Munich Agreement Research Articles

Historical analogies, traumatic past and responses to the war in Ukraine

Abstract This article examines the use of historical analogies by political leaders during foreign policy crises. Specifically, we focus on the German, Polish and Czech leaderships' reactions to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and investigate the historical analogies which leaders invoked to justify their responses to Russia's aggression. The existing scholarship recognizes the importance of historical analogies in foreign policy decision-making, but the literature focuses predominantly on several high-profile analogies (i.e. the Munich Agreement or the Vietnam War) and lacks comparative perspective. We employ a dual-method approach that combines qualitative coding with semantic network analysis, and conduct a comparative analysis of the full spectrum of analogies used by Polish, Czech and German policy-makers. We find that politicians did not focus on a single overarching analogy, but employed a wide array of historical references. We also find that even though the countries' policies largely aligned and that their leaders often invoked the same events, the meaning of analogies and the signals they sent differed substantially across cases. Analysing the full spectrum of analogies demonstrates that justifications for supporting Ukraine were shaped more by these states' own historical traumas than by their sympathy for Ukraine, support for international law, or desire to uphold the rules-based international order.

기로에 선 ‘민주주의 섬’의 지도자: 베네쉬(Edvard Beneš)의 인식과 국정운영 평가에 대한 재고찰

Czechoslovakia’s second president, Edvard Beneš, ranges from being described as “Europe’s most brilliant democrat” to being held largely responsible for the country’s downfall. This study analyzes the root causes of his concerns during the national crisis. From the founding of Czechoslovakia to the First Republic, Beneš made a key contribution to the acquisition of sovereignty, territorial demarcation, and national unity based on Western democracy with the support of Western countries. However, in 1938, the West supported Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. Despite the West’s betrayal, Beneš rejected Stalin’s offer to support the Czechoslovak war effort alone, perceiving it to be communist in intent, and maintained a Western-oriented state. However, the Beneš’s trauma over the Munich Agreement, the Nazi atrocities, the abandonment of the United States, and a two-track strategy based on Soviet friendship and pressure eventually drove Beneš towards communism. Despite tolerating communization, Beneš refused to recognize the nature of communism, being an agonizing ‘leader at the crossroads’ until his death.

MUTUAL PERCEPTION OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR II (THE CASE OF SOVIET-FRENCH RELATIONS)

Perception in international relations has long been studied in political science, but historians have not paid suffi cient attention to it so far. Meanwhile, looking at known events through its prism allows us to draw new conclusions about their origins. The prehistory of World War II and its key episode — the failure of attempts to deter Hitler’s aggression in Europe through the joint eff orts of France and the Soviet Union — can serve as a fruitful field for testing this approach. For the military and political elites of France, the USSR was dangerous due to its unpredictability, but an internally fragile. This presumption leveled all the successes of the Soviet leadership in modernizing the country and the armed forces in the eyes of the French. The increased military danger in Europe after 1933 prompted Paris merely to offer Moscow the role of an ordinary participant in the system of collective security, which was based on the experience of World War I and designed as a new model for the development of international relations and minimization of conflicts between countries. The Soviet government viewed France as a leading imperialist power that prioritized anti-Soviet goals, but had a situational interest in limiting German expansion. At the same time, Moscow believed that Soviet-French cooperation could be effective only as an equal strategic alliance aimed at deterring a potential aggressor. This approach was rejected by French diplomacy, which followed the policy of appeasement. It was a source of a deep crisis in bilateral relations at the time of the 1938 Munich agreements. The collapse of appeasement in early 1939 led to a sharp turn by the French government to strategic planning for a possible war and created a window of opportunity for an agreement with the USSR. However, the inertia of old prejudices deprived the tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in the spring and summer of 1939 of their practical content and opened the way for a Soviet-German agreement

A royal visit revisited: Mackenzie King and the British royal visit to the USA, June 1939

In June 1939 King George VI and Queen Elizabeth were on a tour of Canada that included a brief visit to the United States. The timing of this visit proved to be fortuitous from the British point of view as it came soon after the controversial Munich agreement in September 1938, which ceded the Czech Sudetenland to Germany, and the subsequent occupation of the remainder of the Czech state by German troops in March 1939 – both of which had damaged Britain’s image in America. The royal visit to the USA was a great public-relations success, as was the visit to Canada, and its significance for relations between Britain, Canada, and the United States has been discussed by a number of historians from all three countries. However, very little attention has been paid to the key role of the Canadian prime minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, regarding the American phase of the royal visit. Indeed, a recent film about the Royal Visit and the weekend spent by the king and queen at President Franklin Roosevelt’s family home in upstate New York omitted any mention of Mackenzie King, despite the fact that he was their official escort. This article seeks to fill this gap by assessing Mackenzie King’s involvement in the origins and conduct of the royal visit. It also reflects upon what the royal visit reveals about Canada’s relations with Britain and the United States on the eve of the war and, in particular, Mackenzie King’s relationship with President Franklin Roosevelt and his contribution to the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’.

Судето-немецкая партия в Чехословакии: на пути к объединению с нацистской Германией (1933–1938 гг.)

The history study of nationalist parties in the 20th century is the subject of close attention of many researchersgermanists. However, the history of the Sudeten-German party in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s does not often become an object of research. The purpose of the article is to consider the activities of the Sudeten-German party, to highlight the key reasons for its emergence. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the party leaders' views on the way to unification with Nazi Germany. Also, the work proposed, if possible, an objective analysis of the essence of Henlein movement. The urgency of the problem is substantiated, first of all, by the fact that according to a similar scenario events, developed and continue to develop on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, especially in the Baltic countries, where the Russian-speaking population makes up a significant part, like the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia at their time, however, they are also targeted by the discriminatory policy of the authorities. The source base was made up of the documents collected by the Czechoslovak researcher V. Kral and published by him in 1964. As part of these materials, a large group of sources can be distinguished, which make up materials at the meetings of the main leadership in the Sudeten German Home Front - the Sudeten German Party in the period from 1933 to 1937, early 1938 and the speech by the leader of the Sudeten German Party K. Heinlein. Since the early 1990s we can talk about the renaissance of the historiography of the Sudeten-German history, mainly due to the development of archives in Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The First World War did not contribute to the resolution of national contradictions. After the end of the First World War the Sudeten Germans were also included in Czechoslovakia at the behest of the Entente. The Sudeten-German party of K. Henlein took an active position in this struggle. Summing up, the authors conclude that the question of the nature of Henlein movement is controversial. Henlein movement really resembled the Nazi party in Germany, but at the initial stage of its activity in 1933-1936. However, as the Czechoslovak authorities opposed, pressure from the Nazi party in Germany and the strengthening of the right-wing radical branch, the Sudeten German Party practically lost its characteristics and turned into an analogue of the National Socialist German Workers' Party. This fact largely predetermined the radical solution of the Sudeten-German question through the Munich agreements on September 29, 1938, when the border regions of Czechoslovakia were annexed to Germany. Undoubtedly, these agreements were in the interests of the majority of the Sudeten Germans, who, however, once again became victims of the big European politics.

뮌헨협정(1938)과 동유럽, 지정학속 위기와 그 특징

After the Great Depression of 1929, the international order accepted the territorial invasion and expansion of the Powers into weak countries to secure space for their survival as a natural evolutionary development process. And the basis for justifying this was Haushofer’s Lebensraum theory, which combined Darwin’s theory of evolution with sociology. This study aims to analyze Lebensraum among geopolitical theories, which provided the theoretical basis for Germany’s territorial expansion and racial nationalism. The Munich Agreement (September 1938) was the result of Lebensraum theory. In this study, I would like to analyze the impact of the Munich Agreement on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and its characteristics.
 In Chapter II of this study, based on the geopolitical values of Eastern Europe asserted by Mackinder and Spykman, I explain how Haushofer’s Lebensraum theory influenced the geopolitical crisis in Eastern Europe. In addition, I would like to introduce the process of concluding the Munich Agreement, one of the Lebensraum outcomes, and the impact this agreement had on Eastern European countries. In Chapter III, I analyze how the Munich Agreement affected Yugoslavia and what the process was like, focusing on three characteristics: first, the expansion of internal instability, second, the forced choice to bandwagon strategy, and third, the division of the kingdom of Yugoslavia. Lastly, in the conclusion of Chapter IV, I recall the geopolitical value of Eastern Europe in today’s new Cold War, and I would like to explain what lessons and implications this study provides to the Korean Peninsula, which is in a geopolitical position(Rimland) similar to Eastern Europe.

‘No man’s land’: deportations from Slovak territory in 1938: a case study of the Jewish community of Čadca

ABSTRACT The Munich Agreement and the Vienna Arbitration led to the first displacement of Jewish residents. Representatives of the regime saw the loss of territory as an opportunity to resolve the ‘Jewish question.’ On November 4th, 1938 an operation was launched to deport the Jews to their home villages and the ceded territories. It is estimated that 700 Jews remained imprisoned in ‘No Man's Land’ on the border of Slovakia and Hungary. Two camps were established where these Jews were concentrated. This study illustrates the events in the case study of the town of Čadca and the local Jewish population.

‘A Supremely Good Chinovik’: William Strang, Europe, and the Role of the Official, 1919–1949

ABSTRACT Sir William Strang was the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office from 1949 to 1953, he was the most senior Foreign Office official at an important period in British foreign policy. Prior to this appointment, he enjoyed a Foreign Office career that spanned some three decades, where he was involved in notable episodes such as the Munich Agreement, the Moscow Conference (1939), the workings of the European Advisory Commission, and the post-war occupation of Germany. Strang’s career, however, has been subject to little scholarly attention. He is often regarded as a competent, yet singularly dull individual lacking the intellect or the original thinking of his contemporaries, such as Robert Vansittart, Alexander Cadogan, Orme Sargent, or Gladwyn Jebb. This article challenges this interpretation, arguing that while Strang has a clearly identifiable worldview, this was intrinsically tied to his view of the proper function of a Foreign Office official. For Strang, it was not the role of the official to sway a minister’s mind with well-argued memoranda, but to make vast quantities of information and arguments comprehensible to allow a minister to make as informed a decision as possible. This fundamental tenet of Strang’s worldview must be understood when examining his career prior to his appointment as Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office.

Czech Interwar Literature

In this study, the author attempts to portray Czech interwar literature, i.e., the period from the beginning of the independent republic to its demise in September 1938 (the signing of the so-called Munich Agreement). He focuses on some necessary political and cultural-historical issues, such as the end of the “Great War”, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, and the establishment of an independent republic. However, he pays the most attention to the form of literature (prose, poetry, and drama). In conclusion, he notes that literary life significantly diversified and branched out over the two decades. The system of literature deepened in terms of material and genre, but also in terms of ideological and ideological direction. While initially, literature and literary life were quite centralist (just like the original Austro-Hungarian Empire with its bureaucratic apparatus), over time there is a more pronounced differentiation and the emergence of new cultural centers, usually associated with larger cities. He recalls great literary figures (K. Čapek, J. Hašek, etc.) as well as authors from the circle of German-written works.

Memoranda k otázce německých vysokých škol v Česko-Slovensku z listopadu 1938: Edice

This study outlines the position of German universities in the Czech Lands after the Munich Agreement on the secession of Czech border areas of 30 September 1938. A short introduction explains the situation in the autumn of 1938, when various German officials issued a number of proclamations and memorial volumes in which they expressed their views on the subject of German schools either remaining in their current locations or moving to the ceded areas (Liberec/Reichenberg), eventually even to occupied Austria (Linz). The core of this study consists of an edition of four documents from October and November 1938, in the original German version, which are presented to the public for the very first time in extenso.

Über Rudolf Fuchs' letztes unvollendetes Projekt im Londoner Exil: Der Deutsche Almanach aus der Tschechoslowakei

After Rudolf Fuchs fled Prague for London following the 1938 Munich Agreement, he embarked on the task of compiling an almanac featuring German-speaking authors from Czechoslovakia. This endeavor continued until shortly before his accidental death in 1942. The article explores Fuchs' motivation for pursuing this intended publication. It investigates the almanac's purpose, the selection of authors and texts, and the criteria that texts and authors had to meet to be included in the almanac.

Die deutsch-französischen Sportbeziehungen von 1919 bis 1942

The article begins with Germany’s exclusion from the Olympic Games 1920 in Antwerp and 1924 in Paris. Whereas sports relations between Germany and France slowly returned to normal in bourgeois sports, French workers’ sportsmen already in 1922 visited the festival of the workers’ sport federation in Leipzig. After these preliminary remarks the article focuses on the National Socialist era. From 1933 to 1939 France was Germany’s most favoured sport partner. The German Reich used the Olympic Games of 1936 to present itself as a peace-loving country. However, as the occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland on March 7, 1936 shows – between the Winter Olympics in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (February 6–16) and the Summer Olympics in Berlin (August 1–16) – this was only camouflage. The article enlarges on the initially very positive, but in the end exceedingly critical French press coverage of the Olympic Games in Berlin. The harsh criticism of the “jeux défigurés” provoked the well-known reply by Coubertin, who expressed himself positively about the “Berlin Games illuminated by Hitlerist strength and discipline”. The German-French skiing leisure activities 1938, organized by the Hitlerjugend (HJ), were exploited by the propaganda as a symbol of common understanding. The gestures of understanding culminated in a joint cultural conference in Baden-Baden, where for the first time a bust of Coubertin was set up. In spite of the violation of the Munich Agreement and the occupation of Prague by German troops, several French sports associations came to athletic competitions to Germany in summer 1939. The article ends with the Reichssportführer’s futile attempts to continue sports relations with France during war time.

“The Idea of New Munich is in the Air”: Italian Documents on Preparations for an International Conference in Late August 1939

In the summer of 1939, Hitler's Germany provoked an acute European crisis, the outcome of which had several options for resolution, including a peaceful one, along the lines of the Munich Agreement of 1938. Adolf Hitler, with his strategy of indirect action, played for higher stakes, took risks and often bluffed, leaving it to himself to exploit the option that was most favourable for him. Since 22 May 1939, Fascist Italy had been a military ally of Germany. Depending on the outcome of the Polish-German conflict, the Italian leadership planned a local “parallel” war in the Balkans and the Mediterranean in the event that the Western allies failed to counter German plans. The study proves that the British and French declarations of war on Germany were aimed at preventing Italian aggression in the area of direct geopolitical interest of the UK and France. The author analyses attempts made by Italian diplomacy to organise a “new Munich” and the reasons for their failure. The author analyses attempts made by Italian diplomacy to organise a “new Munich” and the reasons for their failure. He concludes that the Western allies succeeded in preventing the actualisation of the Italian-German military alliance. This was done under the threat of a all-out war and a crushing blow to Italy and its colonial possessions. In the context of the immediate politico-military situation at the time, the holding of a peace conference proved irrelevant to both the German leadership and the Western allies. Analyzing the four powers' negotiation process with regard to convening a peace conference, the author believes that prior to 17 September 1939, the USSR was hardly considered as an independent factor in the diplomatic and military game of the European powers. The author's conclusions are supported by data from Italian diplomatic and military documents, previously unknown in Russian historiography.

The Munich Agreement and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as a Tool of Russian Revisionist Propaganda

Under Vladimir Putin’s regime Russia seeks to whitewash Soviet history and promote an anti-Western narrative in order to legitimize its territorial claims and political demands in Eastern Europe. Drawing on electronic sources such as social media posts, articles from the Russian media, newspaper comments and media statements, the author demonstrates that one of its tools is the exaggerated condemnation of the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and the emphasis on the historical guilt of the Western powers in the Nazi expansion, made to avoid discussion of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, signed less than a year later.

Cesty a dial'nice na Slovensku v medzivojnovom období [Roads and highways in Slovakia during the interwar period] by Michal Ďurčo (review).

Reviewed by: Cesty a dial'nice na Slovensku v medzivojnovom období [Roads and highways in Slovakia during the interwar period] by Michal Ďurčo Jan Štemberk (bio) Cesty a dial'nice na Slovensku v medzivojnovom období [Roads and highways in Slovakia during the interwar period] By Michal Ďurčo. Bratislava: VEDA, 2020. Pp. 230. This monograph is this young Slovak historian's first book, based on his dissertation defended in 2019. So far, in Czech/Slovak/Czechoslovak historiography, little research has looked at the development of the road network. Recently, roads in the Pardubice Region featured in Štěpán and Pražan, Silnice v Pardubickém kraji, 2009. As works published in the past (for example, Musil, Po stezkách k dálnicím, 1987) are now outdated, Michal Ďurčo's monograph is therefore a welcome contribution. His focus on the interwar period divided by 1928, when the Road Fund Act was issued, is very important, as it was a time when load directions in Slovakia changed, initiated by the establishment of the Czechoslovak state, and motor cars appeared, placing higher qualitative demands on the roads. Ďurčo's monograph goes hand in hand with the work of another young Slovak historian, Jančura, Osobný motorizmus na Slovensku v rokoch 1918–1938, 2017, examining personal car transport, for which a good quality road network was a prerequisite. Durčo's grasp of the topic shows a solid knowledge of history writing methods as well as current research trends in transportation history, which he interweaves with approaches used in historical geography. Applying historian Thomas Hughes's Large Technical Systems concept to the road network is a decidedly fresh approach. The sources are Czech and Slovak archives, as well as professional journals and popular magazines. This work is well structured. After introducing the theory and methodology, the narrative is chronological: the central milestone is 1928, the tenth anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia and when the Road Fund was legally established, aiming to modernize Czechoslovakia's road [End Page 1194] network. Although the author's focus is Slovakia, he does not neglect the rest of the republic areas that were also facing problems with poor road network conditions (see Dvořák's contribution to Cestami hospodářských dějin, 2020), and the potential for public funding was limited. The clarity of the monograph is enhanced by the same approach to analyzing the periods before and after the 1928 Road Fund. Readers will certainly welcome the overview of road development in Slovakia from the late 1700s mercantilism to 1918, as well as brief outlines of the economic history of both eras that form the basis for subsequent interpretation. Each stage of the problems encountered with modernizing the Slovak road network is exemplified by a specific structure: the Pohronská Polhora–Tisovec road in the 1920s and Stará Huta–Podkriváň in the 1930s. The case studies are appropriate because 320 km of new roads were built in Slovakia during the period examined, and 600 km were provided with a dust-free surface. However, both cases are notably in central Slovakia. In my opinion, the final chapter (pp. 173–204), devoted to the plans and preparations for the Czechoslovak highways in the late 1930s, is the best. This covers a relatively short period, mostly consisting only of discussions, and the real preparatory work had to be crammed into the few months after the 1938 Munich Agreement. Yet the author captures the development of the idea and its gradual implementation until construction began in February 1939. He thus successfully supplements the up-to-now insufficient literature covering the beginnings of motorway construction in these regions (see Lídl and Janda, Stavby, kterým doba nepřála, 2006). Hopefully the book will initiate further research not only on other parts of the region, but also in the second half of the twentieth century, when the topic was just as relevant. Jan Štemberk Jan Štemberk is associate professor at the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, in Prague, the Czech Republic. He is the author of Podnikání v automobilové dopravě v českých zemích v první polovině 20. století [Automobile industry and trade in the...

An analysis of the Diplomatic Situation of the First Czechoslovak Republic and its Impacts on the Nation’s Demise after the Munich Agreement

Purpose: The objective of this research is to dive into the details of the First Czechoslovak Republic’s diplomacy and examine the impacts and significance of its diplomacy on its doomed national security.
 Methodology: This article primarily used qualitative research methods. By studying official historical documents from governments, the historical circumstances could be analysed. Secondary sources, such as books written by historians were also referenced to view this period of history from unique perspectives.
 Unique Contribution to this Field: Currently, most research about the First Czechoslovak Republic revolves around the time close to the Munich Agreement. This article innovatively studied the diplomatic history of Czechoslovakia since its formation and focused on its diplomacy in the 1920s.

Tvorba ústavy Slovenské republiky z 21. července 1939 a cesta k jejímu přijetí

This article deals with the process of creation and adoption of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic in 1939. Firstly, the development of Slovak autonomism and separatism with an emphasis on events following the Munich Agreement is briefly outlined. Secondly, the beginning of the existence of the Slovak state after its proclamation in March 1939 is introduced. Finally, the main part of the article researches ideological concepts applied in the described constitution. Moreover, it concerns itself with the working process of Constitution Commission of HSĽS presidency, which has prepared the government Bill of the Constitution, and changes made by the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee of the Slovak Assembly. In the final chapter, the principal provisions and institutions of the Constitution, including their changes during the legislative procedure and their further changes under conditions of authoritarian or totalitarian state led by far-right HSĽS are being discussed.

When History Seems to Repeat Itself: Exposure to Perceived Lessons of the Past Influences Predictions About Current Political Events.

The idea that the past holds lessons for the present, under the guise of historical analogies, is prevalent in political and public discourse. Those analogies are often accompanied by dire warnings befalling those who “forget” or otherwise neglect the powerful lessons of History—and would then be “doomed to repeat it”, as the saying goes. So, Would remembering history make it seem more OR LESS likely to repeat itself in the future? In other words, does exposure to specific lessons about past events, especially ones involving causal claims, affect how people expect real-life events to turn out? Four studies (three preregistered) tested this experimentally. In Studies 1 and 2, participants expected the same behavior (the US adopting a harsh stance against Iran in the Nuclear Treaty) to result in a more negative outcome when this current stance seemed to match a “lesson” they had read about the break-out of World War II (European leaders adopting a harsh approach against Germany in the 1919 Versailles Treaty vs. a conciliatory approach in the 1938 Munich Agreement). Studies 3 and 4 attempted to eliminate some confounds present in the first two studies and to generalize the effect to different events. While results varied across studies, an internal meta-analysis indicated that the analogical effect on predictions (d = –.08) tended to become stronger as participants’ knowledge about the target situation decreased (d-1SD = –.24). These findings support the possibility of analogical-based predictive effects for real-life political events, and are discussed in light of their research and political implications.

Diplomacy of Disaster: The Afghanistan ‘Peace Process’ and the Taliban Occupation of Kabul

Summary On 29 February 2020 in Doha, the United States signed an ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’ with the extremist Taliban movement. Yet on 15 August 2021, the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. This article argues that the Doha Agreement did not simply precede the Taliban takeover; in significant ways it contributed to it. In its negotiation, content and implementation, it created destructive incentives for domestic and international parties, and it had effects on mass psychology in Afghanistan that its creators seemed not to have anticipated or understood. In that sense, it serves as a cautionary tale about the danger of assuming that negotiated ‘diplomatic solutions’ are necessarily superior to messy alternatives. The closest 20th-century equivalent was the Munich Agreement of September 1938.

Die rechtliche Interpretation des Münchner Abkommens in der tschech(oslowak)ischen Erinnerungskultur

The exercise of the Czech state sovereignty over the national territory in the pre‐Munich borders is based on the assumption that the Munich Agreement is absolutely invalid right from the beginning. Any questioning of this legal interpretation automatically gives rise to fears of territorial or property claims. Although the borders of the Czech Republic are guaranteed by international law, and the property issues have been settled with both the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria, the topic of invalidity has been a recurring leitmotif in the culture of remembrance of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning and is part of the identity construction of the Czech nation.