Moscow Theatre Research Articles

Moscow Theatres for Young People: A Cultural History of Ideological Coercion and Artistic Innovation, 1917-2000

Moscow Theatres for Young People: A Cultural History of Ideological Coercion and Artistic Innovation, 1917-2000

The image of the terrorist threat in the official Russian press: the Moscow theatre crisis (2002) and the Beslan hostage crisis (2004)

This article explores the evolution of the official Russian discourse on Chechnya during two major recent terrorist acts: the Dubrovka Theatre crisis in Moscow (2002), and the Beslan school siege (2004). By tracing the changes in the official image of the ‘threat’, this article challenges the assumption that this discourse has remained constant in the last few years. Instead, it characterises the dynamic of change at times of terrorist acts and beyond as an ongoing attempt by Russian officials to remove the Chechen issue from the political agenda, which precludes a real dialogue about or solution to the ongoing Chechen crisis.

The Moscow State Yiddish Theater: Jewish Culture on the Soviet Stage (review)

JEFFREY VEIDLINGER. The Moscow State Yiddish Theater: Jewish Culture on the Soviet Stage. Jewish Literature and Culture. Indiana- Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 356.The Moscow State Jewish Theater (GOSET) played significant role in the lives of Moscow theater lovers for both Jews and non- Jews alike. As result of this institution, actors and directors of the theater became national celebrities. Solomon Mikhoels, the director and leading actor of GOSET, was considered by contemporaries to be an informal leader of Soviet Jewry in the 1940s. Yet, until now, the history of Moscow's State Jewish Theater has not been thoroughly researched, and many gaps remain in our knowledge of its repertoire, staff, financial records, and the public reception of its performances. Consequently, Jeffrey Veidlinger's new book is welcome study of Moscow's State Jewish Theater in all its complexity.Veidlinger suggests that the history of Moscow's Jewish theater can serve as a window into Soviet Jewish life (p. 15). ^Vhile one can argue what kind of window the history of the GOSET opens (the of Soviet Jewish elite or Jewish masses, Jewish actors or viewers, or those JeAvs who never heard of the theater) , it is true that the theater was very important in both Soviet Jewish history and in the formation of Soviet Jewish identity.Veidlinger's book also presents insights into the development of Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. He correctly argues that the history of JeAVS in the Soviet Union was neither story of persecution nor story of voluntary assimilation but rather something in the middle, something expressed in compromise of subtle shading. Veidlinger then suggests that during the entire era of the Jewish theater (which was theoretically designed to bring Soviet ideas to the Jewish masses), Jewish -writers and artists Avere able to promote their own culture within the conditions of Soviet nationality policies (p. 3). Veidlinger shows that almost every performance of the theater had Jewish subcontext, although it was sometimes not clearly visible. He argues, for example, that the first director of the GOSET, Alexander Granovsky, was trying to promote Zionist ideas when lie staged the play 137 Chisren\i HuMeJ by Avrom Vevyorke. He argues that the number 137 refers to the famous psalm about .Jewish longing for Jerusalem (p. 76). The problem with this hypothesis is that it is difficult to prove or disprove. Even if Granovsky understood this metaphor himself, it is not certain that the actors, to say nothing about whether the viewers of the performances did. Veidlinger does not provide us with the insights of the artists themselves regarding this matter. Therefore, although this idea is quite interesting, it is not entirely convincing. The analysis of the audiences' reception of these hidden ideas also needs elaboration. Although Veidlinger says that the majority of .Jewish men had some education in Jewish matters and that the audience was more sensible to these sorts of subtexts because of the nature of the totalitarian regime (pp. 147 - 48), it is likely that only very small minority of theatergoers were able to understand these hidden meanings. …

Who Sues Government?: Evidence From the Moscow Theater Hostage Case

Courts can better protect rights when citizens are willing and able to litigate in response to government abuses of power. However, if people are not socialized to the possibility of litigating against governments, why do some individuals decide to litigate? Using an original survey of victims in the Moscow theater hostage incident, we find that litigants in a postcommunist context are motivated by political disadvantage, defined as their perception that they are not well represented by political institutions. The effect of political disadvantage on litigation is intensified by the perception that courts, too, are not fair, suggesting that general alienation from the political system may play an important role in the decision to initiate antigovernment litigation in new states.

The Veiled Women and Masked Men of Chechnya

This article analyzes gender representations of Chechen veiled women and masked men in the Terror in Moscow documentary, an account of the October 2002 Chechen rebel siege of a Moscow theater. Because the documentary is novel in its use of original footage recorded during the siege, it provides several issues to discuss related to objective accounts versus constructed reality in nonfiction films and how gender representations fit into mediated reality. As part of the “circuit of culture,” the documentary follows dominant notions of what it means to be feminine and masculine in the media. By deconstructing the documentary's structure and analyzing the ideological representations of gender, the analysis reveals that film represents female and male rebels differently by questioning and attempting to explain women's involvement while accepting men's involvement as “natural.”

Kremlin rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the end of revolution

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia launched itself on a fitful transition to western style democracy. But with Vladimir Putin at the helm, the promise has vanished. KREMLIN RISING is the first book to go behind the scenes and reveal the secret history of 'Project Putin', the plot to seize back power in the Kremlin. After four years as Moscow Bureau Chiefs for The Washington Post, Susan Glasser and Peter Baker now document the methodical campaign to reverse the post-Soviet revolution and transform Russia back into an authoritarian state as Putin seized control over Russian television, jailed political rivals, cancelled elections and waged a brutal war in Chechnya against separatists and civilians alike. This gripping report takes readers inside the key events of Putin's rise to power - from its mysterious origins through the Moscow theatre siege of 2002 to the horrific slaughter of Beslan's schoolchildren in 2004. Filled with personal stories and groundbreaking reporting, the book features accounts from frightened army deserters, an imprisoned oil billionaire, a trendy Moscow restaurant king, a reluctant underwear salesman, and even George W. Bush, who looked into Putin's soul only to realize belatedly that his new friend was no democrat. With gripping, page-turning narrative, KREMLIN RISING opens a window on a country on the brink, where behind the gleaming new shopping malls the dream of western democracy is slowly disintegrating.

The meaning of Moscow: “Non-lethal” weapons and international law in the early 21st century

AbstractAt the intersection of new weapon technologies and international humanitarian law, so-called “non-lethal” weapons have become an area of particular interest. This article analyses the relationship between “non-lethal” weapons and international law in the early 21st century by focusing on the most seminal incident to date in the short history of the “non-lethal” weapons debate, the use of an incapacitating chemical to end a terrorist attack on a Moscow theatre in October 2002. This tragic incident has shown that rapid technological change will continue to stress international law on the development and use of weaponry but in ways more politically charged, legally complicated and ethically challenging than the application of international humanitarian law in the past.

Stockholm Effects and Psychological Responses to Captivity in Hostages Held by Suicide Terrorists.

October 2002, 800 plus hostages were held for three days in a Moscow theater by suicide terrorists armed with bombs. The stand-off ended when Russian Special Forces gassed and stormed the theater. One hundred thirty of the hostages died. The authors - an American psychologist and colleagues from the Russian Academy of Sciences - began to collaborate soon after the event. This article reports on interviews with eleven hostages regarding their psychological responses to captivity including their expressions of Stockholm syndrome.

Wartime Medical Ethics

To the Editor: Michael Gross raises many important and controversial issues in his article, "Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Mapping the Moral Dimensions of Medicine and War" (HCR Nov-Dec 2004), not least in his principle conclusion that "Medical ethics in times of war are fundamentally different from those in times of peace." If the basic ethical principle for a physician is always to do the best he can for his patients, Hippocrates could be said to share Gross' view; according to Plutarch's Lives, "he would never put his skill at the service of barbarians who were enemies of Greece." The issue comes down ultimately to the human rights of the individual versus the necessities of the state. Modern medicine is evidence-based, but evidence cannot settle ethical disputes. Perhaps, though, a change of circumstances can. Some doctors are pacifists; in countries permitting conscientious objection to military service, they are unlikely to serve in war. Others may refuse to serve in certain combats, or may feel that specific orders breach their ethical code. For health workers as for others, to obey an order which is illegal under the Geneva Conventions is not a defense to a charge of committing a war crime. The most radical proposal was made by J.A. Ryle, professor of physic at Cambridge University, in his preface to The Doctor's View of War, almost seventy years ago: "By withholding service from the Armed Forces before and during war, by declining to examine and inoculate recruits, by refusing sanitary advice and the training and command of ambulances, clearing stations, medical transport, and hospitals, the doctors could so cripple the efficiency of the staff and aggravate the difficulties of campaign and so damage the morale of the troops that war would become almost unthinkable." Perhaps group loyalty--patriotism when you favor it, nationalism when you do not--makes this solution impossible. But many physicians in many countries now support organizations such as International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War. They are working to end all war. Douglas Holdstock Editor, Medicine, Conflict and Survival To the Editor. Concerning Michael Gross's excellent paper, two points: First, the Pentagon's argument that it is not feasible to obtain informed consent for the use of investigational drugs during war is unpersuasive if (1) an accurate, concise, and readable disclosure document can be crafted and distributed with the medication, (2) records can be kept, and (3) there is no evidence that key personnel would opt out. I believe all three conditions are met (as do military physicians with whom I have spoken). Second, the misnomer "non-lethal weapon" distracts from the sometimes lethal consequences of using these items (such as the anesthetic agent used in the Moscow theater hostage situation). In addition, their use is not likely to be confined to deterrent operations but will almost certainly include quasi-policing procedures, as has been contemplated in Iraq. Medical scientists who consider participating in the development of such weapons should not be comforted by the labeling. …

Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses in Hostages Held by Suicide Terrorists in the Takeover of a Moscow Theater

Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses in Hostages Held by Suicide Terrorists in the Takeover of a Moscow Theater

Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses in Hostages Held by Suicide Terrorists in the Takeover of a Moscow Theater.

Summary The hostages interviewed in this project exhibited a variety of mild to severe acute and posttraumatic responses to the terrorist event. The fact that the hostage takers were suicidal greatly increased the hostages’ feelings of helplessness and terror. Also, the death from the gas of so many hostages and the apparent disregard of the Russian government for these individuals was a difficult aspect of the experience with which the hostages grappled. The fact that many of the hostages developed Stockholm effects also made the deaths of the terrorists traumatic, which may have been a surprise to many. Despite their symptoms it seemed likely that given time and support the hostages were making good use of naturally available coping resources and would make full recoveries. It is interesting from a policy making perspective that the hostages were not offered an organized psychological response following their ordeal and that, after going over the hurdle of deciding whether or not to trust our request for a research interview with the offer of a free consultation following it, all the hostages welcomed speaking to a sympathetic psychological team and took advantage of the opportunity to consult about issues that were still bothersome to them. Most of their concerns were standard acute and posttraumatic stress issues that were easily addressed in a straightforward manner. The least difficult to help persons were those who appeared to have been relatively healthy individuals pre-trauma. Those with previous unresolved losses or traumatization presented more complicated cases and likely would have benefited from psychotherapy. Given that suicidal terrorism appears to be a rising threat (witness the recent spate of suicide attacks in Israel, Iraq, Turkey, Russia and so on), it becomes a new type of trauma that psychologists and policy makers must prepare for. We recommend expecting individuals in hostage-taking situations to do well with their ordeal, but to have some degree of acute and posttraumatic responses. These should be addressed in a non-intrusive and supportive manner for those who continue to struggle in the months following their experience. Of course, further study of this type of phenomenon is also recommended.

Beslan's lessons: Is pre-emption better than cure?

The brutal ending to the school siege in the North Ossetian town of Beslan serves as a tragic reminder that seemingly irrational violence remains a central feature of contemporary international politics. In an attempt to understand how Beslan could have occurred, questions about the nature of the Chechen war and the specific response of the Russian security services have been posed to a Putin administration elected - and subsequently returned to power - on a platform that prioritised order ahead of Russia's ailing democratisation project. Some of these questions, such as Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot's insinuation that Russian commandos were to blame for the bloodbath, were misguided. Russian forces, mindful of past criticism of heavy-handedness during the October 2002 siege of a Moscow theatre in which over 100 hostages died, adopted a more patient approach at Beslan. Once a mine detonated inside the school, and terrorists began gunning down those who took the opportunity to flee amid the confusion, on-site commanders had little option but to order a full-scale assault. More thoughtful questions pertain to Russia's conduct in the war against Chechnya, and whether Putin has deliberately sidestepped political solutions in his quest to preserve Russia's territorial integrity. Ultimately, in order to better identify avenues for conflict resolution we also need to determine to what extent the crisis should be interpreted as part of a global war on terror (GWOT) and what the implications are for Russian security policy-making. © 2004 Australian Institute of International Affairs.

Medical Ethics and Non-Lethal Weapons

On October 23, 2002, over 700 people attended the musical Nord-Ost in a Moscow theater with the clunky Soviet-era name House of Culture of the State Ball-Bearing Plant Number 1. During act two 40 Chechen terrorists demanding Russian withdrawal from Chechnya stormed the building, taking patrons and performers hostage. The terrorists made it clear in a videotape that they would die rather than surrender. Conditions over the next several days were miserable as the hostages, including dozens of children, were deprived of food and water. The terrorists spread explosives throughout the building to ensure catastrophe if they were attacked. On the morning of October 26, Russian commandos piped an anesthetic gas called fentanyl through a hole in the wall, hoping to incapacitate the hostage-takers. The action succeeded in putting many of the terrorists to sleep and disrupting the rest. All of the Chechans were killed, some shot at point-blank range. Although dozens of ambulances were standing by and hospital emergency rooms were at the ready, the medical personnel were unprepared for the problems they actually faced, not injuries due to bullets or shrapnel but unconscious men, women and children. Authorities had not told them what type of gas had been used, though it is a familiar agent in operating rooms and its effects could have been managed. As it was, 128 people died of the combined effects of the fentanyl and dehydration. In response, President Vladimir Putin declared a national day of mourning and decided to step up Russia’s grip on the Muslim province. In 2004 hundreds more Russians were killed in multiple suicide attacks, including two downed passenger aircraft, as part of the continuing Chechen resistance. In Washington, the same day as the unfolding tragedy in Moscow, the National Academy of Sciences released a report on the prospects for effective military use of “non-lethal weapons,” including fentanyl. The Academy’s committee concluded that the Chemical Weapons Convention was ambiguous enough to permit the use of some non-lethal chemical weapons. Among the recommendations of the report, entitled “An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology,” was that the Pentagon’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate should establish “centers of excellence” in the weapons’ development (http://www.mindfully.org/ Reform/2002/Non-Lethal-Weapons-AssessmentNAS4nov02.htm). Proponents of “non-lethal” weapons (NLWs) claim that they will obviate the need to kill or maim. These weapons are actively being sought by all branches of the U.S. military and come in a dazzling variety, from “incapacitants” or chemicals that put people to sleep, acoustic and light-pulsing devices that disrupt cognitive and neural processes; odors so disgusting they sicken; sudden colored fog that creates panic; optical equipment that causes temporary blindness; and mechanisms that stimulate nerve endings as though they are fire, among dozens of others. A striking fact about this list is that so many are related to the human brain and nervous system. Growing concerns about terrorism have fed interest in NLWs. The modern nation-state’s typical arsenal is designed for cold war-style fighting between peers. The use of such weapons in the places terrorists like to operate often results in high levels of non-combatant casualties that may be politically as well as morally unacceptable. Hence NLWs seems to advance one of Augustine’s requirements for just war: that only as much force be used as is necessary for the task. A year after the tragedy Robin Coupland of the International Committee of the Red Cross published a commentary in The Lancet in which he raised a number of questions for the medical community about their relationship to so-called non-lethal weapons, including whether health professionals should be trained to take care of people exposed to them and whether they should they allow themselves to be part of developing weapons that require medical and scientific expertise. Coupland noted that one medical research group suggested that international standards of conduct with regard to such weapons be developed (Coupland 2003). To

Russian drama and theatre in education: Perestroika and Glasnost in Moscow theatres for children and youth

Russian theatre for young audiences has had a long tradition of professional, state subsidised theatre, with a strong educational function specifically for young people. The primary task of the tiuz (teatr iunogo zritelia, theatre of the young spectator) was to contribute to the ideological and aesthetic education for future Soviet citizens. To that end, each theatre consisted of an artistic and an education division, which, ideally, shared the power and jointly decided the repertory. Also involved were the communist party division of each theatre and the Ministry of Culture and Enlightenment, which had the final say over the repertory and production. The repertory was directed towards three rigidly observed age groups (children, adolescents, and youth), each with its own mandatory plays. The educational section was headed by an ‘experienced pedagogue’ whose task was to maintain close links with the schools and other educational institutions and to guide the students in their artistic tastes and overall world view. Aesthetic education was mandatory at all schools and included field trips to, among other places, the theatre. At the schools, special clubs were formed of interested students who helped the pedagogues: in preparatory sessions at the schools; in maintaining order during performances; and in organising and sometimes leading post‐performance discussions and evaluations. Questionnaires, interviews, and quantitative analyses were used for audience evaluation. All this changed with the politics of Glasnost and Perestroika in the mid‐1980s. The changes in material circumstances forced the theatres for young audiences to adapt themselves to the rapid ideological and cultural shifts, contesting the legitimacy of their existence as theatres for young audiences proper. This article traces how the two oldest theatres for children and youth in Moscow adapted to the ideological shifts in repertory, practice, and pedagogy, and how these changes affected their respective identities as theatres for young people.

Sweet Bird of Youth (review)

The sex and sin of Tennessee Williams's plays were—until the breakup of the USSR—either banned by prudish censors or diluted by jittery translators. Despite this, Williams has been a popular playwright, and today the repertoire of Moscow theatres includes not only his best-known works—The Glass Menagerie, The Rose Tattoo, and A Streetcar Named Desire—but also Williams's experiments in language, character, and form—Small Craft Warnings, The Two Character Play, and A Perfect Analysis Given by a Parrot. Audiences and artists are returning to the plays with fresh expectations and excitement now that new translations and productions have restored the playwright's corporeal concerns.

RESEARCH NOTE: OBSERVATIONS OF SUICIDAL TERRORISTS IN ACTION

11 September woke the world up to the scourge of the twenty-first century—suicidal terrorism. Hostage-taking coupled with suicidal terrorism is its newest variant, played out in a Moscow theater in late October 2002. Forty Chechen terrorists armed with automatic rifles, grenades and self-detonating bombs announced to 800 plus hostages that the event was a suicide mission. The standoff ended when Russian Special Forces gassed and stormed the building, killing all the terrorists. Suicidal terrorists are rarely, if ever, observed in action. In the first months after the event, an American psychologist collaborated with Russian Academy of Sciences colleagues to collect interviews from the hostages. This article reports on hostages’ observations, interactions and conversations with the 40 suicidal terrorists.

Incapacitating chemical weapons: a year after the Moscow theatre siege

On Oct 26 last year a knockout gas was pumped into a Moscow theatre to end a siege and free around 700 hostages; 120 people were killed by the gas. 1 Enserink M Stone R Questions swirl over knockout gas used in hostage crisis. Science. 2002; 298: 1150-1151 Crossref PubMed Scopus (12) Google Scholar , 2 Schiermeier Q Hostage deaths put gas weapons in spotlight. Nature. 2002; 420: 7 Crossref PubMed Scopus (18) Google Scholar The gas is thought to be an opioid from the fentanyl family and may have been mixed with another anaesthetic. 1 Enserink M Stone R Questions swirl over knockout gas used in hostage crisis. Science. 2002; 298: 1150-1151 Crossref PubMed Scopus (12) Google Scholar , 3 Wax PM Becker CE Curry SC Unexpected “gas” casualties in Moscow: a medical toxicology perspective. Ann Emerg Med. 2003; 41: 700-705 Summary Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (105) Google Scholar Its dispersal was the first time that a therapeutic agent has been used as a weapon in a tactical situation.

Unexpected “gas” casualties in Moscow: A medical toxicology perspective

In October 2002, the Russian military used a mysterious “gas” to incapacitate Chechen rebels at a Moscow theater. Despite increased interest in the potential use of lethal chemical weapons in recent years, the medical community has paid little attention to the development of incapacitating, calmative, and “less than lethal” technologies. In this analysis, we review the events surrounding the use of a calmative “gas” during the Russian military action and discuss what is currently known about fentanyl derivatives, their aerosolization, and the rationale for their use as incapacitating agents. Collectively, the available evidence strongly suggests that a combination of a potent aerosolized fentanyl derivative, such as carfentanil, and an inhalational anesthetic, such as halothane, was used. The paper also assesses potential errors leading to the loss of a substantial number of hostages. Several lessons can be learned from this surprising and novel use of an incapacitating gas. [Ann Emerg Med. 2003;41:700-705.]

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Rhetoric and Realities

Whether or not the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from much of the world (WMD) eventually proves practicable, it is surely necessary to reduce if not eliminate the current flow of loose, emotive, and sometimes extravagant language about them. Such rhetoric, whether from political, official, or media sources, not only misleads and may alarm public opinion but could also lead to clumsy and even dangerous thinking in the policy-making process itself. Far too much recent talk has obscured the fact that WMD can vary hugely in nature, size, reliability, delivery systems, practical military usefulness, and destructiveness. They are not the same in either the scale or the nature of their impacts. Nor are their effects on individuals always or necessarily more atrocious than those of so-called conventional weapons. However dreadful the hostage deaths in the Moscow theatre from BZ gas (if such it was) were, they were not obviously more horrific than a fiery death from napalm or through multiple lacerations from anti-personnel mines or carpet-bombing. This paper seeks to explore some of the misleading statements being employed about WMD in relation to Iraq in particular and, to a lesser extent, to other so-called “terrorist states,” named by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. Whatever eventually happens in Iraq or elsewhere in the “war on terrorism” (which is really a necessary international campaign rather than a “war”), the need for careful distinctions and cool reasoning about WMD will clearly remain crucial to the framing of foreign and defense policy. To criticize loose talk about WMD is not to underestimate either their destructiveness or the waves of disproportionate public terror they can inflict. The latter is, after all, the first aim of a terrorist campaign. Nor does such criticism neglect the genuine difficulties facing democratic politicians in getting complex messages across to an often complacent or skeptical electorate. But extravagance may well magnify skepticism, whereas precision should help to keep threats from both WMD and conventional weapons in rational perspective, along with the full range of possible responses. A degree of care about language—and logic—is especially necessary amidst the understandably inflamed emotions and rampant suspicions that followed the atrocities of 9/11, Bali, Moscow, and Mombasa. Anger, fear, and horror at the very

The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: The Perpetrators, their Tactics, and the Russian Response

AbstractThe Moscow theater hostage crisis was a spectacular media event, which sparked a wide domestic and international debate concerning the appropriateness of the Russian response. This article attempts to reconstruct and assess the events that took place in terms of negotiability of the incident, and seeks to provide an analytical perspective on the possible alternatives that were available to the Russian authorities throughout the crisis. Part I provides a brief overview of the events that unfolded. This section of the article also places Chechen motivations behind the incident into perspective with regard to past Chechen operations and to their overall strategy. Part II focuses on the details of the attack itself, particularly the Russian response. Special attention is devoted to analyzing the successes and failures of both the negotiations and the tactical assault. The conclusion discusses the implications of the Moscow theater incident for the future, including its potential impact on the likelihood of success of crisis negotiation strategies and the future tactics of the Chechen rebels.