Multiparty Coalition Governments, Portfolio Allocation and Ministerial Turnover in Morocco and Algeria

Abstract

Abstract The article analyzes multiparty coalition governments under authoritarian tutelage in Morocco and Algeria. While in Morocco multiparty coalition governments are just a means for the King to dress their windows, in Algeria they represent a new arena of power bargaining. In both cases, portfolio allocation follows the Gamson’s law but cases of advantage for the formateur are also given. Nonetheless, the parties included in multiparty coalition governments are almost always regime-controlled ones, as is the case in Algeria, or encounter reserved domains constitutionally defined, as is the case in Morocco. Moreover, in both cases the democratic potential intrinsic to multiparty coalition governments is defused by preventing grassroots parties to access top-weighted ministerial portfolios and by envisaging a relevant role for non-party ministries. This renders cabinet positions hardly contestable and adds up to the durability of multiparty coalition governments while making them barely apt at channeling grassroots demands for political change.