Muslim Umma Research Articles

Global and local media dynamics in identity construction among British Muslims after September 11

The terrorist attacks of September 11 have become a defining moment not only in the history of the US where they took place, but also in the history of Muslims around the world, particularly those living in Western countries. Muslim diasporas in the West have found themselves at the heart of global events and networks: a global war on terrorism, global flows of images and ideas, and a global Muslim community or Umma. Central to these various processes is undoubtedly the role played by new media and communication technologies, mainly transnational TV channels. Thus, based on an ethnographic study conducted in the city of Leeds, this paper explores the dialectic between local and transnational media, particularly British media and Arab satellite television channels, and the extent to which they have shaped identity building among British Muslims after September11. It argues that the use, appropriation and consumption of these media do certainly have a significant impact on how British Muslims define themselves. However, it demonstrates also that this role is far from being deterministic and it is only one among many other factors that condition identity building among British Muslims.

For Christian Eyes Only? The Intended Audience of the Martyrdom of Antony Rawḥ

The Arabic account of the early medieval Passion of Antony Rawḥ is a remarkable source for the character of Abbasid-era Muslim–Christian relations in that, although it recalls an instance of intercommunal violence, the account itself suggests a profound familiarity among Christian audiences with the defining communal narratives of the early Muslim umma. What is more, certain specific uses of language and apparent allusions to Muslim texts may also reveal this text as one intended for mixed audiences of Christians and Muslims. This only becomes apparent, however, when we read the Passion of Antony Rawḥ in tandem with certain contemporary Muslim texts recalling the personalities and events of the first/seventh-century Arab conquests, texts that recent research suggests were themselves crafted in accordance with much older late ancient hagiographic traditions.

The World Council of Churches in Dialogue with Muslims: Retrospect and Prospect

The World Council of Churches (WCC) has been involved in a variety of inter-religious dialogue projects and initiatives over many years. Dialogue with other religions—or with the peoples of those religions—is of significance and import, not least because of the value placed upon peaceful co-existence and harmonious inter-communal relations. However, of all bi-lateral endeavours, it is arguably the arena of Christian–Muslim relations which has been, and remains, the most challenging, problematic, and pressing for the Christian community at large—and, complementarily, for the Muslim umma also. This article attempts an overview of development in Christian–Muslim dialogue undertaken under the auspices of the WCC since around the mid-twentieth century. Early explorations, when the prospect of dialogue with Muslims was being canvassed, will be discussed. A significant 1972 consultation will be noted, followed by a review of salient features pertaining to the extension of the field of engagement in Christian–Muslim dialogue, and a note on some difficulties and challenges encountered. A comment on a sequence of regional events undertaken during the 80s will precede a discussion of developments in the clarification of issues that took place during the 90s. Finally, issues and challenges that are evident in the opening years of the third millennium of the Common Era will be briefly touched on.

Toward a Post-Western IR: TheUmma,Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory1

This article explores the possibilities of the emergence of a genuinely “post-Western,” and less Eurocentric, “critical” international relations (IR) theory through a brief examination of “critical” discourses within two “non-western” cosmopolitan traditions: Islam and Sikhism. It is argued that, although critical IR has created space for the articulation of post-western discourses within the discipline, it continues to speak for and to the West. A genuinely “post-western” critical IR would seek to go beyond mere mimicry of the “derivative discourses” of the modern West by identifying critical discourses on the political from within non-western traditions. First, “Islamist” discourses on the Umma which are simultaneously critical of the varying forms of “Kemalism” and “neo-fundamentalism” prevalent in the Islamic world will be briefly examined. Second, critical perspectives on Sikhism which critique the derivative “politics of homeland” and re-assert the sovereignty of the deterritorialized, transnational community of believers, the Khalsa Panth, will be considered. It is argued that, like the Muslim Umma, the Khalsa Panth, offers us an alternative conception of universality—and a potentially more “solidarist” conception of international society—than that offered by western Westphalian IR. The inclusion of Islamic and Sikh discourses in the “House of IR” [Aganthangelou and Ling, International Studies Review 6 (2004b), 21] will therefore contribute to the creation of a more diverse, less hegemonic, discipline.

Variations on a Theme: Radical Violent Islamism and European North African Radicalization

Takfiri jihadists, typified by an al-Qaeda perspective, claim that the “true” Muslim Umma (the Islamic community) is held together by a centrifugal universality based on religious identity, and that this religion compels people to engage in a form of radical violent Islamism to confront the evils of the Dar el-Harb (non-Islamic World). A closer examination of those mechanisms of individual radicalization (whether cultural, political, social-psychological, etc.), which lead people to carry out violence in the name of Islam, demonstrates that unique combinations of chance encounters; ideological commitments; individual and collective interactions with state and international organizations/institutions; and individual experience account for propensities to support and participate in radical violent Islamism. Individual processes of mobilization and radicalization and “macro-cultural” contexts serve to ground identities and create recruitment potential for radical violent Islamists to encourage others to join and participate in their cause. The support of the British Academy and the Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. This work has been supported by a British Academy Small Grant “Memories and Massacres in the Formation of Algerian National Identity,” reference SG-41624 and an ESRC research grant under the auspices of the program, New Security Challenge, and the article reflects research being conducted on ESRC grant RES-181-25-0017. I would especially like to express thanks for the hard work of Rebecca Fowler in helping with both this article and the symposium in its entirety.

Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?

Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?

Yūsuf al-'Uyairī and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis

AbstractYūsuf al-'Uyairī was the first leader of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. Besides being part of the al-Qaeda network he was also an important ideologue, whose ideas give a much more coherent view of Jihadism as it has developed during the past few years and as it has been adopted by a new generation. Al-'Uyairī, who was killed in June 2003, aged 29, was a prolific writer who wrote on a variety of topics, ranging from the clash of civilization with the West to economic and political relations between the United States and the Middle East, to jihadist movements in Chechnya, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and finally, just before he died, Iraq. Interestingly, his goal is not only geared to mobilizing the Muslim umma as a whole for the jihād against the West and its local allies, the rulers (tawāghīt), the 'establishment 'ulamā'', and the Westernized intellectuals, who undermine the umma with the discourse of cooperation, mutual understanding, rationalism and tolerance. In his modernist project, he also tries to show that the mujāhid has a superior knowledge and insight into reality and therefore deserves to be on the forefront of the permanent revolution to change reality in accordance with the will of God.

Re-inventing Islam with Unique Modern Tones: Muslim Hip Hop Artists as Verbal Mujahidin

This article explores the complex relationship between Hip Hop Culture and the Islamic Faith, which have both been constructed by dominating discourses as “threats to American civilization.” Like the Muslim umma, the Global Hip Hop Nation functions as a worldwide network of “believers” who have created “nationhood” through cultural, ideological, and imaginary means. I view Hip Hop artists as “verbal mujahidin,” with their speech activities serving as alternative media sources narrating the experiences of a “nation.”

Diaspora unbound: Muslim identity and the erratic regulation of Islam in France

AbstractDespite the apparent innocuity of the diaspora concept, it has not escaped critical reflection and sustained debate. Some have bemoaned its obscurantist fetishism, and in particular its reliance on ‘ethnic essentialism’, while others defend it as a useful metaphor for explaining at least some types of migrant communities. In terms of the latter, Sayyid (2000) argued for a Muslim umma – a shared identity that may be considered ‘diasporic’. While he certainly had reservations about its use, he argued that reference to a diasporic umma need not imply unanimity among those supposedly divided by seemingly more ontologically grounded social categories such as class and gender. In this paper, then, I tread a path between the critique of diaspora as an essentialist concept, and how we might employ Sayyid's conceptualisation in the context of Maghrebin (North African) migrants in France during the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, I seek to demonstrate how the state in both Algeria and France shaped the relationship between Islam and identity among Muslims of Maghrebin origin in France. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

What Is Liberal Islam? The Sources of Enlightened Muslim Thought

Abstract: Does the term liberal Islam make sense? What precisely does it mean? Does the Muslim world need a reformation? What would Islamic reform look like? Where does Islamic liberalism fit among the various currents of religious thought—including fundamentalist strains such as Wahhabism or Salafism—that are contending in the Islamic world today? Who are liberalism's leading figures? Does the work of Ibn Rushd (Averroës)—a medieval Islamic philosopher from Spain who deeply influenced Christian Europe—represent a permanent “liberal option” that may have been rejected during a certain period of the history of the Muslim umma (community) but which nonetheless remains alive and available today?

The Encounter of Zoroastrianism with Islam

The first direct encounter of the two cultures took place soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632. The first Caliph, AbuBakr, who became the head of the Muslim umma, initiated the expansion of Islam beyond the borders of the Arab world to include the lands of Sassanid Iran. In 635 Muslim forces won a decisive victory at al-Qadisiya over the armies of the last Shahinshah, Yazdergerd III. In 637 they seized the capital of the Sassanid state, Ktesiphon. It took almost fifteen years to put an end to the independence of Zoroastrian Iran and to incorporate the latter into the Arab Caliphate by 651. Yet, I would suggest that prior to this devastating (for Zoroastrianism) encounter, an indirect meeting had already taken place that had had a quite opposite conse- quence: the borrowing by Islam of a number of Zoroastrian ideas. A claim for the legitimacy of this statement could perhaps be made if we are willing to question the views of those like Richard Zaehner 4 (referring mainly to Arab sources) who affirm that Zoroaster was born in 628 B.C. (since, allegedly at the age of forty—that is, in 588 B.C.—he succeeded in converting king Vishtaspa, most likely a king of Choras-

Islam and the Western Philosophy of Knowledge

It is a simple truism to state that any scholar who treats such a vast topicas "Islam and the Western Philosophy of Knowledge" must be familiar withthe different domains of intellectual and philosophical discourses in bvth theMuslim and the western worlds, their epistemological bases (i.e., foundationalconceputal principles), historical evolution, and cultural expressions. Inaddition, such a scholar cannot do justice to this imponant topic without constructingan appropriate and comprehensive comparative method that mightshed some light on why there have been some important divergences betweenthe Muslim worldview and the western one, especially in the modern period(e.g., the past few centuries). Third, in dealing with the above subject, ascholar must know at least one Islamic language (e.g., Arabic) and oneEuropean language in addition to English (e.g., French or German). Measuredagainst this criteria, the author of this (very) tiny work fails miserably to justifyhis goal(s) for writing this book, to offer a convincing method of comparativeanalysis, and to prove that he possesses the appropiate tools (i.e., sourcesand languages) with which to conduct his research.To begin with, the author states in the Preface that he intends to offer "ahumble contribution to the contemporary debate on the need for a new epistemology.” The nature of the contemporary debate the author refers to is unclear:Is it an Islamic debate? Western or African? Second, what is the nature of thisnew epistemology of which he speaks? His entire discussion throughout thebook does not mention any new epistemology per se, but rather a historicallyold and established one: that of the Qur’an and other revelations. So, is the authoroffering a Qur’anic rationale for and justification of some uiucial philosophicalissues arising in the modem westem world, or is he interested in measuring theimpact of western philosophy on the modem Muslim mind in the context ofcolonialism and the new world order? No such desire is expressed. When theauthor states in his Acknowledgment that “I came to the conclusion that the realmalaise of the Muslim Umma is the intellectual,” he does not tell us why it is soand why it is not economic, political, social, or a combination of the abov ...

Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications

The Muslim World completes its 1,400 years (after Hijrah) of evolution in a manner quite revolutionary in character, with the emergence of the phenomenon of resurgence. This phenomenon can be explained and rationalized through theological, historical, and political perspectives. However, unlike the earlier post-World War II period when Muslim nationalist sentiments were fortified by Islamic reformist movements, the contemporary revitalization came about as a consequence of the cumulative political developments experienced by Muslim countries in more recent times. Variously captioned as Islamic revivalism, resurgence, and fundamentalism, this rejuvenation of the Islamic ethos has been brought about, especially since the 1970s, by events and sociopolitical changes affecting the Muslim-dominated countries in the Gulf area in particular and the worldwide Muslim umma (community) in general. Notable among these were the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of a predominantly Muslim Afghanistan, the (anti-Saudi regime) shooting incident at the Masjidil Haram, the intensification of the Arab-Israel conflict, and the political and economic leverage that the Muslim nations in the Gulf exerted in international politics as a result of their newfound oil power.1 In addition to these international Islamic stirrings, the sources or causes of the phenomenon must necessarily have their local impetus. Despite it being a universal or global phenomenon, individual countries have experienced different levels of Islamic revival. Within ASEAN-the Associa-

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE MUSLIM UMMA

The Muslim WorldVolume 79, Issue 3-4 p. 217-231 THE PRESENT STATE OF THE MUSLIM UMMA Hussein Ahmad Amin, Hussein Ahmad Amin Hydra, AlgeriaSearch for more papers by this author Hussein Ahmad Amin, Hussein Ahmad Amin Hydra, AlgeriaSearch for more papers by this author First published: October 1989 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1989.tb02849.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume79, Issue3-4October 1989Pages 217-231 RelatedInformation

The relevance of religion and the response to it: a study of religious perceptions in early Islam

What did the Muslim citizen of the classical Islamic world mean by Islam? In what sense was it operative in his life? To what extent did an Islamic slogan signify religious commitment? The difficulty in treating these questions consists in the fact of the variety, not the dearth of answers to them. Rather than develop alternative perspectives, however, we would, in what follows, focus our study on one aspect of the life of the Muslim Umma. This is the problem of the dynamics underlying revolt, rebellion, social protest and revolution in early Islam; with reference to this aspect we would ask our basic questions. In a sense, the three questions could be resolved into one: to what extent, in what sense, and why, was Islam a factor in Muslim revolts during the first centuries? Two propositions would help treat this question, and in the course of the study, we would see if a third may also be legitimately articulated. They are as follows: first, it is possible that the disaffected Muslims in classical and medieval Islam may have tended to translate their mundane grievances into religous terms so that, for instance, the perceived threat to a particular dispensation, or the actual destruction of such a dispensation may have been interpreted as a threat to religion itself; and second, Islam may have been interpreted as the best form of propriety and justice so that those whofeltthemselves deprived considered it incumbent to fight for such justice, not necessarily because it would benefit them but because this was what Islam was, it being considered obligatory to strengthen, save, or reestablish Islam.