Motivational Biases Research Articles

The Perceived Inequity of Systems

It is argued that formal, man-made systems tend to be perceived as inequitable by individuals transacting with them. More specifically, (a) as special purpose tools, systems often deal poorly wit/i complexity and dynamism; (b) as interacting subsystems, systems frequently relegate clients' needs to poorly mapped interfaces between subsystems; (c) as arbiters of meaning, systems tend to stereotype quantities; (d) as regulators of behavior, systems often put internal needs above clients' needs; (e) as mass producers, systems tend to reify procedures; (n as symbols, systems frequently neglect substance; and (g) as amoral entities, systems often neglect common moral and ethical principles. Further, cognitive and motivational biases predispose system clients to view systems as much less equitable than do system administrators. Perceived inequities lead to unmet expectations, reduced system legitimacy, reactance, increased resentment and cynicism, and decreased initiative and trust. This analysis suggests that the very attempt to organize an activity may lead to structures and processes that undermine the activity. General means and a process for reducing perceived inequities are discussed.

Repression and its mediating influence on the defensive attribution of responsibility

The influence of a repressive coping style on the subsequent need to engage in defensive attribution of responsibility in response to a threatening instance of victimization was examined using different operationalizations of a repressor. In the first study, consistent with characteristic differences in coping styles conceptualized by the repression-sensitization continuum, repressors engaged in less defensive attribution of responsibility to a victim relative to sensitizers and were shown to have poorer recall of details associated with the threatening event. In the second study, a combination of anxiety level and defensiveness level were used to identify four distinct groups, including repressors. Results indicated that repressors engaged in less defensive attribution than either high-anxious or defensive high-anxious individuals; however, repressors did not differ from low-anxious individuals in this regard. Thus, characteristically coping with threatening stimuli through a repressive coping strategy appears to mediate the need to engage in defensive attribution of responsibility in a manner consistent with an arousal-based motivational bias.

Naive Attributions for an Unexpected Sports Outcome

This study applied concepts derived from previous research on causal attribution to a real-world event, Super Bowl XXII. 65 undergraduates responded to a four-item survey, which included questions on amount of the game seen, favorite team, why the victor won, and why the loser lost. The responses were then coded for attributional locus of causality and stability. Analysis of variance indicated that success was attributed to significantly more stable factors than failure although other expected effects for locus of causality and motivational bias were not obtained. The natural context and the use of questions regarding both success and failure were identified as methodological aspects with theoretical import, which was then discussed.

When aggression seems justified: Judging intergroup conflict from a distance

This research delineates several factors that may affect how likely observers are to view intergroup aggression as justified. Subjects who favored one side or the other, as well as nominally neutral subjects, rated fictional scenarios depicting an aggressive action by either Israeli or Palestinian armed forces. As hypothesized, rated justification varied with the interaction of an observer's perspective and the relative power of the aggressor and the target, and with the interaction of perspective and the outcome of an action. Also as predicted, power and outcome were found to have no effects on judgments for observers having a neutral perspective. Based on these findings, the extent to which intergroup aggression is perceived as justified is explained in terms of motivational biases theorized to maintain positive social identity.

Task Performance and Attributional Biases in the Ministry

In two studies of performance attribution of protestant ministers, motivational biases were demonstrated in ministers' explanations of positive and negative outcomes in both the spiritual and the instrumentalzbrganizational domains of the ministry. Biases were demonstrated. Positive outcomes were attributed to variable and internal causes, while negative outcomes were attributed to stable and external causes. It is argued that this double bias might be understood as influenced by selfpresentational concerns regarding the avoidance of theological hubris and public loss of face.

Origins of stereotypes of the elderly: an experimental study of the self-other discrepancy.

An experiment using young and old subjects was carried out to test two different explanations for the Harris survey data showing that elderly persons rate their own lives much more positively than they rate the lives of similarly aged others. The informational bias explanation suggests that the old (and young) are passive recipients and mediators of widely disseminated information concerning the life problems of the elderly. The negative evaluations of the elderly in general reflect in part the objective conditions of the lives of the elderly and the tendency of the media to focus on the problems of the elderly. In contrast, self-evaluations are relatively positive because generalized views of growing old are attenuated by lowered expectancies regarding living conditions in late life. The motivational bias explanation assumes a self-enhancing cognitive bias among the elderly that causes them to devalue the lives of similarly aged others. The first explanation is supported by replicating the Harris poll data and demonstrating that the self-other discrepancy can be systematically manipulated by varying, in theoretically relevant ways, the instructions given to subjects.

Relocating Motivational Effects: A Synthesis of Cognitive and Motivational Effects on Attributions for Success and Failure

The long-standing debate over motivational biases as explanations for asymmetrical (i.e., sell-serving) attribution patterns for success and failure is examined in the present paper. Following the suggestion of Tetlock and Levi (1982), our analysis focuses on development of a more precise model of attribution processes, rather than on pitting motivational and cognitive models against each other. We propose a two-stage attribution model, in which motivational manipulations influence the selection of the knowledge structures to be used in the subsequent selection of an attribution. Three experiments demonstrate that a popular ego-involvement manipulation does, in fact, change the perceived relevance of several self-beliefs, and that this knowledge-structure effect does produce the typical asymmetrical pattern of attributions for success and failure, even in uninvolved (i.e., not ego-motivated) observer subjects. It is suggested that the location of motivational impact is at the problem-formulation stage of an attributional task, but is not at the attribution-selection stage. Implications for future research are discussed.

One's Advantage and Perceptual Errors: A Demonstration of Motivational Bias

ABSTRACT Subjects (N = 25) competed for one monetary prize in a group session by estimating time intervals, ranging from 1.7 to 12.1 s. They were told that the one with the smallest sum error of estimates would be rewarded with a monetary prize. They marked each estimate on a response sheet and, subsequently, read and marked the duration of each interval (the correct response) from a stopwatch. Reading errors were more often in the direction of the respective estimate error than in the opposite direction and, hence, in the direction of the subject's advantage. This was particularly so for difficult trials, that is, when the watch hand had stopped between tenths of a second.

Physiological evidence of an arousal-based motivational bias in the defensive attribution of responsibility

Previous research has indicated only indirectly that arousal may serve to mediate the defensive attribution of responsibility to a victim. Results of two experiments presented here, however, provide direct evidence of this relationship. Specifically, female observers' sympathetic autonomic arousal in response to another's apparent sexual victimization was positively associated with their subsequent attribution of responsibility to the victim. Data in the second experiment further demonstrated that the source of this arousal must be correctly perceived, otherwise the need to attribute responsibility in a defensive manner may be diminished.

Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty in Exploration: How Well Do We Predict? How Can We Do Better?: ABSTRACT

Risk and uncertainty are inherent aspects of investing in exploration ventures. Risk, the weight of investment with respect to budget and consequence, is a subtle, variable, but important factor that is intrinsically difficult to apply consistently. Uncertainty, the perceived range of probabilities that a given situation may exist, lends itself more readily to systematic consideration. Professionals may be able to improve their ability to assess uncertainty more reliably. Judgments of both risk and uncertainty are highly susceptible to psychological influences and biases of which most explorationists are unaware. Two of the most influential considerations involved in exploration decisions are (1) the likelihood that a postulated hydrocarbon accumulation is present, and (2) the probable volumes of oil or gas contained in the prospect if it exists. Both lie within the geotechnical purview. Such exploration predictions are made routinely, and they have enormous financial impact. Nevertheless, few public data have been available as to actual performance records of explorationists' predictions: many organizations do not examine predictive performance, and the few that do are reluctant to publicize their records. The reasons are mostly human and understandable, relating to the forward press of exploration events, individual chagrin, corporate politics, proprietary advantage, and even professional mo esty. Limited data on predictive accuracy in exploration began to be available in 1979 and suggest the following general patterns. 1. Accuracy of hydrocarbon-volume forecasts ranges widely, based on predrilling and postdrilling estimates; there may be roughly a 90% change that a given volumetric forecast will be accurate within about one order of magnitude (power of ten), plus or minus the actual volume of the accumulation. 2. Forecasts of hydrocarbon volumes tend to be overly optimistic. The chief technical reason has to do with erroneous predictions of hydrocarbon recovery factor. Other nontechnical forces also appear to contribute to this trend, including motivational bias. 3. Analysis of various geological risk factors (such as structure, reservoir, trap, or charge) may help improve assessment of discovery probability; however, prior to drilling a prospect, explorationists commonly do not identify which geological factors constitute the primary hazards. Also, many explorationists confuse exploratory success and commercial success. 4. The dedicated technical intellect is loath to recognize and accept the large uncertainties and biases actually involved in his/her professional predictions and, therefore, may encourage exploration management to make unwarranted expenditures for data prior to drilling. This tendency is reinforced by the natural corporate inclination to reduce uncertainty to a minimum prior to drilling. Growing evidence exists that professional performance can be improved through the following. 1. Training to minimize heuristic biases inherent in estimating uncertainty, as well as decision-making in risk ventures. 2. Postmortem analysis of exploration predictions and decisions. 3. Evaluation of tactics versus declared strategy, by comparing various exploration parameters (e.g., discovery probability, predicted target volume, actual discovered volume, finding rate, working interest, and prospect origin). Discerned performance trends can then be used to discount or enhance new prospects, to highlight areas for future improvement, and to modify corporate stances and strategies. Such analysis may best take the form of individual professional progress, rather than imposed management inspection. End_of_Article - Last_Page 2046------------

Perception of contingency in conditioning: Scalar timing, response bias, and erasure of memory by reinforcement.

Pigeons' key pecks turned off a key light, which also went off independently of their pecks. The pigeons were able to correctly discriminate the cause of the stimulus change, although their attributions were strongly affected by the amount and the delay of reward given for correct responses. Their discrimination was based on the asynchrony between a response and the change in the key light. A simple detection model that combined detectability and motivational factors provided a good description of the data. It was shown that the discriminative criteria did not change with changes in distribution of noise events in an optimal fashion and that the pigeons therefore were not ideal detectors. In the final experiment, the pigeons were asked to discriminate the cause of a key light change, of a hopper illumination, and of a feeding. Performance decreased with each condition and with the duration of the last two events. It was noted that the memory trace for a stimulus change decays at the same rate as the primary reinforcement gradient but that it decays faster when the delay is filled with an event such as reinforcement. The possibility that the effects of reinforcement may be blocked by reinforcement is briefly discussed. Discriminative stimuli are denned in terms of their impact on current behavior, but they also affect subsequent behavior. Analysis of memory in animals has been stimulated by theories of learning that posit an important role for it and other cognitive processes (e.g., Grant, Brewster, & StierhofF, 1983; Shimp, 1976a; Wagner, Rudy, & Whitlow, 1973). The stimuli to be remembered may be not only lights and tones but also reinforcement schedules (Lattal, 1975; Rilling & McDiarmid, 1965), the animal's own behavior (Reynolds, 1966; Shimp, 1983), and even the animal's characterization of a particular behavior-reinforcement contingency (see e.g., Commons & Nevin, 1981). The techniques used in these studies permit evaluation of sensitivity to events in a motivational context different from the ones in which they occurred and thus allow the measurement of detectability separate from motivational biases. An instance of this approach that provides the prototype for the research to be reported

Defensive attribution of responsibility: Evidence for an arousal-based motivational bias.

Defensive attribution of responsibility: Evidence for an arousal-based motivational bias.

Defensive attribution of responsibility: Evidence for an arousal-based motivational bias.

Defensive attribution of responsibility: Evidence for an arousal-based motivational bias.

Motives and social evaluation: Actor-observer differences in the delineation of motives for a beneficial act

Adequate social evaluation of an intentional act depends on a specification of the actor's motives, that is, the consequences he or she anticipated when performing the purposeful behavior. Prior work in experimental social psychology has often underestimated the important social functions served by motive statements, including how they influence and regulate social conduct, permit adequate social analysis of purposeful behavior, and project desired identities. Two experiments examined actor-observer differences in the delineation of motives for the positive act of helping another person. In both studies, it was found that actors attributed their behavior largely to positive motives (e.g., to help the other) and minimized nonpositive ones (e.g., to make a favorable impression), while observers' attributions showed little or no differentiation as a function of the valence of the motives. Actors' self-enhancing attributions were somewhat more pronounced when the consequences were large, and occurred under private as well as public assessment conditions. Also, a reversal of the “typical” actor-observer effect was found in that actors attributed more personal than situational responsibility, while observers did the opposite. This pattern occurred under private assessment conditions and was even more pronounced when the actors' interpretations would be public. The results suggest the presence of motivational biases in the interpretation of social events, and are difficult to explain through recourse to the standard “logical” information processing alternatives.

A Study of Person Perception in Nigeria

A critical appraisal of the existing motivational and cognitive approaches to attribution led to a postulation of a two-dimensional model consisting of Locus of Causality and Evaluation. Consequently, two attributional mechanisms were hypothesized to be operating: egotism and positive evaluation. In the study, a person's ethnicity was regarded as a factor affecting the degree of egotism in self-attributions, while an interaction of ethnic variables was predicted to determine the magnitude of positive evaluation in actor's attribution. The modelwas tested with Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba Nigerian undergraduate students serving as subjects in a three-way experiment (with target object of perception being the fourth and repeated measures factor). As expected, the Muslim Hausas demonstrated less attributional egotism than the Christian southerners. Other-attributions did not reveal the predicted pattern of a positive evaluation gradient along the psychological distance from the self. The findings demonstrated, however, a strong egocentric tendency in other-attribution due to self-outcome; and here, too, the Hausa subjects showed a unique resistance against this motivational bias.

Bias and error in human judgment

AbstractCurrently prevalent views of human inference are contrasted with an integrated theory of the epistemic process. The prevailing views are characterized by the following orienting assumptions: (1) There exist reliable criteria of inferential validity based on objectively veridical or optimal modes of information processing. (2) Motivational and cognitive factors bias inferences away from these criteria and thus enhance the likelihood of judgmental error. (3) The layperson's epistemic process is pluralistic; it consists of a diverse repertory of information‐processing strategies (heuristics, schemas) selectively invoked under various circumstances. By contrast, the present analysis yields the following conclusions: (1) There exist no secure criteria of validity. (2) Psychological factors that bias inferences away from any currently accepted criteria need not enhance the likelihood of error. (3) The inference process may be considered unitary rather than pluralistic. The various strategies and biases discussed in the literature typically confound universal epistemic process with specific examples (or contents) of such processes. Empirical support for the present analysis is presented, including evidence refuting proposals that specific contents of inference are of universal applicability; evidence suggesting that people do not, because of a reliance on subnormative heuristics, underutilize nonnative statistical information—rather, people seem unlikely to utilize any information if it is nonsalient or (subjectively) irrelevant; and evidence demonstrating that the tendency of beliefs to persevere despite discrediting information can be heightened or lowered by introducting appropriate motivational orientations.

Ego-Relevant Feedback, Affect, and Self-Serving Attributional Bias

The possibility, that people have a need to self-enhance or self-protect via their attributions of causality following success or failure was examined by experimentally inducing more positive or more negative affect following each. A sample of 60 people who succeeded and 60 people who failed an anagram task randomly received positive ego-enhancing feedback, negative ego-diminishing feedback, or no feedback, concerning a prior unrelated task. Results indicated that when affect had been increased there was a reduced tendency to attribute recent success to internal factors (ability' or effort) and a reduced tendency to attribute recent failure to external factors (luck or task difficulty). When affect had been reduced, however, there was a greater tendency' to attribute successful outcome internally and failure externally. The results are interpreted as supporting the existence of a systematic relationship among ego-relevant feedback, affect, and self-attribution following success and failure such that a motivational bias is operative.

AN INVESTIGATION OF MOTIVATIONAL BIAS IN SUBJECTIVE PREDICTIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS*

ABSTRACTIn this paper the problem of conscious motivational bias in the assessment of subjective predictive probability distributions is explored. The primary purpose of this research is to discover how subjects express their bias. Results of an experiment are reported in which subjective distributions were assessed by subjects, first in the absence of a biasing incentive and then in the presence of an incentive to bias upward coupled with an incentive to be “credible.” In the biased task, subjects reported manipulating up to five characteristics of their distribution, such as location, shape, and dispersion. Furthermore, subjects reported using combinations of the characteristics strategically. Dominant strategies included shifting the mode upward and redistributing probability to the left, shifting the mode upward a small amount and redistributing probability to the right, and shifting the mode upward and tightening the distribution. The location of the mode was mentioned first by nearly all subjects, suggesting that they first locate their biased distribution and then manipulate other characteristics to express their bias, need for credibility, and other concerns.

The Attributions of Actors and Observers Concerning Performance in a Football Game

Summary To examine how football players (actors) and their coaches (observers) account for performance, varsity college football players answered a questionnaire immediately following a game and then two days later after coaches and players had viewed the game films. Junior varsity players answered the same questionnaire but without the aid of game films. There was support for Jones and Nisbett's notion that actors make more situational attributions than observers, although there was no difference between actors and observers in their emphasis on internal factors. In contrast to experimental research, players did not make more internal attributions after viewing the films. Both players and coaches were more likely to use internal factors to account for success in the varsity game. For the junior varsity, only players emphasized internal factors to account for success, suggesting a motivational bias.

Reports of the sources of self‐knowledge1

AbstractCollege students reported about the sources of their self‐knowledge in questionnaire (N=118) and interview N= 42) sessions by generating self‐descriptive adjectives, specifying ad libitum how they knew they fit the chosen descriptors (reports the investigator later rated as mentioning self‐observation, social feedback, and social comparison processes), and formally ranking the importance of the three sources of self‐knowledge. Self‐observation appeared in subjects' reports more frequently than feedback from others or social comparison by a proportion of about 7:2:1; average rankings of importance followed the same order. Results were quite similar for both sets of subjects. Two mechanisms that could account for the observed results receive consideration: motivational bias involving self‐presentation, and information‐processing errors due to focus of attention and the underuse of consensus information.