Moral Enhancement Research Articles

도덕적 생명향상과 자유의 문제

도덕적 생명향상과 자유의 문제

Moral enhancement, at the peak of pharmacology and at the limit of ethics.

The debate over the improvement of moral capacity or moral enhancement through pharmacology has gained momentum in the last decade as a result of advances in neuroscience. These advances have led to the discovery and allowed the alteration of patterns of human behavior, and have permitted direct interventions on the neuronal structure of behavior. In recent years, this analysis has deepened regarding the anthropological foundations of morality and the reasons that would justify the acceptance or rejection of such technology. We present a review of proposals for pharmacological interventions directed directly towards moral enhancement. In addition, we identify the ethical dilemmas that such interventions may generate, as well as the moral assessment of the authors of these studies. There is a moderate consensus on the risks of any intervention on the intimate structure of the human condition, its autonomy and identity, but there are large differences in explaining the reasons for this concern and especially in justifying such interventions. These findings show that it is necessary to investigate the moral assessment of authors and the ethical dimension within the field of pharmacology in order to identify future trends.

Objections to the God Machine Thought Experiment and What they Reveal about the Intelligibility of Moral Intervention by Technological Means

The first aim of the paper is to proffer a series of objections to the God machine thought experiment, as presented by Savulescu and Persson, The Monist, 95(3), 399-421, (2012). The second aim is to show that these objections must be overcome by any form of direct moral intervention by technological means, not just the God machine. The objections raised against the god machine involve (i) questioning its intelligibility in light of established views on the relationship between beliefs, desires, intention and intentional action, (ii) pointing out the seeming inability of individuals to attribute warranted moral praise to others or themselves in the case of abstentions from grossly immoral acts (iii) identifying a problematic ‘slippery slope’ argument, and (iv) questioning the rationale underlying the Freedom Lover’s intention to enrol on a moral enhancement course, as well as arguing that that Savulescu and Persson’s notion of ‘complete freedom’ is too stringent.

The evolution of moral progress and biomedical moral enhancement.

In The Evolution of Moral Progress Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell advance an evolutionary explanation of moral progress by morality becoming more ‘inclusivist’. We are prepared to accept this explanation as far as it goes, but argue that it fails to explain how morality can become inclusivist in the fuller sense they intend. In fact, it even rules out inclusivism in their intended sense of moral progress, since they believe that human altruism and prosocial attitudes are essentially parochial. We also respond to their charge that the possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means that we have defended in numerous publications assumes that moral attitudes are biologically hard‐wired to an extent that implies that they are resilient to the influence of cognitive or cultural factors. Quite the contrary, we think they are more open to such influence than they seem to do.

Covert moral bioenhancement, public health, and autonomy.

In a recent article in this journal, Parker Crutchfield argues that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, as some authors claim, then it ought to be covert, i.e., performed without the knowledge of the population that is being morally enhanced. Crutchfield argues that since the aim of compulsory moral bioenhancement is to prevent ultimate harm to the population, compulsory moral bioenhancement is best categorized as a public health issue, and should therefore be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I question the extent to which compulsory moral enhancement should be considered a public health issue that ought to be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. Second, I argue that Crutchfield's argument that covert moral bioenhancement would better respect people's autonomy than an overt program overlooks two important autonomy-based reasons that, in fact, favor an overt moral enhancement program over a covert one.

La permisibilidad ética de las tecnologías de biomejora moral

Los recientes avances en neurociencia, y en las ciencias de la vida en general, han hecho posible no solo tratar y restaurar las funciones dañadas, sino la posibilidad de algún día mejorar las funciones en la población saludable. Las amplias aplicaciones de la biotecnología y medicación farmacológica se dirigen a los mecanismos próximos que se consideran deficitarios en los pacientes. Recientemente, se ha mostrado como algunas de estas medicaciones pueden afectar comportamientos complejos humanos, como la moral en personas saludables (Crockett et al. 2015), lo cual abre la puerta para un entendimiento más profundo de la naturaleza humana. ¿Hasta que punto es éticamente permisible alterar la neuroquímica o modular una región cerebral para intervenir en el comportamiento moral?, ¿es intrínsecamente malo la biomejora moral?, ¿cómo podemos conocer los efectos adversos y cómo sopesarlos en un análisis coste/beneficio de una intervención?, ¿la biomejora moral supone una amenaza a la libertad? Considerando dos posturas opuestas, DeGrazia (2014) y Harris (2011), sobre los retos éticos de la biomejora moral se sugiere que si los principios tradicionales de la bioética como la seguridad, efectividad y universalidad se cumplen no hay nada malo en la biomejora moral per se y, por consiguiente, es éticamente permisible.

What Do We Have to Lose? Offloading Through Moral Technologies: Moral Struggle and Progress

Moral bioenhancement, nudge-designed environments, and ambient persuasive technologies may help people behave more consistently with their deeply held moral convictions. Alternatively, they may aid people in overcoming cognitive and affective limitations that prevent them from appreciating a situation’s moral dimensions. Or they may simply make it easier for them to make the morally right choice by helping them to overcome sources of weakness of will. This paper makes two assumptions. First, technologies to improve people’s moral capacities are realizable. Second, such technologies will actually help people get morality right and behave more consistently with whatever the ‘real’ right thing to do turns out to be. The paper then considers whether or not humanity loses anything valuable, particularly opportunities for moral progress, when being moral is made much easier by eliminating difficult moral deliberation and internal moral struggle. Ultimately, the worry that moral struggle has value as a catalyst for moral progress is rejected. Moral progress is understood here as the discovery and application of new values or sensitization to new sources of harm.

Artificial Intelligence as a Socratic Assistant for Moral Enhancement

The moral enhancement of human beings is a constant theme in the history of humanity. Today, faced with the threats of a new, globalised world, concern over this matter is more pressing. For this reason, the use of biotechnology to make human beings more moral has been considered. However, this approach is dangerous and very controversial. The purpose of this article is to argue that the use of another new technology, AI, would be preferable to achieve this goal. Whilst several proposals have been made on how to use AI for moral enhancement, we present an alternative that we argue to be superior to other proposals that have been developed.

Biomedical Moral Enhancement in the Face of Moral Particularism – Addendum

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How Would We Know If Moral Enhancement Had Occurred?

ABSTRACT The aim of this essay is to question the coherence of debates on moral enhancement by neurophysical or pharmaceutical means in the absence of a cogent conception of the object of moral scrutiny: namely, moral enhancement. I present two conceptions of moral enhancement—weak and strong—and argue that given the problem of acquiring a standard measure of moral enhancement, regardless of whether enhancement is present in its weak or strong form and regardless of whether one endorses moral realism or different forms of antirealism, presenting a cogent conception of moral enhancement is fraught with difficulty. This fact has serious implications for continuing debates on the morality of moral enhancement, insofar as it limits the extent to which we have, or it is possible to have, an agreed conception of moral enhancement that could (in principle) be empirically verified and count as an object for moral scrutiny.

Ηθική ενίσχυση: Μια κριτική βασισμένη στην ωφελιμότητα;

Recent rapid advances in the field of life sciences such as medicine, biotechnology, genetics, biology and neurosciences alongside cognitive sciences raise serious moral concerns. Among the key issues is the one that concerns the way our genetic structure as well as our brain chemistry influences our behaviour. Questions are continually emerging, regarding the genetic basis of behaviour and its manipulation, leading eventually to the enhancement, moral, psychological, cognitive etc. of the human being through science. One of the most controversial issues in bioethics is the possibility of using our knowledge to biologically manipulate traits which have genetic basis as well as to strategically influence people's moral dispositions and behaviour by biomedical means in order to enhance moral behaviour. Therefore, in this article, Ι will try to evaluate the moral enhancement and its importance as set out in the article by Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson “Moral Enhancement, Free Will and the God Machine”, while at the same time exploring whether the implementation of such a challenge can be beneficial.

Genome Editing for Involuntary Moral Enhancement.

During the previous years, voluntary moral bioenhancement (VMBE) has been contrasted to compulsory moral bioenhancement (CMBE). In this paper a third possible type of moral bioenhancement is discussed: genome editing for moral enhancement of the unborn that is neither voluntary nor compulsory, but involuntary. Involuntary moral bioenhancement (IMBE) might engineer people who will be more moral than they otherwise would have been. The possibilities of genome editing aimed at moral enhancement of our offspring is assessed. It is argued that genome editing might have the potential to engineer our offspring in three domains: to be more empathetic, to be less violently aggressive, and to have a higher potential for complex moral reflection. Genome editing is discussed in these three domains, and a proposal made that a combination of VMBE and IMBE might be the best option humans have to become better.

Commentary: The Implementation Ethics of Moral Enhancement.

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Faster, higher, stronger… To go where? Transhumanism and yearning for happiness

Human beings desire to become better. Education and development of tools have helped them to reach this goal for many a time. But what is the ultimate goal? A classical answer is: to be happy. Till now, the result has not been very convincing, but transhumanism has recently taken responsibility for this project, giving us hope to be happy and to live longer. However, will we become more human or posthuman? Transhumanists hesitate between both, but think after all that no limit should be laid down in advance. Consequently, nothing is sacred in human nature and changing it raises no moral concern. Saying this, transhumanism puts itself inside an old tradition, claiming that the value of a human being does not consist in his humanity but in the fact that he is a person, that is a being endowed with reason - reason being the source of all progresses. Consequently, there is a continuity between humanism and transhumanism, and we have good reasons to hope for a bright future. However, the life in our contemporary societies, where everything goes faster and stronger, does not seem to go in this direction. Will transhumanism be able to correct our mistakes? To succeed, it should also aim at human moral enhancement, a hope for some, but a nightmare for others.

Moral Attitudes Toward Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement (PCE): Differences and Similarities Among Germans With and Without PCE Experience.

Pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE), the use of illicit and/or prescription drugs to increase cognitive performance, has spurred controversial discussion in bioethics. In a semi-structured interview study with 60 German university students and employees, differences and similarities in moral attitudes toward PCE among 30 experienced participants (EPs) vs. 30 inexperienced participants (IPs) were investigated. Substances EPs used most often are methylphenidate, amphetamines, tetrahydrocannabinol and modafinil. Both EPs and IPs addressed topics such as autonomous decision making or issues related to fairness such as equality in test evaluation and distortion of competition. While most EPs and IPs were convinced that the decision of whether or not to use PCE is part of their individual freedom, their views varied considerably with regard to fairness. IPs considered issues related to fairness as much more critical than EPs. Thus, a person’s moral attitudes toward PCE may not only depend on moral common sense, but also on whether they have used illegal and/or prescription drugs for PCE before. This points to the importance of including the various relevant stakeholder perspectives in debates on the ethical and social implications of PCE.

The Dual Application of Neurofeedback Technique and the Blurred Lines Between the Mental, the Social, and the Moral

Recent neuroscience studies have reported that neurofeedback training with the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging enables the regulation of an individual’s cognitive, emotion-related, and behavioral states through a real-time representation of her brain activities. Since this technique has been applied not only to clinical research to, for example, mitigate mental or psychiatric symptoms but also to non-clinical research to, for example, change the cognition or preferences of a so-called healthy participant, neurofeedback-based cognitive and/or moral enhancements may be realized in the future. However, neurofeedback-based human enhancement is not the only issue that requires neuroethical consideration. I examine why and to what extent the dual application of neurofeedback technique will blur the lines between the mental, the social, and the moral, threatening some social norms, such as individual freedom and diversity. First, I consider the link between the mental and the social in psychiatry. Examining the definition of “mental disorder” provided by the American Psychiatric Association, I show that the mental is partly defined through social performance. Second, I make explicit the link between the social and the moral and argue that moral evaluation of an activity is gently but positively correlated with its social evaluation. Third, I demonstrate the links between the mental, the social, and the moral. In spite of a great deal of effort to distinguish these notions, the possibility of the dual application of this technique blurs the lines between them. Fourth, I examine whether such blurred lines signal sociocultural evolution or dystopia and argue that it can be understood as a beginning of the second advent of ethical virtue. I conclude that further cautious consideration of neuroethics is required because the establishment of this technique may have unique influences on our society.

How to be Good: The Possibility of Moral Enhancement, written by John Harris

How to be Good: The Possibility of Moral Enhancement, written by John Harris

Smarter Than Thou, Holier Than Thou: The Dynamic Interplay Between Cognitive and Moral Enhancement.

The debate about the desirability of using drugs to enhance human skills encompasses cognitive abilities such as memory and attention, and moral capacities such as emotional empathy and a sense of fairness. These two strands of literature in bioethics have grown relatively independent from each other, and an implicit framing assumption has emerged suggesting that apparently morally neutral cognitive capacities and paradigmatically moral capacities are distinct and vary independently of each other. Here, we identify key distinctions between competing accounts of cognitive enhancement and moral enhancement and argue that, despite the polarized nature of the bioethical debate, cognitive and moral capacities are intertwined. For example, moral behavior can be improved by enhancing “morally neutral” abilities such as attention span; and cognitive skills can be honed by means of socio-moral interaction. Further, cognitive skill is frequently assigned the abstract status of virtue and treated in the same way as more paradigmatically “moral” traits. We argue that the distinction between moral and cognitive enhancement is more apparent than real, since despite being nominally treated as distinct, cognitive and moral skills are frequently interdependent. As such we present evidence to support the claim that the enhancement of these two kinds of capacities cannot be clearly disaggregated from each other in the way that the theoretical poles of the debate in the literature suggest. We synthesize relevant scientific and bioethical literature and combine it with a line of analysis derived from Peter Hacker to show more clearly the terms of what can be said intelligibly about cognitive and moral skills and their enhancement. As a result of this analysis, we conclude that ethical questions in human bioenhancement are only fully intelligible at the level of persons imbued with feelings, thoughts, intentions, desires, values, and abilities, embedded within a particular social context, rather than at the level of pharmacological modulation of particular cognitive or affective capacities which, though conceptually distinguishable, in the embodied context of moral agency are profoundly intertwined.

The Cognitive Basis of Commonsense Morality

The established two tracks of neuroenhancement, moral and cognitive enhancements, rest on the characterization of commonsense morality as a set of static psychological dispositions. In this paper, I challenge this way of describing commonsense morality. I draw a parallel between commonsense psychology and commonsense morality, and I propose that the right way to characterize commonsense morality is as an empirically evaluable theory, with a structure similar to a scientific theory. I argue further that psychological dispositions to react in certain ways require the tacit endorsement of a commonsense moral theory. By adopting this view, I argue that the way to change our psychological dispositions is by changing the background theory that produces them. I conclude that when commonsense morality is construed as an empirically evaluable theory, the cleft between the abilities that support scientific progress and the abilities that promote moral progress closes and it becomes evident that the way to promote both types of advancements is through cognitive enhancement.

Moral Enhancement as a Collective Action Problem

AbstractIn light of the magnitude of interpersonal harm and the risk of greater harm in the future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued for pharmacological enhancement of moral behaviour. I discuss moral bioenhancement as a set of collective action problems. Psychotropic drugs or other forms of neuromodulation designed to enhance moral sensitivity would have to produce the same or similar effects in the brains of a majority of people. Also, a significant number of healthy subjects would have to participate in clinical trials testing the safety and efficacy of these drugs, which may expose them to unreasonable risk. Even if the drugs were safe and effective, a majority of people would have to co-operate in a moral enhancement programme for such a project to succeed. This goal would be thwarted if enough people opted out and decided not to enhance. To avoid this scenario, Persson and Savulescu argue that moral enhancement should be compulsory rather than voluntary. But the collective interest in harm reduction through compulsory enhancement would come at the cost of a loss of individual freedom. In general, there are many theoretical and practical reasons for scepticism about the concept and goal of moral enhancement.