Munich Agreement Research Articles

Czechoslovakia 1938, 1948 and 1968

THE MUNICH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A VAST literature. There are only a few points which I should like briefly to make. The first is that for the Czechs the main horror of Munich was not that it deprived them of valuable territories, but that it was imposed on them by their allies. The Anglo-French ultimatum of September 1938 profoundly wounded President Beneš and the whole Czech nation. If they had had no friends at all, the Czechs might have fought alone and perished, or they might have surrendered, the tragedy would have been simple. But their false friends told them that if they resisted they would be in the wrong, they deprived them even of the chance of defending themselves. This was to have lasting effects on their national morale.

Australia and the Munich agreement

Australia and the Munich agreement

Revolution and Nationalism: Two studies on the History of Communism in Eastern Europe

On March 27,1938, just two days before signing the Munich agreement, by which Czechoslovakia was dismembered, Neville Chamberlain referred to the Czech-German dispute in the Sudetenland as “a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.” The insularity and outright ignorance displayed in this remark, while surprising in a national leader, were not untypical of the views prevailing before World War II among the English-speaking public regarding not only the Sudeten problem, but much else in Eastern Europe. The accounts of journalists, travelers, and writers in search of sensation did little to counteract, and frequently merely reflected, the shallow and often disdainful opinions held by many Westerners regarding the quarrelsome nationalities of Eastern Europe.

Ratz-Lienert and Klein v. Nederlands Beheers-Instituut.

Nationality — Aquisition of — Imposition of Nationality Contrary to Provisions of Treaty — Non-recognition of Nationality Thus Imposed.Treaties — Validity of — Treaties Inconsistent with Previous Treaty Obligations — Treaties Imposed by Force — Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy and Treaty of November 21, 1938, between Germany and Czechoslovakia — Imposition of Nationality and Denial of Right of Option Contrary to Previous Treaty — Refusal to Recognize Nationality Thus Imposed — Non — recognition of German Nationality of Sudeten — Germans

Negotiations leading to the Anglo-Polish agreement of 31 March 1939

The second World War was to find Germany and Italy as allies in a conflict in which their initial opponents were Britain, France and Poland. Italy did not immediately enter the war, but by the terms of the ‘pact of steel’ of 22 May 1939 she was to become a belligerent. The war broke out over the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. The circumstances under which it arose were peculiar in one particular point, namely in that Great Britain entered the conflict directly and immediately as an ally of a power in eastern Europe. She had entered the wars of 1914 and of 1793 in a secondary manner—as an ally of powers already at war and over commitments which related primarily to western and central Europe. It was novel therefore that she should have become involved directly in a conflict relating to eastern Europe.If one had tried to predict, in 1919, the circumstances under which Britain would fight another war with Germany, few would have hazarded the opinion that she would choose the crossing of the Polish frontier as a casus belli. In addition, if one had, in 1938, tried also to predict Britain’s ally in an eventual conflict, Poland would have come towards the end of the list. Since 1934, Poland had generally been regarded as a power which was endeavouring to keep out of conflicts between Germany and the western powers—at least in the early stages of such a war. The relations between Berlin and Warsaw were, as from their agreement of 26 January 1934, surprisingly cautious; and the personal relations between leading Germans and Poles reflected—or so it appeared—the existence of such friendly relations. However, within a very short period after the Munich agreement of 30 September 1938, Britain was to become deeply involved in the defence of a frontier which British public opinion had previously regarded as the most open to criticism and revision of all the arrangements concluded at Versailles.

The World Between the Wars: From the 1918 Armistice to the Munich Agreement, by Quincy Howe; Prelude to World War II, by Gaetano Salvemini

The World Between the Wars: From the 1918 Armistice to the Munich Agreement, <i>by Quincy Howe</i>; Prelude to World War II, <i>by Gaetano Salvemini</i>

Churchill's speech on the Munich agreement

Churchill's speech on the Munich agreement

The German Air Force

The size, striking power and general quality of the German Air Force are the dominating facts in the present position of European diplomacy. Statements made about Germany's alleged superiority in the air played their part in forming opinion at the time of the Munich Agreement. Unfortunately, there is no subject on which, in the absence of ascertained fact, wilder misstatements are current. Since the export of information about the Air Force is, in Germany, a form of high treason, the disentangling of the probably true from the certainly false is a task of considerable difficulty. An attempt has been made here to present such estimates as seem reasonably securely based on fact.

German Activities in Central Europe

DURING the past fortnight, the State of Czechoslovakia has been forcibly broken up and a large part absorbed into tho “Great German Reich” as the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”. In the account of Czechoslovakia's contributions to science which appeared in NATURE of November 26, 1938,pp. 942-44, the hope was expressed that the scientific and cultural development of the Czechs woiild still be possible after their territory had been drastically curtailed by the Munich Agreement, and that they would continue to make contributions to the advancement of scientific knowledge and take a share in its application to the welfare of mankind. This hope was qualified by the anxiety then felt for those men of science and learning whom tho imoverished State might not be able to support, and it is gratifying to know that, until recently, indeed until the very end, the educational authorities succeeded in maintaining practically all the important research institutions and cultural associations remaining within the country. Scientific publications also continued to appear, and there was every reason to believe that the nation would, by hard labour, maintain its vigour and prosperity, and its men of science would be able to continue to achieve distinction and add to the sum of human knowledge by meritorious work in their respective fields. It is, perhaps, too early to foresee the consequences of the latest events in Central Europe. The new Protectorate is avowedly to have a measure of autonomy, though this is scarcely likely to go so far as to permit the free and open interchange of thought which has been banned in Germany for the past few years.

Georges Bernanos and the Christian Apostolate

Whatever the significance of the Munich agreement, whether the pessimists are right in seeing it as a miserable political wangle, or the optimists are justified in their hope for a lasting peace for Europe and the World, one thing is clear, the Christian cannot afford to ignore it, when like the rest of the world he begins to take stock. Even if it was no more than a sign in the sky, not of the shape of things to come, but a taunting reminder of all that might have been, it was clearly a reminder, the meaning of which has not escaped general notice in spite of all the attempts to dilute it with talk of political honour and the flag.Apart from its possible positive results, one of the main elements we cannot fail to appreciate is the sense of urgency it has imposed on the world, an urgency not to be totally side-tracked by the rush for renewed rearmament. By so substantially increasing the tempo of events it has imposed on the Christian issue in Europe a “now or never” condition in the struggle. It is this connection that M. Bernanos has a special significance.The immediate instruments of that struggle are Catholics themselves, whose unity is one of dogma and worship, directed by one authority, but who in a larger sphere reflect every shade of opinion not ruled out by creed. It would be useless even if desirable to regret it. It is an expression of the elemental life of the Church.