Multiparty Systems Research Articles

Affective Polarization Among Radical‐Right Supporters: Dislike Differentiation and Democratic Support

Partisan affective polarization describes the extent to which different partisans like or dislike each other. In Europe, affective dislike is strongest towards the radical-right, as mainstream voters tend to hold particularly negative affect towards radical-right supporters. This is an important pattern given the recent high levels of support for radical-right parties, for example in the Netherlands, France, and Italy. However, the perspective of radical-right supporters themselves has been largely neglected in existing work. To remedy this, we examine how radical-right supporters feel towards supporters of mainstream parties. We develop a new concept, dislike differentiation, which refers to the extent to which radical-right supporters differentiate in the dislike they harbor towards mainstream parties. We use two new studies that sampled 2,628 radical-right supporters in nine European polities. We find that some supporters reject all mainstream parties, whereas others follow more typical patterns of political competition along ideological lines. Dislike differentiation among radical-right supporters is linked to key socio-political phenomena, including party attachment, ideological extremism, satisfaction with democracy, and political tolerance. By creating a novel typology combining out-party dislike and dislike differentiation, we show that anti-system radical-right supporters, characterized by high out-party dislike and low dislike differentiation, are the least supportive of democracy. By centering our analysis on those voters that receive and radiate the highest levels of negative affect, we advance knowledge on what fosters polarized attitudes and intolerance in Europe’s multiparty systems in times when the electoral popularity of the radical-right is surging.

The economic divide that isn’t: A comparative study on economic hardship and affective polarisation

This article examines the role of economic hardship in contributing to our understanding of the causes of affective polarisation – that is, the animosity between partisan groups. Evidence suggests that a variety of political attitudes and behaviours are influenced by economic hardship, but the relationship between individual economic hardship and affective polarisation has not yet been demonstrated. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether individuals facing economic insecurities are more affectively polarised. This study leverages two novel surveys, the first conducted in 11 European countries ( N = 12,000), the second in Belgium and the Netherlands ( N = 2174). Both contain individual-level measurements of economic hardship novel to the field of affective polarisation. Whereas the first allows for making generalisable claims across European multiparty systems, the second contains a more thorough operationalisation of the central concepts. The paper finds little to no evidence to support the existence of a link between economic hardship and affective polarisation. Across countries, objective and subjective measures of economic hardship are not linked to affective polarisation, neither when based on employment or financial status. Future research should now examine whether these cross-sectional findings are supported by longitudinal or experimental evidence.

Decolonization and Democratization in African Countries: The Impact of Liberal Democracy on Political Stability

Since the 1990s, the African continent has experienced dramatic changes in the political sphere. Specifically, as mentioned by Samuel Huntington in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, many Sub-Saharan African countries have undergone democratic transitions, marked by reforms from one-party systems or military rule to multiparty systems with regular elections, a process that prominently features characteristics of Western-style liberal democracy. Despite the fact that African countries employing Western-style democracy have made certain progress in political development and social governance, many African countries that have undergone this political transformation exhibit a lack of political stability. As such, this article studies the development of liberal democracy and political stability in Kenya against the backdrop of the third wave of democratization. Through analyzing the historical and socio-economic contexts of African countries, it argues that the winner-take-all logic of the western representative democracy contradicts with the cultural tradition in African countries, which emphasizes social consensus and consultation. Considering the historical problems left since the colonial era, it adds to the difficulty of applying the western democracy in contemporary African countries, and thus results in the incompatibility between the liberal democracy model and the reality of African social contexts. Consequently, it is argued that the democratization process in Africa requires further exploration and more appropriate combination of advanced political institutions and the local contexts.

Parties influence public opinion far beyond their partisans: evidence from two quasi-experiments

ABSTRACT Are parties able to influence public opinion beyond their supporters? Much of the literature on parties and public opinion finds that parties exercise considerable sway over their own partisans. However, I argue that parties in multi-party systems have broader influence – namely, they can persuade the partisans of their ally parties (“ally partisans”). Thus, I extend a key study in the field by performing difference-in-differences analyses on two rare instances in which some Danish parties shifted their policies on salient issues (unemployment benefits and early retirement), while other parties did not. However, unlike previous research, I test the influence on ally partisans. In addition, I analyse the difference-in-differences for the original partisans while omitting ally partisans from the control groups. My study also examines two potential control groups – partisans of opposing parties and nonpartisans – and concludes that the former group is more appropriate as a control. The findings demonstrate that parties influence (1) their ally partisans considerably, (2) their own partisans to a greater extent than found in past estimates, and (3) possibly even nonpartisans. This indicates that parties exercise broader and more powerful influence over public opinion than previously expected.

Going negative when spoiled for choice? Destabilizing and boomerang effects of negative political messaging in multiparty systems with multimember districts

ABSTRACT Classical electoral behaviour theories have associated possible benefits of negative campaigning with two-party plurality systems due to their zero-sum nature. Nevertheless, negative campaigning is a widely used electoral strategy outside of these contexts, despite scant evidence of its benefits for political parties and candidates who employ it. Our research question is simple – is negative campaign messaging effective for attackers in multiparty systems with multimember districts? Or does it create a ‘boomerang effect’ in this context, for which the producer of the message faces a backlash? Multiparty systems with multimember districts should, according to the literature, be scenarios where the effects of negative campaigning are most complex if not unpredictable. This paper uses Facebook political messages to inform a survey experiment design that tests the effects of negative political messaging on voters. We employ this survey in Ireland, which uses the single transferable vote, an electoral system which magnifies outcome uncertainty for attackers. Our results suggest that negative messaging in this context produces both the intended effect and a boomerang effect for the sponsor of the message. These countervailing results suggest a net null effect for the efficacy of negative messaging.

Why has Europe become the concentration area of multi-party states: A novel explanatory model of multifactorial mechanism

The existence of a multi-party system is one of the most important criterion for assessing the degree of democratization of a state. In contemporary democratic republics, the multi-party system has become a formalistic representation. However, in Europe, the de facto multi-party systems are extensively retained, making Europe a veritable concentration area of multi-party states. This research delved into the phenomenon and conducted a qualitative comparative analysis on the cases of 44 European countries to explore the factors contributing to multi-party states’ agglomeration in Europe. The findings demonstrate a novel explanatory model of multifactorial mechanism of Europe becoming the concentration area of multi-party states, whose solution coverage is 0.7 and solution consistency is 0.954545. According to the model, a developed country with a tradition of parliamentary government is more likely to possess a well-established multi-party system in a non-religious environment. High levels of educational attainment and political participation of the population allow a multi-party system to emerge and continue. Furthermore, the model indicates that a strong Christian culture hinders the development of multi-party systems to some extent, while economy growth has a direct and positive relationship with the formation and continuation of multi-party systems.

Democracy and defections

Abstract Within comparative constitutional law, there is an emerging consensus that political fragmentation has weakened political parties and hindered the functioning of legislative bodies. This article examines legal efforts to curb fragmentation in parliamentary systems by prohibiting floor crossing, or “defections”—a constitutional approach that concentrates power within party leaders. It conducts a detailed case study of India, exploring what is arguably the most extensive experiment in anti-defection law and its impact on accountability and representation. The article goes on to analyze similar laws in Israel and South Africa, highlighting the challenges of self-regulation. After evaluating the limitations of narrow anti-defection laws—such as the one in Pakistan—it proposes that the drawbacks of legislating party unity through formal defection regulation may prompt a reconsideration not only of legislatures but also political parties and political polarization. While some scholars have viewed attempts to stem fragmentation as a solution for limiting polarization, this article suggests the opposite: sharpening polarization, when coupled with norm-based internal party controls, may well tame the excesses of fragmentation, especially in non-programmatic multiparty systems. Although there are difficult tradeoffs here, as polarization can have independent (adverse) effects, the broader lessons of anti-defection laws deserve to be reckoned with. Ultimately, however, what the widespread adoption of anti-defection laws might primarily reveal is the nature of our faith—or lack thereof—in the promise of a certain form of parliamentary politics.

Appraising Measurements of Affective Polarisation in Multiparty Systems: Comparative Insights from the Low Countries

Appraising Measurements of Affective Polarisation in Multiparty Systems: Comparative Insights from the Low Countries

Electoral change through generational replacement: An age-period-cohort analysis of vote choice across 21 countries between 1948 and 2021

People’s generation may have become one of the core predictors of their vote choice. This study examines this hypothesis across 21 Western established democracies between 1948 and 2021. An age-period-cohort analysis on 258 national election surveys (N = 462.084) reveals that the most recent generations are much less likely to vote for the major right-wing party in two-party systems. In multi-party systems, the gradual decline of Christian democratic parties has been largely driven by the generational replacement of pre-WW2 cohorts. Social democratic and conservative parties may face a challenge in future decades because their support is particularly low among the most recent generations whereas liberal, socialist, and particularly green parties stand to gain from generational replacement. Far-right parties have been least popular among voters who came of age during the 1930s and 1940s. A small life-cycle effect points out that people over the age of 65 vote slightly more conservative.

Policy Diffusion Among Domestic Political Parties in Multiparty Systems: An Analysis of Election Manifestos of Indian Political Parties

Policy Diffusion Among Domestic Political Parties in Multiparty Systems: An Analysis of Election Manifestos of Indian Political Parties

Unveiling the Consequences of Parliamentary Thresholds on the Quality and Quantity of Political Representation in Multi-Party Systems

Unveiling the Consequences of Parliamentary Thresholds on the Quality and Quantity of Political Representation in Multi-Party Systems

Government political ideology and green innovation: evidence from OECD countries

In this paper, we examine the relationship between government political ideology and green innovation. We employ data on 20 democratic countries with multi-party systems between 2010 and 2018. Green innovation is measured by the total patents in environment-related technologies. We find a negative relationship between left-leaning government and green innovation, suggesting that leftist governments are associated with low green innovations. This finding is consistent with the political assumption that leftist governments resist technological advancement because it may cause unemployment, whereas rightist promotes technological advancement to benefit the capitalist. We also find that the effect of political ideology remains the same during electoral years, implying that elections do not present any pressure on parties to change their course towards green innovation. Our result implies that partisan politics matters in finding solutions to unending environmental challenges. The results are robust to alternative measurements of variables and econometric identification strategies.

Not everyone suffers equally: The effect of electoral overlap on mainstream party responses to radical right parties

The rise of radical right parties in Europe has led to a number of strategic responses from mainstream parties (MSPs). However, not all MSPs are equally affected by the rise of challenger parties. This idea has been neglected in much of the quantitative work in the field. This paper extends this argument and investigates electoral overlap in a cross-country study of multiparty systems. Using Propensity to Vote (PTV) data to measure the electoral overlap between MSPs and radical right parties in eight Western European countries, I estimate the effect of right-wing threat on the positions of MSPs on immigration. A higher threat of losing voters to the radical right is associated with a move towards more restrictive immigration policies; on the other hand, a party’s chance to win voters back from the radical right has no significant impact on its positions.

Complementary Knowledge Distillation for Robust and Privacy-Preserving Model Serving in Vertical Federated Learning

Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables an active party with labeled data to enhance model performance (utility) by collaborating with multiple passive parties that possess auxiliary features corresponding to the same sample identifiers (IDs). Model serving in VFL is vital for real-world, delay-sensitive applications, and it faces two major challenges: 1) robustness against arbitrarily-aligned data and stragglers; and 2) privacy protection, ensuring minimal label leakage to passive parties. Existing methods fail to transfer knowledge among parties to improve robustness in a privacy-preserving way. In this paper, we introduce a privacy-preserving knowledge transfer framework, Complementary Knowledge Distillation (CKD), designed to enhance the robustness and privacy of multi-party VFL systems. Specifically, we formulate a Complementary Label Coding (CLC) objective to encode only complementary label information of the active party's local model for passive parties to learn. Then, CKD selectively transfers the CLC-encoded complementary knowledge 1) from the passive parties to the active party, and 2) among the passive parties themselves. Experimental results on four real-world datasets demonstrate that CKD outperforms existing approaches in terms of robustness against arbitrarily-aligned data, while also minimizing label privacy leakage.

The Great Global Divider? A Comparison of Urban-Rural Partisan Polarization in Western Democracies

This study is the first to measure urban-rural electoral divides in a way that facilitates comparisons beyond majoritarian democracies of the UK and North America. Based on national election results at the lowest available geographic level in fifteen countries covering roughly five decades, we present a measure for each election and political party, enabling comparisons over time and between countries with different electoral and party systems. We show that long-term increases in urban-rural divides have been most pronounced in the US, the UK, and Canada, but these divides have also emerged in several European multiparty systems in recent decades, largely because of growing smaller parties with predominantly urban or rural support. Overall urban-rural electoral divides remain lower in these systems due to continued presence of mainstream parties with geographically diverse support. Our contribution paves the way for a comparative research agenda on causes and consequences of urban-rural electoral polarization.

Coalition Governance under Separation of Powers: Shadowing by Committee in Coalitional Presidentialism

AbstractDo coalition parties in presidential systems shadow one another with an eye on reducing agency loss? Our knowledge of intra‐coalitional delegation under presidentialism remains limited to a few case studies. This article addresses that question using an original data set of committee chairs in eight multiparty presidential systems around the world. It shows that shadowing—the appointment of chairs from one coalition party to committees overseeing portfolios controlled by another coalition party—is a function of the degree of agency loss the coalition expects to a specific party, operationalized in terms of ideological distance as well as the salience of portfolios. However, the data also tentatively suggest that powerful committees reduce rather than increase the incidence of shadowing, which may be attributed to the risk of intraparty agency loss under separation of powers.

Can we predict multi-party elections with Google Trends data? Evidence across elections, data windows, and model classes

Google trends (GT), a service aggregating search queries on Google, has been used to predict various outcomes such as as the spread of influenza, automobile sales, unemployment claims, and travel destination planning [1, 2]. Social scientists also used GT to predict elections and referendums across different countries and time periods, sometimes with more, sometimes with less success. We provide unique evidence on the predictive power of GT in the German multi-party systems, forecasting four elections (2009, 2013, 2017, 2021). Thereby, we make several contributions: First, we present one of the first attempts to predict a multi-party election using GT and highlight the specific challenges that originate from this setting. In doing so, we also provide a comprehensive and systematic overview of prior research. Second, we develop a framework that allows for fine-grained variation of the GT data window both in terms of its width and distance to the election. Subsequently, we test the predictive accuracy of several thousand models resulting from those fine-grained specifications. Third, we compare the predictive power of different model classes that are purely GT data based but also incorporate polling data as well as previous elections. Finally, we provide a systematic overview of the challenges one faces in using GT data for predictions part of which have been neglected in prior research.

Affective polarization in Europe

Abstract Affective polarization, a concept that originated in the USA, has increasingly been studied in Europe’s multi-party systems. This form of polarization refers to the extent to which party supporters dislike one another – or, more technically, to the difference between the positive feelings towards the supporters of one’s own political party and the negative feelings towards the supporters of other parties. Measuring this gap in Europe’s multi-party systems requires researchers to make various important decisions relating to conceptualization and measurement. Often, our focus could instead lie on assessing partisan hostility or negative party affect, which is easier to measure. While recent research on affective polarization in Europe has already taught USA lot, both about affective polarization and about political conflict in Europe, I nevertheless suggest that research in this field faces four challenges, namely developing better measures, more sophisticated theories, clearer accounts of affective polarization’s importance and successful ways of reducing negative party affect, if this is indeed desirable.

Socialized with "old cleavages" or "new dimensions": An Age-Period-Cohort analysis on electoral support in Western European multiparty systems (1949–2021)

Across Western Europe, the electoral base of formerly dominating parties on the left and the right has been eroding in the past decades. In contrast, both far-right parties and green parties could expand their vote share in numerous elections all over Western Europe - especially among younger voters. Still, those transformations in multiparty systems remain understudied: Are those electoral differences representing a cohort effect within the left and within the right bloc? This study uses survey data from ten Western European countries spanning over 60 years to test for cohort differences in political blocs. By applying multilevel logistic regression models and generalized additive mixed models, the analysis yields generational differences within the left and the right, with more recent cohorts being more likely to vote for greens than other left-wing and more likely to prefer the far-right over other right-wing parties. Those results shed light on the cohort-driven electoral realignment in Western Europe.

Contemporary Autocratisation of Democracies in the Context of “a Paradox of Democracy”

After the fall of the “Iron Curtain,” Francis Fukuyama formulated a thesis on structural victory of liberal democracy and its fundamental values, such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of worldview, freedom of the press etc. This thesis was demonstrably erroneous, as at the beginning of the 21st century, the crisis of liberal democracy in relation to the growth of populist movements is mentioned more and more frequently. While seizing power through democratic means, populist parties abandon the ideals of liberal democracy and values and pivot towards an autocratic governance model while ostensibly adhering to the rules of formal democracy. It was Hannah Arendt, who warned against such a situation saying that tendencies to move towards autocracy within democracies are specific for multi-party systems, while two-party systems in democracies are relatively less prone to such transformation. With regard to the above, the problem which philosophy of politics calls a “paradox of democracy” reappears. Among other things, it is related to the question on the limit of tolerance the liberal democracy has for thoughts, attitudes, actions and words which are substantially opposed to democracy and may lead to autocracy. At the same time, we are observing the fact of reappearance of the militant democracy theory, formulated by Karl Loewenstein. The aim of this article is to look closely at the theory and its suggested modifications (described as neo-militant democracy), as well as to answer the questions on what tools are needed and if they are even possible to be used to defend not only procedures, but also values of democracy from its progressive destabilisation in the face of digital revolution.