Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Research Articles

Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement

Cross-border data access reform may be on the legislative agenda in late 2017, with recent House and Senate judiciary committee hearings revisiting the topic. In light of this increasing interest, we thought it would be helpful to provide a brief primer on how cross-border data access requests currently work, options for reform, and major challenges to reform ahead. This document presents a short, high-level background review of the debate as it currently stands, particularly focusing on the DOJ’s 2016 proposal for reform. Governments need evidence to investigate and prosecute crimes, but increasingly that evidence takes the form of data stored on the servers of U.S. tech companies. In July 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released draft legislation that would address some of the challenges foreign governments face when seeking data related to criminal investigations from U.S. companies. Interest in making such changes continues to grow, with relevant laws, including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), maybe seeing Congressional attention in late 2017, especially as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) comes up for renewal. To access electronic content – including email, social media messages, and more – held by U.S. companies, a foreign country currently relies primarily on the processes set out in agreements called Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), if that country has negotiated one with the U.S. MLATs with the U.S. require countries to meet U.S. legal standards when making requests for electronic content data, with less strict standards for metadata. Countries have grown frustrated with both the normative implications of the MLAT process and its typical lengthiness. After substantial debate, and with many proposed ideas from civil society, industry, and academia, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in July 2016 released draft legislation intended to address these concerns. The proposal moves away from the treaty-based system currently underpinning the mutual legal assistance process. Instead, the new legislation would require “lighter touch” bilateral agreements on this issue between the United States and participating countries. Once countries are approved for these bilateral agreements, the legislation would allow them to submit requests for data, made pursuant to the requesting countries’ laws and stipulations in the legislation, directly to U.S. electronic service providers, instead of first going through U.S. courts. The U.K. would likely be the first country approved to make requests under this new legislation, but the legislation would also pave the way for agreements with other qualifying countries. This legislation advances a legal solution for crossborder data access that proponents hope is sufficiently appealing to foreign governments to forestall more damaging alternative responses to data access concerns, including country-wide service bans, mandated data localization, or forcing companies to make decisions in the face of a conflict of laws.

Legal Access to the Global Cloud

Increased use of the cloud and its international scope raise significant challenges to traditional legal authorities that permit access to data stored outside the United States. The resulting stakes are high. This area of law affects a wide range of important matters concerning law enforcement, national security, and civil litigation. Up until now, however, policymakers in this area have failed to fully appreciate the technological distinctions between different types of data clouds. This Article develops and distinguishes between three models of cloud computing to provide greater clarity for courts when evaluating international data access requests. These models are the Data Shard, Data Localization, and Data Trust clouds. This new typology reveals how the same legal authority will lead to notably different results in data access cases depending on the technical architecture of the cloud network. To illustrate, this Article assesses the likely results for each type of cloud under the full range of American legal authorities that permit parties to seek digital information held abroad — namely, the Fourth Amendment, the Stored Communications Act, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, administrative or grand jury subpoenas, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This Article’s analysis of cloud models also points to the profound instability of current American data access rules. The writing is on the wall. Companies and individuals outside of the United States now have multiple ways, including changing their cloud management models, to shelter data beyond the exclusive reach of U.S. law, which will increase the importance of non-U.S. access rules. This trend will spell the end of unilateral decisionmaking by U.S. courts concerning the legal process to be applied when the government or civil litigants seek data stored extraterritorially. In response, this Article advances two principles for a world of omnipresent global cloud computing. First, U.S. law should treat extraterritorial data requests equally, regardless of the location of the cloud provider’s headquarters. This legal approach would foster a level playing field for global cloud companies and encourage innovation, rather than further balkanization of the internet. Second, there is a need for international cooperation to create reciprocity. The “Pax Americana” of unilateral U.S. governance in this area is ending, and the wisest course for U.S. policy is to establish new international agreements for global data access. As this Article details, the CLOUD Act of 2018 takes a major step toward incorporation of these principles in an effort to preserve the internet as a global space. But the Act also encourages a know-your-customer regime, where the ultimate cost may be paid in users’ privacy.

Divulging data: Domestic determinants of international information sharing

Information is a core input of governance that is often disrupted by the processes associated with globalization. To mitigate potential governance failures, states turn to information sharing – the exchange of sensitive data between governments. Such exchanges, however, come with considerable risks. Building on work in International Relations and organizational sociology stressing the importance of institutional similarity, we argue that states commit to information sharing based on their beliefs as to the reliability and predictability of potential partners – an assessment that involves a relative evaluation of domestic institutions. We test our argument on institutional similarity with a new dataset of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) – a critical example of information-sharing agreements. The empirical analysis finds substantial support for our argument: states with similar legal institutions are much more likely to sign MLATs. The article contributes to a range of research concerned with the politics of globalization, especially as it relates to enforcement cooperation, the role of domestic institutions, and information flows.

The Legality of Data Residency Requirements: How Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership Help?

Article 14.13 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement – the data localization (DL) clause – represents the first time that a far-reaching preferential trade agreement (PTA) seeks to reduce protectionism arising from data residency (DR) requirements. The DL clause, however, is linked to a loose GATT Article XX-like exception: Article 14.13(3)(b), which allows the parties to maintain DR measures to achieve a legitimate public policy objective as long as the measure in question can satisfy the ‘necessity test’. The ambiguity of the DL exception will be clarified by TPP tribunals when a real dispute occurs. After examining the rationales of the DR measures in the context of the necessity test, we find that the responding party invoking a DL exception will have strong arguments, especially when defending Types II and III of the DR measures. Arguments could be made that there is a genuine relationship between the ends, i.e. privacy protection, and the means, i.e. the DR measures. In addition, the responding party invoking a DL exception in a potential dispute would undoubtedly argue that the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) cannot qualify as a ‘genuine alternative’, because the proposed measure must not only be ‘less trade restrictive’ than the DR measures, but should also ‘preserve for (the responding party’s) right to achieve its desired level of protection’ with respect to law enforcement or a criminal investigation. Based upon our findings, we argue that with regard to Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations on e-commerce, the major challenge of trade negotiators is the disciplinary fragmentation of global economic regulation. The DR issues in question confirm that international economic law (IEL) correlates to other areas of law. Future negotiations require more collaborative and interdisciplinary solutions through productive dialogue with experts in private international law and criminal procedure law. True and substantial changes in the theories and practices of Internet jurisdiction would allow us to argue for a more narrow interpretation of the DL exception – rendering it more difficult to satisfy the necessity test.

Understanding the French Criminal Justice System as a Tool for Reforming International Legal Cooperation and Cross-Border Data Requests

In an increasingly interconnected world, where communications can happen anywhere and at any time, law enforcement agencies may need access to evidence stored overseas. To help national law enforcement agencies work together more effectively, a large number of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”) have been signed from 1970 onwards. MLATs have become an area of international dispute, with states becoming increasingly frustrated with the length and complication of the process for requesting electronic evidence. Indeed, access to evidence is a time-sensitive issue for not only the solving and prevention of crimes but also as part of the individual’s right to a fair trial. As part of a larger project on reforming international legal cooperation, a large number of works and projects have emerged, including the Georgia Tech Cross-Border Data Requests Project of which this paper is a part. This paper begins with a description of the current French criminal process, as an example of a mature EU legal system. Then, it explains the steps required for French investigating authorities to access evidence located in the U.S. under the current MLAT rules. Finally, it illustrates that each legal system maintains different checks and balances that have to be carefully considered in reforming any multilateral legal cooperation.

A Mutual Legal Assistance Case Study: The United States and France

This article provides a case study involving France and the United States for a topic of growing importance – how to reform the outdated system of “Mutual Legal Assistance” (MLA). Mutual Legal Assistance occurs when one country (such as France) requests evidence held in another country (such as the US) for criminal prosecution, frequently pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The article is part of the broader Georgia Tech Cross-Border Requests for Data Project, addressing MLA reform. The topic has reached a new level of prominence driven by two technological developments: (1) globalized communications, with data often stored abroad by a cloud service provider; and (2) increased use of encrypted communications, so many local wiretaps are ineffective. The article, building off our prior research on how French criminal procedure operates, examines French and US law in detail to understand the substantive standards that apply to government access to data for criminal prosecutions. Part III explains the US regime, founded on Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizures. The United States also has created a multi-tiered set of standards, with different rules, for instance, for: basic subscriber information; metadata such as to/from information; content of stored records; and interception of electronic communications. Part IV explains the French regime. As a general theme, the French system has a tradition of relying on the acts that can be performed at each stage of the investigation, as well as the investigative authority of a particular actor, such as a magistrate. In contrast, the US system relies more heavily on distinct rules for different categories of electronic evidence. Part V explains the current France/US MLA regime. Part VI turns to possible MLA reform, with the proposed reform mechanism of an amendment to the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act. This amendment would provide that the relatively strict US laws would no longer apply to some French requests for the content of communications held by US companies. We conclude that the France/US relationship is a good case study for MLA reform, given the large differences in criminal procedure and substantive standards for access to evidence. Building on choice of law principles, the article identifies what factors support current MLA procedures and which ones instead suggest the need for reform.

Defining the Limits of Governmental Access to Personal Data Stored in the Cloud: An Analysis and Critique of Microsoft Ireland

Defining the Limits of Governmental Access to Personal Data Stored in the Cloud: An Analysis and Critique of <i>Microsoft Ireland</i>

Defining the Limits of Governmental Access to Personal Data Stored in the Cloud: An Analysis and Critique of Microsoft Ireland

Defining the Limits of Governmental Access to Personal Data Stored in the Cloud: An Analysis and Critique of <i>Microsoft Ireland</i>

The Law of Cyber Peace

Increasing and worthwhile attention has been paid to applying existing international law to the cause of enhancing global cybersecurity. The bulk of this research, though, has been focused on leveraging international humanitarian law to regulate the conduct of cyber warfare. Yet much of this work is largely theoretical given how exceedingly rare it is for a cyber attack to cross the armed attack threshold. The bulk of the cyber risk facing the public and private sectors lies in the arena of cybercrime and espionage. More scholars have been applying international law ‘below the threshold’ to these issues, but much more work remains to be done. For example, perhaps surprisingly, relatively little attention has been paid to leveraging private international law to the cause of mitigating cyber risk. This Article seeks to address this omission by offering a roadmap that synthesizes and extends work in this field by drawing from cybersecurity due diligence, bilateral investment treaties, and customary international law along with underexplored realms of public international law including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, lesser studied global commons regimes, and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. The time is ripe for a fresh look at existing international legal tools that would help us better manage the multifaceted cyber threat. Only then can an accounting be made of gaps to be filled in by norms, custom, and perhaps one day, new accords.

Cloudy with a Conflict of Laws

As more and more of our lives are lived online, so too are those who live lives of crime. Like everyone else, criminals of all stripes are increasingly using online services of all kinds to plan and commit their wrongful acts. Evidence of crime that not so long ago was on-the-ground and physical is now increasingly in-the-cloud and digital. All this has thrown the law parcelling the authority to search and seize among different jurisdictions into confusion, as clouds of data — like those in the sky — are everywhere and nowhere at once. Unless some clarity is brought to this situation and soon, the future of cloud computing as a unified global phenomenon may be hazy indeed.This paper describes how the fractal complexity of cloud computing’s physical geography has fractured the system of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) that arose during the jet age to help shuttle evidence of crime across borders. It explains why the territorially-based MLAT system fundamentally doesn’t work with the physical, technological, and corporate structures that are used to deliver cloud-based services, and how the resulting problems threaten their continued global nature. It highlights the role played by US laws, companies, and government institutions in exacerbating these difficulties that, ironically, have now been visited on the US government itself in the Microsoft Ireland case. It then finally sketches some elements of a potential solution based on principled US leadership that recognizes the legitimate interests of other governments.This paper is hardly the first to examine what’s wrong with the MLAT system or what should be done to fix it. Since the Microsoft Ireland case first started to make headlines nearly two years ago, there has been a flurry of writing on this issue from a range of perspectives. What I hope this paper will contribute is a fuller description of why the MLAT system and cloud computing as we know them are fundamentally irreconcilable, and what are the minimum requirements of an alternative regime that can prevent the splintering of these services along national geographic lines.This paper has grown out of my participation first in a symposium on this issue hosted here at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society in June 2015, which was generously supported by the MacArthur Foundation and Microsoft Corporation, and then by my ongoing involvement in an ad-hoc Cross-Border Data Requests (CBDR) working group of US-based stakeholders that is devising solutions to the problems my paper discusses. My views on this topic are entirely my own and do not represent those of the Berkman Center, the participants in and sponsors of the June 2015 event, or my CBDR co-collaborators — all of whom I thank for informing and inspiring this work.

Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of Globalized Communications: The Analogy to the Visa Waiver Program

With globalized communications, criminal enforcement increasingly encounters communications stored in other countries. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) have been the principal mechanism for responding to these cross-border data requests. This article contends that MLATs today are emerging as a key component of multiple legal and policy debates. Drastically improving the mutual legal assistance (MLA) process has become important, not only for accurate adjudication in individual cases, but also for supporting a globally open and inter-operable Internet against calls for data localization and institution of other stricter national controls on the Internet.After the Introduction, Part II introduces the relevant history. Part III explores the growing importance of cross-border evidence requests over time, as local law enforcement seeks evidence abroad due to globalized communications, cloud computing, and the spread of encrypted communications that block local wiretaps. Notably, improving the MLA process provides an important alternative to law enforcement authorities’ call for limits on effective encryption. Where an MLA request efficiently provides access to the plain text of communications at the server level, then the law enforcement case for key escrow and other encryption limits becomes weaker. Part IV analyzes short- and medium-term policy changes that could make the current MLA process faster, better, and cheaper. Part V proposes an alternative way to improve MLA requests, what we call a Mutual Legal Assistance Statute (MLAS). Fortunately, there is a statutory precedent for addressing the higher volume of cross-border activity that arises with globalization – the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Due to the analogous globalization of cross-border evidence, the idea is that eligible countries, with high-quality procedures for seeking evidence, would face a streamlined process for gaining evidence in the U.S. One notable advantage of a statutory approach is its flexibility compared to renegotiation and re-ratification of a treaty with each country, as shown by the VWP amendments in the wake of the 2015 Paris and San Bernardino attacks. The fact that the VWP has operated and adapted successfully over time, with strict-yet-manageable criteria for country eligibility, suggests that MLA stakeholders might fruitfully explore a streamlined MLAS process that learns from the visa waiver precedent.

Stakeholders in Reform of the Global System for Mutual Legal Assistance

This essay contributes to the Privacy Project’s volume on Systematic Government Access to Private Sector Data, and also is part of our broader research and law reform project on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and law enforcement access to electronic evidence held in other nations. Specifically, this essay briefly explains the reasons why MLATs are vital and becoming increasingly important for law enforcement in this age of globalized evidence. It then adds to the previous literature by presenting the goals of key stakeholders in MLAT reform: the U.S. government, both for law enforcement and other goals; other national governments; technology companies, such as email and social network providers; and civil society, seeking goals including privacy, free speech, and democracy.Part A of the Article explains why two phenomenon are driving the increasing importance of MLATs: (1) storage of consumer records across borders due to Internet uses such as email and social networks; and (2) increasing use of encryption, blocking wiretaps in the user’s country.Part B examines the position of non-U.S. governments, and explains how advances in technology and the use of U.S.-based internet services has increasingly required these governments to petition the U.S. for access to electronic evidence. Part C explains the U.S. government’s position as a combination of law enforcement goals and other government sector goals. These goals include the need for positive working relationships with foreign governments, enabling legitimate law enforcement investigations, and protecting against attempts to use the MLAT system to violate human rights. Part D explains the goals of technology companies, including the wish to comply with lawful data requests, protect the human rights of their users, and find solutions that would persuade foreign governments to refrain from enacting burdensome localization or other regulatory measures. Lastly, Part E explains the goals of various U.S. and international civil society groups.They goals include a desire to raise U.S. and international standards for law enforcement investigations, maintain an open Internet, avoid data localization laws, and prevent a greater role for the International Telecommunications Union or other institutions that would splinter the global Internet. Other parts of our ongoing research will delve into the complex procedures and obstacles that characterize international mutual legal assistance today, as well as our proposed law reforms.Any such reforms, however, will have to be built on an accurate understanding of the incentives and perspectives of the major stakeholders. This essay focuses on that task.

Transborder access and territorial sovereignty

The increasing sophistication of malicious cyber activities and the associated challenges with addressing these threats continue to underline the urgency of effective investigative measures for law enforcement authorities. This is especially relevant in investigations where the necessary data to be obtained are stored in a foreign jurisdiction, and access to that data may require additional legal authority. Given that traditional mutual legal assistance treaties are not entirely suitable for the volatile nature of electronic evidence, options for remotely accessing transborder data have been proposed both by nations and international organisations. Despite having been discussed by scholars and policy-makers for almost two decades, the legitimacy of such transborder access has not been readily accepted. In this context, interpretations that pertain both to the scope of jurisdiction to enforce and the principle of territorial sovereignty are particularly fragmented. This article compares the different approaches proposed in academic literature with developments in State practice and international organisations. The article concludes that transborder access can be generally seen as an extraterritorial application of jurisdiction to enforce and therefore, in order to avoid breaching the other State's sovereignty, such investigative activities should have explicit legal grounds.

20,000 In League Under the Sea: Anonymous Communication, Trust, MLATs, and Undersea Cables

Abstract Motivated by the effectiveness of correlation attacks against Tor, the censorship arms race, and observations of malicious relays in Tor, we propose that Tor users capture their trust in network elements using probability distributions over the sets of elements observed by network adversaries. We present a modular system that allows users to efficiently and conveniently create such distributions and use them to improve their security. To illustrate this system, we present two novel types of adversaries. First, we study a powerful, pervasive adversary that can compromise an unknown number of Autonomous System organizations, Internet Exchange Point organizations, and Tor relay families. Second, we initiate the study of how an adversary might use Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) to enact surveillance. As part of this, we identify submarine cables as a potential subject of trust and incorporate data about these into our MLAT analysis by using them as a proxy for adversary power. Finally, we present preliminary experimental results that show the potential for our trust framework to be used by Tor clients and services to improve security.

MLATs and TorBrowser: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in Online Anonymity Technology and Domestic Surveillance

Since 2004, privacy-protecting, anonymous web browsers, like Tor Browser, have allowed users to hide their identities online. Law enforcement agencies (LEA) responded in contradictory ways to these technologies and tools. On the one hand, LEA have become extensive users to pursue criminals anonymously. On the other, LEAs seek to demonize the technology and break the underlying encryption, which was invented by the Navy in 1998. For example, slides Edward Snowden leaked revealed the NSA undertook a project, “Egotistical Giraffe,” to break Tor encryption and privacy protections. Tor usage significantly increased after Edward Snowden recommended its use as one of his “top tips” for whistleblowers and ordinary people to protect their privacy and anonymity online. Policymakers are becoming aware of Tor’s role in protecting online identity and anonymity, and seek to understand the role of this technology in legal cases. The documents released by Snowden reveal far greater levels of US and other government surveillance than previously known, including surveillance outside the US and across multiple country borders. This startlingly far-reaching surveillance includes online data and telecommunications, much of it culled from third party communication service providers (CSPs). It reveals that government attempts to apply pressure on CSPs now extends across US and other borders, as well. Some contend that much of this surveillance, often referred to by LEAs as “Lawful Intercept (LI), is actually “Un-”Lawful.Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, or MLATs, are little-noticed legal instruments that enable legal pressure on CSPs worldwide, and so offer a significant vector to attempt to “break” Tor or its underlying encryption. Legal pressure on CSPs like Facebook and Google by foreign governments to locate surveillance-enabled servers in their countries, has led CSPs to seek to incorporate into MLATs the automation of remote global surveillance. Their industry groups, like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), seek to incorporate technical standards for automated surveillance LI into MLATs, through remote “dynamic triggering.” A multi-stakeholder group, the Global Network Initiative, announced on January 28, 2015 its public policy agenda, “Data Beyond Borders: Mutual Legal Assistance in the Internet Era,” which sets forth a public policy agenda to further shape MLAT policy. Little-noticed MLATs have eroded fundamental civil liberties both abroad and in the US. Ignored largely due to a perception that MLATs primarily affect “foreign” individuals, the MLAT “devil’s bargain” is rebounding increasingly against US citizens. In this paper, we review the quiet but dramatic expansion, both in number and in scope, of MLATs in recent years. We review recent decisions, including the September 30, 2014 and 2013 Second Circuit rulings in US v. Getto, and the September 2013 First Circuit rulings in Boston College Trustees. In these cases, the executive branch is playing out a quiet struggle to maintain MLAT supremacy over the small, but increasing pushback of the judicial branch. These cases appear to have split approaches in the different circuits, and have all the earmarks of being headed to a higher court in the near future. We review how the benefits MLATs conferred in the 1970s to combat money laundering and narcotics have impacted fundamental civil liberties, to lay the groundwork for understanding their impact on surveillance and global communications networks, and internet privacy and anonymity. Representatives of Global Intelligence Agencies (“GIAs”) have asserted since Snowden’s revelations that their activities are lawful. So far, the legal basis is unclear. We demonstrate the ways little-observed but versatile MLATs contribute to a legal basis for global surveillance. We review the international silver platter doctrine and compare it with MLAT provisions, finding a close fit, which offers further clues as to a “legal” basis for mass global surveillance. In this Article, we offer a number of new contributions, including: demonstrating a new category of attack against Tor, an attack through law; demonstrating a new (MLAT) attack against Tor in this new category, completing the first global MLAT map, using the first comprehensive MLAT database. We believe we are the first to link MLATs to increased surveillance by GIAs, the first to quantify measures of the MLAT “hostility factor,” and the first to offer and analysis of MLATs’ effect on technology, i.e. anonymous network communications.

Globally Protecting Client Confidentiality Using the Cloud

Ethics opinions of eleven states in the United States including most recently Massachusetts stated an attorney would not violate Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 by using a cloud storage provider but the lawyer would have to undertake “reasonable efforts” to protect the client’s information. This article not only discusses the states’ suggestions as to what constitutes “reasonable efforts” but will focus on (1) Whether international cloud computing is viewed as ethical for protection of client confidential information; (2) what kind of compliance is necessary internationally to substantiate as “reasonable efforts;” (3) how the remotely stored data is implicated for electronic discovery and predictive coding; (4) whether the current international mutual legal assistance treaties alter the relationship between the ethical protection of client confidential information and the transfer of this information between countries computing systems and privacy laws. Aside from exploring the issues stated above the article seeks to provide insight into how the international community and American owned companies operating internationally could transfer secured information stored on third party data-farms without violating the ethical implications of Model Rule 1.6 of Professional Conduct. This review is timely because of the multiple jurisdictions making decisions about whether it is ethical for attorneys to remotely store client data and the precedents this will set for international interactions. Compliance with these standards and treaties places a hefty burden on an attorney. Discovering what kind and to what extent an attorney practicing in multiple jurisdictions must maintain currentness with the changes in the electronic rules for privacy. Reasonable efforts is a difficult standard to define when it is incorporating multiple countries input on the definition. This article will seek to clarify the requirements and best practices for the necessary “reasonable efforts” in order for a lawyer to stay in compliance.

The Current Situation and the Main Contents of the domestic Reception of International Criminal Law

Due to the impact of internationalization and globalization of foreign crimes is increasing. As a result, the field of criminal law that the state is expanding the scope of cooperation. The Republic of Korea's economic growth since 1990 while human and material exchanges with foreign countries grew, the influence due to the Republic of Korea from committing a crime criminals fleeing abroad is also increasing. The phenomenon of the internationalization of crime while faster terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking and international organized crime has also increased. And foreign citizens from increased crime carried a sentence in a foreign country, as well as citizens serving in foreign countries was also increased, as a result, the state of criminal law the principle of substantial part of the correction was inevitable. For international crimes, International Criminal Law traditionally does not conflict with the sovereignty of foreign countries within the area of criminal law applicable to a range of prescribed laws and regulations of the Penal Code is the coverage of place. Today, however, the effect on the results of a foreign court, enforcement, transfer of foreign criminal procedure and criminal judicial cooperation, criminal jurisdiction, including information on international transport prisoners are being expanded. The international criminal court, depending on the expansion of Korea's tendency to create Law of on Extradition and Criminal justice assistance law are implemented. The current July 2009, for criminal justice cooperation treaties with 26 countries was signed, a crime that can be transported into the country and 29 countries and signed treaties. And Romes Statute of the International Criminal Court, Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced CETS No.: 112 for a concrete realization, the International Criminal Court the jurisdiction to punish for criminal law and international transport prisoners and law enforcement is to establish. South Korea and China to increase exchanges between the real human situation, in March 2009 is currently detained in prison, the Republic of Korea, China National convicts 124 people, in May 2009 drafts are currently in prison in the Republic of Korea Chinese prisoners of 622 people, Therefore, the Republic of Korea is admitted to the prison of the Chinese, the most important foreign prisoners are accounted for. South Korea and China in the lively exchanges between the crimes committed by South Korea who was also raised to increase the possibility that prisoners will continue to grow as a result is expected. Prisoners housed in prisons in China are Korean language communication problems, such as treatment issues and are experiencing many difficulties in ensuring the basic rights. So, families of prisoners and prisoners in this area needs improvement, and for transporting prisoners and the results have a high interest in the treaty is being evaluated. Mongolia, South Korea by the practical need for these (Mongolia, 2007.5.28. Signed, August 23, 2008 effective) as second only to China, May 27, 2008 Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons was signed. And July 6, 2009 Different countries has been confined to prison for convicts sentenced to the punishment of his country's remaining period of the certificate in their home country to send the treaty were exchanged. The treaty for the rest of the prisoners by more than 1 year if they want the rest of the nation's prison and was able to. The of August 5, 2009 Republic of Korea and China becoming effective extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance treaty criminal and civil judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance treaties with all the major treaties have been effective. In this study, increasing phenomenon of international criminal justice cooperation in accordance with acceptable international criminal law on the domestic level and the main topics discussed extradition system, on the International Criminal Court Rome Statute, the international system and the prisoners transferred the contents of the relevant international conventions and examine the status of agreement. And Law of on Extradition, International Criminal Court jurisdiction over the crime rate on the penalty law, Convicts transported International Law look at some of the key information, and should. Language: ko

MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES (MLATs) SEBAGAI INSTRUMEN PEMBERANTASAN KEJAHATAN INTERNASIONAL

International contractual law is an order which must respect and adhered by pertinent of the parties in agreement. The formal and informal relation between the citizen or corporate have very intensively. International badness which pass boundaries jurisdiction of the state have increase in the form which is sophisticated and the frequency which progressively often. Because of international badness which have more progressively is needed cooperation between the state which it is more coordinated as straightening of law. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATS) emerge because eradication of insufficient badness upheld by agreement of extradition. Form of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATS) have agreed on, for example United Nations Convention Against Corruption Year 2003, United nations Conventions Against Transnational Organized Crime Year 2000. While in the level of ASEAN, Treaty Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters year 2004. Kata kunci: kejahatan internasional, perjanjian internasional

Ekstradisi Dalam Meningkatkan Kerja Sama Penegakkan Hukum

Law enforcement cooperation in international relations is crucial to determine on whether or not national law enforcement to transnational crimes is succeed. The oldest cooperation is extradition followed by other cooperation such as mutual legal assistance treaty, transfer of sentenced person, transfer of criminal proceedings, joint investigation and handing over. This article tries to examine the reasons why those kinds of agreement are needed in law enforcement cooperation. It specifically discuss on Indonesia’s experience in concluding those agreement with its neighboring states within ASEAN.

Prosecutorial challenges in freezing and forfeiting proceeds of transnational crime and the use of international asset sharing to promote international cooperation

Argues that confiscation of criminals’ assets is an effective and justifiable way of depriving them of the proceeds of crimes such as drug trafficking. Describes the challenges facing confiscation and the reasons why there has so far been only modest success in this. Refers to legal cases in the Cayman Islands as an illustration. Distinguishes between the conviction‐based approach and the civil or in rem forfeiture method, and illustrates use of the latter in the USA, the Cayman Islands and the UK. Discusses the justification for the reversal of proof in forfeiture cases. Considers the civil and in rem forfeiture procedures as countermeasures to the special case of terrorism. Cites the Geneva Convention as an example of global law enforcement in order to overcome problems of mismatch between different countries’ regimes, and points out the effectiveness of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) as methods of legal assistance and cooperation. Contends that since all states have an obligation to combat organised crime, each state also has a moral right to share in the forfeited proceeds of these crimes.