Most-favoured Nation Clause Research Articles

Reciprocity and the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause

NOTHING has been more remarkable in the recent history of commercial policy than the change in the attitude towards the mostfavoured-nation clause as an instrument for regulating international commercial relations. Until I923 the efforts of governments and of unofficial organisations representative in almost every economically developed country of banking, shipping, commercial and, in many countries, of producing interests, were bent towards the establishment of the clause in its unconditional form as the Statue of Liberty for the world's commerce. The consummation of these efforts came, as is well known, with the abandonment in I9231 of the conditional interpretation previously maintained by the Government of the United States of America in its commercial policy from I778 onwards. Although the attitude of the French Government from time to time has shown signs of revolt,2 from I923 onwards the principle of the clause in its unconditional interpretation has been universally accepted, both in declarations of experts of which the most authoritative were the recommendations of the World Economic Conference, I927,3 and of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations in I929,4 and officially in commercial treaties. But between the acceptance of the principle and its full application in practice from the beginning a gulf stretched which has rapidly widened since I929. At periods when the tide of international confidence and economic prosperity is high there appears to be a fair chance of safe and easy navigation, but when the

Did Americans Originate the Conditional Most-Favored-Nation Clause?

C E RTAIN writers on the history of commercial policy and commercial treaties either state directly or convey the impression that the form of the mostfavored-nation clause was devised by American statesmen.' It is possible that the importance of the principle in international commercial relations may be justifiably dated from its appearance in Article II of the Franco-American commercial convention of February 6, 1778; and it is true that the United States has throughout most of its history been the chief, and at times the sole, advocate of this form. But was the conditional principle originally formulated by Americans, and was it inserted in the treaty of 1778 on American initiative? In attempting a solution, it is convenient to divide the problem geographically. If the principle was originated by Americans, its origin, or at least its official sanction, is to be sought in

The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in American Commercial Treaties

Previous articleNext article FreeThe Most-Favored-Nation Clause in American Commercial TreatiesJacob VinerJacob Viner Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 32, Number 1Feb., 1924 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/253580 Views: 160Total views on this site Citations: 15Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Fabian Bohnenberger, Clara Weinhardt Most-Favoured Nation Clauses: A Double-Edged Sword in a Geo-Economic Era, (Feb 2022): 127–148.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81281-2_6August Reinisch, Christoph Schreuer International Protection of Investments, 15 (Jul 2020).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139004978Tanjina Sharmin Evolution of MFN Treatment and Drafting Trends in the Older Generation of IIAs, (Apr 2020): 25–69.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3730-1_2Benjamin O. Fordham Protectionist Empire: Trade, Tariffs, and United States Foreign Policy, 1890–1914, Studies in American Political Development 31, no.22 (Oct 2017): 170–192.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X17000116Michael E. Flynn, Benjamin O. Fordham Economic Interests and Threat Assessment in the US Congress, 1890–1914, International Interactions 43, no.55 (Sep 2016): 744–770.https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2017.1236925Paul Oslington Contextual History, Practitioner History, and Classic Status: Reading Jacob Viner’s The Customs Union Issue, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 35, no.44 (Nov 2013): 491–515.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1053837213000308Kym Anderson Trade Barriers: Costing Global Trade Barriers, 1900 to 2050, (Oct 2013): 273–302.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225793.011Rodney D. Ludema, Anna Maria Mayda , The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no.44 ( 2013): 1837.https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt016Stephen Meardon On the Evolution of U.S. Trade Agreements: Evidence from Taussig's Tariff Commission, Journal of Economic Issues 0, no.22 (May 2011): 475–484.https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624450225Rodney D. Ludema, Anna Maria Mayda Do countries free ride on MFN?, Journal of International Economics 77, no.22 (Apr 2009): 137–150.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.08.004Luca Fiorito, Sebastiano Nerozzi Jacob Viner’s reminiscences from the new deal (February 11, 1953), (Mar 2015): 75–136.https://doi.org/10.1108/S0743-4154(2009)00027A008Gal Hochman Trade negotiations, domestic policies, and the Most Favored Nation clause, Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 41, no.33 (Jul 2008): 781–795.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00485.xHenrik Horn, Petros C Mavroidis Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause, European Journal of Political Economy 17, no.22 (Jun 2001): 233–279.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00028-3 References, International Organization 55, no.44 (Jul 2003): 1083–1103.https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193709G. Berndt Feste Lehren (Meßgeräte ohne Maßanzeige), (Jan 1929): 283–339.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50677-2_5