Multiparty Coalition Governments Research Articles

An Analysis of Article 356 in Coalition Era of Indian Politics

Article 356 of the Indian Constitution has often been subjected to the partisan use by the successive Central governments since 1950. However, the shift from a single-party majority government to a multi-party coalition governments in national politics since early 1990s has largely influenced the scope and intent of invoking this Article. The coalition government’s survival with the backing of regional parties has indeed been a major factor in diminishing the incentives for the arbitrary and frequent invocation of Article 356. In this backdrop, the present article explains how the political change brought about by the coalition governments since 1990s has created the conditions for restraining Central transgressions on state governance, and also discusses the prospects of rationally employing this Article in the changing political conditions of the country. The argument of this paper is that—although the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party to national political dominance since the 2014 general elections has raised apprehension about the move towards centralised federalism, it is not likely to upset the current pattern of restrained use of this Article.

Multiparty Coalition Governments, Portfolio Allocation and Ministerial Turnover in Morocco and Algeria

Abstract The article analyzes multiparty coalition governments under authoritarian tutelage in Morocco and Algeria. While in Morocco multiparty coalition governments are just a means for the King to dress their windows, in Algeria they represent a new arena of power bargaining. In both cases, portfolio allocation follows the Gamson’s law but cases of advantage for the formateur are also given. Nonetheless, the parties included in multiparty coalition governments are almost always regime-controlled ones, as is the case in Algeria, or encounter reserved domains constitutionally defined, as is the case in Morocco. Moreover, in both cases the democratic potential intrinsic to multiparty coalition governments is defused by preventing grassroots parties to access top-weighted ministerial portfolios and by envisaging a relevant role for non-party ministries. This renders cabinet positions hardly contestable and adds up to the durability of multiparty coalition governments while making them barely apt at channeling grassroots demands for political change.

Політичний проєкт керівної партії Ріккендоші-кай від виникнення до самоліквідації: ідейна сутність і причини нетривалості

The Rikkendōshi-kai party, founded in 1913, became the ruling party after winning the 1915 parliamentary election and Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu joined it. In historiography, the process of Rikkendōshi-kai emergence, as well as this party’s cabinet, is limited to an exclusively positive statement of the fact of existence of such party and government, which in the midst of World War I was replaced by a “technical” non-party cabinet. The problem of deep reasons for emergence of such an unexpected power is not only unstudied but not even posed in available publications. During World War I the party government of the Association of Allies of the Constitution effectively pursued domestic political liberalization policy (property electoral qualification was reduced) and active external imperial expansion (particularly in China). Despite the undeniable achievements, Ōkuma’s single-party Cabinet did not rely on stable majority in the parliament. Thus, in October 1916 the Cabinet was dismissed and the Rikkendōshi-kai party ceased to exist. Problem and chronological analysis method of factual material allows to claim that the main reason for the self-dissolution of “The Association of Allies of the Constitution” was lack of experience in then Japanese political tradition of forming multiparty coalition governments. Japanese party politicians learned their lessons from Rikkendoshi-kai’s bitter experience. The key one was the fact that in conditions of absence of an unambiguously dominant party in the parliament a reliable party support for the government should become inter-party coalitions, formed on the basis of inter-party ideological and personnel compromises. However, that idea was implemented only in 1924, when, for the first time in its history, a true coalition “Cabinet of Three Parties to Defend the Сonstitution” (Goken sampa naikaku) led Japan.

The agenda power of non-legislative tools

ABSTRACT How do we assess the power of governments to control and set the agenda in parliaments? How do we assess the power of oppositions to present their agenda? Cox and McCubbins’ cartel model used a roll rate analysis of legislation, while Krehbiel suggested the use of non-legislative tools. Based on this advice, this article investigates the use of a non-legislative tool – motions for the agenda – in the Israeli Knesset, or more specifically: ‘the agenda power of non-legislative tools’ defined as the ability to block or significantly delay motions from reaching a debate in committee. Using data from the Knesset, in which the opposition operates in a parliamentary system with multiparty coalition governments, it demonstrates that opposition legislators utilise these non-legislative tools more extensively than coalition members to wield their agenda power. The findings support the addition of this tool to the cartel model.

Uruguay 2020: El despliegue de la agenda de centro derecha en contexto de pandemia

The year 2020 in Uruguay was characterized by the unfolding of the agenda of the new center-right government in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper analyzes this process, paying special attention to the political dynamics between the new multi party coalition government and the opposition, under the regional context of the rise of conservative parties. The paper shows that the new government managed to take advantage of the pandemic to successfully implement its agenda of reforms both in terms of effectiveness, the cohesion of the ruling coalition and the evaluation of public opinion. At the beginning of 2021, the deterioration of health, social and economic indicators poses a more complex scenario for the government.

How do regional parties influence foreign policy? Insights from multilevel coalitional bargaining in India

When and how do regional parties influence foreign policy in federal democracies with multiparty coalition governments? The existing literature has focused on situations of foreign policy disagreements between subnational parties and the central government in multinational states. By contrast, we argue that under varying conditions, central governments either decide to accommodate the preferences of small regional parties when designing foreign policies, or co-opt these regional parties to push their own foreign policy agenda. Some scholars looked at the role of decentralization and federal power arrangements in providing more control to political sub-units over the external affairs of a state. Other studies showed that certain coalition-building configurations facilitated the inclusion of the concerns of small parties in the foreign policy debate. Bridging these two literatures, we argue that both structural and agential conditions behind regional and national coalition building processes—visible in federal settings—affect foreign policy-making in different ways, and not necessarily toward disagreement and obstruction. To illustrate these hypothesized mechanisms, we look at two case studies in the Indian context: the role of regional parties in the debate over the US–India nuclear deal of 2008 and the role of regional parties in shaping India’s Sri Lanka policy from 2009 to 2014.

Evolution of manifestos in a developing parliamentary democracy with proportional representation and multiparty coalition governments

In exploring the first two decades of evolution of political programmes applied for the electoral processes in Slovenia, a young European multiparty parliamentary democracy with a proportional electoral system and multiparty government coalitions, the article contributes to a rich tradition of studying the programmes of political parties as relevant narrators of the development of democratic systems and suggests an answer to ‘why do parties write manifestos?’ The main findings include the distinct issue emphasis of parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties’ manifestos and convergence in issue emphasis over time among parliamentary parties who go on to form coalition governments. Regarding the ‘why’, these and other findings indicate that the manifestos considered here are intended more for post-election purposes – in particular, for the formation of alliances and negotiating and running a coalition government – than for attracting voters in the pre-election period. Party programmes are seen more as self-intended tools for political struggle than as promoters or control mechanisms for the further development of the democratic political system.

The More Parties, the Greater Policy Stability

This article discusses, models and quantifies the relationship between the number of parties in government and the degree of policy change or instability. Single-party governments, such as those formed in the United Kingdom for several decades, tend to produce very high levels of policy changes and reversals, whereas multiparty coalition governments, such as the ones in Switzerland or Israel, tend to produce a high degree of stability and little policy change. This relationship is studied for 295 elections and the subsequent governments in twenty-four countries since the Second World War. According to the study, there is a strong negative correlation between the number of parties in government and the degree of policy change. The fewer parties in government the more changes, and vice versa.

Shadowing Ministers

In this article the authors study delegation problems within multiparty coalition governments. They argue that coalition parties can use the committee system to “shadow” the ministers of their partners; that is, they can appoint committee chairs from other governing parties, who will then be well placed to monitor and/or check the actions of the corresponding ministers. The authors analyze which ministers should be shadowed if governing parties seek to minimize the aggregate policy losses they suffer as the result of ministers pursuing their own parties’ interests rather than the coalition’s. Based on data from 19 mostly European parliamentary democracies, the authors find that the greater the policy disagreement between a minister’s party and its partners, the more likely the minister is to be shadowed.

The More Parties, the Greater Policy Stability

This article discusses, models and quantifies the relationship between the number of parties in government and the degree of policy change or instability. Single-party governments, such as those formed in the United Kingdom for several decades, tend to produce very high levels of policy changes and reversals, whereas multiparty coalition governments, such as the ones in Switzerland or Israel, tend to produce a high degree of stability and little policy change. This relationship is studied for 295 elections and the subsequent governments in twenty-four countries since the Second World War. According to the study, there is a strong negative correlation between the number of parties in government and the degree of policy change. The fewer parties in government the more changes, and vice versa.

Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies

Ideology is widely considered to be an important factor in shaping policy outcomes and in influencing election outcomes. We propose a theory of the coalition-directed vote. The argument suggests that voters anticipate the postelection bargains negotiated among potential members of the governing coalition and that these anticipated policy agreements inform their vote choice. Our analysis, based on 86 voter preference surveys from 23 countries and over a 25-year period, confirms that coalition-directed voting occurs with considerable frequency in contexts with multiparty coalition governments.

Agenda Control in the Israeli Knesset during Ariel Sharon's Second Government

How do multi-party coalition governments share agenda power? In principle, coalitions might allocate agenda power among their members by distributing special proposal rights, distributing special blocking rights, or both. The literature has prominent models embodying each polar possibility, with Laver and Shepsle's model envisaging that each party in a coalition has the ability to propose any bill(s) it wishes within the jurisdiction of a ministry it controls; and Cox and McCubbins' cartel theory envisaging that each party has the ability to block bills, thus necessitating collective bargaining over the overall agenda. This paper shows that agenda-setting in Israel is not consistent with the ‘ministerial dictatorship’ version of the Laver–Shepsle model but is consistent with the Cox–McCubbins model.

Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe

AbstractThis paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998–2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.

COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES

This article examines the domestic politics of sovereign debt crises. I focus on two alternative mechanisms that aggregate the preferences of domestic actors over debt repayment: single‐party versus multiparty coalition governments. I uncover a very strong empirical regularity using cross‐national data from 48 developing countries between 1971 and 1997. Countries that are governed by a coalition of parties are less likely to reschedule their debts than those under single‐party governments. The effect of multiparty coalitions on sovereign defaults is quantitatively large and roughly of the same order of magnitude as liquidity factors such as debt burden and debt service. These results are robust to numerous specifications and samples.

From “Parliamentarized” to “Pure” Presidentialism: Bolivia After October 2003

Among the many shifts in Bolivian politics since October 2003 is a subtle, yet significant change in the country’s presidential system. Bolivia has recently transitioned from a “parliamentarized” to a “pure” presidentialism. In the previous system (1985–2002), Bolivian presidents were chosen by the legislature and led multiparty coalition governments. Since October 2003, Bolivia has instead been governed by two independent chief executives. This paper discusses the shift in presidential behavior by analyzing the similarities between Carlos Mesa and Evo Morales—who also fit the description of “delegative democrats” or “populists”—and their consequences for democratic stability (the lack of a constitutional “crisis”). It also considers potential reforms recently approved by the country’s Constituent Assembly and suggests that many of the benefits of “parliamentarized” presidentialism are still relevant for constitutional engineers.

Needs and Impediments for Local Government Reform: Lessons from Israel

ABSTRACT:I argue that calls for local government reform and prospects for implementation are largely a product of images and external sociopolitical circumstances rather than of particular needs and attributes of the local government system. A discussion of images and facts in the case for local government reform in Israel shows that the need for reform was real, but debates were often based on inaccurate perceptions of extreme fragmentation and centralization. Attributes of the sociopolitical environment that form extremely high barriers for reform include ethno-religious heterogeneity, sociopolitical fragmentation, increasing role of courts as the arenas for societal conflicts, and deep involvement of national parties in local politics in a multiparty coalition government structure. The 2001–2003 political and economic crisis in Israel provides insights on the endurance of barriers for reform. It shows that crisis climate and the creation of unfavorable public image of the present local government system have a role in overcoming such barriers.

Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries

Abstract. Government formation is guided by several principles such as majority, plurality and electoral gain. According to the principle of electoral gain, parties that increase their share of seats in the elections should form the government, with parties that lose seats joining the opposition. We analyse conformity with this principle in 15 West European countries with multiparty coalition governments between 1945 and 1999. With the exception of the largest party, electoral performance is a rather poor predictor of getting into government. The results show interesting variation between countries, with the loss of seats increasing the probability of entering government in Austria, Germany, Spain and Italy. High electoral volatility is positively related to the degree to which the electoral gain principle applies, but there was no association between this principle and party system fragmentation or aggregation. Prime ministers come more often from parties that are big winners, but winning does not explain the probability of becoming a coalition partner – if a party wants to be a coalition partner, then avoiding the loss of seats is more important.

Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions

I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government.

Nepal and Bhutan in 1999: Some Progress

Nepal in 1999 At the end of 1998, Nepal appeared to be poised to continue the series of weak, unproductive, coalition cabinets that had dominated politics in Nepal since 1995. In December 1998, a one-party Nepal Congress Party (NCP) cabinet headed by G. P. Koirala was in office, but with only minority support in Parliament. Koirala' s government held office for the first half of the year primarily on his assurances to the opposition parties that an election would be held. The election date was set for May 1999, about the earliest date that climate permits balloting in the hill areas and the Himalayas. The May election was held on schedule without any serious problems and, to the surprise of many Nepalis, the NCP won an absolute majority in Paliament (111 of 205 seats) and formed a one-party government. The NCP's emergence as a majority party raised hopes that the new government would end the long period of instability caused by multiparty coalition governments and that the new NCP government would be able to enact reform legislation on a major scale-seen as required if Nepal was to begin to improve its political and economic structure. It was also assumed that a relatively strong NCP government would recast vital economic relations with India on terms more favorable to the Nepalis. It has not worked out that way, primarily because of divisions between the two main NCP factions led by Koirala and K. P. Bhattarai. After the May elections, Bhattarai was selected as prime minister while Koirala took over as party president. Both leaders have carefully avoided any open conflicts, but

Consensus Versus Majoritarian Democracy

This article argues that consensual political institutions as operationalized by Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) have significantly favorable effects on unemployment, inflation, and the number of working days lost, whereas economic growth remains unaffected. Although this finding is consistent with Olson's theoretical concept of “encompassing organizations,” this study shows that Olson's empirical operationalization is flawed. “Strong,” two-party “Westminster” systems, based on single-member district electoral rules, and single-party, bare majority cabinets do not perform as well as “weak,” multiparty coalition governments with proportional representation as an electoral rule. An empirical measure of “encompassing organizations” is introduced, termed popular cabinet support. A cross-sectional/time-series panel study of 162 elections (18 countries and 9 elections per country, N = 162) provides strong evidence that governments with consensual, inclusive, and accommodative constitutional structures and wider popular cabinet support behave more “responsibly” than do their more majoritarian, exclusionary, and adversarial counterparts.