Democracy and defections

Abstract

Abstract Within comparative constitutional law, there is an emerging consensus that political fragmentation has weakened political parties and hindered the functioning of legislative bodies. This article examines legal efforts to curb fragmentation in parliamentary systems by prohibiting floor crossing, or “defections”—a constitutional approach that concentrates power within party leaders. It conducts a detailed case study of India, exploring what is arguably the most extensive experiment in anti-defection law and its impact on accountability and representation. The article goes on to analyze similar laws in Israel and South Africa, highlighting the challenges of self-regulation. After evaluating the limitations of narrow anti-defection laws—such as the one in Pakistan—it proposes that the drawbacks of legislating party unity through formal defection regulation may prompt a reconsideration not only of legislatures but also political parties and political polarization. While some scholars have viewed attempts to stem fragmentation as a solution for limiting polarization, this article suggests the opposite: sharpening polarization, when coupled with norm-based internal party controls, may well tame the excesses of fragmentation, especially in non-programmatic multiparty systems. Although there are difficult tradeoffs here, as polarization can have independent (adverse) effects, the broader lessons of anti-defection laws deserve to be reckoned with. Ultimately, however, what the widespread adoption of anti-defection laws might primarily reveal is the nature of our faith—or lack thereof—in the promise of a certain form of parliamentary politics.