Multiple Voting Research Articles

Dual-class firms and governance: an acquisition perspective

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of governance quality on firms with multiple voting structures. Design/methodology/approach – The sample includes 487 acquisitions undertaken by dual-class firms from 1996 to 2009. The author used event studies (Patell, 1976) for short-term performance analysis around merger announcement dates; Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) methods to identify the motive behind these transactions; and standard benchmark adjusted return on assets (and return on sales) (Barber and Lyon, 1996) and BHAR (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) to analyze long-term post-acquisition performance. Findings – First, dual-class acquirers with better governance quality show stronger performance around takeovers which indicates that these firms make better acquisition decisions. These results hold even after controlling for different firm and deal characteristics. Second, transactions undertaken by acquirers with good governance show little or no sign of agency motive. This reinforces the findings in first. Third, the author reports that acquirers with above-median governance quality display stronger long-term post-acquisition operating as well as stock performances. These results are robust to different benchmarks used for this study. Originality/value – This paper expands the literature on dual-class firms by showing the impact of governance quality on acquisition activities undertaken by these firms. This is the first study to show that despite agency issues inherent in the dual-class structure, improving governance quality would have a positive impact, at least in the case of corporate takeovers.

The cross-border hostile bid fight between Scania in Sweden and the two German companies MAN and Volkswagen: institutional change and the mandatory bid rule

International hostile takeovers provide a unique context for studying how corporate governance mechanisms migrate across countries. This paper is prompted by a case study of the cross-border takeover fight between the target companies Scania (Sweden) and MAN (Germany) and the involvement of the owners of Volkswagen, Porsche (both Germany) and Investor (Sweden), 1999–2014. It reveals how incumbent owners in Germany and Sweden—two countries with a history of corporate control through blockholdings, corporatist-governance, state control (Germany) and multiple voting shares (Sweden)—manage to take advantage of the minority shareholders through arbitraging the differences in implementation of a new governance device across borders. The study focuses in particular on the mandatory bid rule (MBR) that forces a shareholder who passes a certain threshold of ownership to bid for the rest of the shares. The study reveals over twenty incidents of breaches of the idea of the MBR, to the detriment of minority shareholders. Building on institutional theory and sociology, the study provides useful insight into how incumbent actors may use bargaining power to capture a new regulation and circumvent it. Furthermore, the case illustrates the importance of legitimacy in the efforts to converge corporate governance systems. Thirdly, it adds to the critique of the mandatory bid rule in countries with a governance system supporting blockholders. Overall, the study raises a number of important issues regarding how national politics shape corporate governance and responds to new actors and coalitions of actors entering the scene. A convergence of takeover regulation not compatible with the legal framework might result in a less efficient than anticipated outcome of the market for corporate control. These results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective that key actors may have a vested interest in resisting change.

The Cross-Border Hostile Bid between Sweden's Scania and Germany's MAN and Volkswagen: Institutional Change and the Mandatory Bid Rule

International hostile takeovers provide a unique context for studying how corporate governance mechanisms migrate across countries. This paper is prompted by a case study of the cross-border takeover fight between the target companies Scania (Sweden) and MAN (Germany) and the involvement of the owners of Volkswagen, Porsche (both Germany) and Investor (Sweden), 1999-2014. It reveals how incumbent owners in Germany and Sweden - two countries with a history of corporate control through blockholdings, corporatist-governance, state control (Germany) and multiple voting shares (Sweden) - manage to take advantage of the minority shareholders through arbitraging the differences in implementation of a new governance device across borders. The study focuses in particular on the mandatory bid rule (MBR) that forces a shareholder who passes a certain threshold of ownership to bid for the rest of the shares. The study reveals over twenty incidents of breaches of the idea of the MBR, to the detriment of minority shareholders. Building on institutional theory and sociology, the study provides useful insight into how incumbent actors may use bargaining power to capture a new regulation and circumvent it. Furthermore, the case illustrates the importance of legitimacy in the efforts to converge corporate governance systems. Thirdly, it adds to the critique of the mandatory bid rule in countries with a governance system supporting blockholders. Overall, the study raises a number of important issues regarding how national politics shape corporate governance and responds to new actors and coalitions of actors entering the scene. A convergence of takeover regulation not compatible with the legal framework might result in a less efficient than anticipated outcome of the market for corporate control. These results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective that key actors may have a vested interest in resisting change.

Comparison of Hybrid Classifiers for Crop Classification Using Normalized Difference Vegetation Index Time Series: A Case Study for Major Crops in North Xinjiang, China.

A range of single classifiers have been proposed to classify crop types using time series vegetation indices, and hybrid classifiers are used to improve discriminatory power. Traditional fusion rules use the product of multi-single classifiers, but that strategy cannot integrate the classification output of machine learning classifiers. In this research, the performance of two hybrid strategies, multiple voting (M-voting) and probabilistic fusion (P-fusion), for crop classification using NDVI time series were tested with different training sample sizes at both pixel and object levels, and two representative counties in north Xinjiang were selected as study area. The single classifiers employed in this research included Random Forest (RF), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and See 5 (C 5.0). The results indicated that classification performance improved (increased the mean overall accuracy by 5%~10%, and reduced standard deviation of overall accuracy by around 1%) substantially with the training sample number, and when the training sample size was small (50 or 100 training samples), hybrid classifiers substantially outperformed single classifiers with higher mean overall accuracy (1%~2%). However, when abundant training samples (4,000) were employed, single classifiers could achieve good classification accuracy, and all classifiers obtained similar performances. Additionally, although object-based classification did not improve accuracy, it resulted in greater visual appeal, especially in study areas with a heterogeneous cropping pattern.

Expert advice to a voting body

I provide a theory of information transmission in collective choice settings. In the model, an expert has private information on the effect of a policy proposal and communicates to a set of voters prior to a vote over whether or not to implement the proposal. In contrast to previous game-theoretic models of political communication, the results apply to situations involving multiple voters, multidimensional policy spaces and a broad class of voting rules. The results highlight how experts can use information to manipulate collective choices in a way that reduces the ex ante expected utilities of all voters. Opportunities for expert manipulation are the result of collective choice instability: all voting rules that allow collective preference cycles also allow welfare-reducing manipulative persuasion by an expert. The results challenge prevailing theories of institutions in which procedures are designed to maximize information transmission.

Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that alternative voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. This result differs from the one obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using different voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.

Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that alternative voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. This result differs from the one obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using different voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.

Multiple-Votes Parallel Symbol-Flipping Decoding Algorithm for Non-Binary LDPC Codes

A novel decoding algorithm for non-binary low density parity check (NB-LDPC) codes is proposed. The algorithm builds on the recently designed parallel symbol-flipping decoding (PSFD) algorithm and combines a technique of error estimation and a method of multiple voting levels from each unsatisfied check-sum to the corresponding variable nodes. Simulations results, performed on a number of NB-LDPC codes of various lengths and column weights constructed using several methods, show that the new algorithm not only avoids using code-dependent voting threshold but also improves the error rate performance of the PSFD algorithm, particularly for low column weight parity-check matrices.

Clientelism as Persuasion-Buying

In distributing clientelistic payoffs to citizens, the best strategy a party machine can pursue, we argue, is to target citizens who are opinion-leading epicenters in informal conversation networks. This persuasion-buying strategy carries the highest potential yield for the party because the payoff can create a social multiplier: The effect of the clientelistic gift can be magnified via the conversion of multiple voters within a payoff recipient’s personal networks. Using cross-sectional survey data from 22 Latin American countries and a panel survey from Mexico, we confirm that individuals who engage in frequent political persuasion and who are located in large political discussion networks are the most likely recipients of clientelistic payoffs. We also show that a finding that is key to previous theories, namely, that loyal partisans are the most likely targets of clientelism, is driven by omitted-variable and endogeneity bias.

The Disappearing Taboo of Multiple Voting Shares: Regulatory Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat

In 2014, the Italian Government broke an old taboo of Italian corporate law, joining the ranks of many different legal systems that allow the issuance of multiple voting shares (MVSs), including the United States. The importance of the reform is therefore broad, also because it offers the occasion to review, more generally, the state of the debate on MVSs. The new rules are also interesting because they are both a cause and a consequence of regulatory competition in Europe, and can be considered an example of the recent trend toward greater flexibility and contractual freedom in corporate law. This article examines the new rules in a comparative perspective, considering similar experiences in Europe and the US, and discussing the empirical evidence on the effects of MVSs, especially in listed corporations. The second part of the paper illustrates some interpretative issues raised by the new Italian rules, and the possible motivations of the Italian legislature in taking this step also vis-a-vis the planned privatization of some large state-owned enterprises.

Altruism, Noise, and the Paradox of Voter Turnout: An Experimental Study

This paper addresses the paradox of voter turnout, wherein observed voting participation rates are far greater than what rational choice theory would predict. Voters face multiple voting choices, stochastic voting costs, and candidates offering different economic platforms. A combination of two approaches attempts to resolve this paradox: quantal response equilibrium (QRE) analysis, which introduces noise into the decision-making process, and the possibility of ethical (altruism-motivated) voting. A series of laboratory experiments empirically tests the predictions of the resulting model. Participants in the experiments are also given opportunities for communicating online with their immediate neighbors, in order to enhance the chances that subjects would realize the possibility of ethical voting. The results show that ethical voting occurs but gains momentum only in the presence of a vocal advocate and even then it mostly dissipated by the second half of the session. The QRE-based model was able to explain some but not all of the overvoting that was observed, relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction. There is evidence to suggest that communication via the chat feature generated some of the voting and also some of the ethical voting.

The Costs of Control-enhancing Mechanisms: How Regulatory Dualism Can Create Value in the Privatisation of State-owned Firms in Europe

Empirical studies show that ownership structures that separate control and cash flow rights create agency problems and are associated with reduced value for minority shareholders. Institutional investors recognise these inefficiencies and expect a discount on the share price of companies with control-enhancing mechanisms like multiple voting rights shares or pyramidal ownership structures. In the US, corporate pyramids are discouraged through the taxation of intercompany dividends, whereas multiple voting rights shares are allowed but have to be issued before the firm goes public. Therefore, controlling shareholders who want to entrench themselves in control by retaining multiple voting rights shares pay the costs of this inefficient capital structure when the firm initially goes public at a discounted price. Some European countries — including Spain, Portugal, Greece and, until very recently, Italy — have adopted a diametrically opposite solution. Multiple voting rights shares have been expressly prohibited by the legislator, but corporate pyramids are commonly used by listed companies and can be created following the IPO of the firm without approval from the shareholders. In this situation, if institutional investors expect that a pyramidal ownership structure will be created in the future, they will discount the price of the shares when the firm goes public. Therefore, if Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are willing to privatise some of their state-owned companies and want to maximise the price of their stocks, they should create the conditions to assure the market that these companies will not be controlled through pyramids in the future. Because of strong opposition from national business elites which control the largest corporate groups, it is very difficult to adopt strict regulations aimed at prohibiting — or at least limiting — the use of pyramidal ownership structures in a relatively short period of time. In order to solve this Olson problem, I suggest that Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece should use regulatory dualism to create new markets with enhanced corporate governance rules that prevent shareholders’ control through pyramids.

The Big Question

The Big Question

Non-Binary LDPC Decoder Based on Symbol Flipping with Multiple Votes

In this letter, a new algorithm to decode non-binary LDPC (NB-LDPC) codes is proposed. This algorithm is inspired from very low complexity decoders that have been proposed recently, in which only syndrome computations at the check node update are used, while performing symbol-flipping based update at the variable node. Usually, the low complexity decoders based on symbol flipping suffer from a non-negligible performance degradation compared to soft-decision NB-LDPC decoders. Our improved decoder makes use of a list of syndrome computations instead of a single one based on hard-decision, and builds soft information at the variable node input by assigning votes weighted by different amplitudes. Simulations show that using multiple votes with multiple weights yields better performance, while still maintaining the low complexity feature.

Detecting potential labeling errors for bioinformatics by multiple voting

Classification techniques are important in bioinformatics analysis as they can separate various bioinformatical data into distinct groups. To obtain good classifiers, accurate labeling of the training data is required. However labeling in practical bioinformatics applications might be erroneous due to various reasons. To identify those mislabeled data, an ensemble learning based scheme, single-voting has been widely used. It generates multiple classifiers and makes use of their voting to detect mislabeled data. Single-voting scheme mainly consists of two components: data partitioning component to generate multiple classifiers, and mislabeled detection component to identify mislabeled data. Existing works in this field mainly focus on mislabeled detection part and neglect data partitioning. However, our analysis shows that data partitioning plays an important role in single-voting scheme. This analysis helps us proposing a novel multiple-voting scheme. It is superior to traditional single-voting by reducing the unreliable influence from data partitioning. Empirical and theoretical evaluations on a set of bioinformatics datasets illustrate the utility of our proposed scheme.

Reduction of Defect Misclassification of Electronic Board Using Multiple SVM Classifiers

This paper proposes a new method to improve the classification accuracy by multiple class classification using multiple SVM. The proposed approach classifies the true and pseudo defects by adding features to decrease the incorrect classification. This approach consists of two steps. First, detect the straight line by Hough Transform to the inspection image and condition is judged with the gradient. More than 80% of AOI images consist of images with the margin line between base part and lead line part which has the same direction. When detected line directions are almost the same directions, shifted image of inspection image is generated and used as the reference image. In case of different directions of detected lines (this case holds for less than 20% of AOI images), reference image is generated manually. After the reference image is prepared, the difference is taken between the inspection image and reference image. This leads to extract the defect candidate region with high accuracy and features are extracted to judge the defect and foreign material. Second, selected features are learned with multiple SVM and classified into the class. When the result has the multiple same voting counts to the same class, the judgment is treated as the difficult class for the classification. It is shown that the proposed approach gives efficient classification with the higher classification accuracy than the previous approaches through the real experiment.

Face Recognition Based on Multi-classifierWeighted Optimization and Sparse Representation

Facial recognition (FR) is a challenging area of research due to difficulties with robust FR when the number of training samples is very small. The state-of-the-art sparse representation-based classification (SRC) shows very excellent FR performance. However, the recognition rate of SRC will drop dramatically when the number of training samples per class is very limited. To solve these issues, we propose a weighted multi-classifier optimization and sparse representation based (WMSRC) method for FR, which efficiently combines the local and global characteristics of face images. A face image is firstly divided into continuous but non-overlapped blocks by multi-resolution based blocking and each block is sparsely represented over the corresponding set of blocks of all training samples. The multi-scale SRC classifiers are then established and associated with different weights based on sub-block dictionary learning. According to the multiple voting results of the classifiers, the weights of multi-classifiers are optimized by a least-squares optimization equation with 2 l -norm regularization. Finally, the classification results of all the blocks are combined by a weighted fusion criterion. Our experiments show that the WMSRC algorithm outperforms many existing block-based sparse representation classification algorithms, especially for FR when the available training samples per subject are very limited.

Expert Advice to a Voting Body

I provide a theory of information transmission in collective choice settings. In the model, an expert has private information on the effect of a policy proposal and communicates to a set of voters prior to a vote over whether or not to implement the proposal. In contrast to previous game-theoretic models of political communication, the results apply to situations involving multiple voters, multidimensional policy spaces and a broad class of voting rules. The results highlight how experts can use information to manipulate collective choices in a way that reduces the ex ante expected utilities of all voters. Opportunities for expert manipulation are the result of collective choice instability: all voting rules that allow collective preference cycles also allow welfare-reducing manipulative persuasion by an expert. The results challenge prevailing theories of institutions in which procedures are designed to maximize information transmission.

Divided Government Versus Incumbency Externality Effect: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on Multiple Voting Decisions

This paper explores the interdependency of political institutions from the voter's perspective. Specifically, we are interested in three questions: (1) Does the partisan identity of the local mayor influence the voter's decision in the subsequent town council election?; (2) Does this partisan identity influence in ensuing higher level elections?; and (3) Do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election? We collected a unique data set for Germany in which we link election results for different political institutions at the municipal level. To identify causal effects, we rely on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes. We find that the party of the mayor receives a bonus of 4-5 percentage points in vote share in the subsequent town council elections if, and only if, mayoral and council elections are held simultaneously. With regard to higher level elections, we find no effect for the party identity of the mayor on federal and European election outcomes. Using run-off mayor races, which are held shortly after council elections, we show that voters punish parties that performed strongly in the council election. To explain our empirical findings, we explore two mechanisms from the theoretical literature. We conclude that there is evidence both for an incumbency externality effect as well as a preference for divided government effect in opposite directions.

Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions

This paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections. We ask: (1) Does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter's decision in subsequent town council elections? (2) Do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election? The analysis mainProd. Type: FLPly relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for Germany. We find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election. Moreover, voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections. Throughout the paper, we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government.