1.0 INTRODUCTION: FINDING LEGAL CERTAINTY? Things, called objects for a good reason, appear to be the most 'pure' form of objectivity.'1 Watch an antique or collectables show on television, and more often than not, one segment is devoted to testing the knowledge of an expert panel (and sometimes members of the public) with a problem or 'mystery' object. The object of the exercise (no other word will do so the pun must stay), is to find out what the object actually is, what it was used for, and when it was used. Sometimes the experts know what it is, but more often than not, the host has to tell them. The only way an object can provide some kind of objective knowledge about itself is in terms of a weighing and measuring exercise, but without more, the object is bare, meaningless, and lifeless. The appearances of objects can be deceiving, as Mieke BaI is telling us, because pure and certain objects are meaningless without context, meaning, value, or significance. Meanings and values discursive factors - have to be imposed on these objects in order to make sense of them as objects of culture or objects of value.2 The only things that an object can tell us with precision are those things we impose upon it. The object, despite these deficiencies, is prized by the legal enterprise (a term I will use to encompass law as doctrine, law within its categories of meaning, and law in the hands of its practitioners) because it provides a sense of clarity and certainty that brooks no opposition. If something can be described, quantified, weighed and measured, then that thing and its existence is incontrovertible, by apparently providing knowledge about the object in its clearest and most precise mode. It assumes the veracity of the object as a physical presence as a fact, which can provide a trustworthy source of information about the object itself. But as the example of the television collectables program shows, objects can only do so much, and explanations about the object must be imposed externally on the object. While these may be described as facts about the object (who owned it, who painted it and so on) the legal enterprise characterises these interventions, generally speaking, as opinion. Opinions, by their nature, are uncertain, and always suspect because they are based on the views of the people who make diem. They cannot, unlike objects, be certain at all. Yet as the example of the 'mystery object' shows, objects as they are used in the social world are fallible because they have no meaning other than that placed upon them, such as their associations with a particular historical person, or because of their rarity. However, this reliance on the veracity of objects is fundamental to a range of areas of law from the law of contract to personal property law, and informs the rules of evidence dirough decisions whether or not to admit expert 'opinion'. As will be seen shortly, the idea that the fact of an object can be determined with precision, but that opinions are suspect, is imbued within the stuff of the legal enterprise. Yet law's practitioners are mostly unaware that the fact/opinion divide was a creation of seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophical empiricism which suited the emerging commercial temperament of the legal doctrines and categories that took their modern shape during the same period. The fact/opinion divide embedded itself within law because it has the appearance of making legal decision-making more certain, more rational, and more objective. However, I will argue here that not only does it make some types of decisionmaking less certain, other methods based around the discursive practices used to create meanings about objects (which the legal enterprise would classify as opinion) have the potential to create a more solid and certain set of meanings about objects. I will suggest that the duality of fact and opinion is a divisive analytical tool that can alter the appearance of meanings and value of an object, and rather than ensure a certainty of outcome in cases involving art and cultural objects, may result in greater uncertainty than if the legal enterprise used a less divisive method to make decisions about the veracity of objects. …