Phenomenological Movement Research Articles

Понятие телесности в рецепции представителей феноменологии архитектуры

This article is devoted to the question of corporeality within the phenomenology of architecture. It aims to observe how this term is represented in theoretical works by architects and theorists, such as Alberto Perez-Gomez, Juhani Pallasmaa, and Steven Holl. These theorists are concerned about the social and cultural context of architecture. Furthermore, they pointed out the importance of sensory perception as a key factor in the process of interaction between a building and its user. They believed that pure, genuine contact could only be achieved at the pre-speculative level. They argue that the body does not exist separately from the surrounding space, as well as the space is inextricably linked with its viewer. An experience received by the body through its senses turns into one holistic image. The qualitative characteristics of space — such as length, width, color, depth — are determined solely by the senses, that is, through the body. Thus, the theorists of phenomenological movement emphasize the value of embodiment both in the design and the perception of architecture.

Anschauung, Anschauen (Intuition)

Since Plato’s metaphor of the light of knowledge used in the “Allegory of the Cave” from his dialogue Politeia, the concepts of Anschauen or Anschauung (intuition) and their corresponding lexical field, including the terms light, sun, and eye, represent key notions and much-debated issues in philosophical thinking. In his literary, scientific, and philosophical writings, Goethe does not articulate a systematic and explicit theory of these concepts; on the contrary, most of his remarks on the topic of “intuition” are aphoristic or tacitly integrated into his poetic and scientific works. One of his main contributions to the philosophical debates surrounding Anschauen and Anschauung is that he developed and integrated into his works different modes of a specifically creative and productive—as opposed to a merely receptive and sensory—form of Anschauen. This productive form of Anschauen, for which he also uses the terms “Phantasie” (phantasy), “Einbildungskraft” (imagination), “exakte sinnliche Phantasie” (exact sensory phantasy or imagination) or “anschauende Urteilskraft” (intuitive power of judgment) in various contexts, can serve as both a creative faculty in his poetry and a precise scientific or philosophical instrument of cognition. Within the context of the philosophical tradition, and apart from the heritage of Plato and Platonism, Goethe’s notion of Anschauen can be understood, on the one hand, in the context of classical German philosophy and its debates on “anschauender Verstand” (intuitive understanding) and “intellektuelle” or “intellektuale Anschauung” (intellectual intuition). On the other hand, it is also phenomenologically grounded and anticipates the main insights of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and the phenomenological movement in the 20th century, one of the most important of which is the so-called phenomenological Wesensschau (eidetic intuition).

O campo da estética social: ambiente e alteridade / The field of social aesthetics: environment and otherness

This paper seeks to introduce the field of social aesthetics, concerning both the phenomenological tradition and psychology academic research. It proposes a brief return to the history of the phenomenological movement and it points out the relevance of concepts like sensitivity and intersubjectivity. In the context of contemporary phenomenology, particularly following Merleau-Ponty's thought, the paper focus on the aesthetics concept in relation to the environment (Arnold Berleant) and the issue of the otherness (Joao Frayze-Pereira). The revision of the idea of aesthetic as a theory of sensibility opens up the field of everyday aesthetics and the meaning process of interpersonal relationships. In sum, the contribution of the field of social aesthetics in psychology highlight the participatory aspects of the sensitive dimension in social life.

Das Wesen der Heimat nach Kurt Stavenhagen

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the main premises of the notion of “homeland” as analyzed by Kurt Stavenhagen, the significant Latvian-German philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century. The paper points out the differences in Stavenhagen’s approach to the notion of homeland between the first and second edition of his study, Heimat als Grundlage menschlicher Existenz (Homeland as the Basis of Human Existence) from 1939 and Heimat als Lebenssinn (Homeland as the Meaning of Life) from 1948. The paper informs about the biographical and political background of Stavenhagen’s analysis and argues that his philosophical thought belongs to the so-called phenomenological movement. The thesis of the paper is that Stavenhagen’s definition of the homeland as a kind of community presupposes Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between community and society, which was fundamental for German sociology of that time. The author argues that Stavenhagen follows Max Scheler’s ideological misinterpretation of Tönnies’ distinction in his “war writings” in that he contrasts two types of sociality: authentic and unauthentic. These types are characteristic for German and Anglo-American social relations, respectively. In this light, Stavenhagen’s analysis turns out to be not so much a phenomenology but rather a mythology of the homeland. In reference to Leszek Kołakowski’s book The Presence of Myth (1984), the paper presents the need for answering to the “phenomenon of the indifference of the world” as a proper meaning of Stavenhagen’s mythology.

Zwrot erotyczny w fenomenologii francuskiej?

One way to describe changes in the phenomenological movement is to announce the next “turns”. The best known is the “theological turn in French phenomenology” announced in 1991 by Dominique Janicaud, but there is also talk of an aesthetic, cognitive and other turn. In this paper, we want to investigate whether we can tell about an erotic turn in French phenomenology, and this is because of the important place in the study of corporeality, love, eroticism and sexuality in French authors. First, we show the French phenomenology as a place of spontaneous changes, excesses and turns. Then we look at the structure of turn, referring to Heidegger’s die Kehre as the paradigm. This is justified, since French phenomenology is much more rooted in Heidegger's thought than in Husserl’s. Interpretation of the term “turn” is ambiguous and we may speak of its four versions, which, taken together, form a chiasmic structure. After referring to it erotic studies in French phenomenologists, it should be stated that the “erotic turn” in French phenomenology exists and in the same time does not exist, that is, it has the character of a paradox. The erotic turn does not occur if understood as a critical point and a new beginning, or as a definitive transgression of metaphysics. However, we can note it as a return to forgotten phenomena, such as corporeality, intersubjectivity, and erotic relationship. Jean-Luc Marion attempts to formulate a new philosophy and theology based on the erotic phenomenon, which shows the turn as a step forward.

PHENOMENOLOGY WITHOUT EGOLOGY: EDITH STEIN AS AN ORIGINAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL THINKER

Edith Stein is considered a leading figure in the early phenomenological movement and the disciple who performed in the best way the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl, and yet her relationship to phenomenology remains unclear in the literature. This article seeks to add clarity to her relationship to phenomenology while considering three inescapably related questions. (1) What did Stein conceive phenomenology to be? (2) How should we understand Husserl’s influence on Stein? (3) Was Stein an original phenomenological thinker? I argue that Stein conceives of phenomenology as an epistemological critique that aims to clarify the essential foundations of knowledge. It involves intentional analysis that proceeds by way of essential-seeing (Wesensschau), which can be brought about through the method of free imaginative variation, and its intentional analysis involves close attention to the relationship between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. I argue that the primary influence Husserl exerts on Stein is in the development of phenomenology as conceived in his Logical Investigations. Finally, I offer an understanding of how Stein conceived of her differences with Husserl on the issue of idealism in order to argue that Stein’s phenomenological writings in On the Problem of Empathy and “Sentient Causality” offer us a novel phenomenological account of the human being that begins with the ego but escapes being a mere egology. Edith Stein’s phenomenology of the human person begins with the ego and its experiences, and yet, she identifies within those experiences a certain kind of extra-egoic content, viz. experiences of my sentient states.

A SAMOVAR FOR PHENOMENOLOGY LETTERS FROM ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ TO HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS IN THE PERIOD TILL 1933

Alexandre Koyré from Taganrog in Southern Russia, later teaching in France and the US, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius from Rostock in Northern Germany, eventually teaching in Munich, got to know each other as students of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen. Members of the Philosophische Gesellschaft Göttingen, they then also belonged to the Bergzabern Circle which came into existence during World War I and has been named this way as the group usually met in Conrad-Martius’ and her husband Theodor Conrad’s house in Bergzabern, a small town in Southern Palatinate, close to Germany’s border with France. Common to the circle was their critical reception of Husserl’s “transcendental turn” and their adhesion to Adolf Reinach whom they understood as the “real phenomenologist” because of upholding a rather realist view on things and consciousness. Also typical for the Bergzabern phenomenologists, both Koyré and Conrad-Martius spent much effort on religious and theological questions. So beginning from the second half of the war, inspired by Reinach’s writing on religious philosophy, and intensifying during the early 20s, Koyré and Conrad-Martius shared the interest e.g. in the idea of God, considerations on God’s existence which then led to common endeavors on René Descartes and similar investigations of theosophical thinkers like Jakob Boehme. Together with Jean Hering, Edith Stein and Alfred von Sybel they struggled and intensely questioned Martin Heidegger’s philosophical and academic activity and sharply argued—especially after the publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927 and Husserl’s 70th birthday in 1929—against Heidegger’s “Atheist philosophy,” as they would call it. Though being one the most compelling relationships inside the early phenomenological movement, the interconnection of Koyré and Conrad-Martius by now has unfortunately merely been scratched on its surface, let alone has been analyzed in depth. Following some minor recent contributions of the author on the topic, the article highlights Koyré’s and Conrad-Martius’ correspondence from the time before World War I until Summer 1933, in particular the nine letters and postcards preserved in Munich’s Bavarian State Library. It may show not only the personal and philosophical relationship between Koyré and Conrad-Martius, but hopefully raise the interest in further research on this topic, i.e. to what degree Koyré’s claim that phenomenology can’t do without a samovar should be followed and lived up to.

A phenomenological movement study of the aspects of the development of a soccer game

A phenomenological movement study of the aspects of the development of a soccer game

Fate of Ideas: Some Reflections on the Enduring Significance of Manfred Frings’ Rejected Translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II

This paper investigates a moment in the history of the phenomenological movement and offers an argument for its enduring significance. To this end, it brings to light, for the first time in a half-century, Manfred Frings’ rejected and so unpublished translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II. After considering the meaning of the term Leib, which Frings renders ‘lived-body’ and to which the editor suggests ‘organism,’ a brief argument for the living tradition of phenomenology is given. It is claimed that the enduring significance of the document is found in the elucidation of the need to renew the phenomenological tradition through a collaboration across generations. Thus, even in its supposed “failure,” Frings’ translation gives data to future thinkers for insight into both their own life and the life of the ideas of phenomenology itself.

UNKNOWN HEROES OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE: S. HODGSON AND G.F. STOUT

S. Hodgson and G.F. Stout were remarkable, but insufficiently studied philosophers and presidents of the early Aristotelian society. The report is about their conceptions which despite almost unknown in the contemporary philosophy make us pay attention to them. For example S. Hodgson’s philosophy was the subject of discussion about its place in the phenomenological movement. G.F. Stout’s philosophy is interesting not only because he was the G.E. Moore’s and B. Russel’s lecturer. His philosophy was arguably ascribed to idealistic direction in British philosophy of XIX–XX century. There are few contemporary studies where the influence of G.F. Stout on the emergence of analytical philosophy is considered. The report will consider the metaphilosophical role of "common sense in G.F. Stout’s philosophy.

What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?

Abstract The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between logic and reasoning. If logic is the study of the forms of all possible theories, it will include the study of many logical consequence relations; by what criteria, then, should we select one (or a distinguished few) consequence relation(s) as correct? I consider how Husserl might respond to this worry by looking to his late account of the ‘genealogy of logic’ in connection with Gurwitsch’s claim that ‘[i]t is to prepredicative perceptual experience … that one must return for a radical clarification and for the definitive justification of logic’. Drawing also on Sartre and Heidegger, I consider how prepredicative experience might constrain or guide our selection of a logical consequence relation and our understanding of connectives like implication and negation.

Phenomenology in Central Europe: Philosophy from the margins

Abstract The aim of the paper is twofold: first, to enrich the factual historical record of the phenomenological movement in the second half of the 20th century in a Central European context by presenting two representatives of this movement who are now relatively unknown in the Czechoslovak philosophical milieu (Marie Bayerová and Josef Cibulka). The genealogy of this stream of phenomenology has been shaped by the difficult conditions under which philosophy was conducted. The second aim is to use the genealogy to describe the type of phenomenology that developed in this milieu. The article considers minor figures in the phenomenological movement, by exploring philosophy, both “in margine” and from the centre. It also consider the concept of “state of emergency”. Taking these pointers of philosophical analysis (elaborated by Jan Patočka and Milan Šimečka in their time) we reveal the anthropological conditions of philosophizing and the type of phenomenology.

Michela Beatrice Ferri (ed.): The Reception of Husserlian Phenomenology in North America

In my review I argue that this book is more than just a history of the way in which Husserl’s work was studied and taught in the United States and Canada from the early XXth Century on since it shows that what started as a “reception” soon became a local interpretation and appropriation of the phenomenological perspective which ended up blossoming as an autochthonous movement with its own concerns, issues, and schools. The book clearly shows the different phases in the development of the phenomenological movement in North America, the numerous institutions participating in it, and the variety of local perspectives.

Ethnomethodology as an Experimentation with the Natural Attitude: George Psathas on Phenomenological Sociology

My aim is to depict Psathas’s position on ethnomethodology as a way of doing phenomenological sociology. On this, he contested with others who argued that ethnomethodology is not a phenomenological sociology at all. His claim was that ethnomethodology is a part of the phenomenological movement. In this dispute, he offered two kinds of arguments. On the one hand, he documented the strong phenomenological background of Garfinkel’s ideas. On the other hand, he found in Garfinkel’s own words expressions of gratitude to Husserl, Gurwitsch, and Schutz, among other phenomenologists. However, having proved that there was a close relation of Garfinkel with ethnomethodology, Psathas went on to show that Garfinkel turned phenomenological ideas into something new; in particular, he turned phenomenology into an experimental science dealing with the natural attitude. This is a groundbreaking contribution that Psathas appreciated and comprehended as no one else.

Reinach and Kantorowicz: Justice, Phenomenological Realism and the Free Law Movement

Adolf Reinach met and befriended Hermann Kantorowicz in one of Lujo Brentano’s political economy seminars during the 1901/1902 academic year at the University of Munich. After Munich, Kantorowicz would go on to be a major contributor to the Free Law Movement (Freirechtsbewegung) in Germany and play an important role in the development of the sociology of law in the 20th century. Reinach encountered the work of Edmund Husserl while studying with Lipps and later became central to the phenomenological movement in Göttingen. But all the while he remained interested in and focused on issues related to justice. His last scholarly publication before leaving for battle in WWI, Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes (The a priori Foundations of Civil Law, 1913) published in the very first edition of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research) is a testament to this. Here we see Reinach taking his phenomenological education and applying it to entities of justice. I believe Kantorowicz inspired this lasting interest in matters of justice.
 This essay will focus on the influence of Kantorowicz on Reinach, and while doing so attempt to flesh out and contrast the ways in which these two men sought to overcome the problems of justice (Recht) of their time. Many of these problems still continue to be relevant today.

Study of teaching ball movements based on phenomenological movement theory

Study of teaching ball movements based on phenomenological movement theory

A study on the role of video observation in motor learning in physical education based on phenomenological movement theory

A study on the role of video observation in motor learning in physical education based on phenomenological movement theory

A study of coaching in the digging technique for a volleyball player from the perspective of sports phenomenological movement theory

A study of coaching in the digging technique for a volleyball player from the perspective of sports phenomenological movement theory

Junto e além de Jaspers: intersecções entre abordagens contemporâneas em psicopatologia informada fenomenologicamente

Karl Jaspers was influential in the phenomenological psychopathology movement. Contemporary phenomenological scholarship provides fruitful propositions in psychopathology as well as renewed recognition of Jaspers’ pioneering works. This paper is an attempt to give a more general account on how Jaspers’ oeuvre stands in face of contemporary phenomenological scholarship, outlining the intersections between them. Both poles critic the reductionism of consciousness, affirm the necessary relationship with the sciences and philosophy as well as the training and effort that the field demands. Disagreements are related to Jaspersian’ restricted use of phenomenology. We claim that Jaspers provides an interesting model of applying phenomenology in psychopathology that is scientifically robust without losing the due primacy of experience in both conceptual and clinical developments. We recognize Jaspers` limitations on the development of phenomenology, nevertheless we consider that one should go with Jaspers in his rigorous descriptions, scientific endeavors, philosophical groundings, and also beyond him, emphasizing the structures of consciousness in its embodied, temporal and intersubjective features.

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.