as essential properties; others deny this. Studies into the relation between artefact functions and intentional actions combine these two intuitions. In this paper, we reconsider these intuitions in the light of another feature of existing philosophical work on artefacts, namely its minimalis tic view of the actions and agent roles involved in dealings with artefacts. The model implicit in most of the literature is that of an artisan, a single person who produces relatively simple artefacts, starting with a (perhaps personal) desire and ending with a finished product. This artisan model
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