Mubarak Regime Research Articles

Pyramid capitalism: Cronyism, regulation, and firm productivity in Egypt

Using a large, original database of 385 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, we document for the first time the negative impact of cronyism on economic growth. In the early 2000s, a policy shift in Egypt led to the expansion of crony activities into new, previously unconnected sectors. 4-digit sectors that experienced crony entry between 1996 and 2006 experienced lower aggregate employment growth during the period than those that did not. A wide array of supporting evidence indicates that this effect was causal, reflecting the mechanisms described in Aghion et al. (2001), and not due to selection. Crony entry skewed the distribution of employment toward smaller, less productive firms; crony firms did not enter into sectors that would have also grown more slowly even in the absence of crony entry; and they enjoyed multiple regulatory and fiscal privileges that reduced competition and investments by non-crony firms, including trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and favorable regulatory enforcement. Moreover, energy subsidies and trade protection account for the higher profits of politically connected firms.

Mobilization structures and political change in an authoritarian context: the national association for change as a case study (2010–2011)

ABSTRACTIn spite of the eruption of numerous public protests in contestation of the Hosni Mubarak regime since 2004, it was only with Khalid Said’s death that public protests gained momentum. The torture to death of the young Alexandrian man by police officers incited rage among youth on social media where pictures of his disfigured face went viral. Although it was not an unprecedented case of violation, this study argues that Khalid Said’s death was a transformative event that enabled Mohamed ElBaradei’s National Association for Change to provide the necessary mobilisation structures for youth protests. The NAC mobilised opposition groups and movements, fuelled by a shared grievance over the death of Said, into protests calling for Mubarak’s ouster. While the literature has mainly focused on how mobilisation structures would develop into a successful collective action in democratic regimes, this study introduces transformative events as the reason behind the success of mobilisation structures in an authoritarian environment. By perceiving a shared grievance among youth, who were highly identified politically with Mubarak’s opponents, and capitalising on a political opportunity to call for the fall of authoritarianism, transformative events led to collective action. This study relies on a qualitative research methodology based on exhaustive semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with 25 NAC members from December 2011 until August 2012 in Cairo.

THE WALL


 
 
 
 On January 25, 2011, Egyptian youth protestors took to the squares and streets in all the major cities of Egypt, asking for “bread, freedom, and social justice.” A few days after, when marches across Egypt ballooned, the protesting youth felt empowered to topple the oppressive Mubarak regime that had lasted for close to 30 years. In a collective effort, they gushed into Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo, and the streets in its vicinity, to ensure that their needs were known and to demand that they be met. The subsequent series of events included the first fair election in the modern history of Egypt, followed by the military coup.
 Throughout these events, street art and social media became the main two mediums of public expression and news sharing. The walls of the streets surrounding Tahrir Square were very dynamic, changing with every new incident to communicate the tragedies that the state media refused to circulate. One of the walls, a wall on the street leading to Muhammed Mahmoud Street, was particularly interactive.
 This poem addresses the resistance of the inspired youth protestors against the government before and after the military coup.
 
 
 

Voting in Transition: Participation and Alienation in Egypt’s 2012 Presidential Election

How does voter turnout change as countries transition to democracy? Using district-level data from Egypt’s 2012 presidential election, we show that turnout was higher in more educated and urban districts—a stark reversal from voting patterns under the authoritarian Mubarak regime, when less educated and poorer areas were more likely to participate. However, this pattern weakened in the second round of the 2012 election, when the choice was restricted to two candidates who reflected Egypt’s primary pre-revolution political divide. Urban and educated districts experienced a decline in turnout and a rise in protest voting during the second round relative to the first, suggesting that key political groups were alienated from the electoral process. These results indicate that who participates in elections can shift quickly as institutions change, but this is conditional on the choice of candidates available to voters.

Rationalizing Public Repression: Mubarak's Self‐Toppling Regime

Rationalizing Public Repression: Mubarak's Self‐Toppling Regime

Revisiting the Political Economy of the State to Society Relation during Mubarak Regime

This study revisits the political economy of the Mubarak Regime and his downfall byengaging with the existing literature, which dwells on political, economic,administrative, legal, and constitutional methods of maintaining hegemony and regimessurvival. This paper revisits and combines them into a single framework and argues thatstate structure and society remained fundamentally disconnected from each other,whereas their relations remained dialectical between the state's control over society onthe one hand and interests of the people on the other. It is argued that Mubarak madeuse of moralism rhetoric and pragmatic coercion that disenfranchised the society ofEgypt from the state structure and interest articulation which were not sustainable forthe longer term. It is argued that the revolution was rolled back as the Morsi regimeapplied the same tactics his predecessor had applied.

‘Let them entertain themselves’: the fall of the Mubarak regime seen through Egyptian political cartoons

ABSTRACTThis article examines the issues underlying the downfall of the Mubarak regime from the perspective of Egyptian cartoonists. A total of 2734 political cartoons published in five leading newspapers between January 2010 and February 2011 are analyzed. Because they form a significant part of the cultural context within which these cartoons are created, popular political jokes are also referenced. The study identifies political stagnation, domestic issues and corruption as the three most significant issues that paved the road to the fall of Mubarak.

Institutional journalism in a revolutionary crisis: the press as an aide to the Muslim Brotherhood 2011–2012

ABSTRACTThis article is based on the hypothesis that the Egyptian institutional media played an active role in the Egyptian ‘Arab Spring’ revolution in 2011 and analyzes how Egypt's official newspapers constructed and presented a moderate and positive image of the Muslim Brotherhood (hereinafter the Brotherhood) despite the fact that they had labeled the Brotherhood ‘the outlawed movement’ a year earlier. In order to examine whether their attitudes changed after the downfall of the Mubarak regime, a critical discourse analysis of newspaper texts has been made of the news columns written throughout 2011 of two of the most popular Egyptian newspapers – al-Ahram (n = 115) and al-Gumhuriyya (n = 94) both of which identify with the Egyptian government's official policy. In addition, an analysis made of three of the Brotherhood's publications (n = 72) (N = 281) revealed that the Brotherhood exploited the printed media not only to replace the regime but also to gain control of its narrative. Ultimately, by controlling the shaping of public opinion, the media contributed to the drawing of a parallel between the motivation that formed the basis of the mass protest and the Brotherhood's agenda.

Arab Spring: A Case Study of Egyptian Revolution 2011

Egyptian Revolution, also known as Arab Spring or Arab Uprising, was a shock for international community because Egypt has been seen as one of the strongest military state in North Africa region. Experts and observers even suggested that this revolution is the biggest event since the Cold War. No one ever saw this coming; yet, the Revolution happened, and it succeeded to topple President Hosni Mubarak from power. Indeed, prior to the revolution, there are factors that became the preliminary incidents as well as problems that led to the revolution, and most of these factors came from within the country. Nevertheless, this revolution has given idea to other states with repressive regime in the North Africa region, which started the ‘domino effect’ in Middle East and North Africa region. As for Egyptians, though successfullnes of the revolution brought positive outcome for them, the negative result also followed as well as responses from international community. The objective of this paper is to examine the Egyptian Revolution that led to the end of Hosni Mubarak regime. Keywords: Arab Spring; Egyptian Revolution; President Hosni Mubarak; ‘domino effect’; Middle East and North Africa region.

Economic Interdependence and Stability: The Failure of US Policy in Egypt

This paper argues, with a focus on the final 10 years of the Mubarak regime, that the US policy of using economic interdependence to influence stability in Egypt failed. By assessing the formation of this US policy and the factors concerning US‒Egyptian ties, this paper also provides a better understanding of US policy towards Egypt in general. The argument is entrenched in the stability through economic interdependence literature and identifies how this case study disproves the positive correlation associated with these two variables. The paper achieves this aim by consulting primary source governmental and non-governmental material, media, analytical and scholarly work concerned with the topic. Consequently, the paper identifies how and why Egypt’s alignment to the ‘War on Terror’, suppression of political opposition and the run-up to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, led to the US policy failure.

Trickster Defeats the Revolution: Egypt as the Vanguard of the New Authoritarianism

Egypt’s January 25 Revolution often has been viewed as an explicit contest between the Hosni Mubarak regime and its cronies, who were able to prevail by pulling the levers of a ‘deep state,’ and revolutionaries espousing progressive visions, albeit visions divided between those of Islamists and non-Islamists, and often seen by each as mutually incompatible with the other. The defeat of the January 25 Revolution’s progressive aspirations can be understood, to a substantial degree, as a victory by the old regime. However, revolution understood as a Liminal Crisis allows us to see the rise of ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi not as a straightforward restoration of the old regime, but as both a revolutionary outcome and as an instantiation of a New Authoritarianism that has been making significant strides toward power in the wake of the 2011 revolutions. Liminality is understood here as the intermediate stage in a transition as described in Victor Turner’s Ritual Process and recently reinterpreted in the context of politics by Bjørn Thomassen. The potential dangers of liminality often are controlled by ritual, but this is not the case in revolutions, which become liminal crises precisely because there is no conventionalized means for closing off the state of being in-between. In such circumstances Tricksters—beings at home in liminality and often-elaborated in myth, folklore, and literature—become potentially dangerous in politics. Sisi can be seen as a Trickster politician. But more broadly, the structuring of liminality through the global political-economic order of contemporary capitalism both creates a generalized precarity outside the most elite levels of society, and at the same time predisposes those compelled to live in precarity to be attentive to political Tricksters. Hence liminality can be seen as both the beginning and the end of revolution.

A political settlements lens onto Egypt’s critical junctures and cyclic violence (2011–2014)

While there is a copious body of literature explaining Egypt’s political trajectory post-Mubarak through the lens of democratisation and transition theory, this paper argues that by using a political settlements lens, a less linear reading of the events can be offered, which highlights several attempts through both peaceful and violent means of arriving at negotiated agreements. The paper analyses the forging of three political settlements, one informal (2011) and two formal (2012, 2013) following the demise of the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the influence of intrinsic, instrumental and resultant violence on power configurations. It argues that the formal political settlement forged in Egypt in 2013 following the ousting of President Morsi cannot be read independently of the exclusionary outcomes of the informal political settlement forged in 2011 and the demise of the Fairmont Agreement of 2012. The paper relies on empirical data, including survey and focus groups undertaken in 2013–2014, complemented with secondary literature in Arabic and English.

Beyond Biodiversity Conservation: Why Policy Needs Social Theory, Social Theory Needs Justice, and Justice Needs Policy

Beyond Biodiversity Conservation: Why Policy Needs Social Theory, Social Theory Needs Justice, and Justice Needs Policy

The Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Virtuous society’ and State Developmentalism in Egypt: the Politics of ‘Goodness’

The rise of Islamists in Arab countries has often been explained by their capacity to offer an alternative path of development, based on a religious vision and on a parallel welfare sector, challenging post-independence developmentalist states. Taking the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and building on ethnographic fieldwork, this chapter aims to contribute to this debate, exploring how conflict and cooperation were deeply intertwined in the relationships between this movement and Mubarak's regime. Rather than postulating any structural polarisation, or—in contrast—any simplistic authoritarian coalition, the author argues that the vision of two models of development opposing one another unravels when we move from abstract approaches towards empirical studies. On the ground, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the former regime elites participated in what the author calls the politics of ‘goodness’ (khayr), which she defines as a conflictual consensus built on entrenched welfare networks, and on an imaginary matrix mixing various discursive repertoires of state developmentalism and religious welfare. The chapter also elaborates an interpretative framework to aid understanding of the sudden rise and fall of the Brotherhood in the post-2011 period, showing that, beyond its failure, what is at stake is the breakdown of the politics of ‘goodness’ altogether.

Regime-change agenda: the Egyptian experience from 2011 to 2015

This article discusses the role of the United States of America in the failure of the democratic revolution in Egypt during the Arab Spring. While appreciating the role of internal actors and the domestic dynamics, it demonstrates that regime change in Egypt was largely a consequence and a reflection of the US’s interests in Egypt and the region in general. It argues that the seemingly successful removal of the Hosni Mubarak regime by popular uprisings and the rise of Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood signalled the success of democracy. However, Morsi’s controversial overthrow and imprisonment, notwithstanding his weaknesses, led to the backfiring of the regime-change strategy. The subsequent rise to power of a former military man, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and his administration has, thus far, demonstrated a contradiction to all the promises of the Egyptian revolution. It concludes that the drivers of regime change should re-examine the merits of their strategy in an effort to establish lasting peace in the country.

God in the Tumult of the Global Square: Religion in Civil Society by Mark Juergensmeyer, Dinah Griego, and John Soboslai

Reviewed by: James G. Mellon, independent scholar, Halifax, NS, CanadaIn the midst of the tumult at Cairo's Tahrir Square during the protests that ultimately brought down the Mubarak regime in 2011, Muslims were able on Friday to engage in prayer safe from the intervention of troops because they were surrounded as they prayed by a ring composed of Coptic Christians, and on Sunday the Coptic Christians could pray without harassment because they were protected by a ring of Muslims. Even those with little knowledge of global politics during the last 20 years must be aware, to some degree, of the rising profile of religion in the public arena, whether the emergence in both democratic and non-democratic forms of Islamic revivalism, the rise of Hindu nationalism, or the in American politics of the Religious Right. Conventional notions of secularization tended to hold that over time the of religion in public life would gradually but invariably diminish, and that religion would be increasingly consigned to the private sphere. Recent developments have challenged such conventional notions, and this led New York's Henry Luce Foundation to sponsor a workshop held at the University of California at Santa Barbara on Religion in Global Civil Society. This foundational event, held in 2012, led to a series of further workshops among academics and representatives of various faiths in Santa Barbara, Buenos Aires, Delhi, Cairo, Shanghai, and Moscow. in the Tumult of the Global Square: Religion in Global Civil Society encapsulates the results.God in the Tumult of the Global Square does a profound service in framing the issues involved. It also conveys just how complex the subject is. In some cases, religion seems to be on the cutting edge of progressive movements; in other cases, it seems associated with the defence of traditional identities besieged by globalization. Globalization opens up new horizons for many, even as it potentially threatens notions of identity, accountability, and authority. Juergensmeyer, Griego, and Soboslai observe that, at a time in which globalization and the emergence of nascent local nationalisms complicate issues of identity, religion sometimes operates to erode and sometimes to reinforce existing notions of identity. Sometimes it supports, and sometimes it inhibits democratization. Nevertheless, invariably it exercises power that cannot be ignored. The authors note the protests of recent years, observing that God is in these public squares as well. In almost every case, religion has played a role (115). They point out thatIn Turkey and Iran, the protestors were motivated, in part, by antagonism against government policies that they felt forced religious standards on personal behavior. …

The evolution of norms: American policy toward revolution in Iran and Egypt

ABSTRACTIs there a growing norm against violence towards civilians that constrains how the United States deals with its client states? This article examines two similar cases that suggest there is. In Iran in 1978 and in Egypt in 2011, the United States faced a possible revolution by a democratic/Islamist opposition, yet American policy makers gave their major regional ally opposite advice. In 1978, the White House urged the Shah to crack down on the opposition, and, in 2011, it pressed the Mubarak regime, as well as other regimes, to refrain from violence. This indicates that in situations where the American government is culpable for a potential bloodbath, policy makers are loath to take on that responsibility, which significantly shapes their policy toward revolution in a way that it did not when President Carter called the commitment to human rights “absolute.”

The January 25th 2011 "Revolution", 5 years later – a Balance

The struggle between the rebelling masses and the old regime is the fate of every revolution in history. This rebellion has mobilized mainly the forces of the counter- revolution, both the brutal violent force, as well as the delicate strategic thinking soft power, which I refer to as the class brain. In the case of Egypt 2011, this struggle was very clear from the first day. TheSupreme Council of Armed Forces” (SCAF) had sacrificed Mubarak to protect or evensave the whole regime from further radicalization by the popular movement. The military leadership has indeed theatrically saluted with military honors the martyrs of the great Revolution, but at the same time they have severely resisted any claims of this movement. Every achievement was only made possible thanks to massive combat missions. Two demonstrations with more than a Million demonstrators in March 2011 were necessary to overthrow the nominee of Mubarak's cabinet. Two more followed to arrest Mubarak’s sons and his clique and bring them to tribunal in April. And for that alone to happen, this revolutionary wave had to continue with undiminished momentum until July 2011. The maxim of the SCAF was therefore; make minimal concessions towards the revolutionary forces and retain maximum of old power structures. In order for this tactic to work, the SCAF has entered into an alliance with the political power, the only force in the class, which did in fact dispute the Mubarak regime about its share of the power, the Muslim-Brotherhood and all the other groups of political Islam.

Parliamentary elections and the future of the political system in Egypt

Egypt's recent parliamentary elections held from 17 October to 2 December 2015 took place at the end of an unsettled transitional period in the country that lasted for almost five years since the January 2011 revolt ousted the almost 30-year-old Hosni Mubarak regime. This paper discusses the road to these recent parliamentary elections that began with the ‘Corrective Revolution’, ‘road map’ and constitution of 2013. General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's victory in the presidential elections of 2014 was followed by controversial legislation, unnatural political alliances, and a troubled and unfavourable political environment for holding the parliamentary elections. The paper examines some of the candidates in these parliamentary elections and the absence of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the election results and the parliament they produced, concluding with the repercussions for the future of the political system.

الحزبية عند جماعة الإخوان المسلمين 1934 – 2011م

تناول موضوع الحزبية عند جماعة الإخوان المسلمين 1934 – 2011م فکرة الحزبية عند حسن البنا، وموقفه من الأحزاب في عصره، ووضح رغبة البنا في تأسيس حزب واحد، يستمد برنامجه من مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية؛ لذا طالب بإلغاء الأحزاب السياسية، متجاهلا بذلک کافة التوجهات الفکرية والأيديولوجية التي سادت مصر في هذه الفترة التاريخية. وخلف حسن الهضيبي البنا في قيادة الجماعة، وعاصر ثورة 23 يوليو 1952م، وأراد توجيه الثورة بما يتوافق وفکر الإخوان؛ مما أوقع الجماعة في صراع مع نظام يوليو، انتهى بتوجيه عدة ضربات لها، أدت إلى انهيار الجماعة. وعادت الجماعة إلى العمل السياسي بعد أن سمح الرئيس السادات بالتعددية الحزبية، وحاول عمر التلمساني مرشد الجماعة تأسيس حزب سياسي يعبر عن توجهاتها، ولکن الصراع الفکري داخل أروقة الجماعة أفشل هذه المحاولة، وتعرضت قيادات الجماعة مع غيرها من رموز القوى السياسية وآخرون إلى السجن نهاية عهد السادات. وسمح الرئيس مبارک للجماعة بالعمل السياسي طوال الثمانينات دون صدام معها، وفاز بعض أعضاء الجماعة في انتخابات 1984م، و1987، 2005، وحاولت الجماعة تأسيس حزب سياسي دون جدوى، واصطدمت بالنظام؛ مما أدى إلى توجيه الضربات المتتالية إليها. وعندما نشبت ثورة 25 يناير 2011م استغلت الجماعة الوضع الثوري في البلاد، وأسست حزب الحرية والعدالة. Abstract. This study describes the historical evolution of Partisan idea in Muslim Brotherhood thought 1934 to 2011, starting from Hassan El bana. We also Assessed The attitude of El bana towards other political parties, emphazing his desire to keep a unique political party whose ideas are mainly driven by the Islamic religion El bana asked for excluding all political parties from the political theatre, regardless of their background and ideologies. Similar to El bana, El Hudaybi was the leader of The Muslim Brotherhood during july 1952 evolution, attempting to convert the Egyptian Revolution to an Islamic revolution. This attempt forces The Muslim Brotherhood their political work after a permission from president Sadat. Omar Telmisani the next leader Muslim Brotherhood endeavored to construct a new political party, but this attempt failed due to internal conflicts. Many leaders of Muslims Brotherhood were in jail at the end of sadat's age. President Mubarak gave a permission for Muslims Brotherhood to practice their political activities during 1980s, but with no conflict with Mubarak's regime. Some members of the Muslims Brotherhood successfully become members in the Egyptian parliament in 1984 , 1987 and 2005. At the same time, they failed to constituted their political party. After 25 Jan 2011, Muslims Brotherhood constituted Freedom and Justice political party.