Moral Status Research Articles

I VR therefore I am: toxic binary thinking in visions of the metaverse

ABSTRACT While the metaverse is typically billed as representing a radical break with the past and an invention of a new reality in a virtual form it merely reproduces historical patterns of anthropocentric dominance, exploitation, and violence. The Western intellectual tradition has long billed the human (or a privileged part of humanity) as the bearer of special rights, moral status, and epistemic capacities, which were seen as rendering the rest of the world not only subservient, but even existing solely for human benefit. Moreover, particularly since the Enlightenment, this dualism was also extended within the human by drawing a dividing line between the body and the mind. To trace the morphing of such ideas into the digital domain, this article provides a critical reading of the mainstream accounts of the metaverse. Crucially, the metaverse functions as a perfect manifestation of the vision for a domain of the mind, radically separated from all embodiment and always adjusting to human needs through data-based rendering of virtual worlds. However, the metaverse not only represents the conquest of the embodied physical world but also reproduces expansionist and colonialist tropes of (virtual) land grab, subjection of the world to human will, and exploitation of (digital) resources. In this way, visions for the metaverse enable seemingly guilt-free reenactment of the behaviours and attitudes that have led to great injustices in the past and in the present.

The ethical inadequacy of uninformed surrogate consent: advancing respect for persons in clinical research.

In clinical research, decision-making capacity is often equated with unspecified conceptions of autonomy, and autonomy is often equated with personhood. On this view, the loss of decision-making capacity is seen as a loss of autonomy, and the loss of autonomy subsumes a loss of personhood. An ethical concern arises at the intersection of those philosophical considerations with the legal considerations in informed consent. Because persons with inadequate decision-making capacity cannot provide legally effective consent, enrollment in research can occur only if a surrogate gives permission on the person's behalf. Federal regulations and resulting institutional policies allow permission from surrogates empowered under state law to consent to medical treatment procedures, typically in a hierarchy of legislatively prioritized relationships lacking regard for what the surrogate actually knows about the current research-related values and preferences of the potential subject. As a result, the research enterprise often countenances reliance on surrogates who have no relational or informational basis for an enrollment decision that aligns with the values and preferences of the subject. Arguing from the perspective that losing decision-making capacity does not alter the moral status of persons, and that respect for persons rather than respect for autonomy is the central ethical obligation, I assess the ethical implications of allowing persons with no knowledge of the values and preferences of the potential subject to make enrollment decisions, concluding that reliance on uninformed surrogates is not an ethically defensible approach to enrolling subjects in clinical research.

Could a robot feel pain?

AbstractQuestions about robots feeling pain are important because the experience of pain implies sentience and the ability to suffer. Pain is not the same as nociception, a reflex response to an aversive stimulus. The experience of pain in others has to be inferred. Danaher’s (Sci Eng Ethics 26(4):2023–2049, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-019-00119-x) ‘ethical behaviourist’ account claims that if a robot behaves in the same way as an animal that is recognised to have moral status, then its moral status should also be assumed. Similarly, under a precautionary approach (Sebo in Harvard Rev Philos 25:51–70, 2018. https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20185913), entities from foetuses to plants and robots are given the benefit of the doubt and assumed to be sentient. However, there is a growing consensus about the scientific criteria used to indicate pain and the ability to suffer in animals (Birch in Anim Sentience, 2017. https://doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1200; Sneddon et al. in Anim Behav 97:201–212, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.09.007). These include the presence of a central nervous system, changed behaviour in response to pain, and the effects of analgesic pain relief. Few of these criteria are met by robots, and there are risks to assuming that they are sentient and capable of suffering pain. Since robots lack nervous systems and living bodies there is little reason to believe that future robots capable of feeling pain could (or should) be developed.

Artificial Intelligence, Discrimination, Fairness, and Other Moral Concerns

Should the input data of artificial intelligence (AI) systems include factors such as race or sex when these factors may be indicative of morally significant facts? More importantly, is it wrong to rely on the output of AI tools whose input includes factors such as race or sex? And is it wrong to rely on the output of AI systems when it is correlated with factors such as race or sex (whether or not its input includes such factors)? The answers to these questions are controversial. In this paper, I argue for the following claims. First, since factors such as race or sex are not morally significant in themselves, including such factors in the input data, or relying on output that includes such factors or is correlated with them, is neither objectionable (for example, unfair) nor commendable in itself. Second, sometimes (but not always) there are derivative reasons against such actions due to the relationship between factors such as race or sex and facts that are morally significant (ultimately) in themselves. Finally, even if there are such derivative reasons, they are not necessarily decisive since there are sometimes also countervailing reasons. Accordingly, the moral status of the above actions is contingent.

Intergenerational Domination

AbstractThe political and ethical status of future generations is commonly discussed within conceptual frameworks like intergenerational justice, rights, or welfare. In this article, I argue that the concept of domination can provide a novel perspective on the philosophy of intergenerational relations. To that end, I first advance and defend a (slightly) revised conception of domination, drawing on Philip Pettit’s neorepublican view. Second, I establish a prima facie case for the existence of intergenerational domination and address four major objections to the claim that the present generation dominates future generations: the non-concurrency challenge, a modified version of the non-identity problem, the inescapability objection, and the problem of historical domination. Finally, I explore some implications and conceptual advantages of the framework of intergenerational domination. As a theoretical foundation of a comprehensive analysis of structures of domination, the proposed framework may contribute to identifying and reducing domination within and across generations.

Is It Fair to Kill One to Save Five? How Just World Beliefs Shape Sacrificial Moral Decision-making.

Sacrificing a target to save a group violates deontological ethics against harm but upholds utilitarian ethics to maximize outcomes. Although theorists examine many factors that influence dilemma decisions, we examined justice concerns: We manipulated the moral character of sacrificial targets, then measured participants' dilemma responses and just world beliefs. Across four studies (N=1116), participants considering guilty versus innocent targets scored lower on harm-rejection (deontological) responding, but not outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) responding assessed via process dissociation. Just world beliefs (both personal and general) predicted lower utilitarian and somewhat lower deontological responding, but these effects disappeared when accounting for shared variance with psychopathy. Results suggest that dilemma decisions partly reflect the moral status of sacrificial targets and concerns about the fairness implications of sacrificing innocent targets to save innocent groups.

Rousseau and Kant on the Moral Value of Compassion

Abstract Despite Rousseau’s acknowledged influence on Kant, the moral value of compassion (or pity) is regarded as a major difference between their theories of morality. Pity plays a fundamental role in Rousseau’s theory of moral relations, whereas Kant appears suspicious of compassion. I argue that Kant nevertheless accords compassion a significant moral value, not only because it provides an appropriate supplementary incentive when the incentive of duty is not sufficient to motivate action but also because of the role it plays in attuning individuals to the moral status of others. Rousseau’s account of pity in Emile helps to explain how compassion can play this role.

Intuition and Kagan's Hierarchicalism

Abstract According to Shelly Kagan, the moral status of an individual is determined by the extent to which the individual has (has now, might/will have, or could have had) certain psychological capacities. Roughly speaking, the greater one's relevant psychological capacities, the higher their moral status. In this paper, I offer a twofold critique of Kagan's hierarchicalism. On the one hand, I argue against the primary argument in favor of Kagan's view (the argument from distribution) by challenging the key intuition on which the argument relies, thereby reducing the appeal of Kagan's position. On the other hand, using Kagan's general methodology, I argue that a good reason to reject Kagan's account of moral status is that he fails to explain away the counterintuitive result of his theory in the case of normal variation.

Ethical constraints and dilemmas in the provision of in-vitro fertilization treatment in Ghana: from the perspectives of experts

BackgroundInfertility presents both medical and public health challenges, with in vitro fertilization (IVF) emerging as a prominent solution, particularly when other alternatives are exhausted. However, IVF treatment raises significant ethical questions that have been under explored in the Ghanaian context. This study aimed to explore ethical constraints and dilemmas in the provision of in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment in Ghana.MethodsA descriptive phenomenological qualitative design was employed. Purposive sampling techniques were used to recruit 12 participants including ART experts from three in vitro fertilization (IVF) centres, ethicists and a legal practitioner. In-depth face-to-face interviews guided by an open-ended interview guide were conducted. Thematic analysis of the interviews was performed to identify major themes.ResultsProviding IVF treatment in Ghana raises several ethical issues, including inequitable access due to high costs and limited availability, which favour wealthier individuals and leave marginalized populations with fewer options. There are significant ethical considerations in balancing the potential benefits of successful IVF treatment outcomes against the health risks and emotional tolls on patients. Decisions about the fate of surplus embryos present moral dilemmas, including whether to preserve, donate, or discard them. Differing personal beliefs about the moral status of the embryo further complicate the ethical landscape. Ensuring informed consent is challenging due to the complex medical, ethical, and emotional implications of IVF treatment, potentially leading to compromised consent. Additionally, there are ongoing risks of breaches in confidentiality, given the sensitive nature of reproductive health data and the importance of protecting patient privacy.ConclusionThis study revealed that several ethical dilemmas confront both healthcare providers and couples in the process of IVF. There is an urgent need for the development of clear and uniform regulations to govern the practice of IVF treatment in Ghana, with further attention given to mitigating financial barriers and enhancing support systems for couples considering IVF treatment.

Ethical considerations of using artificial intelligence (AI) in recruitment processes

The use of artificial intelligence technology in recruitment and selection procedures has become commonplace in business practice. As a result, there has been a significant increase in research on AI recruitment in recent years. However, these studies focus primarily on the considerations of skills and the effectiveness of AI tools. Only recently have analyses emerged presenting these procedures from an ethical perspective. The purpose of the article is to fill this gap and explore the opinions of both HR professionals and employees themselves regarding the use of artificial intelligence-based recruitment solutions. The article contains a systematic review of the literature and the results of a qualitative pilot study. The interview study was conducted in one organisation with the participation of four managers. Widely accepted assumptions about the objectivity of learning algorithms contribute to a seemingly positive image of AI-powered recruitment among practitioners, but the research conducted showed a number of ethical concerns raised by managers regarding AI recruitment requirements. The contrast between this positive image and the ethical concerns raised by critics of AI recruitment requires an assessment necessary to gain a more scientifically grounded perspective on the ethical status of AI recruitment.

Artificial agents: responsibility & control gaps

ABSTRACT Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present moral risks, often leading to harm or ethical violations. We propose a second-order ‘duty of moral control’ that mandates closing these gaps to reduce risks within acceptable moral limits. Our analysis encompasses both autonomous machines and collective agents, acknowledging their similarities and key differences in constitution and moral status. We suggest four methods to close control gaps: ensuring artificial agents attain moral agency, providing meaningful human control, implementing safety engineering, and employing social control. These methods aim to responsibly integrate artificial agents into society. We conclude that a realistic approach, which addresses the practical problems posed by control gaps, is essential. This approach provides solutions to manage the risks posed by artificial agents while maintaining acceptable moral standards, ensuring we responsibly harness their potential and address the ethical challenges they present.

Responsibility Gaps

AbstractResponsibility gaps arise when there is a mismatch between the amount of responsibility that can be attributed to any person or collection of persons on leading accounts of moral responsibility and the amount that robust intuitions suggest should be allocated to someone in a case. Claimed responsibility gaps arise in numerous philosophical debates, including those concerning government, corporate, and other forms of group agency and new technologies and those concerning theoretical issues in the philosophy of responsibility. This work is an opinionated introduction to and overview of recent work on responsibility gaps. It outlines and evaluates paradigmatic responsibility gap cases and ways of understanding the phenomenon as well as the existence conditions and moral status of and possible responses to responsibility gaps. It thereby contributes to ongoing work in the philosophy of responsibility and several applied domains.

Apply the Laws, if They are Good: Moral Evaluations Linearly Predict Whether Judges Should Enforce the Law.

What should judges do when faced with immoral laws? Should they apply them without exception, since "the law is the law?" Or can exceptions be made for grossly immoral laws, such as historically, Nazi law? Surveying laypeople (N = 167) and people with some legal training (N = 141) on these matters, we find a surprisingly strong, monotonic relationship between people's subjective moral evaluation of laws and their judgments that these laws should be applied in concrete cases. This tendency is most pronounced among individuals who endorse natural law (i.e., the legal-philosophical view that immoral laws are not valid laws at all), and is attenuated when disagreement about the moral status of a law is considered reasonable. The relationship is equally strong for laypeople and for those with legal training. We situate our findings within the broader context of morality's influence on legal reasoning that experimental jurisprudence has uncovered in recent years, and consider normative implications.

Introduction. Our relationships with GenAI and the media: Testing the limits of transparency, trust and moral agency

We present the last part of this special issue on Use of Artificial Intelligence in Communication: Ethical Implications for Media. This editorial examines the role that humans should play in the responsible use of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) in the media. It provides an overview of transparency as an ethical obligation in relation to trust and truthfulness when using GenAI to create different kinds of content. Finally, it enters into the debate about the moral status of machines as we anticipate ethical questions in the study of ethics and GenAI in the media. Six articles complete this special issue with studies examining implications of GenAI for semiotics research, public relations, advertising, fact checking, information literacy and journalism education.

Ethical considerations on the moral status of the embryo and embryo-like structures†.

The current article provides an ethical reflection on the moral status of the human embryo, which is a crucial factor in determining permissible actions involving embryos and the extent of their protection. It advocates for the extension of the research period for embryos to 28-days post fertilization. It also states that integrated embryo-like structures (ELSs) should not currently be given the same moral status as natural embryos. However, if they pass the relevant tests, they should be subject to the same rules as natural embryos.

Cultured Meat as a Transitional Step Towards Interspecies Justice?

Abstract For some, cultured animal products ought to be celebrated for the potential they offer to replace factory farming. Others argue that, for the same reason, there is a duty to support their production and consumption. This paper argues that the ethical status of cultured animal products ought to be assessed not just in comparison with factory farming, but also in terms of its potential to bring about interspecies justice. The claim is made that the attitudes embodied within cultured animal products show a lack of proper respect for nonhuman animals and are at odds with those required by justice. Although cultured animal products have the potential to greatly reduce harms done to nonhuman animals, this paper argues that their adoption ought to nevertheless be regarded with some regret. Using a Rawlsian framework for assessing transitional steps towards justice, the paper shows that, whilst the adoption of cultured animal products may be permissible, the case for regarding it as a duty is much weaker. For cultured meats to be permissible, it must first be shown that alternatives that respect the value of nonhuman animals as ends-in-themselves do not exist.

Regulating advanced biomedical technologies: A modern criminal law perspective

This study explores the urgent need for criminal law to address the advancements in biomedical technologies, particularly focusing on cloning. It highlights the dichotomy between the potential therapeutic benefits of cloning technologies, such as combating hereditary diseases, and their possible misuse. The paper discusses international legal frameworks and declarations, such as the United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning and the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which seek to navigate the ethical and legal challenges of cloning. The distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning is emphasized, with therapeutic cloning offering significant medical advancements raising profound ethical concerns, particularly regarding the moral status of the embryo. The paper critiques the current legislative landscape in the Republic of Armenia, which it finds insufficient in addressing the complexities introduced by these technologies, suggesting a need for comprehensive legal reform to safeguard human dignity and genetic integrity within the context of modern medicine.

Three Injustices of Adaptation Finance - A Relational Egalitarian Analysis

This primarily diagnostic paper offers, from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, a normative analysis of three major injustices in the context of adaptation finance. Adaptation finance includes payments provided by the affluent countries of the Global North to low-income countries in the Global South, countries particularly exposed to the harms of climate change. Relational egalitarianism is the normative view that interactions between people and between institutions have to respect the equal moral status of every human being. The first injustice, from this perspective, consists in the sheer fact that adaptation measures are required at all to deflect harm from people who did not significantly contribute to the causes of climate change. The second injustice consists in the persisting, even increasing adaptation finance gap, as countries of the Global North do neither provide adequate financial means to reduce climate risks, nor even fulfil their commitments to adaptation finance pledged in the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. The third injustice emerges from current procedures to determine criteria for distributing scarce financial resources that consolidate structural injustice. The paper concludes by providing the contours of a practical response to these injustices that respects the demands of relational egalitarianism.

Clinicians’ criteria for fetal moral status: viability and relationality, not sentience

The antiabortion movement is increasingly using ostensibly scientific measurements such as ‘fetal heartbeat’ and ‘fetal pain’ to provide ‘objective’ evidence of the moral status of fetuses. However, there is little...

The Silence of God and the Witness of the Christian Soldier through Kenosis

The moral status of soldiers as agent-instruments of polities has been long debated among Christians. Recognizing soldiers’ moral vulnerability, Stanley Hauerwas has argued for a pastoral rather than a missiological shape of what Oliver O’Donovan has called evangelical counter-praxis through a Christian’s participation in war. To reframe the complications of this dilemma, this essay argues that the Christian soldier has the potential to actively witness the love of Jesus Christ through a kenotic repudiation of one’s unwillingness to kill. Through an interpretation of Shusaku Endo’s novel Silence, a correspondence between the Christian soldier and the apostate-cum-martyr Fr. Rodrigues is arguable through an act of paradoxical faith in Jesus, where killing the enemy becomes an imitation of his self-emptying on the cross for the sake of others. Christian soldiers may find self-understanding, healing, and forgiveness by naming their acts truthfully with the intention to move through confession to gratitude and a deeper love for God and neighbor.