Mutual Defense Treaty Research Articles

Korea's Future: Moscow's Perspective

ALTHOUGH Moscow AND Pyongyang have a mutual defense treaty, a common ideology, and extensive economic and military relations, the relationship between the two communist powers has been seriously troubled ever since the late 1950s. At that time, Kim Il-song, after a series of purges, was able to assert his leadership against a rival group of leaders whom Kim subsequently accused of trying to subvert him with Russian assistance.' By 1958, Kim, who had been lifted from obscurity and installed in power by Russian troops during the Soviet occupation of the northern part of Korea at the end of World War II, had created an independent power base, overcome the last remnants of internal opposition, and asserted his independence from both Moscow and Peking. Since the early 1960s, Soviet relations with North Korea have moved through three stages, all of them connected primarily with the Sino-Soviet conflict and Moscow's determination to line Pyongyang up on its side of that historic dispute. Between 1962 and 1964, Soviet Premier Khrushchev, who was not reputed for his subtlety, was determined to apply maximum pressure on the Chinese. He was therefore unwilling to tolerate any waverers on the issue from within the socalled socialist camp. Because Kim Il-song was unwilling to line up with Khrushchev on the China issue, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang deteriorated to a point where Khrushchev cut economic assistance to Pyongyang and North Korea publicly accused the Russians of big power chauvinism, xenophobia, and exploitations Immediately after Khrushchev's removal, the new Soviet leaders sought to make the energetic Soviet premier a scapegoat for their difficulties with both Peking and Pyongyang and to improve relations

The Japan-China-USSR Triangle

A T THE FULCRUM of northeast Asian international politics rests Japan. Originally the target of, and justification for, the ig5o Sino-Soviet Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan currently finds herself the object of political and economic courtship by both estranged communist powers. Tokyo's ability to maneuver between and to take advantage of their conflict has been enhanced by the loosening of its military ties to the United States as well as the latter's own d&tente policy inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, which presaged American support for a new balance of power policy for Asia in which China would play a legitimate role. The purpose of this article* is to describe the economic and security parameters of the new Japan, China, Soviet relationship and to project their implications for East Asian stability. It is important to stress at the outset that both Russian and Chinese interest in Japan is a combination of Tokyo's positive attractiveness to each as an economic partner and unattractiveness as a potential political ally to the other side. Hence, both Moscow and Peking are employing economic incentives to forestall the establishment of a Japanese political relationship with the other. China's current relations with Japan are best understood as an adaptation to changes in both Peking's global and regional environments, beginning with the Amur-Ussuri border clashes against the USSR early in i969. Through the course of that year, Peking renewed its interest in foreign policy for fear of a Soviet pre-emptive strike and concern that Japan was about to play a larger military role in both Korea and Taiwan as implied in the mid-year Sato-Nixon communique. Peking was apparently unaware of the explanation that Sato agreed to include Korea and Taiwan in the i969 communique (not repeated in I972) in hopes of expediting the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan and improving his own political stature within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). For the Nixon Administration, Japan's commitment to South Korea and Taiwan represented one way of sharing U.S. defense burdens in Asia, while for Sato, the statement was probably a political tactic for domestic purposes rather than a commitment to change Japan's strategic policy.' In any event, Peking seized upon the U.S.-Japan communique to begin to mend the fences damaged by the xeno-

The Role of Japan and the Future of American Relations with the Far East

American interest and involvement in Asia is not a recent aberration, but a continuing phenomenon going back to the days of the China Clippers and extending through the period when the United States followed a policy of isolation in other areas. Today Japan is the leading nation in Asia, vastly superior economically and technically to other states in the area. Linked to the United States by a Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan has substantial armed forces capable of assuring the country's immediate conventional defense. In his State of the Union message, President Nixon recognized this primacy, stating "Japanese-American friendship and coöperation are the linchpin for peace in the Pacific." Japan is contributing to the development of the free states of Asia through increasing economic and technical coöperation. We welcome this policy and will not ask Japan to assume security responsibilities inconsistent with the felt concerns of the Japanese people. Looking at the region as a whole, the ultimate ideal is a community of the free states of Asia coöperating for their common interests in the political, economic, and security fields, with which we are associated only to the degree that these states desire our association. Japan must play a major role in any such community.

United States-Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty

United States-Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty

Statement by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on the Signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States

Statement by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on the Signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States