Multi-level Regulatory Governance Research Articles

Ocean Governance in the Coral Triangle: A Multi-Level Regulatory Governance Structure

The current mode of ocean governance in the biogeographically defined space of the Coral Triangle emerged due to the framing of marine degradation as a de-bounded risk with a transboundary nature. This framing justified the rescaling of the issue’s governance from the national to the regional. This article will explore how ocean governance in the form of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security (CTI-CFF) is an example of a regional multi-level regulatory governance arrangement based on disaggregated, regulatory forms of statehood. These new kinds of regional regulatory governance are defined by the dominance of policy and technical expertise. As such, non-state actors work closely with national and supranational actors in the development, implementation, and regulatory functions of the CTI-CFF. The organizational structure of the CTI-CFF’s governance framework provides an example of how regional regulatory systems are networked into existing national government structures. The CTI-CFF’s Regional Plan of Action and corresponding mechanisms serve as a model for each member country’s National Plan of Action and domestic programs. These plans of action promote the transformation and rescaling of national governance to be consistent with regional standards of marine resource governance. To summarize, CTI-CFF is a multi-level governance structure constructed to strengthen regulatory regionalism.

Corrigendum

Regulation & GovernanceVolume 15, Issue 2 p. 442-442 CorrigendumFree Access Corrigendum This article corrects the following: Measuring multi-level regulatory governance: Organizational proliferation, coordination, and concentration of influence Emmanuelle Mathieu, Koen Verhoest, Joery Matthys, Volume 11Issue 3Regulation & Governance pages: 252-268 First Published online: August 15, 2016 First published: 02 April 2021 https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12393AboutSectionsPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat In Mathieu et al. (2017), the second equation in Table 3 was published incorrectly. The second number ‘1’ in the numerator should be changed to ‘i’. The correct equation is presented in the table below. Table 3. Equations used in the calculation of the indices Equations Variables Description OP Organizational Proliferation Index a Number of actors in the regulatory arrangement i Number of issues in the regulatory arrangement Co Coordination Index aj Number of actors involved in the decision over the issue number j AI Actor Influence Index AI(Ak) Actor Influence of Actor number k on the whole regulatory arrangement AI(AkIj) Actor Influence of Actor number k on the issue number j Cc Concentration Index AI(Amax) Actor Influence of most influent actor of the regulatory arrangement We apologize for the error and any inconvenience it may have caused. Reference Mathieu E, Verhoest K, Matthys J (2017) Measuring Multi-level Regulatory Governance: Organizational Proliferation, Coordination, and Concentration of Influence. Regulation & Governance 11 (3): 252– 268. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12127 Wiley Online LibraryWeb of Science®Google Scholar Volume15, Issue2April 2021Pages 442-442 ReferencesRelatedInformation

Multilevel regulatory governance: Establishing bank-regulator relationships at the European Banking Authority

AbstractFollowing the 2007–9 financial crisis, the EU strengthened its institutional apparatus for bank regulation, creating a trio of sectoral bodies, including the European Banking Authority (EBA). Various aspects of this new system have been studied, but to date, little is known about how banks engage with their new supranational regulator. We argue that such engagement fosters an interdependence between banks and regulators, thus contributing to the efficiency and robustness of the overall regulatory regime; but also that it is contingent on the regulator exhibiting the qualities of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency. These qualities are grounded in the domestic regulatory governance literature, but we suggest that they are rendered problematic by the complexities of the EU's multilevel system and, in particular, the overlap in competences between the EBA and the European Central Bank. We examine the EBA in the light of these criteria and find that banks’ engagement remains pitched towards established national regulators and the EU's legislative arena. This poses concerns for the efficacy of agency governance in the EU's regulatory regime for banking.

The Politics of Local Regulation in Tanzania: The Quest for Multilevel Regulatory Governance

The Politics of Local Regulation in Tanzania: The Quest for Multilevel Regulatory Governance

Redundancy in Multilevel Energy Governance: Why (and When) Regulatory Overlap Can Be Valuable

The realization of the European Union’s climate change and energy goals is said to require a shift towards a sustainable, competitive as well as secure energy system. This shift entails considerable uncertainties as regards the behavior of the multitude of actors involved, which are exacerbated; it is argued, by the unpredictability of the decisions of regulators. Moreover, this unpredictability is increased by the proliferation of regulators at various levels of the governance system, often resulting in redundancies, i.e. duplications and overlaps in regulatory governance. Such redundancies are usually considered inefficient and, hence, wasteful. A level of redundancy in regulators and the rules they enact and enforce may, however, be required in order for the multilevel system of regulatory governance to operate effectively and legitimately, for instance through increasing innovation and responsiveness. While overlap thus in principle provides for an alternative way through which EU climate change and energy goals can be achieved, it is not at all clear if and how one can analyze and design redundant regulatory systems in practice. Much of the existing work on redundancy is theoretical and abstracted from the subject matter of regulation, while also neglecting the strategic behavior of regulators as well as companies and consumers triggered by redundancy. In this paper, the question is therefore asked under which conditions redundancies in regulatory governance can help to make experimentation with new roles, responsibilities and relationships easier and, ultimately, the shift towards a sustainable, competitive and secure energy system more attractive. By identifying such conditions, first in theory and then empirically in the case of both the preparation of codes for cross-border network issues and market integration and the development of transboundary energy infrastructure, the paper seeks to contribute to our knowledge about the design and functioning of novel institutional arrangements for multilevel regulatory governance.

Rules, Rules, Rules, Rules: Multilevel Regulatory Governance

Rules, Rules, Rules, Rules: Multilevel Regulatory Governance, G. Bruce Doern and Robert Johnson, eds., Studies in Comparative Political Economy and Public Policy; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, xi, 372.The first stated purpose of this edited collection is to “clarify conceptually the nature, causes, and dynamics of regulatory governance in, or affecting, Canada” in a world where the international, federal, provincial and local spheres are “interacting, reinforcing and colliding.” The second is to “contribute practically to the debate on what kinds of principles and institutional approaches and changes can lessen the problems of multilevel regulatory governance” (3).

Multilevel Regulatory Governance

Multilevel Regulatory Governance