Multiple Relation Theory Of Judgment Research Articles

Interpreting Russell’s Paralysis

Interpreting Russell’s Paralysis Graham P. Stevens James R. Connelly. Wittgenstein’s Critique of Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement. London and New York: Anthem P., 2021. Pp. xiv, 206. (Hb) isbn-13: 978-1-78527-740-5, us$125; (ebook) 978-1-78527-741-2, us$40. In 1913 Russell reportedly told Wittgenstein that he was “paralyzed” by Wittgenstein’s objection to the multiple relation theory of judgment at the heart of the book he was writing. Russell abandoned the manuscript, which was only published after his death. However, no clear record of the objection, fully stated, has survived. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there are a lot of competing interpretations of Russell’s paralysis. Given the amount of coverage it has received, a book-length study of the issue is maybe not a hard thing to produce. A good book-length study which does justice to all of these competing theories through a careful analysis of them while also carving out space for a new contribution to that field is far harder to achieve. James Connelly has achieved that here. The multiple relation theory of judgment (mrtj) was intended to eliminate Russell’s ontology of propositions by replacing them with judgment complexes. Ontologically speaking, judgments are not self-subsisting entities but formations out of constituents that are the true members of Russell’s ontology. The proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio does not exist as a unified complex, but Desdemona, Cassio and the relation expressed by the verb “loves” do. Othello’s belief unites these entities through an act of judgment. Wittgenstein’s objection is commonly thought to be directed at demonstrating that judgment (at least as construed by Russell) is not a suitable relation for securing something that meets the demands we have of propositional content. The starting place for the competing interpretations is the ingenious account offered by Stephen Sommerville and Nicholas Griffin. What made their interpretation such an improvement on earlier proposals is that they were the first to really take seriously Russell’s dramatic response. Previous interpretations had provided compelling accounts of how Wittgenstein’s objection fitted into [End Page 181] his wider philosophical project in the Tractatus, but gave no explanation for why Russell should be particularly troubled by it. Sommerville–Griffin argued that the objection exposes a fundamental incompatibility between the mrtj and the ramified type theory of Principia Mathematica. Given that the mrtj was intended to play a key role in the same work, this interpretation gives a very good explanation for the impact of the objection on Russell if he was persuaded by it. Connelly recognizes the influence of the Sommerville–Griffin interpretation, labelling it “sr” (standard reading) and situating subsequent interpretations in comparison to it, including his own. The alternative accounts include my own, as well as those of Peter Hanks, Christopher Pincock, Gregory Landini, Samuel Lebens and Fraser MacBride, and other interpretations are often considered alongside these main targets of the book. An inevitable criticism one might be tempted raise at this point is that several other interpretations are excluded, at least from detailed scrutiny, although it is hard to see how any book on this topic could avoid that without becoming intolerably long. Connelly’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s objection divides it into three “waves”: (1) a general complaint that the Theory of Knowledge manuscript was mistakenly prioritizing epistemology over logic in trying to solve foundational questions; (2) the specific attack on the structure of judgments in the mrtj; (3) the appeal to logical forms in the theory. Really, (1) is something of a scene-setting device. As an objection it would be flimsy, as it just amounts to an opinion of Wittgenstein’s, not any sort of argument. But what makes it significant, Connelly suggests, is that Russell shared the same view, hence the force of the concern in his mind. While I agree with Connelly up to a point here, and he certainly provides evidence for the claim, I don’t think this issue can really point to an explanation of Russell’s paralysis. For one thing, the terms “logic” and “theory of knowledge” are being used in quite an antiquated sense by Russell and Wittgenstein: much...

Acquaintance, presentation and judgement: from Brentano to Russell and back again

ABSTRACT The notion of acquaintance is one of the pillars of Russell’s philosophy and it remains at the center of work in the philosophy of mind and language. Russell’s development of his theory of acquaintance was influenced by Brentano and Meinong. In this paper I will trace this Austrian Influence on the development of Russell’s theory of acquaintance through two phases; one before and one after Russell introduced the multiple relation theory of judgement in 1907. I will use Brentano’s view of the distinction between judgement and presentation to highlight problems with Russell’s theories of acquaintance in both phases. In doing so I will give special attention to Russell’s notion of experiencing together that plays a foundational role in the second phase. The paper concludes by recommending to Russell that he returns to Brentano’s original ideas about judgement and presentation.

“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement

ABSTRACT In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply (§1), we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons.

Russell’s theories of judgement

ABSTRACTThis paper is an attempt to explain why Russell abandoned the ontology of propositions, mind-independent complex entities that are possible objects of judgements. I argue that he did so not because of any decisive argument but because he found it better to endorse the existential account of truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if there exists (or in his view subsists) a corresponding fact. In order to endorse this account, he had examined various theories of judgement before he adopted the multiple-relation theory of judgement, the most feasible way he then had of espousing it. I also attempt to explain why he preferred the existential account of truth.

Samuel Lebens. Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: A History and Defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement

Reviewed by Rosalind Carey.

A Historically Informed Defence of the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment [review of Samuel Lebens, <em>Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement</em>

A Historically Informed Defence of the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment [review of Samuel Lebens, <em>Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement</em>

A Historically Informed Defence of the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment [review of Samuel Lebens, <em>Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement</em>

A Historically Informed Defence of the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment [review of Samuel Lebens, <em>Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement</em>

A Historically Informed Defence of the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment

russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 38 (summer 2018): 89–96 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036–01631; online 1913–8032 c:\users\arlene\documents\rj\type3801\red\rj 3801 050 red.docx 2018-07-30 2:56 PM oeviews A HISTORICALLY INFORMED DEFENCE OF THE MULTIPLE-RELATION THEORY OF JUDGMENT Landon D. C. Elkind Philosophy / U. of Iowa Iowa City, ia 52242, usa dcelkind@gmail.com Samuel Lebens. Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement. New York: Routledge, 2017. Pp. xi, 296. us$140. isbn: 978-1-138-73745-7. n his book Lebens discusses the history of Russell’s much-maligned multiple -relation theory of judgment (mrtj); he also defends a mrtj (p. 1).1 The book is well written. It gives clear arguments. It interweaves seamlessly historical and ongoing controversies within unified narratives. For these reasons a close study of Lebens’ book will richly reward scholars interested either in Russell’s mrtj or in the metaphysics of meaning. His book stands out for its detailed attempt to trace the origins of mrtj through Russell’s pre-Principia writings. I recommend Lebens’ book to the attention of readers of Russell. Lebens’ book is framed around the need for “an account of the metaphysics of meaning” (p. 6). His defence of his mrtj focuses on mrtj’s suitableness as giving a metaphysics of meaning. To grasp his book, one must understand why Lebens thinks we need a metaphysics of meaning.2 And to grasp his book’s significance for Russell’s scholarship, it is vital to understand whether and in what sense Russell also thought we need a metaphysics of meaning, and whether he deployed mrtj to give us a metaphysics of meaning. Lebens understands “metaphysics of meaning” in terms of eleven roles that propositions play (pp. 2–4). Propositions are sometimes said, for example, to be truth-bearers; they are sometimes said to be the common content of different 1 It is important to distinguish Lebens’ mrtj from Russell’s mrtj, and to distinguish both of these from a mrtj in general. Where context does not indicate which is meant, I will use, say, “Lebens’ mrtj”. 2 “In order to understand Mr. Wittgenstein’s book, it is necessary to realize what is the problem with which he is concerned” (“Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” [1921]; Papers 9: 101). f= 90 Reviews c:\users\arlene\documents\rj\type3801\red\rj 3801 050 red.docx 2018-07-30 2:56 PM sentences, like “snow is white” and “Schnee ist weiß”; they are sometimes said to be the objects of propositional attitudes; and so on. Lebens’ book starts from the claim that at least some of the eleven roles that propositions play “represent genuine explananda” (p. 6). That is, at least some of these roles demand a metaphysical explanation of what it is to play these various roles: “I want to know what it means for a sentence to mean something. I want a metaphysics of meaning” (p. 6). Lebens undertakes this work of giving a metaphysics of meaning; he believes mrtj is well-suited to that work (p. 18). Now, Russell’s mrtj is a no-propositions theory of propositions, that is, an account “of ” propositions on which there are no propositions as entities (p. 1). And yet rejecting propositions as entities does not thereby eliminate the need to offer a metaphysical explanation of the eleven roles Lebens describes (p. 6). Lebens for his part feels the need for a metaphysical explanation despite the fact that he, like the Russell of mrtj, rejects propositions as entities. Lebens believes Russell likewise felt this need. Lebens writes: [mrtj] was Bertrand Russell’s attempt to give an account of propositions—i.e., an explanation of the 11 explananda of §1 (or most of them)—without incurring ontological commitment to propositions. […] [mrtj] takes the metaphysical task of a theory of propositions seriously, and doesn’t desert the undertaking. … (Pp. 17–18) Contrary to Lebens, I do not believe Russell had this problem in mind when devising the mrtj. First, supposing that giving a...

Mapping the Understanding Complex in Russell's <em>Theory of Knowledge</em>

Anyone familiar with Russell’s work on the multiple-relation theory of judgment will at some point have puzzled over the map of the five-term understanding complex at the end of Chapter 1, Part II of his Theory of Knowledge (1913). Russell presents the map with the intention of clarifying what goes on when a subject S understands the “proposition” that A and B are similar. But the map raises more questions than it answers. In this paper I present and develop some of the central issues that arise from Russell’s map, and I offer an interpretation of it that reflects his evolving views in the manuscript. I argue that multiple lines in the map are not meant to represent many relations, but rather one comprehensive multiple relation of understanding. And I argue that such a relation relates in a complex way due to the distinctive nature of its relata.

The Prenective View of propositional content

Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you can refer to with singular terms. For example, on the Standard View, we should parse the sentence ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’ as: [Simon] believes [that Sharon is funny]; ‘Simon’ is a term referring to a thinking subject, ‘that Sharon is funny’ is a term referring to a proposition, and ‘x believes y’ is a dyadic predicate expressing the believing relation. In this paper, I argue against the Standard View. This is how I think we should parse ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’: [Simon] believes that [Sharon is funny]; here we have a singular term, ‘Simon’, a sentence ‘Sharon is funny’, and a ‘prenective’ joining them together, ‘x believes that p’. On this Prenective View, we do not get at the propositional content of someone’s belief by referring to a reified proposition with a singular term; we simply use the sentence ‘Sharon is funny’ to express that content for ourselves. I argue for the Prenective View in large part by showing that an initially attractive version of the Standard View is actually vulnerable to the same objection that Wittgenstein used against Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment.

Mapping the Understanding Complex in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge

Anyone familiar with Russell’s work on the multiple-relation theory of judgment will at some point have puzzled over the map of the five-term understanding complex at the end of Chapter i, Part ii of his Theory of Knowledge (1913). Russell presents the map with the intention of clarifying what goes on when a subject S understands the “proposition” that A and B are similar. But the map raises more questions than it answers. In this paper I present and develop some of the central issues that arise from Russell’s map, and I offer an interpretation of it that reflects his evolving views in the manuscript. I argue that multiple lines in the map are not meant to represent many relations, but rather one comprehensive multiple relation of understanding. And I argue that such a relation relates in a complex way due to the distinctive nature of its relata.

Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher? Wittgenstein vs Russell

This article is in six main sections. In the first three sections, some indication of how and why philosophers have differed in their response to the title question is given by describing Wittgenstein’s encounters with Carnap, and by examining Wittgenstein’s commitment to clarity and argument in philosophy, illustrating this commitment by reference to his Philosophical Investigations discussion of the will. In the remaining three sections, Russell is taken as a paradigm example of a central kind of analytic philosopher. The answer to the title question is unfolded by sketching Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s treatments of a few philosophical topics and problems, focusing on theories and questions surrounding propositions, judgments, and their constituents, in particular Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment and the question of the unity of the proposition. This approach displays, and does not merely assert, Russell’s deployment of (sometimes repeated variants of) technical solutions to philosophical problems and how that deployment contrasts with Wittgenstein’s attempts to make such problems disappear.

Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgement: What did Wittgenstein Try that Wouldn't Work?

AbstractIn this article, I pay special expository attention to two pieces of philosophically relevant Wittgenstein–Russell correspondence from the period leading up to the ultimate demise of Russell's Theory of Knowledge manuscript (in June 1913). This is done in the hopes of shedding light on Wittgenstein's notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement. I argue that these two pieces of correspondence (the first, a letter from Wittgenstein to Russell dated January 1913, and the second, a letter from Russell to Ottoline Morrell, reporting a tense confrontation with Wittgenstein on 26 May 1913) each refer to what is more or less the same approach to problems concerning the unity and well‐formedness of propositions or judgements. However, the view advanced in Wittgenstein's January letter to Russell nevertheless differs in a key respect from the view of Russell's referred to in the May letter to Morrell. The difference involves Wittgenstein's incorporating qualities and relations as unsaturated parts of the copulae of atomic complexes, where these copulae are in turn conceived as logical forms. Because such an approach to logical form (and more specifically, to relations) was philosophically unpalatable to Russell, he undertook an alternative theoretical correction in the context of his 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript. This theoretical correction was discussed with Wittgenstein during the tense confrontation on 26 May, and involved deploying a supplemental significance constraint on judgements. It was this significance constraint on judgements, moreover, which was the ‘premiss’ alluded to by Wittgenstein in the context of a June 1913 letter to Russell, wherein he claims to express his objection to Russell's theory ‘exactly.’

Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?

Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (Philos Stud 104(1):47–62, 2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the aforementioned validity of attitude-report inferences. It then shows that the notion of a predication act-type, which remains importantly Russellian in spirit, is sufficient to explain the range of propositional phenomena in question, in particular the validity of attitude-report inferences. The paper concludes by discussing whether predication act-types are really just propositions by another name.

Judgment and the identity theory of truth

The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.

On "Props", Wittgenstein's June 1913 Letter, and Russell's "Paralysis"

Recent years have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in the precise nature of Wittgenstein’s fateful but notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, levelled as Russell was furiously composing Theory of Knowledge in May–June 1913. In this paper, I place special expository focus on two controversial documents from the relevant period, whose nature and interrelationships to this point have been inadequately understood in the literature. The first document is a set of working notes composed by Russell under the title “Props”—which I date as on or shortly after 26 May—while the second is a June 1913 letter from Wittgenstein to Russell, often thought to contain a “paralyzing”, if mysterious, objection to Russell’s theory. On the basis of a new interpretation of these two documents and their relationship, I revise the “standard reading” of Wittgenstein’s criticisms. The revision renders that reading invulnerable to certain seemingly devastating criticisms developed by Stevens in 2003. I defend my revised reading against various “non-standard” alternatives which have flourished in the recent literature, in part as the result of Stevens’ criticisms.

On “Props”, Wittgenstein’s June 1913 Letter, and Russell’s “Paralysis”

Recent years have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in the precise nature of Wittgenstein’s fateful but notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, levelled as Russell was furiously composing Theory of Knowledge in May–June 1913. In this paper, I place special expository focus on two controversial documents from the relevant period, whose nature and interrelationships to this point have been inadequately understood in the literature. The first document is a set of working notes composed by Russell under the title “Props”—which I date as on or shortly after 26 May—while the second is a June 1913 letter from Wittgenstein to Russell, often thought to contain a “paralyzing”, if mysterious, objection to Russell’s theory. On the basis of a new interpretation of these two documents and their relationship, I revise the “standard reading” of Wittgenstein’s criticisms. The revision renders that reading invulnerable to certain seemingly devastating criticisms developed by Stevens in 2003. I defend my revised reading against various “non-standard” alternatives which have flourished in the recent literature, in part as the result of Stevens’ criticisms.

Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions

One of the main arguments Russell offers for the Theory of Descriptions in “On Denoting” is that it can be used to solve a puzzle about substitutivity. This article argues that, owing to a widespread mischaracterization of the substitutivity principle Russell means to be defending, neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues that Russell's solution requires him to adopt certain substantive views about the nature of the referents of what are usually called “logically proper names.” In particular, Russell's solution will work only if the referents of such names are given to one who understands them in a manner that is entirely “aspect-free.” Russell's notion of acquaintance, since it fits this bill, is therefore motivated by his solution to the puzzle, as is his choice of sense-data to be the referents of genuine Russellian names of particulars. Finally, the article argues that since a version of the George IV puzzle arises for propositions, Russell's solution commits him to regarding some instances of sentences as incomplete symbols and to denying that we have acquaintance with propositions. This in turn leads Russell in Principia Mathematica to adopt the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment, and thus to embrace agnosticism about propositions. His further move to the stronger position of full eliminativism concerning propositions is motivated only by his late-in-the-day espousal of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Recent Work on Propositions

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Recent Work on Propositions

Russell’s “paralysis”

January 28, 2009 (12:22 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 051red.wpd 182 Reviews RUSSELL’S “PARALYSIS” James Connelly Philosophy, Trent U./York U. Peterborough, on k9l 1z6 / Toronto, on m3j 1p3, Canada jamesconnelly@trentu.ca Rosalind Carey. Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement. London and New York: Continuum International, 2007. Pp. [viii], 150. isbn 978-0-82648811 -4. us$132.00; £65.00 (hb). Rosalind Carey’s new book, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement , oTers a fresh look at Wittgenstein’s fateful but notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell’s so-called “multiple-relation theory of judgment”, oTered in May–June of 1913 as Russell was hastily composing the Theory of Knowledge manuscript. In light of the fact that this manuscript was abandoned and subsequently suppressed as a result of these criticisms, and given the fact that Russell nevertheless went on the develop and defend new versions of the multiple- January 28, 2009 (12:22 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 051red.wpd Reviews 183 1 In giving this reading, Carey follows Peter Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Clarendon P., 1990), esp. pp. 266–7, and relation theory long after these events, Carey sets out to answer the question: “what objections to his theory of judgment could have allowed Russell to think that his theory of judgment was still viable, but suUced to cause him to abandon the manuscript?” (p. 2). Through a careful and detailed examination of extant correspondence, working notes and diagrams, as well as of both the manuscript itself and subsequent work of Russell’s, Carey attempts to reconstruct the events of May–June 1913 in such a way as to give a plausible answer to this question. In so doing, she makes a powerful case against the orthodox interpretation of Wittgenstein ’s criticisms and Russell’s reactions to them, an interpretation according to which the criticisms culminate in the so-called “postcard” objection of June 1913 and concern either issues of logical type, or the unity of the proposition. Carey downplays the signiWcance of the June letter and instead sees Russell’s paralysis as consisting in his having no ready analysis of the form of beliefz which will both account for the bipolarity of judgment as well as accommodate Wittgenstein ’s critique. Unwilling to eliminate belief and so succumb to Wittgenstein ’s more austere extensionalism, Russell had no choice but to cease writing the manuscript, while holding out hope that an analysis of the form of belief which is immune to Wittgenstein’s critique would someday be forthcoming. Carey develops her case over the course of four compact chapters (the whole of which make for a quite digestible 120 pages), each of which builds on the insights of those coming previously. In Chapter 1, Carey looks at the development of Russell’s epistemological and logical views over the period from 1903 through 1910, for the express purposes of showing “how the multiple relation theory of judgment emerges from and is inXuenced by a number of problems and doctrines that contribute to his eventual paralysis in the face of Wittgenstein’s objections” (p. 6). She begins by introducing Russell’s early conception of belief as involving a dual relation between a subject and a complex unity, a so-called “Russellian proposition”, and grounds this conception in Russell’s view to the eTect that word meanings consist in mind- and language-independent, often Platonic, objects and properties. The relation between these semantic doctrines and Russell’s characterization of logical truths as topically and contextually unrestricted , universal principles, is also probed. Carey then goes on to show how tensions within and amongst these views lead to important theoretical diUculties , which in turn motivate the development of the theory of incomplete symbols. Notably, Carey reads the theory of incomplete symbols as designed primarily to address the sorts of concerns outlined in the so-called “Grey’s Elegy argument” contained in “On Denoting” and having only secondarily to do with either issues of ontological parsimony, or diUculties surrounding non-referring singular terms, e.g. “The Present King of France”.1 That is, she reads the theory January...